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MARIE-PIERRE GRANGER* 
The Preamble(s) of the French Constitution: 
Content, Status, Uses and Amendment 
Abstract . This article ana lyses the way of the French Constitutional Counc i l , starting with its famous Association 
decision in 1971, t ransformed a brief reference to historical declarat ions of rights in the thin Preamble of the 
current French constitution (adopted in 1958) into a wide-ranging j u d g e - m a d e catalogue of fundamental rights. 
This, combined with two impor tan t reforms o f the procedure for submiss ions of statutes to the Constitutional 
Counci l for review (in 1974 a n d 2008), are gradual ly establishing the Consti tutional Counci l as an important actor 
in the legislative process a n d a central body for the protection of h u m a n rights in France. The article also briefly 
explores the scope and l imits o f this protection. It then discusses recent proposals for amend ing the Preamble. It 
analyses the only amendmen t so far, namely the inclusion of a r e fe rence to the Char ter fo r the Environment , 
which a imed at providing a constitutional basis f o r the protection o f environment , as well as other controversial 
suggest ions, such as those a i m i n g at enabling pos i t ive discrimination measures towards minorit ies, the guarantee 
of media pluralism, the p ro tec t ion of privacy and personal data and the respect of human dignity. It concludes on 
the use and misuses of compara t i ve law for const i tut ional reforms. 
Keywords: constitutional r e f o r m , constitutional preamble , constitutional review, protection of fundamental rights, 
compara t ive law 
1. Introductory remarks: the 1958 "Political" Constitution, 
its "Amputated" Constitutional Judge and its "Insignificant" Preamble 
As is well-known, France has had a tormented constitutional history, going through many 
different political regimes, and no less than fifteen constitutions since the French Revolution 
in 1789. This is to say that 
the French should know about constitutions! One can differ as to whether the history 
of France should be considered a fruitful garden of constitutional thought, a graveyard 
of constitutional experiments, a "musée des constitutions", or a minefield; in any 
case it is beyond doubt that the French are rather experienced in constitutions and 
constitutional changes.1 
The current constitution, which provides for the basic rules for France's Fifth Republic, 
was adopted in 1958. It is the longest lasting French constitution after the constitutional 
laws of the Third Republic (1875). It has been amended twenty-four times. 
As to the significance of the Constitution in French political life, it is important to 
recall that prior to 1958, the system was centered on the loi which was, in the words of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the expression of the "volonté générale" (general will).2 As such, it 
* Associate Professor, Central European University (Budapest), Department of Public Policy, 
H-1051 Budapest, Nádor u. 9. 
E-mail: Grangerm@ceu.hu 
1
 van Nifterik, G.: French Constitutional Flistory, Garden or Graveyard? European Constitutional 
Law Review (EuConst), 3 (2007) 3, 476. 
2
 See also Art. 6 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man. 
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was sovereign and should not be subject to judicial control. This reluctance to submit 
statutes to any kind of judicial oversight was also reminiscent of the long-standing distrust 
of the French political class and society towards judges, dating back to the Ancien Régime, 
where judges (parlements) had been mostly concerned about maintaining privileges. 
Consequently, the Constitution was essentially a symbolic document, and was endowed 
with no serious enforcement mechanism. The 1946 Constitution (Art. 91) did provide for a 
Comité Constitutionnel to check whether the adoption of legislation required the revision of 
the Constitution. The procedure was nonetheless difficult to engage and remained unused. 
The 1958 Constituant deviated slightly from this tradition, by setting up a body, the 
Conseil Constitutionnel, whose task was to check the conformity of legislative proposals 
and bills with the Constitution. This control was nonetheless minimalist; it provided only 
for concentrated, abstract and a priori constitutional review. Once in force, a statute could 
no longer be contested, even where it had not been subject to prior "constitutional clearance" 
or where its incompatibility with constitutional rules only unfolded through its application. 
Moreover, the control was political.3 First, it was essentially aimed at limiting parliamentary 
influence over executive affairs and at preventing governmental instability of the kind which 
destabilised the Third and Fourth Republics.4 Basically, the Constitutional Council was 
meant to be the "guard dog of the executive".5 Second, only a restricted number of political 
personalities could refer legislation to the Constitutionnal Council for review. These were 
the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister or the President of one of the two 
parliamentary chambers (Assemblée Nationale and Senat). Where all belong to the some 
political party, the likelihood of referral would be almost non-existent. Third, the membership 
of the Conseil Constitutionnel was political too, with no legal competences required from 
its members, and a nomination process controled by political personalities (three members 
nominated by the President of the Republic, three by the President of the National Assembly 
3
 Stone, A.: The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative 
Perspective. Oxford, 1992. 
4
 It was part of a general attempt to "rationalise" parliamentarism. Art. 34 of the Constitution 
fixed the domain of intervention of the legislator; the rest was taken as falling under the competence 
of the executive (Art. 37 of the Constitution). The Constitutional Council was essentially set up to 
make sure that the Parliament remained within the limits set by the Constitution and did no endeavor 
to "govern", as it did in the previous regimes. The Council did not have the competence to review acts 
of the governments which interfered with legislative power. It was thus a one-way street, although the 
Conseil d'Etat, the highest administrative court, could check that decrees and regulations complied 
with laws and did not interfere with legislative competences. There were two ways to involve the 
Council in the control of legislation. The Council could be seized during legislative discussions by the 
Prime Minister (Art. 41 of the Constitution, not much used) where some provisions of envisaged 
legislation did not belong to the legislative field of competence. Since 2008, the President of each 
chamber can also raise such issue (Constitutional law No 2008-624 DC on the Modernisation of the 
Institutions of the Fifth Republic). A second situation calling for referral concerns legislative projects, 
which contain provisions related to the regulatory field (Art. 37.2 of the Constitution). The main mode 
of referral of proposed legislation to the Constitutional Council is provided by Art. 61 of the 
Constitution, and takes place after the law has been adopted in parliament, but before it comes into 
force, and may concern any provision of the Constitution. 
5
 Vie Publique (2010) "Les Origines du Conseil Constitutionnel", available at http://www.vie-
p u b l i q u e . f r / d e c o u v e r t e - i n s t i t u t i o n s / i n s t i t u t i o n s / a p p r o f o n d i s s e m e n t s / o r i g i n e s - d u - c o n s e i l -
constitutionnel.html 
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and three by the President of the Senate), and former Presidents of the Republic were ex 
officio life members.6 
Let us now turn to the aspect of this Constitution which concerns us here: its preamble. 
The preambles of past French constitutions not only offered an exposition of the motives or 
"proclamation" (1814, 1815, or 1852); the vast majority of them also included fully fledged 
bills of rights (1791, 1793, 1795, 1848, and 1946).7 Indeed, traditionally, French constituants 
did not provide for self-standing Charters of Rights; neither did they integrate Bills of 
Rights into the core of the Constitution. The French custom was to place the Declaration of 
Rights in the preamble. This positioning seemed to indicate that these Declarations of 
Rights were meant to have purely symbolic value; something which in any case was not 
such a big deal, since the Constitution itself, for lack of constitutional review system, also 
remained purely aspirational. 
At first sight, the 1958 Preamble, does not impress. Nothing like the "We the People of 
the United States..." which opens the American Constitution. It only consists of two 
sentences.8 The last sentence oddly refers to the right to self-determination of overseas 
peoples, whilst the first sentence briefly states that "the French people solemnly proclaim 
their attachement to the rights of the Man and principles of national sovereignty as defined 
in the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and complemented by the Preamble of the Constitution 
of 1946".9 However, although in formal terms it stops there, most commentators would 
agree that, in substantive terms, the Preamble also encompasses what is now Art. 1 w h i c h 
provides that "France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic; ... 
ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or 
religion, [and],..respect all beliefs." The rest of the Constitution, at least in its original 
configuration, dealt with the various organs of the state and their relationships. Thus, the 
only mention of fundamental human rights in the French 1958 constitutional settlement was 
in the Preamble, which bearing in mind constitutional tradition, did not augure well for the 
the protection of such rights. However, the apparent modesty of the 1958 Preamble will 
tum out to be its greatest strength, as it offered a discrete, yet potentially limitless, short-cut 
to human rights resources. 
2. The 1971 Freedom of Association Decision, the Rights Revolution 
and the Russian Dolls Preamble 
From 1958 until the 1970s, France's Constitution was a "Separation of Power-Constitution" 
but not a "Charter of Rights and Liberties-Constitution'"1 or, to use the typology developpcd 
6
 Art. 56 of the Constitution. 
7
 Only the rapidly adopted constitutional laws of 1875, which founded the Third Republic, had 
no preamble. Note, in passing, that it did not prevent it from lasting 70 years...! 
8
 It is one of the shortest Preambles in the world of constitutions. Orgad, L.: The Preamble in 
Constitutional Interpretation. International Journal of Constitutional Law, I-CON (forthcoming), 
8 (2010) 5, footnote 15. 
9
 Since the constitutional revision of 2005 (Constitutional Law No 2005-205 of 1 March 2005 
relating to the Charter for the Environment), it also makes reference to the rights and duties as defined 
in the Charter for the Environment of 2004. 
10
 Part of what is now Art. 1 used to be Art. 2, until the Constitutional Law No 95-880 of 
4 August 1995. 
11
 Veil, S.: Redécouvrir le Préambule de la Constitution-Rapport du comité présidé par Simone 
Veil. La Documentation Française. 2008, 7. 
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by Dean Maurice Hauriou, France was endowed with a political constitution, but no 
apparent social constitution (save for a frail embryo in the 1958 Constitution Preamble). 
The "rights' revolution"12 took place in 1971, when the Constitutional Council turned 
the "insignificant" 1958 Preamble into Russian dolls, revealing almost limitelcss 
constitutional resources. 
Perhaps because they had introduced some kind of constitutional control, the drafters 
of the 1946 Constitution had explicitly forbidden the weak ancestor of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel, the Comité Constitutionnel, from assessing the compatibility of laws with 
the Constitution's ambitious and progressive Preamble.13 However, as the 1958 Preamble 
was so "low-key", the drafters of the Fifth Republic's Constitution probably thought it 
unnecessary to take similar precaution and did not make any explicit provision as to its 
legal value, or rather lack thereof. The Conseil Constitutionnel thus did not face formal 
constitutional obstacle to upgrading the Preamble into a constitutional norm. However, that 
would mean flexing its muscles, as constitutional traditions in France and abroad suggested 
tha constitutional preambles were meant to be essentially for symbolic, or at beast, 
interpretative purposes, and not to serve a independent sources of rights.14 It would also 
have to deploy a fair amount of legal ingenuity to transform the ugly little duck-preamble 
into a beautiful swam. The Freedom of Association case provided the right opportunity for 
such delicate operation.15 
In the follow-up to May 1968, the Interior Minister started a policy of limitations of 
individual freedoms (right to demonstrate, right to free movement, the freedom of the press, 
the freedom of assembly, and eventually freedom of association). Based on a ministerial 
instruction, a prefect (a representative of the state at local level) refused to the founding 
members of the "Association des Amis de la Cause du Peuple", the receipt for the 
declaration of this association, without which it could not operate. The administrative court 
annuled the prefect's refusal. The Minister, who realised that its position was in breach of 
the law, simply decided to have the law changed. In June 1971, the National Assembly 
adopted, despite the opposition of the Senate, a legislative proposal which enabled a prefect 
to delay his/her issuance of an authorisation until judicial authorities had reviewed the 
lawfulness of an association. The President of the Senate referred the law to the 
Constitutional Council. 
The judges of the Rue de Montpensier16 engaged into what I like to call Russian Dolls 
reasoning. First, the Constitutional Council declared that the 1958 Preamble was an integral 
part of the Constitution. In doing to, it integrated the Preamble into the "bloc de 
constitutionnalité", that is the collection of constitutional norms against which statutes can 
12
 This expression is also used in the French context by Lasser (2009); however, he uses it in 
relation to the way the "contrôle de conventionalité", whereby national courts checked the 
compatibility of national legislation with international agreements, especially the European Convention 
on Human Rights, enabled national courts to limit legislative infringements of human rights, in a 
manner which was not allowed by constitutional review (at least until the 2008 reform). 
13
 Art. 92 of the 1946 Constitution. 
14
 Orgad: op. cit. 
15
 Decision No 71-44-DC Freedom of Association of 16 July 1971. 
16
 Address of the Constitutional Council. 
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be reviewed (analogy with the "bloc de légalité")}1 Second, the Constitutional Council 
explained that the 1958 Preamble proclaimed the "attachement" of the French people to 
human rights as expressed in the 1789 Declaration, and confirmed in the 1946 Preamble. 
From these, it concluded that these two documents also had constitutional value. In doing 
so, it basically granted the 1946 Preamble a status which the 1946 Constituant had refused 
it.18 Third, it noted that the 1946 Preamble itself referred to the fundamental principles 
recognised in the laws of the Republic. Since the famous "Loi 1901" (an ordinary law), 
which was such a "republican" law, had granted protection to the freedom of association, 
such freedom therefore should also have constitutional status. 
To sum up, by granting constitutional value to the 1958 Preamble, the Constitutional 
Council also gave the texts to which the 1958 Preamble made reference, namely the 1789 
Declaration and the 1946 Preamble, similar superior status. By the same token, it conferred 
on all the rights and principles to which these two constitutional documents referred, or 
which could be derived from them, the nature of supreme law. The Preamble thus operated 
like Russian dolls, with new constitutional rules and principles to be derived from past 
constitutional documents, themselves found in the current Preamble. 
3. Moving towards comprehensive constitutional review: 
the 1974 and 2008 revisions 
The Freedom of Association decision was welcome in legal circles and by the public alike. 
It became such a "popular" issue, that V. Giscard d'Estaing, during his presidential 
campaign, made the promise that he would extent the right to refer laws to the Constitutional 
Council to a wider range of personalities. When he became President of the Republic in 
1974, he obtained a revision of the Constitution which granted the right to submit proposed 
legislation to the Council to sixty députées and senators.19 This reform marked a second 
turning point for the protection of fundamental rights through constitutional review im 
France. 
This reform basically enabled the parliamentary Opposition to use constitutional 
review systematically to obtain the partial or full invalidation of bills, or threatening to use 
it, to secure amendments in planned legislation. The new perspective of negotiating in the 
shadow of constitutional review thus changed the legislative game. It also enabled the 
Constitutional Council to play a greater role in the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedom, and to flesh up the Constitution, and more particularly, its Preamble, at least in 
abstracto. 
The reform nonetheless maintained the French constitutional review system within a 
pure Kelsenian tradition, focused on a procedural and theoretical aspects. Further expension 
of the right to apply to the Constitutional Council where thus halted for quite a while, 
although academics and politicians regularly called for a more comprehensive review 
system, to enable constitutional compatibility checks after a statute had come into force (for 
17
 In fact, this decision was only the logical result of a less-known decision adopted in the 
previous year, which had already established the legal value of the preamble, although in relation to 
the conformity of a treaty (and not a statute) to the Constitution (Decision No 70-39 DC European 
Community Budget of 19 June 1970). 
18
 Orgad: op. cit. 13. 
19
 Constitutional Law No 74-904 of 29 October 1974 on the revision of Art. 61 of the 
Constitution. 
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example, 1990 Badinter proposal, 1993 Vedel Committee report). These nonetheless 
remained lettre morte, due to the Senate's opposition. The idea eventually returned on the 
political agenda, when President Sarkozy, in its Epinal speech of 12 July 2007, raised the 
question, and entrusted a Committee of Reflection on modernisation of the institutions of 
the Fifth Republic, chaired by Edouard balladur, to examine possible reforms. The work of 
the Committee led to the important 2008 constitutional revision, which amended many 
constitutional rules.20 For our purpose, we should mention that the amendments created a 
new institution, the Defensor of Rights, a sort of Ombudman, whose task will be to make 
sure that administrations and public bodies respect citizens' rights (New Title XIA). The 
constitutional revision also introduced a long-awaited a posteriori and concrete constitutional 
control mechanism, by means of exception, through the Priority Preliminary Ruling on the 
Issue of Constitutionality (in French, Question Prioritaire de Constitutionalité or QPC). 
This reform should enable the Preamble to develop its full social potential and the 
Constitutional Council to finally become a real guardian of fundamental rights and liberties. 
Indeed, the new Art. 61-1 of the Constitution provides that "if, during proceedings in 
progress before a court of law, it is claimed that a statutory provision infringes the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the matter may be referred by the Conseil 
d'Etat or by the Cour de Cassation to the Constitutional Council, within a determined 
period." The organic law, which determines the conditions of application of the new 
mechanism, specifies that the question must be relevant to the dispute and serious, and that 
the legislative provision should not have been already declared as complying with the 
Constitution by the Constitutional Council.21 
What this new constitutional review mechanism will actually bring remains to be seen. 
Some believe it comes too late to transfer the Constitutional Council as the choice defensor 
of human rights, for such role has already been taken up, for quite a while, by the European 
Court of Human Rights,22 or even the European Court for Justice.23 But one can also be 
more optimistic. The road to Strasbourg is a long one, and the QPC, if the Cour de Cassation 
and the Conseil d'Etat play the game, and refer all questions which fulfill the conditions, 
offers a short-cut to Paris.24 If the judges take care of at least aligning their standards of 
protection with the Strasbourg judges, any rational being would opt for the QPC. Truly 
20
 Constitutional law No 2008-624 DC on the Modernisation of the Institutions of the Fifth 
Republic. 
21
 Organic law No 2009-1523 du 10 December 2009 related to the application of Art. 61-1 of 
the Constitution. 
22
 Chantebout, В.: Droit Constitutionnel Paris, 2009, 578; M. de Lasser, S. О.: Judicial 
Transformations: the Rights Revolution in the Courts of Europe. Oxford, 2009. 
23
 In that regard, it is interesting to note that the Cour de Cassation recently sent a reference for 
a preliminary ruling challenging the compatibility of the QPC with the principle of supremacy of EU 
law; however, the ECJ considered it compatible with EU law, taking into account the Conseil d'Etat 
and Conseil Constitutionnel's explanations of the operation of the procedure, as not interfering with 
courts' ability to interpret national law in conformity with EU law and to set aside national measures 
incompatible with EU law. C-188/10 and C-189/10 Aziz Melki and Selim Abdeli [2010], nyr. 
24
 Recently, the Conseil D Etat refused to refer a QPC concerning the constitutionality of 
measures relating to the dissolution of sport associations to the Constitutional Council, arguing that 
the question was not new and serious. The parties are planning to take the case to the European Court 
of Human Rights. CE, 2ème et 7ème SSR. 8 October 2010, Groupement de fait Brigade Sud de Nice 
et M. Zamalo (No 340849). 
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enough, it is problematic that legislative provisions which have already been given a priori 
abstract clearance cannot be challenged through the QPC, even if their application revealed 
unforeseeable constitutional flaws; these renders many of the legislative provisions adopted 
since 1974 "untouchables". Yet, the reform should still help to clear up the French legal 
order from legislative provisions which, either for lack of jurisdiction, negligence, or 
political calculation, have remain "unchecked". 
The procedure was used for the first time in May 2010. After five months of actual 
operation, the pace of examination of legislative provisions by the Council under the QPC 
is accelerating, with around twenty decisions per month over the last two months. This 
should be contrasted with the one or two decisions a month delivered under the previous 
system. More significantly, from all the provisions referred under the QPCs, the Council 
found that one-third were in either a total or partial violation of the Constitution, or that 
they were only compatible if interpreted and applied according to its instructions.25 Finally, 
and unsurprisingly, QPCs basically concern the compatibility of statutes with rights and 
principles protected on the basis of the Preamble. With that in mind, the new review 
procedure should contribute to the Preamble establishing itself as the central pillar of 
constitutional review in France. 
4. The "rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution": 
a "judge-made" catalogue based on the France's constitutional tradition 
Let us now turn to the question of which rights and liberties are hidding in our Russian 
Dolls Preamble, which contain constitutional texts drafted over a range of more than two 
hundred years, for different regimes, with different, and perhaps even conflicting, ideologies 
in mind? How do these fit, and interact, with one another to build a protective web for 
peoples' rights. 
The information page of the Conseil Constitutionnel specifies that "the rights and 
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution" which statutes must respect are the ones mentionned 
in the 1958 Constitution (as amended), the text to which the 1958 Constitution refers, 
namely the 1789 Declaration, the 1946 Preamble, the fundamental principles recognised by 
the laws of the Republic (referred to in the 1946 Preamble) and, since 2005, the Charter for 
the Environment. However, in reality, there is more than that, since from these sources, the 
Constitutional Council derived a number of further constitutional principles and 
objectives.26 
The 1789 Declaration of Rights was strongly inspired by the Enlightment philosophy. 
Drafted by the Marquis de Lafayette, it was destined to become the basis for a constitution 
for France. It was based on the notion of natural rights, the concept of social contract (Locke 
and Rousseau) and Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers. It is thus a text with a 
strong liberal and individualist orientation, focused on what we now refer to as "first 
25
 Over the fifty or so decisions made so far under the QPC, about 20% found a total or partial 
non-conformity (about half with temporal limitations of their effects), and another 10% of the 
decisions declared compatibility with reserve of interpretation. 
26
 "Qu'entend-on par 'droits et libertés que la Constitution garantit'?", under Question Prioritaire 
de Constitutionnalité, at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/ 
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generation" rights.27 It recognises civil rights, or the "rights of a man as a person",28 such as 
the principles of equality (Art. 1), liberty (Arts 1 and 4), including the right to safety and 
civil resistance (Art. 2), legality and legal certainty (Arts 7-8), the presumption of innocence 
(Art. 8), the freedom of opinions and thoughts (Art. 10), the freedom of expression (Art. 
11), and the right to property (Arts 2 and 17). It also recognises political rights, or the 
"rights of the man in relation to the Nation", such as the right to participate directly or 
indirectly in the elaboration of the law (Art. 6), equal access to public positions (Art. 6), the 
unity of national sovereignty (Art. 3), the principle of agreement to taxation and its equal 
sharing (Art. 14), the existence o f f o r c e publique (Art. 12), the control and accountability of 
the administration (Art. 15), and legal guarantees (Art. 16). 
The Declaration has been a wonderful source of inspiration for the recognition and 
protection of civil and political rights, since the Constitutional Council has granted 
constitutional value to every rights it contains.29 However, its anachronism sometimes poses 
problematic restrictions on constitutional jurisprudence. Notably, the formal equality notion 
on which it is based prevents positive discrimination measures in France.30 The only way 
out is to amend the Constitution itself, to provide for a "concurrent" constitutional basis for 
affirmative action. Art. 1 of the Constitution was thus amended on in 1999, to include that 
"statutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and posts".31 It 
served as a basis to the 2000 statute on equal access of women and men to electoral mandate 
and elective functions,32 which the Council eventually validated.33 However, the narrow 
focus of the constitutional amendment excluded positive measures beyond the political 
world. In 2008, the Constitution was thus amended again to enable legislative promotion of 
equal access between men and women to "positions of professional and social responsibility" 
(new Art. I ).34 Yet, to the extent that the successive constitutional amendments only focus 
on sex discrimination in certain fields, the formal equality principle of the Declaration still 
blocks the way to other types of positive discrimination measures, towards ethnic minorities 
for example. It is seen as effectively blocking the way to any "communautarist" legislation. 
Art. 1 also prohibits statistical information on ethnicity or race, despite the strong support 
27
 Note in passing that it only granted rights to men and male citizens, and not to women 
(despite Condorcet's support to the inclusion of women). It prompted Olympe de Gouges to publish a 
concurrent Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen in September 1791. Women 
equal rights were eventually recognized in the 1946 Constitution. The principle also did not apply to 
slaves. 
28
 Veil: op. cit. 21. 
29
 The first time that a statute was checked against a provision of the Declaration was in the 
Conseil Constitutionnel Decision 73-51 DC Finance Law of 27 December 1973, concerning the 
principle of equality. 
30
 For example, Decision No 82-146 Local Elections of 18 November 1982, confirmed by 
a decision No 98-407 Regional Elections of 14 January 1999. 
31
 Constitutional law No 99-569 of 8 July 1999 relating to the equality between women 
and men. 
32
 Law No 2000-493 of 6 June 2000 to favor the equal access of women and men to electoral 
mandate and elective functions. 
33
 Decision No 2000-429 DC Equal access of women and men to electoral mandate and elective 
functions. 
34
 Constitutional law No 2008-624 DC on the Modernisation of the Institutions of the Fifth 
Republic. 
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from the academic and scientific community for such data, as many consider them as 
essential in the fight against discrimination.35 
The Preamble of 1946, for its part, is "a legal discourse of political facture",36 which 
aims a fairer society.37 In addition to adhering to the French liberal constitutional tradition 
through a reference to the 1789 Declaration and the "fundamental principles recognised by 
the laws of the Republic", the 1946 Preamble adds its own list of political, social and 
economic principles "particularly necessary to our times", such as equal rights for men and 
women (para 3), the right to protection of health, material security, rest and leisure of 
mothers, children and older workers (para 11), the right of the family to the conditions of 
development (para 10), the right for anyone unable to work to have suitable means of 
existence (para 11), and the right to asylum for persecuted persons (para 4). It also includes 
workers rights, such as the right to work and have a job (para 5), the right to defend ones 
interests through trade union membership and action (para 6), the right to strike (para 7), 
and the right to the determination of working conditions and participation in the management 
of companies (para 8). Finally, it added the right to education, vocational training and 
culture through a laic and free education system (para 13), solidarity and equality in the 
face of national catastrophies (para 12), and a few principles related to international relations 
(paras 14—18). The Constitutional Council's first reference to such principles necessary to 
our times was in its famous Abortion decision of 1975,38 which established the right to 
health. 
So much for the rights and principles explicitly mentionned in this bundle of 
constitutional texts. These are, in any case, only the visible tip of the iceberg, as the 
constitutional judge also nees to identify what lies behind the cryptic, and apparently open-
ended, formula of the "fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the Republic", to 
which the 1946 Preamble refer without further ado.39 The Conseil d'Etat had already started 
such process by recognising, as early as 1956, the freedom of association as such principle.40 
The Constitutional Council followed up and recognised a number of such principles, such 
as the freedom of association (identified in the groundbreaking decision of 1971 ), the rights 
of the defense or "due process" (1976),41 individual freedoms (1977),42 the freedom of 
education (1977),43 including the freedom of higher education44 (1999), the freedom of 
35
 Decision No 2007-557 DC Immigration management of 15 November 2007. Veil: op. cit. 60. 
36
 Koubi, G.: Le Préambule de la Constitution de 1946. Antinomies juridiques et contradictions 
politiques. PUF, 1996. 9. 
37
 Conac, G.: Le Préambule de la Constituion de 1946. Une Genèse difficile, un itinéraire 
imprévu. In: Conac, G.-Prétrot, X.-Teboul, G. (eds): Le Preambule de la Constitution de 1946. 
histoire, analyse et commentaires. Paris, 2001, 4. 
38
 Decision No 74-54 DC Abortion of 15 January 1975. 
39
 Simone Veil submits that it proceeded of the desire of the 1946 Constituant to link the 
Constitution back to the political liberalism of the Third Republic, and definitely end with the Vichy 
regime. Veil: op. cit. 23. 
40
 CE, Amicales des annamites de Paris', 11 July 1956, Ree 317. 
41
 Decision No 76-70 DC Prevention of occupational accidents of 2 December 1976. 
42
 Decision No 76-75 DC of Vehicle Search of 12 January 1977. 
43
 Decision No 77-87 DC Freedom of education and conscience of 23 November 1977. 
44
 Decision No 99-414 DC Agricultural Orientation of 8 July 1999. 
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thoughts (1977),45 the independence of administrative justice (1980),46 the independence of 
University professors (1984),47 the judicial review competence of administrative courts 
(1987),48 the notion of judicial courts as guardians of private real estate (1989),49 and the 
educative nature of criminal sanctions for minors (2002).50 The Conseil d'Etat added to that 
list the duty of the state to refuse extradition when it is asked for political motives (1996)51 
and the principle of "laïcité" (2001).52 These, by and large, correspond to values which are 
recognised in most European constitutional systems. However, aware of the potentially 
limitless nature of the notion and risk of arbitrariness, the Constitutional Council rapidly 
put some limits to this category of constitutional norms, by considering that only really 
fundamental principles, stating a sufficiently important rule, in a sufficienly general manner 
and concerning essential fields for the life of a nation, such as fundamental liberties, national 
sovereignty or the organization of public powers, could be granted constitutional value. In 
addition, it explained that they must be found in, and never have been derogated from, laws 
adopted under a republican regime prior to 1946. 
In addition to these principles "based" on republican laws, the Conseil Constitutionnel 
also endeavoured to flesh up the Constitution and its Preamble, by recognising "principles" 
and "objectives" of "constitutional value", which are not explicitly referred to in the 
constitutional texts, but can be dcduced from them. The Constitutional Council recognised 
for the first time an objective as having constitutional value in the famous Decision on the 
Audiovisual Law, which established the objective of pluralism of the press and media of 
objective of constitution.53 These objectives can serve to place limits of individual rigths 
which arc constitutionally protected. But let us detail a little how these principles and 
objectives are discovered by the constitutional judge. 
For example, f rom Art. 6 of the 1789 Declaration, the Constitutional Council drew a 
principle of equality before justice. Based on this, it considered that the legislator could not 
impose more than one penalty for the same offence,54 could not refuse to legal persons a 
right of response which natural persons have,55 or could not prevent victims of strike from 
introducing law suits to obtain compensation.56 From Art. 11 of the 1789 Declaration on the 
freedom of communication, it derives a right to information, and from that, the objective of 
pluralism of the press and media,57 or the right of access to the Internet as a fundamental 
freedom.58 From the principle of individual freedom provided by Art. 2 of the Declaration 
45
 Decision No 77-87 DC Freedom of education and conscience of 23 November 1977. 
46
 Decision No 80-119 DC Validation of Administrative Act of 22 July 1980. 
47
 Decision No 83-165 DC University freedoms of 20 July 1984; Decision No 2010-20/21 QPC 
University of 6 August 2010. 
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 Decision No 86-224 DC Competition Council of 23 January 1987. 
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 Decision No 89-256 DC Urbanism and new towns of 25 July 1989. 
50
 Decision No 2002-461 DC Justice Law of 29 August 2002. 
51
 Conseil d'Etat, Decision of 3 July 1996, Ass., Koné, Ree. 255. 
52
 CE, SNES, 6 April 2001. 
53
 Decision No 82-141 DC Audiovisual Communication of 27 July 1982. 
54
 Decision No 75-56 DC Penal Law of 23 July 1975. 
55
 Decision No 82-141 DC Audiovisual Communication of 27 July 1982. 
56
 Decision No 82-144 DC Staff Representation of 22 October 1982. 
57
 Decision No 84-181 DC Concentration, Financial Transparency and Pluralism of Press 
Undertakings of 11 October 1984. 
58
 Decision No 2009-580 DC HADOPI of 10 June 2009. 
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or Art. 66 of the Constitution, it constructs not only the right to come and go, but also the 
prohibition of arbitrary detention, the inviolability of the home, the right to private life,59 in 
particular regarding the protection of personal data,60 the right to marry, the right to have a 
normal family life, and the right to family reunion for foreigners.61 Probably the most far-
stretched "discovery" is that of the principle of protection of human dignity, which the 
Council derived from the first sentence of the 1946 Preamble, providing that "all human 
being without distinction of race, religion or beliefs, possess ineliable and sacred rights".62 
Other principles having constitutional value are the continuity of public services,63 the 
freedom to carry out a business (liberté d'entreprendre),и or contractual freedom.65 As for 
the "objectives of constitutional value", these cover the safeguard of public order, the 
respect of others' freedom, the preservation of the pluralist character of means of socio-
cultural expressions,66 the pluralism of beliefs and opinions,67 the protection of public 
health,68 the prevention of public order offences, in particular threat on the security of 
persons and goods, and the search for those commiting offences,69 the possibility for 
everyone to have a decent accomodation,70 the accessibility and clarity of the law,71 the 
fight against tax fraud and evasion,72 and the financial balance of social security.73 
Next to the list of recognition, we should also add the list of rejections, that is the 
principles to which the Council refused to give constitutional value. These are the principle 
of legitimate expectations,74 the transparency of public activities,75 the equity between 
generations,76 the criminal irresponsability of minors,77 the "principe de faveur" in labor 
59
 Decision No 76-75 DC Vehicle Searches of 12 January 1977, No 94-352 DC Security Law of 
18 January 1995, No 99-416 DC Universal health Cover Law of 23 July 1999, No 2003-467 DC 
Internal Security Law of 13 March 2003; No 2010-25 QPC Internal Security Law of 16 September 
2010. 
60
 Decision No 2004-499 DC Treatment of Personal Data of 29 July 2004. 
61
 Decision No 93-325 DC Immigration of 13 August 1993. 
62
 Decisions No 94-343/344 DC Organ donation of 27 July 1994; No 2010-25 QPC "Internal 
Security Law" of 16 September 2010. 
63
 Decision No 79-105 DC "Continuity of Public Service of radio and Television" of 25 July 
1979 
64
 Decisions No 81-132 Nationalisation Law of 16 January 1982 and No 92-316 Corruption and 
Transparency Law' of 20 January 1993. 
65
 Decisions No 81-132 Nationalisation Law of 16 January 1982. 
66
 Decision No 82-141 DC Audiovisual Communication of 27 July 1982. 
67
 Decision No 2004-497 DC Electronic and Audiovisual Communication Law of I July 2004. 
68
 Decision No 90-283 DC Fight against Tobacco Dependence and Alcoholism Law of 
8 January 1991. 
69
 Decision No 94-352 DC National Security of 18 January 1995. 
70
 Decision No 94-359 DC Accommodation Diversity Law of 19 January 1995. 
71
 Decision No 99-421 DC Codifications of 16 December 1999. 
72
 Decisions No 99-424 DC Finance Law of 29 December 1999; 2010-19/27 QPC Modernisation 
of the Economy Law of 30 July 2010. 
73
 Decision No 2002-463 DC Social Security Financing of 12 December 2002. 
74
 Decision No 97-391 DC Urgent fiscal and financial measures of 7 November 1997. 
75
 Decision No 93-335 DC Urbanism and construction of 21 January 1994. 
76
 Decision No 97-388 DC Pension saving fund (PEP) of 20 March 1997. 
77
 Decision No 2002-461 DC Justice Law of 23 August 2002. 
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law78 or recently the prohibition, exception and exclusivity related to gambling and 
betting.79 
And of course, one should also bear in mind the rules and principles which the Conseil 
uses to determine the degree of control which it applies (for example, proportionality, the 
sanction of only manifest errors).80 
It is important to point out that there is no hierarchy within this "bloc de 
constitutionallté", based on the origin of the norm, or its form. In French constitutional law, 
unlike in Germany, no norm have supra-constitutional value and are inalienable. A 2003 
decision of the Constitutional Council confirmed it, when it declined having competence to 
assess the compatibility with the Constitution of laws amending it.81 In case of contradiction, 
the rights and principles "must be conciliated, and they do no exclude eachother; thus, a 
'recognised fundamental principle' like that of the 'continuity of the public service'justifies 
some restrictions to the right to strike, expressly proclaimed by the Preamble of 1946."82 
Also, as noted before in relation to the principle of equality, since the constitutional value of 
the 1789 Declaration and the 1946 Preamble is based on the 1958 Constitution, amendments 
to the Constitution can "go against" them. In France, the Preamble, although an independent 
source of rights, thus still does not go as far as "walking before the Constitution".83 
The creative and expensive nature of constitutional jurisprudence is not typically 
French. And modern trends also point at greater reliance on constitutional preambles not 
only as providing determinant interpretative guidance, but also as creating rights.84 Yet, the 
scope of the French Constitutional Council's law-making has been remarkable, considering 
the frail constitutional basis, and its weak (original) institutional position. Probably its 
closest "competitor" in Europe is the European Court of Justice, which developped a 
susbtantial catalogue of fundamental rights based on no legal basis at all. 
This is for the theory. Now what does this mean in practice? Indeed, it is one thing to 
declare rights and values as constitutional, it is another one to give them a concrete 
realisation. 
5. Constitutional practice and the protection of human rights 
Some noted a certain timidity in the application of the "hard won" principles, in the 
aftermath of the 1971 "coup". For example, the Council never invalidated any of the major 
socialist reforms of the early 1980s, mostly "amputating legislation" by sanctioning flaws 
in implementing legislation or giving interprctatative or application directions.85 However, 
during the R. Badinter's presidency (1986-1995), the Council became more activist.86 Not 
78
 Decision No 2004-494 DC Vocational Training and Social Dialogue of 29 April 2004. 
79
 Decision No 2010-605 DC Gambling and Betting of 12 May 2010. 
80
 Veil: op. cit. 24-25. 
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 Decision N o 2003-469 DC Decentralisation of 26 March 2003. 
82
 Decision No 79-105 DC Continuity of Public Service of Radio and Television of 25 July 
1979. 
83
 Schmitt, С.: Constitutional Theory (Seitzer, J.-Thornhill, C. eds). Durham, 2008, 79. 
84
 Orgad: op. cit. 
85
 Although these decisions could have some important practical impact. For example, his 
decision on the nationalization law led to an increase of 30% of the compensation granted to 
shareholders of nationalized companies, and his 1984 decision "saved" the press group Hersant, which 
had been targeted by the law on the press. (Stone Sweet 1992) 
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 Chantebout, В.: Droit Constitutionnel. Paris, 2009. 595. 
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only did it invalidate a number of legislative provisions, it also made a greater use of 
interpretative restrictions ("declarations de conformity sous reserves "), by which it imposed 
"its" interpretation of the law on those who will apply and enforce it. It started to write 
precise decisions which left no margin of maneuver for those who had to revise the law to 
make it pass the constitutional test. At some stage, it even seemed to want to lock-in 
fundamental freedoms, such as the right to asylum or the freedom of communication,87 by 
only validating legislative provisions which reinforced them ("effet de cliquet "); however, 
this policy was not pursued.88 
In practice, the "interference" of the Constitutional Council disturbs the political class, 
which on occasions, worked to exclude it from the process (for example reform of the Code 
Pénal in 1992). Besides, it results in the government needing to resort more frequently to 
constitutional revision in order to pass legislation. We already mentionned the revisions to 
allow equal chances between men and women; there was also a reform related to the right 
to asylum in the application of the Schengen agreement.89 In 1999, the refusal by President 
Chirac to engage a revision of the Constitution to allow the adoption of the Charter on 
regional and minority languages was strongly criticized by the socialists as being a move 
against civil liberties. It remains that, again, this constitutional revision frenzy is not a 
French phenomenon and seems to be common currency other EU countries, too. 
To sum up, stone by stone, the Constitutionnal Council built on the foundations of the 
Preamble an comprehensive bills of rights. Yet, this gradual discovery of new principles, 
which may be accelerated with the new reform which will also give a more "individual 
drive" to the constitutional case law, is being criticized by some commentators as favoring 
particular interests over the public good.90 Indeed, with the QPC, the speed of construction 
is likely to accelerate, on a piece-meal basis, as disparate provisions from past statutes are 
examined by the Council. It may also be that, wary of this new "social" legitimacy, the 
Constitutional Council becomes more "sensitive" to individual human rights arguments 
which plaintiffs can now put directly to it, rather than through the mediation of members of 
the parliament. This semi-direct link with the "people" may grant the Council, and the 
courts which refer cases to him, a new autonomy, which could affect the direction of the 
case law. It is too early to tell us, but one should watch for inflections in the case law. 
It remains that the "French way", this web of written and unwritten constitutional 
norms based on an alledgedly symbolic document, is still a bit of an oddity in the European 
constitutional tradition. Critics are plenty, who stress its lack of transparency and 
accessibility, and call for (some) codification. One could even point at Europe for inspiration, 
where the fundamental rigths jurisprudence of the ECJ was eventually codified in an EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which the Lisbon Treaty endowed with legally binding 
status. However, the French seem to be attached to their "unwritten" declaration of rights. 
In the country which put together the Code Civil more than 200 years ago, and which has 
Codes on everything, this constitutional exception looks strange. 
87
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6. The strange reluctance of the French constituant to "touch" at the Preamble 
Various projects of amendments, or even total redrafting, of the Preamble have emanated 
from the civil society (for example project of the Nouveaux Droits de l'Homme Association, 
in the 1990s) or from the government itself. In 1975, the Edgar Faure "Commission Spéciale 
des Libertés" listed a number of constitutional principles, which could have taken place in 
the Preamble, alongside the references to the 1946 Preamble and the 1789 Declaration; 
these were the principles of diversity, equality of chances, equality between men and 
women, dignity, right to life and physical and moral integrity, protection of privacy and 
personal data, and pluralism of the means and expression and médias. However, the Left 
refused to support the proposal. In 1993, again, a consultation committee on the revision 
of the Constitution, presided by Dean Vedel considered it desirable to grant express 
constitutional recognition to certain new rights bearing in mind the conditions of 
developments of the French society; these were the right to human dignity and private life 
(proposal 32) and the freedom and pluralism of communication (proposal 33). Finally, in 
2008, President Sarkozy set up a Committee chaired by Simone Veil, to analyse the 
Preamble, and make suggestions as to possible amendments. After a very thoughful, 
informed and detailled analysis of the current status, substance and uses of the Preamble, 
and the pros and cons of a number of specific amendments, it eventually concluded that 
"the urgency was less in supplementing it, than in exploiting its richness through ambitious, 
concrete and active policies".91 It therefore seems that everytime, the importance of 
maintaining the rich constitutional acquis, the flexibility and adaptation which the current 
set-up allows, and the complementarity of overlapping international, european, and national 
constitutional and legislative framework for the protection and promotion of human rights, 
plead in favor of the status quo. 
As put by one of the most eminent French constitutional scholars, Guy de Carcassone, 
"...the seventeen articles of 1789, supplemented by the 18 paragraphs of 1946, which 
themselves incorporate the fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the 
Republic, constitute a Declaration of Rights and Freedoms, tainted enough by time so 
that they cannot be callcd into question, eternal enough so that they remain modem, 
precise enough to be protective, and vague enough to be subject to evolutions imposed 
by progress."92 
There is one single exception to the French Constituant's reluctance touch at the 
Preamble. As France entered the New Millenium, it was felt that this sedimented 
constitutional block lackcd an ecological flavour.93 President Chirac, supported by French 
TV presenter, journalist and environmental activist Nicolai Hulot, commissioned the 
Coppens Committee to put together a draft Charter for the Environment, which was adopted 
in 2004. The Charter consists of ten articles encompassing third generation rights, including 
the right of everyone to live in an environment which is balanced and respectul of his or her 
health, as well as duties imposed on individuals, public authorities and research and 
91
 The Committee instructed to read their report "not as the acknowledgement of an impossibility 
to make France progress on the way to law (justice?) and equality, but as an encouragement to make 
that 'she' moves forward". Veil: op. cit. 6. 
92
 de Carcassone, G.: La Constitution. (Traduction by the author) Essais, 6th ed., Paris, 
2004, 39. 
93
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éducation institutions to take part in the preservation of the environment. It also incorporated 
a carefully drafted precautionary principle. On 1 March 2005, a constitutional revision for 
the first time ever amended the Preamble to add a reference to the 2004 Charter for the 
Environment, thereby giving it constitutional status. 
The constitutional value of the Charter was confirmed by the Constitutional Council 
"GMO" decision, which stated, in 2008, that "all the rights and duties defined in the Charter 
for the Environment have constitutional value".44 However, in 2005 already, the Council 
has relied on it to invalidate important legislation,95 including the famous law on the carbon 
tax, as exemptions granted to polluting industries were declared incompatible with 
provisions of the Charter.96 First instance judicial courts have also used the Charter 
creatively, for example to order the discharge of environmental activitists who had destroyed 
GMO crops and were threatened with criminal penalties.97 First instance administrative 
courts also did not wait long to declare that the Charter had granted the right to a clean and 
healthy environment the status of "fundamental freedom of constitutional value".98 The 
Conseil d'Etat, for its part, was rather timid at first, limiting the effects of the provisions of 
the Charter.99 However, in a 2008 decision, he finally recognised the full constitutional 
value of the Charter.100 
Whilst these judicial confirmation and uses testify that any addition to the Preamble is 
not anodine and is followed with practical effects, it remains that this only amendment of 
the preamble since its inception in 1958 does not disrupt the evolutive dynamics of the 
constitutional block. It simply adds one more written source of constitutional norms, 
alongside the others. 
Despite that all projects aiming at significantly amending the Preamble and codifying 
the constitutional case law eventually "failed", it is nonetheless instructive to review the 
last endeavour, for it highlights well the advantages and drawbacks of the current system, 
and the adverse consequences that could result from touching at a text which has had such a 
fruitful progeny. 
7. The latest attempt at amending the Preamble: highlights and comments 
The Veil Committee was asked to reflect initially on three themes. Two of them are clearly 
inspired by the limitations imposed by the Declaration's formal conception of equality. 
Should one enable the legislator to better guarantee the equal access of women and men to 
94
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of the Charter (para 79). 
97
 Tribunal correctionnel of Orléans, 09/12/2005; but the decision was quashed in appeal. 
98
 Administrative Tribunal of Chalons-en-Champagne, order of 29 April 2005, No 050082805. 
99
 CE, 6 April 2006 Ligue pour la Protection des oiseaux (LPO) No 283103, et 19 June 2006 
Association Eaux et Rivières de Bretagne, No 282456. 
100
 Decision of 3 October 2008 Commune d'Année, No 297931. 
1 6 M A R I E - P I E R R E G R A N G E R 
responsibilities, outside of the political sphere? Should one make it possible to have new 
integration policies valuing the diversity of French society to favor the effective respect of 
the principle of equality (affirmative action)? The last one was triggered by scientific and 
medical progress. Arc there guiding principles on which to based our approach on 
bioethics? 
A few more topics were also suggested, which have already receive some constitutional 
recognition in the case law of the CC: the recognition of human dignity, the pluralism of 
means of expression and media; the respect for private life and the protection on personal 
data; and the European anchoring of the Republic. 
The Veil Committee's work was guided by a number of principles. Some of them are 
obvious, such as the respect of the French constitutional heritage or of recent constitutional 
revisions. Wisely, they were also keen to limit the constitutional amendments' frenzy, and 
considered that the addition of new norms into the Preamble should only occur where these 
were unlikely to "change" in the medium to long term. However, the Committee was also 
determined to suggest amendments to the Preamble only if they had an uncontested "effet 
utile". They rejected any symbolic addition, and were strongly opposed to any codification 
of the case law. They considered that academia or committee works produced enough 
"descriptive" codifications to ensure the visibility of rights, and that with codification came 
the risk of limiting constitutional dynamism. Besides, they identified important technical 
difficulties concerning the scope of such codification. Finally, they also feared that it could 
be perceived as a threat on the constitutional judges' independence. 
Let mc develop on some of the points which the Committee had to examine, and which 
may be relevant to the Hungarian context. 
A specific reference to a commitment to the European legal order or to international 
and European treaties for the protection of fundamental rights was rejected in the sense as it 
would constitute a pure abandonment of "soveraineté constituante" and would not allow 
for the protection of principles touching on "French constitutional identity" against 
conflicting European norms.101 
Relating to positive action beyond gender issues, although the Committee admitted 
that the constitutional acquis did not enable differentiated treatment based on criteria such 
as race, origin and religion, it nonetheless rejected the idea that either Art. 1 be modified, or 
that the Preamble be amended so as to authorize such positive action policies on ethnical or 
racial grounds. N o doubt that the Committee was sensitive to the strong anti-communaurism 
movement within the French constitutional doctrine and political movements. However, it 
insisted that the current constitutional texts and case law offered a sufficient margin a 
maneuver for ambitious positive action policies.102 It allowed for the special treatment of 
persons with special difficulties103 or in dire social situations (for example young people, 
aged workers, unemployed)104 or based on where they live (for example suburds, rural 
areas...). In relation to the collection of racial or ethical data, which was considered not 
compatible with the Constitution105 they considered that the Constitution allowed for the 
gathering of sufficiently related data (for example geographical origin, feeling of 
101
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belonging...), which could give sufficient indications as to the composition of the 
population. 
Another issue under consideration was the pluralism of the means of expression and 
media. As exposed earlier, the Constitutional Council declared the pluralism of daily 
newspaper as being a constitutional objective, necessary to guarantee the free communication 
of ideas and opinions protected by Art. 11 of the 1789 Declaration. Later on, it extended its 
cope to radio and television and the internet. Under pressure from the Senate, the 
constitutional revision of 23 July 2008 amended the Constitution (but not its Preamble) in 
order to give competence to the legislator (and no longer the executive) to adopt statutes 
determining the rules relating to "freedom, diversity and the independence of the media".106 
Although it did not give further constitutional protection to this objective, it led the Veil 
Committee to decline examining any amendment to the Preamble which would reaffirm this 
principle. 
Concerning the protection of privacy and personal data, these did not have any textual 
basis in French constitutional documents. However, the constitutional judge had developped 
a rich jurisprudence, exposed earlier. Based on Art. 2 of the 1789 Declaration, it derived a 
right to respect of private life, with the result that it allows the exchange and sharing of 
personal data between public bodies only with individual's consent and for a purpose of 
constitutionally protected general interest107 or prevents legal legal persons from treating 
datas relating to offences for the purpose of fighting against fraud.108 Besides, there exists 
also quite extensive international standards, as well as protective legislation. Because of 
these, the Committee felt that any amendment would be superfluous, in particular as 
international and European treaties provided complementary safeguards. It applied a similar 
reasoning to the guiding principles related to bioethics. 
As for the right (or principle) of human dignity, it considered the notion to be very 
vague and polyphormic; however, it agreed that Art. 1 of the Constitution could be amended 
to include a precisely drafted principle of "equal dignity". 
Another aspect which transpires across the Committee's study, although without being 
explicitly mentionned, is the difficulty in amending preambles in a consensual manner, once 
the national urgency and drama which led to a adoption of a new constitution passes. This 
is not peculiar to France, but is noticeable wherever attempts were made to amend national 
constitutional preambles.109 
8. Conclusions 
Legal transplants are delicate operations. This is even more so in the case of constitutional 
rules and principles, which reflect not only universal(isable) values, but also norms, values 
and processes which are peculiar to particular states and their peoples. Comparative 
constitutional law thus has its limits when it comes to inspiring constitutional reforms. Yet, 
I hope that this little "tour" of the Preamble of the French Constitution, which highlighted 
106
 Art. 4: addition of "Statutes shall guarantee the expression of diverse opinions and the 
equitable participation of political parties and groups in the democratic life of the Nation." To the 
competence of the legislator in Art. 34, the revision added "freedom, diversity and the independence 
of the media". 
107
 Decision No 93-325 DC Immigration Law of 13 August 1993. 
108
 Decision No 2004-499 DC Personal Data of 29 July 2004. 
109
 Orgad: op. cit. 22. 
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its "potential" as well as its limits, can contribute to the Hungarian debate on constitutional 
reform. In any case, at the moment, contemporary France and Hungary seems to have in 
common a liking for "gradual" rather than drastic constitutional development. But, if I 
understand well the current Hungarian debate, they may soon depart, for the better or for 
the worst. 
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Two Preambles in the Czech Constitutional System 
Abstract. The preambles are used in the Czech legal system dur ing the last twenty yea r s rather rarely. Nonetheless , 
constitutions in the Czechoslovak history as in the Czech history are traditionally in t roduced by the preambles . As 
the Czech constitutional system inclines to consist of more consti tutional legal ac ts at the supreme level of the 
interior legal system, w e can found two consti tutional preambles in the recent Czech constitutional system. Both 
top constitutional ac t s - the Constitution and the Charter of Fundamenta l Rights and Bas ic Freedoms are preceded 
by their own preamble. The preambles d i f fer as they are focused on different part o f constitutional issues. Despi te 
of this obvious fact they are built-up on some features, which are common to both o f them. 
The preambles are characterized by a modes t fo rm- the i r pu rpose is to explain, w h y the new chapter of the legal 
development is opened, and to offer us a c o m m o n starting line. Nonetheless, they a l so keep to us a f r eedom of 
movement in the new legal period. Their main goal is to connect the people, not to d ivide , if the constitutional act, 
which is introduced by them, should be an expression of the c o m m o n national will. 
Keywords: preamble, Czech Republic, constitution. Char ter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms, 
democracy, rule of law, human rights, consti tutional values 
I. Introduction 
During the current discussions in Hungary about the preamble of the possible new 
constitution, the constitutional solutions of the neighbouring countries are worth a look. 
The Czech Republic is in quite a special situation, as its constitutional system contains not 
only one, but two preambles. As will be shown, this quite unusual state is not the result of a 
reasoned decision of the makers of the constitutional system. Rather, it is a legacy of the 
constitutional development in the last years of the existence of Czechoslovakia. 
The Czech constitutional system is weighed towards constitutional legal acts at the 
supreme level of the interior legal system. In other words, the Czech constitutional system 
is polylegal. 
If the term constitutionalism as a legal idea is defined to mean that the government, or 
the public power, should be legally limited by a supreme legal act-usually called a 
constitution-adopted by the people or with their consent, then it includes the concept that 
the constitution should regulate at least two main questions: the organisation and limitations 
of the public or state power and the guarantees as to the position of an individual in a 
society consisting of others and in relation to the state. Thus, constitutions have an 
organisational part and a catalogue of human rights. 
States tend to regulate those main questions in one legal act. Such a solution is more 
lucid and understandable to the addressees. That is, the citizens themselves, as possible 
problems stemming from the need to interpret two or even more equal constitutional acts 
are avoided. 
The situation before the Czech Republic was established did not allow enough time for 
preparation of a complex constitution for the upcoming new state. Thus, the Czech Republic 
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has had three main constitutional acts in an equal legal position since the moment of its 
declaration. The first is the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms; the second 
is the Constitution of the Czech Republic; and the third is Constitutional Act No. 4/1993 
Coll., which sets up the rules for the continuity of the former Czechoslovak legal system in 
the independent Czech Republic. 
Two of those constitutional acts are preceded by their own prcambles-these are the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms and the Constitution of the Czech 
Republic. 
II. Historical Roots of Polylegalism in the Czech Republic 
From the proclamation of the independent Czechoslovak state on October 28, 1918, its 
constitutional system consisted of more than one constitutional act. At the very early 
beginning of Czechoslovakia there were two reasons for such a constitutional solution. 
First, the constitution of the new state was influenced through its writers and creators 
by the Austrian constitutional tradition. Especially the Czech political elites of those times 
had spent all their professional political lives in the Austrian parliamentary system based on 
the December Constitution of 1867. The Constitution proclaimed on December 21, 1867 
consisted of seven constitutional acts. Each branch of state power had not only its own 
section, but in fact a separate constitutional act. In addition to five organisational 
constitutional acts there were an act on civil rights and a fédéralisation act. Thus, this 
collection of separated acts crcatcd the constitution. Such a situation, which continued for 
50 years, certainly influenced many Austrian politicians, who did not experience a polylegal 
constitutional solution as something strange and unusual. 
Second, there were strong practical reasons for avoiding a single complex constitutional 
act in autumn 1918. Above all, it should be stressed that the first, interim Czechoslovak 
constitution was prepared during a two-week period. The drafters' ambitions were not too 
high; the interim constitution need only define a basic constitutional framework for a 
relatively short period during which the definitive constitution would be written, adopted 
and promulgated. 
Even though there were strong proclamations about discontinuity with the former legal 
and state system, in reality the new state used Austrian and Hungarian legal acts to the 
extent that these did not contradict the declaration of independence of Czechoslovakia. 
Thus, for example, the Austrian catalogue of civil rights was adopted by the Czechoslovak 
state for the interim period. 
The preparatory works on the new Constitution during 1919 tended toward a complex 
solution in the form of one constitutional act as much as possible. Nonetheless, some special 
issues were omitted from the Constitution. The most important and most understandable 
such element was the issue of national minorities, which were still being negotiated at peace 
conferences in France when the definitive Czechoslovak constitution was adopted on 
February 29, 1920. Thus, during the 20 years of the existence of the so-called First Republic 
its constitutional system was still polylegal, although it was not so strongly clustered as the 
Austrian monarchical ancestor. 
After World War II, when Czechoslovakia was liberated from the Nazi occupation the 
state returned to the pre-war constitution with a plan to prepare a new constitutional 
document that would offer more contemporary solutions. This goal was fulfilled by the 
Constitutional National Assembly, which was established by the way of the general election 
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in spring 1946. The new Constitution was written as a complex document regulating all 
constitutional issues. It was promulgated on May 9, 1948. 
From 1948 to 1989 the Czechoslovak constitutional system was based on a single 
complex constitutional act. In fact, the Constitution was amended several times by special 
and independent constitutional acts; nonetheless, all the main important issues that constitute 
the constitutional field were included in the Constitution. 
That situation changed as a result of the events and social and political changes that 
started on November 17, 1989. The need to adopt a new constitutional framework for 
human rights in Czechoslovakia was very quickly obvious as a result of the ensuing events. 
If the issues relating to the organisation of the state powers between a federation and 
republics could wait, the problem of human rights appeared as more acute. 
More or less, human rights had been a crucial topic in Czechoslovak society since the 
so-called Prague Spring in 1968. When this process was frozen, including the informal 
social and political movements that requested more civil rights and freedoms, by the 
intervention of the Warsaw Pact member state armies, the issue of human rights remained 
partially hidden yet reappeared in certain special moments. One of these moments was in 
1975, after the Helsinki summit. This moment led to the civic initiative Charter 77, 
demanding respect for human rights according as agreed at the Helsinki summit; the Charter 
criticized the Czechoslovak government for non-implementation into the Czechoslovak 
legal system of the human rights treaties that Czechoslovakia had signed. 
The importance of human rights issues was so evident in the 1980s that even the 
supreme communist officials reacted to the problem and allowed the possibility of a very 
liberal solution in this regard as part of a project considering a new constitution, which was 
carried out from 1986 to 1988. However, this project was never published for the general 
public before the November 1989 events. For the conservative wing of the communist party, 
such a possibility was probably too liberal to accept. To tell the truth, as to the question of 
human rights the proposed solution did not differ too strongly from the human rights 
catalogues of those times in Western Europe. In fact, the ambition was to prepare a document 
that would fit with all the international treaties binding Czechoslovakia as a party to the 
treaties. 
Nonetheless, the issue of human rights and their violation was not solved until 
November 1989. Until then a more radical solution for the situation was needed. The 
solution needed to be based on the following four main rules: 
- Stress on the natural law origin of human rights 
- Democracy as a way to define rule over society 
- Rule of law as a guarantee of human rights 
- Respect for human rights on the international field 
These rules became the most significant features of the re-bom Czechoslovak 
constitutionalism, which influenced the forthcoming political and constitutional develop-
ments. 
At this moment, we can observe the point since which the prevailing concept of 
monolegal constitution had been abandoned for 40 years. In the first half of 1990, decisions 
were adopted that led to a splitting of the constitutional matter into at least two parts. The 
opinion that urged solving the issue of human rights separately and as a question of high 
priority won. 
At that time there appeared two factors, which were decisive as to the separate 
preparation of the future Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms. 
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First was the time factor. It was a common opinion that the issue of a new definition of 
human rights is too important to postpone. Human rights and a respect for them was one of 
the crucial topics of the November events, generally called the Velvet Revolution. 
The second reason to give the highest priority to human rights was the common support 
that this issue had gained across not only politicians, but also the general public. This 
common support stood in contrast to the problem of the division of powers between the 
federation on the one side, and the republic on the other. It was absolutely clear that the 
division of powers under the new, democratic circumstances would need much more time 
to solve. 
Thus, under the natural contemporary circumstances the complex constitutional matter 
was split into two separate parts-those relating to human rights and to the organisation of 
the state power at the supreme level. 
When the preparation of the future Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms 
started, the work was planned with intentions as to a symbolic date of adoption for the 
document. The very first date, which was strongly preferred from the political point of view, 
without any special consideration of the difficulty of the preparatory work, was November 
17, 1990, the 1st anniversary of the Velvet Revolution. 
As I have stressed, the political will was not supported by any special experience or 
estimation how difficult it would be not only to prepare, but above all to discuss and adopt 
such an important constitutional act under democratic rules. During the preparatory work 
the goal of November 17 appeared unrealistic. 
Therefore, an alternative date was found in December 10, 1990, a day celebrated as 
Human Rights Day. Nonetheless, even on date the preparatory work was not finished. 
Finally the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms was adopted and 
promulgated on January 9, 1991. 
III. Preambles in the Czech Legal System 
As an initial matter, it should be stated that in the Czech legal system preambles are not 
generally used. If they are found, then it is in the most important legal acts, which usually 
found a legal discontinuity. Thus, preambles are rarely used. They serve as an explanatory 
statement or introduction of the legal act that follows them. Their purpose is to provide an 
explanation of the legislative motivation, and to set out the historical circumstances and 
reasons under which the legal act was prepared and adopted. Sometimes the expccted results 
of the legal act are also declared. 
In Czech legal theory a preamble is understood as a part of the legal act, but without a 
normative character. The preamble is thus comprehended as a text containing important 
rules, which are enacted in detailed form in the text of the legal norm. This way the preamble 
may help significantly in the process of interpreting the legal act. This purpose might be 
especially important in the case of legal norms creating elements of legal discontinuity and 
founding the basis of a new legal order. 
IV. The Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms 
During the approximately one year period of preparation the text of the Preamble of the 
draft of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms was also considered. There 
were many factors that played significant roles. Not only the Charter, but also the 
introductory part had to constitute a compromise that could establish the basis for a new 
constitutional and legal order in the Czechoslovak Federation. For example, legal and social 
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values differed slightly in Czech and Slovak society, there were some differences in the 
view on modern history, different views on the relationship between the federation and 
republics, etc. 
Thus, there was a need to find a compromise based situation, in which the Preamble 
could be designed as a text connecting both nations, and looking more to the future than 
trying to judge the recent or distant history. 
The final version of the Charter's Preamble was adopted in the following form: 
"The Federal Assembly, 
On the basis of the proposals of the Czech National Council and the Slovak National 
Council, Recognizing the inviolability of the natural rights of man, the rights of 
citizens, and the sovereignty of the law. Proceeding from the universally-shared values 
of humanity and from our nations ' traditions of democracy and self-government, 
Mindful of the bitter experience of periods when human rights and fundamental 
freedoms were suppressed in our homeland, Placing hope in the common endeavours 
of all free nations to safeguard these rights, Ensuing from the Czech and Slovak 
nations' right to self-determination, Recalling its share of responsibility towards future 
generations for the fate of all life on Earth, and Expressing the resolve that the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic should join in dignity the ranks of countries cherishing 
these values, Has enacted this Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms:... " 
The first aspect of the Preamble's text that is worthy of notice relates to the body that 
enacted and promulgated the Charter, including the Preamble. It was the Federal Assembly 
of the Czechoslovakia as the supreme legislative and representative body, with exclusive 
capacity to adopt constitutional acts. No other body was granted the power to act on a 
constitutional level. This was an issue especially with respect to the two republics' national 
councils, which were allowed only to propose or to be consulted over constitutional matters 
relating to the whole of Czechoslovakia. 
It is also very interesting that in the Preamble there is no mention of the people, in 
whose name the Charter was prepared. 
There could be different reasons why the first portion of Preamble is drafted so 
modestly. Generally the Czechoslovak Federation, since 1968, and Czechoslovakia as 
unitary state, since 1945, as well, were built up on the theory that the common state is 
created from the will of two nations, which together create the people of Czechoslovakia. 
The people then were represented in the National, and later Federal Assembly, which is 
rather a complex structure, and its proceedings to protect the vital interests of both nations. 
Thus, the interests of inner balance led to the choice to list the Federal Assembly as the 
adopter of the Charter and not to solve the problem of which element should be stressed as 
a constitutive one. 
This way of thinking appeared in the formulation as follows. The remarks on the 
proposals of both National Councils found in the Preamble show that the Federal Assembly 
did not force its will upon the two republics or nations, or on their institutional and political 
representation. 
The Preamble's first sentence mentions the proposals of the National Councils. In fact, 
the preparation of the Charter did not start from two viewpoints, but rather there was one 
framework project offered as a starting document to both National Councils and they 
discussed it and prepared their own proposals on its basis. This way, the initiative went out 
from the whole-nation's representation, gathered in the Federal Assembly. 
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The role of both National Councils is stressed later in the Preamble, where it is 
mentioned and confirmed that the Charter and its contents fully respect the right of both 
nations to self-determination. Therefore, the drafting itself had to fit to this key national 
right. 
The narrow approach of the first parts of the Preamble was used throughout the text. 
The authors of the Preamble did not try to solve anything beyond explaining the importance 
of the following Charter for the future through its subject, human rights. 
First, the Federal Assembly stressed the need for a new attitude about human rights, 
such that Charter should open a new chapter in the constitutional and legal system in 
Czechoslovakia. As a result of the Charter's adoption, human rights should be understood 
in their natural law character-not granted by a state, but just recognized by the state power, 
which should respect them. Thus, human rights should create a boundary that cannot be 
trespassed by the state (or any individual). 
The Preamble also stressed the fact that the complex system of legal limitations and 
guarantees, called the rule of law, is one of the institutional protections of human rights. In 
other words, the Federal Assembly declared the will to respect the rule of law in the interests 
of human rights. Here we can see the connection of a material and formal rule of taw. The 
procedures are not values in themselves, but should serve another, supreme goal. 
It was very important at the very early 1990s, after 40 years of authoritarian regime in 
Czechoslovakia that the Federal Assembly did not try to "invent" human rights. To the 
contrary, the Charter should be anchored in the wider context. The Federal Assembly even 
declared its belief that human rights have a common source, the universally shared values 
of humanity. Thus, in the conviction of the Federal Assembly human rights exist in wider 
context and arc common to all people around the world. 
This declared belief also reflected the fact that the international as well as the regional 
human right treaties and pacts served as important inspirations. This way, the new Charter 
was absolutely compatible from the beginning with all the international human rights 
documents that Czechoslovakia had newly adopted. It was very important for the entry or 
in some cases re-entry of Czechoslovakia into the family of democratic states respecting 
human rights, and into international organisations like the Council of Europe. 
Further, we can see a combination of the rule of law and the way the Czechoslovak 
conception of human rights is anchored in general human values. The Federal Assembly 
expressed a strong belief that human rights as an idea can be protected in the wider context 
only by the common effort of the democratic states respecting human dignity. Here, the 
Czechoslovak experience of 40 years under an authoritarian regime controlling a significant 
part of Europe is expressed. The isolated effort to reach démocratisation and respect for 
human rights failed not only in Czechoslovakia but in other socialistic states as well. 
Therefore, the Preamble stresses the interest in cooperation in the international arena with 
other free nations on human rights protection. 
From the historical point of view, in the Preamble there is only a modest commemoration 
of the periods in which human rights flourished or were violated. The expression does not 
aspire to be a judgement of recent or distant history. The authors of the Preamble only 
recalled two historical facts. One was the bright years for human rights during the years of 
democracy, not only in pre-war Czechoslovakia, but also during the years before World 
War Г. The other was a commemoration of the years when human rights were broken in 
Czechoslovakia. 
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Thus, we can see that this part of the Preamble creates a starting point for discussions 
for those interested, but does not aspire to instruct how the discussion should continue 
further. 
We can see some kind of reflection on recent history and a perspective of the future in 
the belief that Czechoslovakia can join the family of states and nations that respect the 
values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. We can also understand this 
proclamation as a persuasion that a state can exist in dignity only if it respects those values. 
From a certain point of view, it's a kind of judgement on the last decades in Czechoslovakia. 
Nonetheless, that kind of opinion can hardly be confirmed. 
The Preamble's aspects that can, from the current point of view, be understood as 
environmental or "green" are also very interesting. Of course, this aspect of state activity 
and social responsibility was very important in the days of preparing and adopting of the 
Charter. Environmental protests were a motivating power of the social and political changes 
in northwestern Bohemia. It should be said that those protests started in October 1989, even 
before the student demonstrations in Prague, and were of a huge scale and independent of 
them at the beginning. Later, in the second half of November, they both were connected 
together into a united and coordinated movement. 
That is why the environmental aspect of human rights is expressed in the Preamble of 
the Charter so conspicuously. Nonetheless, the words about responsibility for the future of 
life on Earth also can and should be understood from a different point of view. We should 
not forget that the Charter was being prepared at the end of two super-powers' arms race, 
which focused on nuclear weapons. This experience of nuclear threat is another ideological 
source of the stress on responsibility for the whole planet. 
In the end, it could be said that the Charter's Preamble marks a milestone initiating a 
new era. With the Charter new legal values were established and a new approach of the 
state to human rights began. Since then one of the state's most important tasks is to protect 
human rights. 
Regarding to the form and content of the Charter's Preamble, it should be stressed its 
modest attitude towards the issues addressed. This form of the Preamble allows a start to a 
new era with an open future. The authors do not aspire to judge or declare an end to recent 
history or enact their judgement on the supreme constitutional act in a binding form. Thus, 
the Preamble can serve as a common starting point for the entire society, more connecting 
than dividing. 
V. The Preamble of the Constitution of the Czech Republic 
During the 18 months after the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic 
Freedoms, discussions and drafting to accomplish a rc-organisation of the federation 
continued. As I mentioned above, this process started and ran simultaneously with the 
Charter's preparation. In fact, the federal reform in post-1989 Czechoslovakia took place 
for more than 30 months. 
A certain breaking point appeared in June 5 and 6, 1992, when general elections were 
held. The winning parties in both republics very quickly agreed with each other that they 
could not find a mutual solution for the future existence of the federation and agreed further 
that the federation should be dissolved. 
The process of dissolution started almost immediately, on June 17, 1992, when the 
Declaration of Independence of the Slovak nation, which was understood as a proclamation 
starting the process of secession from the federation, was adopted by the Slovak parliament. 
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The Constitution of the Slovak Republic was adopted and proclaimed on September 1, 
1992. This constitutional act still respected the sovereignty of the federation as a temporal 
solution, just as long as necessary to dissolve the common state. 
On the Czech side the situation did not go forward so rapidly. Only in the middle of 
August did serious work on the new constitution start. It should be said that some projects 
were prepared during the 1990-1991, but they were being prepared for a republic as a 
member state of a federation. Thus, the projects had to be re-discussed, because some 
proposed solutions were not applicable and some issues were not solved at all—they would 
have been regulated by the federal constitution. Wc can say that intensive work on the new 
Czech constitution started at the moment when the work on the Slovak constitution was 
being finished. 
There were no doubts that the new Constitution would be introduced by a preamble. 
As all of the Constitution was being prepared by a government expert commission, the text 
of the Preamble was prepared by that group of experts as well. Nonetheless, the former 
Czechoslovak president, and the main and probably only possible candidate with a real 
chance to be elected to the office of the Czech president, Václav Havel, played a significant 
role in the process of preparation. His notices and proposals to change the syntax of the 
Preamble to make it simpler and more readable were very useful. Thus, he influenced (not 
only) the Preamble in significant form. 
The final version of the Constitution's Preamble was adopted in the following form: 
"We, the citizens of the Czech Republic in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, at this time 
of the reconstitution of an independent Czech State, true to all the sound traditions of 
the ancient statehood of the Lands of the Crown of Bohemia as well as of Czechoslovak 
statehood, resolute to build, protect and develop the Czech Republic in the spirit of the 
inalienable values of human dignity and freedom as the home of free citizens who are 
aware of their obligations towards others and of their responsibility to the community, 
as a free and democratic State founded on respect for human rights and on principles 
of civil society, as a member of the family of European and World democracies, resolute 
to protect and develop their natural, cultural, materia! and spiritual heritage, resolute 
to take heed to all the well-proven tenets of law-abiding state, have adopted this 
Constitution of the Czech Republic through our freely elected representatives. " 
The first significant feature of the Constitution's Preamble is the civic base upon which 
the new state is declared. As is stressed, the Constitution of the future independent Czech 
Republic is adopted by the representatives of the citizens of the republic. This is not an 
oxymoron. When the Czechoslovak federation was being dissolved, there were generally no 
special problems of defining the rules governing who would be a citizen of which republic. 
During the existence of the federation there existed two citizenships-citizenship in the 
federation, which was important in relations outside and citizenship in one of the two 
republics. The republic citizenship was not really important for everyday life inside the 
federation. Nonetheless, for purposes of the existence of the republic inside the federation it 
was important on the level of constitutional ideas, because the citizens of the republic 
created together the Czech or Slovak political nation. The rules under which the republic 
citizenship of each Czechoslovak citizen was added to the previously uniform Czechoslovak 
citizenship, which was turned into Czechoslovak federal citizenship, had been prepared and 
applied since 1969. Thus, at the end of 1992 it was generally clear who is and would be a 
citizen of which republic. Thus, the Preamble could also declare that it is a result of the will 
of the Czech Republic's citizens. 
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When the new Constitution came into force, at the same moment the original citizenship 
in the republic in the federation turned into citizenship in the independent state. We can see 
here since that moment the existence of an independent political nation as well, which also 
includes the members of all national minorities living in the Czech Republic. But no 
member of the Czech ethnic nation without citizenship, for example living abroad, was 
included in the political nation. 
In fact the Preamble establishes a limited form or model of the political nation. The 
new state is created by the will of the citizens living in the territory of the Czech Republic. 
We can see this important fact in the formulation recalling the historical parts of the Czech 
Republic, which are Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. 
Thus, the mention of the historical countries is not just a manifestation of some regional 
political movements that existed in 1992 especially in Moravia that demand consideration 
of Moravian identity. It also has a constitutional sense, as was described above. 
It should be stressed that the enumeration of the historical countries does not mean any 
territorial demands. This is especially so in the case of Silesia-the great majority of this 
historical region is now situated in Poland. The Preamble addresses only the regions inside 
the borders of the Czech Republic. 
This emphasis has strong importance in a further part of the Preamble, which refers to 
the statehood of the Lands of the Crown of Bohemia. This sentence also means only a 
reference to the long tradition and one of the paramount phases of Czech statehood, not any 
territorial demands and requests. 
Why the authors of the Preamble refer to statehood in the later middle ages, and not to 
more ancient roots is not entirely clear. They probably wanted to stress the form of the 
Czech state in one of its most extended phases. 
The reference to the Czechoslovak statehood that declares the continuity of the state 
ideas and a close mental connection of the Czech nation with the Czechoslovak state is also 
very important. 
Generally it can be said that we can see in this part of the Preamble a reference to the 
best traditions of Czech statehood in the middle ages and in modem times. The stress on the 
continuity of statehood is also very important, as the Preamble also mentions statehood in 
its "hidden" form, as in the times of the existence of Czechoslovakia. 
The Preamble of the Constitution talks about the issue of human rights in relatively 
modest terms. There are two possible reasons of such an approach. 
The first can result from the fact that the Constitution should not have involved a 
catalogue of human rights. The Constitution should solve mainly the issues bound to 
problems of the structure of the supreme state bodies, division and distribution of the powers 
among them and the system of checks and balances. 
The other reason is that the existing Czechoslovak Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Basic Freedoms should have been recognized as a part of the polylegal constitution of the 
new state. Thus, its Preamble was also taken into the new legal and constitutional system, 
and the issue of human rights could be understood in a certain sense as redundant in the 
Constitution's Preamble. 
Nonetheless this topic was not omitted and the orientation of the new state as to respect 
for human rights and the rule of law was declared in a form that is not different from the 
formulation and approach described in the Charter's Preamble. 
Similarly, as in the Charter's Preamble the Constitution's Preamble also mention the 
desire to belong to the wider family of democratic states respecting human rights. Only 
membership in this group of states can create conditions that are friendly to democracy, 
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human rights and the rule of law. Thus, the belief that a small state is not able to protect 
these values itself was clearly declared. Here we can also see some foundations of the Czech 
aspiration to enter into the European Union, as well as other international human rights and 
security organisations. This part of the Preamble also legitimates the Czech effort to support 
dissidents in different countries, which is a priority of the current Czech foreign policy. 
A very special task of the state is declared in its responsibility for all kinds of 
manifestations of the heritage created by the Czech society and country. One of the main 
problems of the former regime was a lack of required respect or effort to protect all aspects 
of the national heritage. Thus, this point appeared as one of the most important demands 
during the Velvet Revolution. And later it was still an issue during the process of 
reconstitution of the independent Czech Republic. 
Also, the Constitution's Preamble can be judged as a modest document in its 
formulations and aspirations. Its content does not open any special controversies, as the 
document is written to open a new chapter of Czech statehood and constitutionalism, but 
not to explain all the reasons and the previous history. The Preamble also remains a space 
for open future interpretation-with the exception of some very special values like democracy 
and respect for human rights, freedom and the mlc of law, which are the crucial values of 
contemporary Czech constitutionalism. Also, the Constitution's Preamble may serve as a 
common starting point for the entire society, more connecting than dividing. 
VI. Conclusion 
What I wanted to show is that the authors of both of the current binding constitutional 
Preambles followed the concept of drafting in a modest form, more to connect than to 
divide. Such an approach to the problem of the Preamble is, in my opinion, the ideal one. 
The more complex the text is, the more dangers of discontent it contains. Such a danger 
should not be underestimated by the authors of the constitutional project. According to the 
theory of constitutionalism, the constitution as a basic law should be a document of the 
common will of the people. The more groups and interest it covers, the better and more 
stable the new constitutional system is and will be in the future. The stability of the 
constitution is one of its basic values. The constitution, including its preamble, should serve 
as a common anchor for the times, which are not always friendly. The constitution should 
not be in a position of ballast or deadwood, which would stir up desires to cut off some of 
its parts. Sometimes it is better not to mention a controversial topic in favour of general 
success. 
Thus, the purpose of the preambles is to explain why a new chapter of legal 
development is opened, and to offer us a common starting line. Nonetheless, they should 
keep for us a freedom of movement in the new legal period as well. 
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1. The jurisprudence of values has an important role to play in interpreting the Constitution 
in the legal culture of a democratic state ruled by law.1 The Constitution comprises general 
clauses and notions whose meaning it does not specify in detail-and this meaning can be 
established in the light of principles and values set out in the Preamble to the Constitution. 
2. The opening statements of the Polish Constitution2 define the axiological identity of 
Constitutional democracy and they identify the system's underlying principles, including 
some which are mentioned only in the Preamble and not elsewhere in the Constitution (such 
as subsidiarity). 
3. In the Polish doctrine of Constitutional law, opinions about the legal status of the 
Preamble are diversified. 
The normative importance of the Constitution lies in that its particular provision may 
serve as a benchmark, a point of reference in respect of "norms, principles and values". All 
this holds for the Preamble, too. The dominant view in the contemporary doctrine of 
Constitutional law is that the Preamble has a normative character. An opinion expressed in 
literature on the subject posits that "irrespective of its specific features, the Constitution's 
introductory part indeed has a normative character. It also plays an important role in 
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 Values make possible a grounding "in the post-modem law-fuzzy and indeterminate, 
polycentric and multilayered as it is". See Giaro, T.: Wartosci w jçzyku prawnym i dyskursie 
prawniczym (Values in legal language and discourse). In: Trybunat Konstytucyjny: Preambula 
Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Constitutional Court: Preamble to the Polish Constitution). 
Warszawa, 2009, 15. 
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mapping out the lines of interpretation of the basic law's individual norms. And in addition, 
it serves for the Constitution to perform other-than-lcgal functions, such as integration or 
public education".3 It is also argued that an assessment of the Preamble's normative 
character must always be made in respect of a particular Constitution, and that this 
assessment does not have to be the same for all provisions of the Preamble. It is pointed out 
in literature that a tendency towards "normativation" of Constitutional preambles is 
inevitable within the framework of statutory law, where the Constitution is the fundamental 
legal act of the highest import-and this also applies to the Preamble as an integral part the 
Constitution.4 
In the past, it was asserted that "the Constitution's opening remarks are its integral 
part; and the different manner in which these are formulated ... does not suffice to conclude 
that the framers of the Constitution wanted to deprive the Preamble of its normative 
character".5 The view was also presented that the Preamble-even if being of a normative 
character, as part of the Constitution-may also include parts of propagandist and political 
nature, or formulations serving as pointers to interpret the entirety of Constitutional 
provisions.6 According to yet another opinion, the fact that the Preamble is part of the 
Constitution does not necessarily determine the legal status of its provisions.7 And A. 
Gwizdz claimed that individual sentences in the Constitution's introductory part "take on a 
normative character".8 
According to theorists of law, the Preamble is not of an obligatory nature and as such it 
docs not contain norms which would bind an interpreter of the Constitution.9 And in the 
more recent literature on the theory of law, we can find the opinion that "the texts of 
Preambles do not contain material from which to directly construct legal norms" and that 
preambles "should rather serve as an aid to be drawn for the purpose of interpretation, and 
especially when applying the articles laid down in the normative acts to which these 
preambles are attached."10 
Nowadays, it is proposed in the doctrine of Constitutional law that Preamble provisions 
should be divided into those "of a normative character" which "themselves form a legal 
norm or a major part of such norm", and those which do not meet this condition and as such 
3
 See Banaszak, В.: Prawo konstytucyjneporównawcze wspólezesnyehpahstw demokratycznych 
(Comparative Constitutional law of modem democratic states). Kraków, 2004, 130. 
4
 Cf. Jamróz, A. In: Prawo. Administracja. Obywatele (Law. Administration. Citizens). 
Bialystok, 1997, 107. 
5
 Cf. Rozmaryn, S.: Konstytucja jako ustawa zasadnicza PRL (Constitution as the basic law of 
the Polish People's Republic). Warszawa, 1967, 61. 
6
 Cf. Burda, A.: Polskié prawo pahstwowe (Polish Constitutional law). Warszawa, 1977, 158. 
7
 Cf. Siemienski, F.: Prawo konstytucyjne (Constitutional law). Warszawa-Poznan, 1980, 30. 
8
 Cf. Gwizdz, A.: Wstçp do konstytucji-zagadnienia prawne (Constitutional Preamble-legal 
aspects). In: Trzcinski, J. (ed.): Charakter i struktúra norm konstytucji (Nature and structure of 
Constitutional norms). Warszawa, 1997, 183. Cf. also Balaban, A.: Prawny charakter wstçpu do 
polskiej Konstytucji z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku (The legal character of the Preamble to Polish Constitution 
of 2 April 1997). In: Kudcj, M. (ed.): W krçgu zagadnien konstytucyjnych (Around Constitutional 
issues). Katowice, 1999, 120. 
9
 Cf. Lewandowski, S.: Kontrowersje wokót preambul (Controversies over Preambles). Studia 
Iuridica, (1996) 31, 88. 
10
 Cf. Jablonska-Bonca, J.: Wstçp do nauk prawnych (Introduction to Legal Sciences). Gdansk, 
1992, 89. 
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are of "normative importance".11 According to Constitutional interpreters,12 the following 
dimensions of a Preamble's normative nature should be differentiated: 
1. interpretative dimension-the provisions belonging in this dimension "indicate how 
other Constitutional provisions, and all provisions in the entire body of Polish law, should 
be understood". This dimension embraces all provisions of the Preamble, which formulates 
the axiological foundation of the Constitutional order and which specifies the direction 
along which detailed provisions should be interpreted; 
2. constructional dimension-the provisions of the Preamble belonging in this 
dimension may be used in the construction of Constitutional norms, by deriving elements of 
the constructed norm from these provisions. According to L. Garlicki, only some provisions 
of the Preamble may be handled in this way. But it is "almost always" that the Preamble 
and other Constitutional provisions are applied jointly, because "almost always" a principle 
formulated in the Preamble is enlarged upon or repeated in the articles of the Constitution. 
The normative importance of Preamble provisions may consist in that they express on their 
own a Constitutional principle of a normative character (subsidiarity principle).13 
4. The Constitutional Court has many times drawn upon the provisions of the Preamble in 
its rulings.14 
The Constitutional Court said: "Freedom, justice, cooperation and dialogue-these are 
among the values clearly expressed in the preamble to the Constitution of 1997, which must 
be used as criteria in assessing any activities by the public authorities, including the 
legislative activity aiming to realise the principle of a democratic state, ruled by law and 
implementing the tenets of social justice. These requirements unequivocally invoke the so-
called material understanding of the rule of law, and they categorically rule out arbitrary 
law-making" (memorandum of explanation to ruling in case К 34/97). 
Given the Preamble's provision which counts "truth, justice, good and beauty" among 
"universal values", the Constitutional Court said: "The notion of truth is a normative one, 
and not only purely factual. This can be seen in the wording of the Constitution itself. The 
framers of the Constitution refer in the Preamble to truth as a universal value upon which 
the system of government of the Republic is founded" (memorandum of explanation to 
ruling in case SK 13/05). 
In the memorandum of explanation to its ruling in case K. 20/00, asserting the 
constitutionality of a provision in the Environment Act,15 the Constitutional Court pointed 
out that "the Preamble to the Constitution lists among an individual's basic obligations the 
obligation of solidarity with others", which is further fleshed out in Art. 20 of the 
Constitution. According to the Constitutional Court, "the arrangements introduced under 
11
 Cf. L. Garlicki's comments on the Preamble. In: Garlicki, L. (ed.): Konstytucja RP. Komentarz 
(Polish Constitution. A commentary). Warszawa, Vol. V, 2. 
12




 Stefaniuk, M.: Preambula do Konstytucji RP z 2 kwietnia 1997 roku w orzecznictwie 
Trybunatu Konstytucyjnego (Preamble to Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997 in jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Tribunal). Annales UMCS, 2003/2004. Constitutional Court rulings are posted online at 
www.trybunal.gov.pl 
15
 Uniform text in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland) of 1994, No. 49, 
item 196, as amended. 
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the referred provision do serve the implementation of the Constitutional principle of 
solidarity of citizens living in different municipalities". 
Citing the Preamble's provision about the "need for cooperation with all countries for 
the good of the Human Family", the Constitutional Court found that the "interpretation of 
the law of the country should take into account the Constitutional principle of favourable 
attitude towards the process of European integration and cooperation among states (cf. 
Preamble and Art. 9 of the Constitution). Interpreting the law in a way which serves the 
implementation of this Constitutional principle is correct in Constitutional terms and 
preferable" (memorandum of explanation to verdict in ease К 11/03). 
In some of its rulings, the Constitutional Court not only cites the provisions of the 
Preamble, but it also makes direct use of the Preamble by affirming a compliance of the 
referred regulation with the provisions of the Preamble. In such instances, the Preamble, 
cited by the plaintiff as part of the benchmark of Constitutional control, is referred to by 
name in the text of the ruling. 
And so, when assessing the conformity of Poland's Europe Agreement and the 
Accession Terms Act with the values indicated in the Constitutional Preamble, the 
Constitutional Court analysed the significance of the Preamble (case К 18/04). In the 
opinion of the Constitutional Court, the Preamble "contains a characterisation of Poland's 
system-of-government pathway, emphasising the universal pro-independence and 
democratic experiences and pointing to the universal Constitutional values and to the 
underlying principles organising the life of community living in the state, such as democracy, 
respect for human rights, cooperation between the public powers, social dialogue and the 
principle of subsidiarity". Simultaneously, the Constitutional Court said, these values and 
the principle of subsidiarity, are among the underlying foundations of the European 
Communities and the European Union-and this remains relevant for the fundamental 
European values indicated in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
In the memorandum of explanation to its ruling in case К 18/04, the Constitutional 
Court stated that legal norms sensu stricto cannot be derived from the text of the 
Constitutional Preamble. What the Preamble does provide arc "indications, based on the 
Constitution framers' authentic pronouncement, of the lines along which to interpret the 
provisions of the Constitution's normative part, these lines of interpretation being in 
compliance with the intentions of the framers of the Constitution". According to the 
Constitutional Court, the Preamble also retains such status with regard to the benchmarks of 
Constitutional control indictcd by the plaintiffs in case К 18/04. This translates into seeing 
to it that in the process of European integration there is "concern about a sovereign and 
democratic determination of the present and future existence of the Homeland and about 
guarantees of civil rights as well as the efficiency and diligence in the work of public 
bodies" (memorandum of explanation in case К 18/04). An opinion has been expressed in 
the Polish doctrine of Constitutional law that the statement of the Constitutional Court 
"legal norms sensu stricto cannot be derived from the text of the Constitutional Preamble" 
means in fact that "certain parts of the Constitution cannot be presented in the form of a 
traditionally understood legal norm".16 
The Constitutional Court is currently examining motions from Sejm Deputies and 
Senators about the compliance of certain provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon with the 
16
 Garlicki, L.: Uwagi do wstçpu (Comments on the Preamble). In: Garlicki, L. (ed.): Konstytucja 
RR Komentarz (Polish Constitution. A commentary). Warszawa, Vol. V, 20. 
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provisions of the Preamble on the sovereign and democratic determination of the fate of the 
Homeland. The provisions of the Preamble defining the axiological identity of Poland and 
the European Union may, therefore, play an important role legitimising Poland's membership 
of the European Union. 
When ruling on a competences dispute between the Polish President and the Prime 
Minister as to which of the state's central Constitutional bodies is authorised to represent 
the Republic of Poland and communicate the position of the state at meetings of the 
European Council, the Constitutional Court based its ruling on the Preamble. It found that 
in discharging their Constitutional duties and competences, the Polish President, the Council 
of Ministers and the Prime Minister are guided by the principle of cooperation between the 
public powers, as laid down in the Preamble and Art. 133.3 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland (memorandum of explanation in case Kpt 2/08). 
The Constitutional Court has ruled on the compliance of a referred regulation with the 
provisions of the Preamble in a case involving the understanding of the subsidiarity 
principle, whose binding nature is recognised only in court jurisprudence. In the Constitution, 
that principle is only laid down in the Preamble. 
And so, for example, in its ruling in case U 5/04, the Constitutional Court found the 
Council of Ministers' regulation on border delineation and change of name and seat of 
authority for some municipalities and towns and on raising to township the status of some 
localities'7 is in compliance with the Preamble to the Polish Constitution to the extent where 
the Preamble cites the principles of cooperation between the public powers, social dialogue 
and subsidiarity. 
The significance of the subsidiarity principle was taken up by the Constitutional Court 
in the memorandum of explanation to its ruling on case К 24/02. The Constitutional Court 
then said that the principle of subsidiarity, defined in the Preamble as one which strengthens 
the powers of citizens and their communities, "warrants the taking of activities at a higher-
than-local level where such an arrangement turns out to be better and more effective than 
the activities of bodies of local-level communities. The subsidiarity principle should be 
viewed in all its complexity, which means that the strengthening of citizen and local-
community powers does not mean abandoning above-local activities by public authorities. 
Such activities are actually a must where it is not possible for the local-level bodies to solve 
problems." 
In its ruling in case K. 14/03, the Constitutional Court said that the "diligence and 
efficiency of public bodies, and especially those public bodies, which have been created to 
implement and protect the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, is among the values of 
Constitutional importance". This, in the opinion of the Constitutional Court, "clearly results 
from the text" of the Preamble, which "lists the two main objectives of the Constitution: 
guarantying civil rights and ensuring diligence and efficiency in the work of public 
bodies". 
The Court therefore may examine "whether the regulations on the activity of these 
institutions are so designed as to enable their diligent and efficient operation. A regulation 
whose design is not conducive to the diligence or efficiency of institutions protecting the 
Constitutional rights actually represents a violation of these rights, and it is therefore 
warranted to declare it unconstitutional". A similar opinion was expressed by the 
Constitutional Court in the memorandum of explanation to its ruling in case К 20/00. 
17
 Dziennik Ustaw of 2003, No. 134, item 1248. 
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In case К. 54/05, the Constitutional Court ruled that a provision in the Spatial Planning 
and Development Act18 complies with the Preamble to the Polish Constitution to the extent, 
where this Preamble expresses the principle of cooperation between the public powers, the 
subsidiarity principle and the requirement of efficiency and diligence of the public bodies. 
In its ruling in case К 31/06 Constitutional Court attested to the constitutionality of the 
whole Act of 6 September 2006 amending the rules governing elections to municipality 
councils, county councils, and regional assemblies.19 The principle of diligence and 
efficiency in the work of public bodies, espoused in the Preamble, was used by the 
Constitutional Court as a benchmark of Constitutional control of the referred regulations. 
The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court also includes the opinion that the charge 
of Preamble violation by a normative act on the basis of which a final ruling has been 
issued about Constitutionally defined rights, freedoms and obligations must not by itself 
provide a basis for Constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court said so in the 
memorandum of explanation to its ruling in case SK 10/03: "The Constitutional complaint 
is warranted only where Constitutional freedoms or rights have been violated, and only 
where the violation comes as a result of unconstitutionality of the normative act on the 
basis of which the final judgment, injuring the plaintiff, was issued. Therefore, not every 
Constitutional provision may serve as a benchmark of Constitutional control in a proceeding 
launched in response to a complaint". Consequently, among benchmarks in a Constitutional 
complaint proceeding, "the Preamble to the Constitution must be ruled out becausc-leaving 
out doubts about its normative character-it certainly does not comprise norms from which 
arise freedoms and rights" (memorandum of explanation in case SK 10/03). It is thus 
inadmissible for the Constitutional Court, acting in response to a Constitutional complaint, 
to rule on the referred regulations' compliance with the Preamble to the Constitution. 
The issue looks a bit differently in the light of the Constitutional Court's ruling in a 
constitutional-complaint case SK 39/06. The complaint pointed to the Preamble as a 
benchmark of Constitutional control, and the Constitutional Court found in its response that 
the "Preamble is part of the Constitution, and its pronouncements may be of a normative 
character, in the context of a given case and especially in connection with particular 
provisions of the Constitution". However, the Constitutional Court went on, "the plaintiff 
did not indicate the relevant pronouncements of the Preamble and, consequently, did not 
indicate the norms which could be constructed on the basis of such pronouncements. Nor 
did the plaintiff indicate which civil-law right was violated as a result". 
But the part of the Preamble evoking the times "when fundamental freedoms and 
human rights were violated in our Homeland" was actually cited by the Constitutional Court 
in explaining its ruling in constitutional-complaint case SK 42/01. It found then that the 
"negative identification of a group of judges" (deprived of a retirement right), who have 
"worked for, or served in, the security services, and their separation from other judges, 
shows no signs of arbitrariness and complies with the principle of fairness. For this reason, 
it is relevant to characterise people holding the office of judge as participating in the 
apparatus of repression in the indicated period. Consequently it is acceptable, perhaps even 
advisable, (...) that these persons be not treated as equal with the other judges, who did not 
embark on such work for, or collaboration with, the security apparatus". In the opinion of 
18
 Dziennik Ustaw of 2003, No. 80, item 717, as amended. 
19
 Dziennik Ustaw Ho. 159, item 1127. 
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the Constitutional Court, such reasoning is premised on the indicated part of the Preamble 
to the Constitution. 
In its ruling in case Kp 5/08, the Constitutional Court found a particular provision of 
the Act of 4 September 2008 amending the passport act and the stamp fee act to be in 
compliance with the Preamble. The ruling, in a way, sums up the opinions presented in 
earlier rulings and the doctrine of Constitutional law. 
In its memorandum of explanation in case Kp 5/08, the Constitutional Court recalled that 
"doubts exist as to the normative character of the Preamble to the fundamental law". In the 
opinion of the Constitutional Court, these doubts "result from the circumstance that it is not 
possible to derive legal norms sensu stricto from the text of this Preamble". But on the other 
hand, "the introductory part of the Constitution of 1997 contains a characterisation of Poland's 
system-of-government pathway, emphasising the universal the pro-independence and 
democratic experiences and pointing to the universal Constitutional values and to the 
underlying principles organising the life of the community living in the state, such as 
democracy, respect for human rights, cooperation between the public powers, social 
dialogue and the principle of subsidiarity". The Constitutional Court further said that "in 
the light of the most recent Constitutional doctrine, this suffices to recognise the normative 
character of the Preamble to the Constitution". In the opinion of the Constitutional Court, 
"a tendency towards 'normalisation' of Constitutional preambles is inevitable within the 
framework of statutory law, where the Constitution is the fundamental legal act of the 
highest import-and this also applies to the Preamble as an integral part the Constitution". 
5. The Constitutional Court has often cited Preamble provisions in its rulings. In particular, 
the Court checked the compliance of particular regulations with the provisions of the 
Preamble, these provisions constituting for the Court a benchmark by which to control the 
referred regulations. In other rulings, the Court cited the Preamble when "supplementing 
arguments with regard to the assessment of norms with other benchmarks, contained in 
articles of the Constitution" (memorandum of explanation in case Kp 5/08). That was about 
the provisions of the Preamble, especially those concerning the sovereignty of the Polish 
People, the cooperation between the public powers, subsidiarity, and also diligence and 
efficiency in the work of public bodies. 
It looks like the Preamble, which largely found itself in the Constitution in order to 
emphasise the continuation of Constitutional tradition,20 has been gradually gaining in 
importance in the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence as material to construct Constitutional 
principles and norms, in search of solutions to major problems related to the system of 
governance. 
Constitutional commentators point out that the Preamble "provides an important clue 
to interpreting the provisions of the act which it opens". According to representatives of 
doctrine, "a modem constitutional court cannot adjudicate without invoking various kinds 
of values. And their largest collection is provided in the opening crédits to fundamental 
laws. In addition to stating the overarching ideas and underlying principles, the Constitutional 
Preamble also expresses the framers' other statements of the most important points of law". 
20
 See Stefaniuk, M. E.: Tradycje preambut w polskich konstytucjach i ich wptyw na rozwiqzania 
wspólezesne (Traditions of Polish Constitutional Preambles and their influence on modem 
arrangements). In: Witkowski, W. (ed.): W krçgu historii i wspólezesnosei polskiego prawa (The past 
and present of Polish law). Lublin, 2008, 696. 
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If the Preamble were ignored in Constitutional Court rulings, this would "put in question 
the legality and correctness of the decisions taken. Without steadily taking note of the 
Constitution's opening part, these decisions would be flawed and would fail to reflect in full 
the rich contents of the Polish supreme law. (. . .) A progressing juridisation of the whole 
Constitutional text stands in contradiction to the opinions regarding the introductory part as 
just an ideological and political declaration."21 
By invoking provisions of the Preamble, it is easier to find rules legitimising the country's 
membership of the European Union-and this is also conducive to a polycentric system of 
sources of law. It transpires from the Preamble that the Constitution should be understood and 
applied in conformity with a common European tradition, while respecting national sovereignty 
and identity. The provisions of the Preamble dealing with Constitutional principles and values 
form a "bridge" between natural law and positivist law, which may be conducive to a fuller 
protection of human rights in the state, and consequently a better operation of Constitutional 
democracy. 
From this viewpoint, how Preamble is understood may also serve to strengthen 
the capacity to defend the Constitution against hypothetical changes contradicting its 
function of human rights' guarantee and, consequently, compromising the tenets of 
constitutionalism. 
For the Constitution to be understood in a way commensurate with the constitutionalist 
approach, one first needs to assume that the authorities should be constrained by human 
rights.22 Thus, the public authorities, even if backed by a majority, cannot just do 
"anything"23-even if they observe the rules laid down in the text of the Constitution. In 
particular, the constitutionalist approach contests the opinion that we enjoy human rights 
because they are inscribed in the Constitution. On the contrary, they are inscribed in the 
Constitution because they are human rights. This means that not all provisions of the 
fundamental law can be changed without risking that it will lose features of a Constitution. 
Constitutionalism is opposed by theories of Constitution which posit that by observing the 
relevant procedural requirements, it is possible to arbitrarily determine the contents of the 
fundamental law.24 
The injunction to respect "the inherent dignity of the person, his or her right to freedom 
and the obligation of solidarity with others" is described in the Preamble to the Constitution 
as "the unshakeable foundation of the Republic of Poland". The way in which the 
Constitution is applied must rest of a foundation of principles, not on fluctuating political 
configurations reflecting election results. A serious approach to the Constitution requires 
that we notice the special significance of the Preamble's conclusive part. Having regained 
the possibility of a sovereign and democratic determination of Homeland's fate, we now bar 
the authority-including a majority-backed authority-from legitimising violations of the 
state's axiological foundations. These foundations must remain "inviolable", meaning 
"resistant to being revised, undermined, moved or overturned".25 In this way, the Preamble 
defines the limits of legitimate authority, including the authority to revise the Constitution. 
21
 See Вое, J.: Konstytucje Rzeczypospolitej oraz komentarz do Konstytucji RP z 1997 r. (Polish 
Constitutions and comment on the Constitution of 1997). Wroclaw, 1998. 12. 
22
 See Murphy, W.: Constitutional Democracy: Creating and Maintaining a Just Political 
Order. Baltimore, 2007, 6. 
23
 Cf. Memorandum of explanation of Constitutional Court ruling in case U 4/06. 
24
 Cf. Murphy: op. cit. 15. 
25
 See Dunaj, B. (ed.): Slownik wspóiczesnego jçzyka polskiego (Modern Polish Dictionary). 
Warszawa, 1996, 616. 
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And it is precisely through the prism of Preamble provisions that we should understand 
the rules governing Constitutional change, as provided in Chapter XII. That chapter contains 
procedural provisions which take on a substantive importance precisely due to the Preamble 
which serves as an "important axiological clue in the process of interpreting other 
Constitutional provisions, as phrased in individual articles".26 Chapter XII does not set the 
limits to change, because it deals with procedure. It is in the introductory part that the limits 
are defined (in the form of "unshakeable foundation"), the principles are named which must 
not be breached, and the overriding objective to be sought by the changes is indicated: "the 
good of the Third Republic." Other objectives are ruled out by the Preamble, which thus 
constrains the authority wielded by a majority capable of bringing about changes in 
accordance with the procedure defined by the Constitution.27 
The obligation to respect the provisions of the Preamble rests upon all those who apply 
the Constitution, including the Constitutional Court, in all its functions. Now, if we accept 
that the Constitution must not infringe "the inherent dignity of the person, his or her right to 
freedom and the obligation of solidarity with others", it remains to be explained who 
else-other than the legislators and the electorate-shoulders the responsibility for the 
observance of these principles and values. Given the Preamble's closing passage, where 
respect for principles is described as the unshakeable foundation of the state, one could 
hardly rule out an extension of the Constitutional Court's terms of reference to embrace the 
content of Constitution-revising statutes-precisely from the viewpoint of those principles 
and values which are described in the Preamble as "unshakeable". As has been pointed out 
in doctrine, the Constitutional Court may examine the constitutionality of Constitution-
revising procedure as part of preventive control28 (exercised before a Constitution-changing 
statute is signed by the president). But if such examination is accepted as part of ex ante 
control, this means that we recognise the Court's competence to make pronouncements on 
Constitution revising laws. It is my belief that the terms of reference of the Constitutional 
Court may include the control of such statutes (both ex ante and ex post) not only in its 
procedural aspect but also in the material aspect-precisely because of the Preamble's 
closing part. Supporting this position is the specific nature of the Constitutional Revision 
Act, remembering that the Constitution-strictly speaking-is not a new constitution but 
rather a statue revising the existing constitution. In a situation, where its is found acceptable 
to examine the constitutionality of a statute ceding state bodies' competences in some 
matters to an international body or organisation-even though the passage of such statute 
requires special procedure in both chambers (including the requirement of two-thirds 
majority in both chambers)-, then constitutional control of a Constitution-revising statute 
no longer looks out-of-the-question from the viewpoint of procedural requirements. If a 
statute approving the previously mentioned cession of competences comes within the terms 
of reference of the Constitutional Court-as defined by the notion of "statute" in Art. 188 of 
the Constitution29-then a "Constitution-revising statute" may likely come within these terms 
26
 See Garlicki, L.: Polskié prawo konstytucyjne (Polish Constitutional law). Warszawa, 2009, 42. 
27
 Cf. Piotrowski, R.: Preambula i zagadnienie granic zmian w Konstytucji RP (The Preamble 
and the question of limits to revision of Polish Constitution). In: Trybuna/ Konstytucyjny, Preambula 
Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskié. Warszawa, 2009, 139. 
28
 Cf. W. Sokolewicz's comments on Art. 235 of Polish Constitution. In: Garlicki, L. (ed.): 
Konstytucja RP. Komentarz (Polish Constitution. A commentary). Vol. II, Warszawa, 2001, 72. 
29
 See L. Garlicki's comments on Art. 188 of Polish Constitution. In: Garlicki, L. (ed.): 
Konstytucja RP. Komentarz (Polish Constitution. A commentary). Vol. V, Warszawa, 2007, 14. 
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as well. Consequently, the statute referred to in Art. 188 of the Constitution also means a 
Constitution-revising statute.30 It would indeed be hard to accept a situation where, in a 
democratic state ruled by law, the framers of the system of governance are not bound by the 
requirement of decent legislation within the area subject to Constitutional Court's 
examination, while they are so bound in their capacity as legislators. And besides, it is only 
natural that the framers of the system of governance should act on the basis of law and 
within the bounds of the law. 
The interpretation of the provisions of the Preamble to the Polish Constitution may 
provide an instrument with which to defend Constitutional democracy's axiological identity 
against potential threats from a majority susceptible to pressure from politicians and media. 
This line of defence may prove useful in avoiding a situation where the creators of public 
opinion (as reflected in the results of public opinion polls) will become the creators of 
Constitutional changes. The proposed interpretation reflects neither the position of doctrine 
of Constitutional law nor the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court which has had no 
reason to take up the question of limits to Constitutional change. The Polish Constitution, in 
its part phrased in articles, does not regard any provisions as unchangeable. Doctrine rules 
out the existence of unchangeable provisions in the Polish Constitution. It has been 
demonstrated, though, that there are restrictions on Constitutional change, stemming from 
Poland's membership of the European Union.3' On the other hand, the importance of 
external factors, related to membership of the European Union, seems to be fairly limited 
by the Constitutional Court's recognition of the primacy of the fundamental law over 
European law. 
It is my opinion that the Polish Constitutional Preamble, in its closing part, contains a 
clause on the immutability of the Constitution. The formulation of this clause and 
identification of an internal benchmark on limits to Constitutional change leads us to the 
conclusion that the clause itself must be regarded as unchangeable-as long as there exists 
the world of values defining the identity of a Constitutional culture in which it belongs.32 
The values in question-coessential to the constraint on authority due to the dignity of the 
person-have been present in European culture since the times of Homer and Sophocles. 
They have survived triumphs of violence, and they remain relevant despite manifestations 
of the "intelligence of evil"-and despite the ambivalence of all political forms connected 
with phenomena such as "voluntary enslavement" or "instinctive, suicidal ineffectiveness 
of systems of power".33 The unshakeable Constitutional foundation, laid down in the 
Preamble, thus represents a steadfastness of values which constitutionalism accepts as an 
authority higher than the highest "powers that be"-an anchor for dignity of the person. At 
the same time, this unshakable nature makes of the Preamble a barrier to virtualisation, 
30
 Cf. Sokolewicz: op. cit., who however argues that "from the very essence of a Constitutional-
revising statute it transpires that control must not be applied to the statute's substantive provisions 
which by definition have been designed to modify Constitutional provisions". Similarly, L. Garlicki: 
ibid. 
31
 Cf. Garlicki, L.: Aksjologiczne podstawy reinterpretacji konstytucji (Axiological basis for 
reinterpretation of the Constitution). In: Zubik, M. (ed.): Dwadziescia lat transformacji ustrojowej w 
Polsce (Twenty years of systemic transformation in Poland). Warszawa, 2010, 99. 
32
 Cf. Piotrowski: op. cit. 142. 
33
 Cf. Baudrillard, J.: Pakt jasnosci. О inteligencji zla (The Lucidity Pact, or The Intelligence of 
Evil). Warszawa, 2005, 136. 
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which poses a threat to the Constitution in the same degree as other contraptions of the 
social world, where "anything, any moment, can turn into anything else".34 
6. But the higher the frequency of principle- and value-invoking notions in the 
Constitutional text (usually in the Preamble), the greater and the more real is the authority 
of those who interpret these notions-and impart sense to them-in conditions of a particular 
constitutional dispute. This holds in particular for situations where, in particular 
circumstances of a particular case, the values declared in the Preamble stand in conflict 
among themselves, which requires that some of these values be either preferred over, or 
counter-balanced by, others. The judges empowered to interpret the Preamble, and also 
interpret the Constitution from the Preamble's viewpoint, are thus awarded with the right of 
last word in particular political disputes-and they will hold this prerogative at least as long 
as the Constitution stays. This requires an appropriate restraint in invoking the Constitutional 
Preamble in Constitutional Court rulings and appropriate prudence in appointing the Justices 
of the Court, whose legitimacy stems from the special role of the Constitution under 
democracy and from the Constitutional Court's mastery of the art of passing judgement on 
what is good and what is bad-in accordance with the maxim ius est ars boni et aequi. The 
existence of Preamble to the Constitution, and its application in Constitutional jurisprudence, 
is conducive to an inter-penetration of statutory-law culture and the culture of judge-
generated law-which is an element of the common Constitutional tradition of European 
countries. 
The transformations of the notion of national sovereignty, linked to its restriction by 
human rights, offer a great deal of legitimacy to the activities of the Constitutional Court 
which thus becomes a guardian of the limits to sovereignty, understood as exercise of 
authority based on the force of values referred to in the Preamble to the Polish 
Constitution-and simultaneously restricted by these values. Such re-definition of the notion 
of sovereignty legitimises the activities of the Constitutional Court, and at the same time 
makes this legitimacy contingent on the Constitutional Court's involvement in the protection 
of human rights-remembering that respect for human rights provides a yardstick of 
sovereignty.35 
The impact exerted by the Preamble on the Polish Constitutional Court's jurisdiction is 
both positive (from the standpoint of the tenets of constitutionalism) and restricted. The 
provisions of the Preamble proved useful for the purpose of legitimising the process of 
European integration and legitimising the public authorities because, when it comes to the 
application of the Constitution, the Preamble basically favours a balance between the realm 
of ideas and values on the one hand and the sphere of social practice on the other, between 
the need for change and the necessity of continuity in state affairs-and that, one might 
venture to suggest,36 is what constitutions are for. 
34
 Arendt, H.: Miçdzy czasem minionym i przyszlym (Between Past and Future). Warszawa, 
1994, 117. 
35
 Cf. Piotrowski, R.: Uwagi о ustrojowym znaczeniu sqdownictwa konstytucyjnego [Comments 
on the systemic importance of Constitutional courts]. In: Budzilo, K. (ed.): Ksiçga XXV-lecia 
Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego (In commemoration of the 25th anniversary of Constitutional Court). 
Warszawa, 2010, 323. 
36
 Cf. Spadaro, A.: Contribute per una teória della costituzione. Milano, 1994, 47. 
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EWA POPLAWSKA* 
Preamble to the Constitution as an Expression of 
the New Axiology of the Republic of Poland 
A b s t r a c t . If we realize that in the first consti tut ional laws of modern const i tut ional ism (such as the Constitution of 
the U S A of 1787, the Declarat ion of the Rights of Man and of the Cit izen, the Polish Constitution of 3 May 1791 
and the French Constitution of 3 September 1791), the contents of the p reambles corresponded to contemporary 
chap t e r s defining the pr inciples of the sys tems of state government , whi le the opening chapter of the Polish 
Const i tu t ion of April 2, 1997 includes 29 articles, a question arises whe the r it was necessary to precede that 
Cons t i tu t ion with a preamble. 1 Introductions to consti tutions are part of the Polish systemic tradition: they featured 
in the Constitution of 1791, as well as in the so-called March Consti tution of 1921, the Constitution of the Polish 
P e o p l e ' s Republic of 1952 and the so-callcd Small Constitution of 1992, w h e r e a s the so-called Apri l Constitution 
of 1935 did not have one. 
Like those of other states, the ma jo r contents of the Preamble to the Constitution include a solemn 
proc lamat ion of those pr inciples and assumpt ions that its makers found part icular ly important in light of the state's 
h is tory and contemporaneous situation. Sett ing these out explicitly was a s s u m e d to further the goal of integrating 
consecu t ive generations a round a certain sys tem of values as well as legi t imising the system of government that 
w a s thereby established.2 This is why the Preamble indicates the entity w h o acts as the consti tutional legislator 
(pouvoir constituant) as " the Polish Nat ion-a l l cit izens of the Republic", descr ibes the Consti tution itself as the 
" the bas i c law for the State", characterizes the historical context in which the fundamental law was adopted a n d -
m o s t significantly—1 ists all the basic goals of the Polish State and the fundamenta l principles underlying the 
f u n d a m e n t a l law. 
T h e reader may find it striking that the Preamble contents largely over lap, or at least are not coordinated 
wi th , t he wording of provis ions of the first chapter , entitled "The Republic". This chapter is, as we have mentioned, 
very long and-as the title sugges t s -no t only does it list the classic principles of the state government system, but it 
a lso g ives quite an exhaus t ive description of the Polish national communi ty in all its complexity (including the 
s t a te ' s main tasks and symbols , but also, a m o n g other things, references to the institutions of civil society, the 
def in i t ion of marriage en joy ing the protection of the state, the duty to take care of war invalids, etc.) .3 
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It is something of a paradox that because of the moment and circumstances of adoption, the 
Preamble is more a device supporting and crowning the fundamental law than an introduction 
to it.4 This results from the fact that, despite the intentions the National Assembly previously 
adopted, according to which there was to be no introduction, at the final stage of work on 
the Constitution (at the end of 1996) a decision was made to include an introduction which 
was to determine finally the ideological character of the fundamental law. Out of the seven 
constitutional bills submitted to the National Assembly, four had introductions, while three 
did not. Although in the course of work the idea of adding a preamble was not excluded, the 
vast regulation of Chapter I originally tipped the scales against a preamble. The eventual 
decision to add an introduction at the final stage of work on the Constitution was taken on 
strictly political grounds. In an attempt to get the supermajority in the National Assembly 
required to adopted the constitution (2/3) and then passage in the national referendum, 
a decision was made to include a Preamble with a denominatio Dei and references to 
axiology similar to the social teaching of the church. 
The coalition of the centre-left parties (SLD, PSL, UW, UP) that reached agreement as 
to the text of the Constitution hoped to broaden approval among members of the Parliament 
and, later on, the Poles voting in a referendum, to include right-wing circles by means 
unequivocally anchoring the fundamental law in a system of values close to Christian 
democracy. The plan failed, because the opposition did not change its hostile attitude despite 
the inclusion of a preamble. 
Eight drafts of the Preamble were submitted, and of these the version Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki had promoted, prepared by Catholic intellectual and activist Stefan Wilkanowicz, 
was chosen. The somewhat hasty preparation of the Preamble and failure to correct the 
provisions of the first chapter after the Preamble had been adopted caused the existing 
repetitions and inconsistencies. 
The introduction is written in a particularly solemn style, which is typical of preambles 
in general. Although doubts as to the normative character of the introduction, or at least its 
portions capable of direct application, currently seem to have been positively settled by the 
Constitutional Court, at the time the Constitution was adopted the situation was less 
unequivocal and the views of Polish legal scholars and commentators diverged. One should 
not be surprised that devotion to traditional, pompous and sometimes not sufficiently clear 
language prevailed over care for clarity of the language of the law. 
The first problem caused by the Preamble concerns the definition of the Polish Nation 
as the constitution-maker-the entity that establishes the Constitution "as the basic law for 
the State". In this context, the Preamble further defines the Polish Nation as "all citizens of 
the Republic", therefore a political and not an ethnie nation. But at the same time it makes 
reference to being "bound in community with our compatriots dispersed throughout the 
world", therefore not ignoring the other definition of a nation. 
The National Assembly dccided to recognise the existing division of Polish citizens by 
referring to both "those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty" 
and "those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other 
sources". Members of both categories are treated as "equal in rights and obligations towards 
the common good-Poland". The authors' intention was to stress the universal character of 
the highest values on which the Polish national community is founded: truth, justice, 
4
 Complak, K.. In: Boc, J. (ed.): Konstytucje Rzeczypospolitej oraz komentarz do Konstytucji RP 
z 1997 r. [Polish Constitutions and Commentary on the 1997 Constitution]. Wroclaw, 1998, 13. 
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goodness and beauty, even though there are various sources from which different persons 
assume their origin. A more down-to-earth argument for choosing the expression was the 
intention to find a formula to replace the invocation of God, which was firmly demanded by 
right-wing and Catholic circles. Although the introduction also refers to the "Christian 
heritage of the Nation", these expressions did not convince those opponents, who did not 
consider these a worthy substitute for the desired express reference to God ("In the name of 
God Almighty..." was included in Polish constitutions of 1791 and 1921). These references 
were also criticised by supporters of consistent secularisation of the Constitution. 
Paradoxically, the dualist formula, judged as moderately successful in Poland, was taken 
into consideration when the Convention on reform of the European Union worked on the 
Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty. 
References to a supernatural being arc not references to a specific religion, but relate to 
all faiths especially in the context of recent events that polarized the Polish community after 
the presidential plane crash, when reflecting on the expediency of the double definition of 
members of the Nation in the Constitution, one cannot lose sight of its basic meaning. The 
Constitution clearly emphasises the shared highest values, while realistically stating the 
different ideological backgrounds of citizens. It does the same when it mentions "our 
responsibility before God or our own consciences", which is to accompany the establishment 
of the Constitution. 
From that formulation one can draw an important interpretative conclusion as to the 
nature of the Polish state. Firstly, it excludes both transformation into a religious state and 
into a radically atheist one. (The details of the relationship between the state and religious 
organizations is regulated by Art. 25 of Chapter I and Art. 48 and 53 of Chapter 11, which is 
devoted to the status of an individual.) Secondly, it introduces into the text of the fundamental 
law a reference to transcendental, supernatural values, which fits well with the definition of 
"the inherent and inalienable dignity of the person" as "a source of freedoms and rights of 
persons and citizens" (Art. 30). Thus, the Preamble initiates the introduction of natural law 
into the Polish fundamental law and gives it a binding character. 
It is also in the classical part of the introduction, which refers to the history and place 
of the state in the contemporary world, that one can find important axiological provisions, 
to which the Constitutional Court has often referred in its judgments. The makers of the 
Constitution leave no doubt as to which periods of Polish history and corresponding 
systemic solutions they perceive as positive (for example, "struggle for independence 
achieved at great sacrifice", "the best traditions of the First and the Second Republic") and 
which ones they condemn ("bitter experiences of the times when fundamental freedoms and 
human rights were violated in our Homeland"). 
In a way unprecedented in Polish constitutional history, the fundamental law of 1997 
expresses the State's attitude towards its international surroundings. Constitution makers, in 
light of the Preamble, declare that they are "aware of the need for cooperation with all 
countries for the good of the Human Family". In the legal sphere, pursuant to Art. 9 ("The 
Republic of Poland shall respect international law binding upon it."), there is proclaimed as 
a principle a general favourable attitude of Polish law towards international law, which is 
then concretised by way of a detailed regulation on the place of international agreements in 
the domestic legal order and through openness to integration processes. Not only did the 
Constitution provide for the possibility of transferring the powers of State authorities as to 
some matters to an international organization or body, together with a specific procedure for 
expressing consent to ratification of an agreement upon such a transfer, but it also anticipated 
the inclusion in the national legal order of legal instruments with an integrative character 
enacted by such an organization. 
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Due to the scope and abundance of constitutional provisions that form the grounds for 
the international cooperation of the Republic of Poland, they can be considered as an 
element of axiology of the fundamental law. Unlike "constitutional values", this axiological 
choice in the Constitution is realized by way of sub-constitutional instruments (among 
others, extensive amendments to laws because of the need to harmonize them with EU law 
before accession, and now implementing directives), and expressed in the case law of the 
Constitutional Court. In its judgment assessing the conformity of the Accession Treaty with 
the Constitution, the Court referred to the constitutional principles quoted in the Preamble, 
such as democracy, respect for rights of the individual, cooperation between the public 
powers, social dialogue and the principle of subsidiarity, and pointed out that these principles 
belong at the same time to "fundamental assumptions of functioning of the European 
Communities and the European Union" (judgment К 18/04). It was on the axiological 
aspects that it grounded, among other things, its convictions about the lack of discrepancies 
between the Accession Treaty and the Polish Constitution. 
The Preamble identifies the basic values to be realised by the Polish State. It mentions 
the desire to "guarantee the rights of the citizens for all time" and ensure "diligence and 
efficiency in the work of public bodies". The principles on which-according to the 
Preamble-"the basic law for the State", that is, the constitutional provisions, are to be based 
occupy a special place. It also refer to "respect for freedom and justice", "cooperation 
between the public powers", "social dialogue" and "the principle of subsidiarity in the 
strengthening the powers of citizens and their communities". It is clear from the context 
that there can be no doubt that the constitutional legislator intended that those applying the 
fundamental law be guided by the above principles. The first is developed in detail in the 
"articled" part of the Constitution. The second further defines the principle of the separation 
and balance of powers from Art. 10 and clarifies that the system of government in Poland 
corresponds to the parliamentary model. "Social dialogue" should be understood more 
broadly than just in the context of a social market economy, as a principle of the socio-
economic system of the Republic of Poland (Art. 20), where the term is used again. 
The last principle, that of subsidiarity, deserves special attention, because it is the focus 
of problems relating to the normative character of the Preamble. Although this principle, 
too, is reflected and concretised in detailed constitutional provisions, it is not clearly 
repeated there, nor, all the more so, is it defined, which arouses doubts in light of Poles' 
slight familiarity with (or even the prevailing misunderstanding of) this principle. 
* * * 
While the principle of subsidiarity is a novel solution as far as Polish constitutional 
provisions are concerned, it has already served as a useful point of reference and a general 
guideline in the political and constitutional transformations that Poland has been going 
through in recent years. It offers an exceptionally pertinent answer to a fundamental question 
about the desired extent and tasks of State authority. While in search of the model of the 
State and its functions that best corresponds with the needs of post-Communist society, one 
could hardly accept without any greater objections the model of the welfare State which-as 
shown by recent West-European experience-has failed due to its overdevelopment of the 
administration and impoverishment of the public sector and the related growing passivity of 
the citizens. What seems just as ill-suited to the social situation of Poland is another model 
initially thought to be an effective remedy against the negative social phenomena inherited 
from the former system: that is, the model of a liberal State in the classic sense, with the 
State's organizational functions restricted to the minimum. 
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According to the principle of subsidiarity, the chief function of power is to satisfy the 
needs of its subordinate communities or persons who shape their fates independently and 
bear the related responsibility but are incapable of full development. The aims and tasks of 
power should not extend beyond those of its subordinate individuals or groups. What 
justifies the existence of power is the lack of self-sufficiency on the part of those individuals 
and groups. Therefore, the role of power is secondary and auxiliary as it is nothing but a 
means to the achievement of aims by individuals and communities. 
The idea of subsidiarity-a specific "common sense" principle relating to the nature of all 
social organizations-has been known for many ages now and can be found repeatedly in the 
history of philosophy and in political thought. Subsidiarity's roots lie in Aristotelian political 
science and Thomist doctrine and philosophy. In the fonner, it appears as a principle of justice 
implicit in the notion that an association is not an end in itself but serves to help participants 
in the association to help themselves. This has been recognised in that since in large 
organizations the process of decision-making is more remote from the initiative of most of 
the many members who will carry out the decision, the same principle requires that larger 
associations should not assume functions that can be performed efficiently by smaller 
associations.5 In the Thomist context, it not only forms part of the Thomist notions of 
hierarchy and order but is also to be found in the notion of social and rational collaboration 
and the diversity of individual and collective capacities essential to such collaboration.6 
However, Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler gave the subsidiary principle its name only 
quite recently, in 1862 in "Freiheit, Autoritaet und Kirche", with respect to Germany and 
Switzerland.7 Since the 1930s, the social teaching of the Catholic Church, which related 
that principle to the philosophy of personalism, has made an important contribution to the 
conccptual development of the principle of subsidiarity.8 
Until recently, subsidiarity was not a familiar part of the contemporary legal lexicon. 
That it has become so is largely due to controversy within the European Community over 
the terms on which it should progress towards some form of European Union. It has been 
employed in the debates over the division of competences between the Community (and 
then the Union) and its Member States. That process eventually resulted in a statement of 
the principle being incorporated in the European Community Treaty (Art. 3b) as amended 
by the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) 1992, and then clarified in the Protocol on 
the Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity and Proportionality attached to the 
Amsterdam Treaty, 1997, approved and developed recently by the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. 
There, an attempt is made to allocate competence in terms of the criterion of achieving the 
objectives of the Community. Some have hailed it as a guiding principle for relations 
5
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 Millon-Delsol, Ch.: Le principe de subsidiarité. Paris, 1993, 3 -8 ; Millon-Delsol, C.: L'Etat 
subsidiaire. Paris, 1992, 18-84; Melchionni, M. G.: Subsidiarity from the historical perspective. In: 
Hrbek, R. (ed.): Die Anwendung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips in der Europäischen Union. Baden-Baden, 
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between the Union and its Member States;9 others regard it as a mere facade and doubt its 
value as a legal concept.10 
Putting aside the specific application of the principle of subsidiarity with respect to the 
mechanisms of European integration, the mere fact of its introduction into the legal 
terminology contributed to its considerable popularity and theoretical development. As a 
principle of constitutional law, the principle of subsidiarity was among the subjects discussed 
at the 14th International Congress of Comparative Law held in Athens in August 1994. In a 
recapitulation of the work of 12 national reporters, Prof. John W. Bridge (University of 
Exeter, UK) stated that "subsidiarity is not generally found as an express principle of 
constitutional law, other than in the context of the European Union. But either the principle 
or the underlying concept from which the principle is derived is generally implicit or 
inherent in constitutional law and/or structures. In some cases the principle or concept has 
informed or is informing the constitution-making process. In others it is used as a tool of 
constitutional implementation and interpretation in relation to the allocation of decision-
making power."" 
In accordance with the formulations of Catholic social science, the principle of 
subsidiarity is based on the assumption that man is the sole independent being.12 Just like 
man, who only seeks the community's help through organization of or participation in 
communities created by nature if he cannot perform his life tasks himself, and only to the 
extent necessary, any smaller or "inferior" community also only resorts to the help of larger 
or "superior" communities i f i t cannot perform its tasks as determined by the needs of all its 
members. Hence all "superior" communities are obliged to respect the rights of "inferior" 
communities, thus securing to them the possibility of performing their natural tasks. 
The principle of subsidiarity can be reduced to the following two basic postulates in 
reference to the individual-community-State relation: 
1. as much freedom as possible, as much collectivization as absolutely necessary; 
2. as much society as possible, as much State as absolutely necessary. 
Even if they have never been formulated as explicitly in official documents, these 
postulates formed the foundations of the Polish reform movement aimed at subversion of 
the totalitarian system. 
The position of subsidiarity in the constitutional law follows from the principles of the 
organisation of socio-political life that can be educed from it. The first of these is the 
principle of organic construction of State community, in other words, of State pluralism. It 
postulates a multi-level organisation of society where, situated between individual and 
State, there are many varied intermediate communities: professional (trade unions and 
employers' unions), local (local governments), political (political parties) and cultural 
(associations). This conception sees the State as the supreme social organisation that 
coordinates and manages the whole of the social system, and not just something that controls 
9
 Delors, J.: Subsidiarité: défi du changement. Actes du colloque Jacques Delors. Maastricht, 
1991; Constantinesco, V.: La subsidiarité comme principe constitutionnel de l'intégration européenne. 
A ussenwirtschaft, 1991,439^459. 
10
 Dehousse, R.: Does Subsidiarity Really Matter? European University Institute of Florence 
Working Paper, LAW 92/32. 
11
 Bridge, J. W.: Subsidiarity as a Principle of Constitutional Law. General Report, International 
Academy of Comparative Law, XIV Congress, Athens, 31 July-6 August 1994, 30. 
12
 In particular, the encyclical Pope Pius XI: Quadragesimo Anno. 1931 and the encyclical Pope 
John XXIII: Mater et Magistra. 1961. 
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an atomized society of individuals through its machine of coercion. What follows from the 
principle of pluralism are principles of self-government and of federation, a special case of 
national self-government. 
Another principle of the organisation of social life that follows directly from 
subsidiarity is the principle of decentralisation of State authority. It consists of the State's 
renunciation of a part of its rights to inferior communities: national, local, professional 
organizations, unions of families, etc. The minimum postulate of decentralization is the 
separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judiciary, which prevents an 
accumulation of power with its demoralizing effect and the danger of abuse, and guarantees 
mutual supervision of the functionally separate elements of the State machine. Real 
decentralisation depends also on the structure and range of competences of administrative 
authorities, and in practice also on the professional level and moral standards of the 
administrative machine. 
The third and probably most important principle to be cduced from subsidiarity is the 
principle of democracy expressed by way of the real and not just formal participation of 
broad masses of society in government. For genuine democracy to be introduced, it is 
indispensable that all citizens be made equal and given the opportunity to participate in all 
spheres and manifestations of State activity. 
To recapitulate the importance of the principle of subsidiarity, subjective freedom of 
individuals based on their equality before the law should be the basic source of law in a 
democratic State. This provides the foundations for social justice that meets the requirements 
of personal dignity and is based on the moral sense and free cooperation of community 
members. In a genuine democracy, the community of interests of the rulers and the ruled is 
derived not only from the rulers' awareness of being plenipotentiaries of the society but 
also from the two groups' profound inner moral bond that unites them in their journey 
towards the common good.13 
The Republic of Poland is a unitary State where in the last 20 years a radical 
transformation of the political and socio-economic system took place and the autocratic 
totalitarian system controlled by the Communist party and the centrally planned economy 
were abandoned. For these reasons, manifestations of subsidiarity in Poland's constitutional 
system should be sought not precisely in the repartition of the powers of decision-making 
between the separate levels of the State machine but rather, and predominantly, in the 
radical and multi-plane subjectivisation of the society that resulted from the adopted 
principles of political pluralism and the free market. 
These two principles follow from the profound revaluation of the mutual relations 
between individual, society and State that proceeds in the ideological sphere. The idea of 
subjection of the individual to the laws of history is replaced by that of inalienable human 
rights, the philosophy of collectivism by that of personalism and the idea of statism by the 
idea of civil society.14 
Although the principle of subsidiarity was introduced expressly into Polish 
constitutional law only in the Constitution adopted in 1997, the whole of the reforms 
launched previously, which aimed at transforming the system from autocracy into liberal 
13
 See more: Strzeszewski, Cz.: Katolicka nauka spoleczna [Catholic Social Teaching]. Warsaw, 
1985, 508-521. 
14
 Sokolewicz, W.: Democracy, Rule of Law and Constitutionality in Post-Communist Society 
of Eastern Europe. Droit Polonais Contemporain-Polish Contemporary Law, (1990) 2, 5-6. 
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democracy and at submission of the State to the rigours of law and of the Constitution 
above all, arc of paramount importance to the position of individual in society and the State; 
they guarantee the rights and liberties of individuals and define the functions of the State 
with respect to society as a whole and to individuals as elements of that society. 
The principle of subsidiarity was introduced into the Preamble of the Constitution as a 
principle underlying the whole legal system of the State, including-first and foremost-the 
Constitution. The principle of subsidiarity is mentioned in this context on a par with the 
principles of respect for freedom and justice, social dialogue and cooperation between the 
public powers. The National Assembly has not gone beyond "naming" the principle of 
subsidiarity in the Preamble, without elaborating on the topic in the main body of the 
Constitution. This does not seem to be a good solution, for the essence of the principle of 
subsidiarity remains rather obscure to society, while the most widespread interpretation that 
it has received limits subsidiarity to obliging authorities (the State) to provide unconditional 
assistance to individuals and communities in the name of "the common good". Describing 
the principle of subsidiarity as "strengthening the powers of citizens and their communities" 
will not prevent further interpretations of subsidiarity that ascribe, in the spirit of the welfare 
State, a rather narrow scope to the principle-indeed it may lead to such interpretations being 
perpetuated. 
In formulating the preamble-as Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the MP who made the preamble 
motion, said-e was "oriented towards what actually is stipulated in the Constitution but 
what cannot be couched in the language of articles, but what can be put in terms of 
formulating a certain direction".15 Difficulty arriving at a proper definition of the principle 
of subsidiarity in terms of legal and constitutional language was actually invoked by 
members of the Constitutional Committee as an argument to abandon such an attempt. 
However, despite the evident difficulties that such a legislative task might involve, it would 
be a sign of excessive pessimism and restraint to claim, as deputy Jerzy Ciemniewski has, 
that "the principle of subsidiarity cannot be translated into a system of institutions" and that 
it is only the kind of "idea that such institutions may or may not be inspired by".16 
Elaborating on the principle of subsidiarity in the Constitution seems to have been 
indispensable because while it has binding force, the public remains rather ill-informed as 
to its actual nature. Needless to say, for a principle to become an enforceable foundation of 
the social and constitutional order, it has to be understood by all those who are to adhere to 
it. Any possible misunderstandings concerning the term "subsidiarity" necessitate an 
educational effort. A special role should have been played here by an elaboration of the 
principle in the main body of the Constitution in the chapter dealing with the principles of 
the constitutional system in Poland. 
Inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the Preamble and failure to fully elaborate 
on it in the main, so-called normative, part of the Constitution, might, in light of views 
sometimes presented by legal experts, have given rise to doubts as to the normative character 
of the principle. This, however, is not the case, for both the context in which the principle is 
invoked in the Preamble, as well as its normative content, i.e. the fact that the principle 
makes it possible for particular kinds of obligations to be specified for bodies that apply the 
Constitution, provide convincing grounds to recognize that the principle is unequivocally 
15
 See: proceedings of the session of the Subcommittee of general issues and introductory 
provisions of the Constitutional Committee, on 23 October 1996, 1. 
16
 Further page 10. 
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normative in nature. The definitive answer to the question about the normative (binding) 
character of the Preamble is to be given by the judiciary, especially by the Constitutional 
Court. The principle of subsidiarity, even if it does not impose any specific and currently 
binding obligations on State authorities, indirectly sets down guidelines for legislation and 
for the application of the law. 
Besides the reference to the principle of subsidiarity as a principle underlying the 
constitutional order of the State, in the Preamble elements of the principle of subsidiarity 
and provisions that have been inspired by it can be found in the following parts of the 
Constitution. Included among the constitutional principles, even before the definition of the 
Republic of Poland (as a "democratic State ruled by law and implementing the principles of 
social justice"), is the principle that "The Republic of Poland shall be the common good of 
all its citizens". Despite the general approval of the principle by members of the National 
Assembly, its sense and meaning, which goes beyond any ideological considerations, do not 
seem to be unambiguous. On the one hand, the quoted article is a tautology if the word 
"Republic" [Rzeczpospolita = literally: common good] is understood in its historical sense. 
On the other, if the article is meant to give special protection against any form of 
discrimination, it coincides with provisions to the same effect contained further on in the 
text. Their prominence in Art. 1 can be accounted for only by the intention to make them 
acquire the status of a constitutional principle, however, without creating much impact on 
the eventual application of the provisions, e.g. by adjudicating bodies. The prevalent view 
of members of the National Assembly was that describing the State as "the common good 
of all its citizens" would contribute towards developing an awareness of the natural link 
between the obligations of the State towards the citizens and the duties of the citizens, such 
as loyalty to, and the bearing of costs and burdens for the benefit of, their common good, 
the State (including taxes or military service). Such an interpretation seems to be confirmed 
by the reference to the "common good" in the Preamble: it appears in the context of the 
citizens' duties with respect to the State in the following passage: "[...] we, the Polish 
Nation-all citizens of the Republic, [...] equal in [our] rights and obligations towards the 
common good-Poland [...]". 
A manifestation of the principle of subsidiarity in the Constitution is to be found in the 
formula in Art. 12 relating to civil society, based on the principles of liberty and pluralism 
with regard to public activity: "The Republic of Poland shall guarantee freedom of the 
creation and functioning of trade unions, socio-occupational organizations of farmers, 
societies, citizens' movements, other voluntary associations and foundations". The clause 
represents a step forward in comparison to the former formulation of the principle of 
political pluralism, for it also refers to civil society with its manifold forms of self-
organization, and it is not restricted to guaranteeing freedom of formation and activity for 
political parties. In the chapter on "The freedoms, rights and obligations of persons and 
citizens", there are additional provisions regarding freedom of association, freedom of 
activity of national and ethnic minorities' organizations, religious communities, etc. 
The constitutional formula on relations between the State and churches and religious 
unions (providing for their "autonomy and mutual independence of each in its own sphere, 
as well as their cooperation for the good of the person and the common benefif '-Art. 25 
para. 3) is a reflection of an idea underlying the principle of subsidiarity, namely the idea of 
the separateness and preservation of specific methods of activity, as regards religious 
organisations and the State. The Constitution emphasises their mutual complementarity in 
the implementation of the overriding goal constituted by the good of the individual and the 
community. 
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The constitutional principles also include provisions for participation of local 
authorities in the exercise of public power (Art. 16 para. 2: "Local government shall 
participate in the exercise of public power. The substantial part of public duties which local 
government is empowered to discharge shall be done in its own name and under its own 
responsibility"). This principle is further elaborated, in the spirit of subsidiarity, in other 
provisions of the Constitution dealing with local government, in particular those stipulating 
a presumption of the power of local government to perform public duties (Art. 163: "Local 
government shall discharge public functions that have not been reserved by the Constitution 
or statutes for other public authorities"), a presumption of the power of communes, the 
lowest tier of local government units, to perform the duties of local government (Art. 164 
para. 3: "The commune shall discharge all local government functions that have not been 
reserved for other local government units"), and judicial protection of the autonomous 
nature of local government units (Art. 164, paragraph 2: "The autonomous nature of local 
government units is subject to judicial protection"). These provisions are, toutes proportions 
gardées, an equivalent of similar clauses in countries with a federal system of government, 
which recognize the powers of Ländern, cantons, states, etc. with regard to those duties that 
have not been enumeratively reserved for the federal authorities. 
Separate regulations in the Constitution that have the force of constitutional principles 
relate to professional self-government. They provide for the creation by statute of self-
governments for professions enjoying a high degree of public confidence, with a view to 
monitoring the proper practice of the professions within the limits, and for the protection, of 
the public interest (Art. 17 para. 1). They also permit other forms of self-government, 
provided they do not infringe upon the freedom of practicing a profession or impose 
restrictions upon the freedom to engage in economic activity (Art. 17 para. 2). The new 
formula highlights the public duties of self-governments within professions of public 
confidence, and at the same time makes the freedom of other forms of self-government 
dependent on respect for the fundamental freedoms of practicing a profession and engaging 
in economic activity. 
The principle of subsidiarity also emerges in the newly introduced citizens' legislative 
initiative (under Art. 118 para. 2 of the Constitution; such an initiative can be launched by 
one hundred thousand citizens eligible to vote in Sejm clcctions). The citizens' initiative 
creates opportunities for organized groups of citizens, representing shared interests, to 
influence the shape of legislation. This provision, it seems, may contribute to giving a more 
tangible expression to the objectives held by various groups in society, and it may help such 
constituencies to organize themselves. 
Another manifestation of the principle of subsidiarity, this time at the supranational 
level, is to be found in Art. 90 paras. 1 and 2 and Art. 91 para. 3. Their provisions concern 
the legal conditions as well as the limits of accession to the European Union, a legal entity 
based on the principle of subsidiarity itself: "The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of 
international agreements, delegate to an international organization or an international 
institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain matters." If an 
international agreement ratified by the Republic of Poland constituting an international 
organization so provides, the laws it established by it shall be applied directly and have 
precedence in the event of a conflict of laws. 
The principle of subsidiarity-the core and essence of a democratic and truly citizen-
friendly State-has become a new constitutional principle in the Republic of Poland. In all its 
variety of meanings, it was even before this an excellent point of reference for appraisal of 
the legal and actual state of the country's systemic transformation. The conclusion emerges 
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that constitutionalisation of that principle by way of a duty imposed on State authorities to 
observe it in all their actions of control should contribute to a fuller development of civil 
society and prevent arbitrariness on the part of the State machine. While, however, 
institutionalized and particularly judicial review of the observance of the principle of 
subsidiarity is common in the sphere of distribution of powers between the separate levels of 
public administration, it is difficult to find appropriate means and instruments of such review 
with respect to broader obligations that follow from that principle: this is shown by the force 
of the controversies and doubts as to the practice caused by the introduction of subsidiarity 
into the European Union treaties.17 
That this is possible, however, is evidenced by the European Union's institutions, 
which, in spite of the controversies and practical problems that arise from the introduction 
of the subsidiarity principle into the Treaty on the European Union, have managed to work 
out a system of operationalizing the principle in a fairly effective way. The system requires 
every unit of the EU institutions involved in the law-making process to analyze drafts of 
new acts with regard to their conformity with the principle of subsidiarity, and now, pursuant 
to the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments of Member States are involved 
in the control of adherence to this principle.18 To a certain degree, a similar system of 
regular assessments of new bills with respect to the principle of subsidiarity results from the 
Regulatory Impact Assessment of governmental legislative bills and requirements set in the 
Rules of the Sejm requiring justification of all bills submitted to the Speaker of the lower 
chamber of the Parliament. 
Work in the National Assembly has shown just how difficult a task it is to formulate 
the principle of subsidiarity for purposes of constitutional regulation. Hence, there is also a 
lack of precedents in the constitutional law of other countries, which have recognized its 
constitutional significance but have failed to introduce the provisions that would 
unequivocally define it (the above-mentioned federal clauses constitute an exception here).19 
It is worth noting that Poland is bound by an instrument of international law that does 
define the principle of subsidiarity. This instrument is the European Charter of Local Self-
17
 The legal definition of subsidiarity is contained in the Treaty on European Union (Art. 5.3): 
"Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional or local level,and can rather, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Union." 
18
 See more: Overall Approach to the Application by the Council of the Subsidiarity Principle and 
Art. 3b of the Treaty, European Council of Edinburgh - 1 1 - 1 2 December 1992-Presidency Conclusions; 
Interinstitutional Agreement of October 25, 1993 between the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission on procedures for implementing the principle of subsidiarity; Keukleire, S.: The Principle 
of Subsidiarity between Word and Deed. Operationalization of Art. 3b of the Maastricht Treaty. In: De 
Groof, J.: Subsidiarity' and Education. Leuven-Amersfoort, 1994; Ciavarini Azzi, G.: La Commission en 
matière du principe de subsidiarité. In: Hrbek, R. (ed.): Die Anwendung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips in der 
Europäischen Union. Baden-Baden, 1995, 59-69. See Winczorek, P.: Zasada subsydiarnosci w 
dyskusjach ustrojowych w Komisji Konstytucyjnej Zgromadzenia Narodowego [Principle of Subsidiarity 
in systemic debates in the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly], In: Subsydiarnosc 
[Subsidiarity], Warszawa, 1996, 140-146. 
19
 See Winczorek, P.: Zasada subsydiarnosci w dyskusjach ustrojowych w Komisji 
Konstytucyjnej Zgromadzenia Narodowego [Principle of Subsidiarity in systemic debates in the 
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Government-Convention of the Council of Europe of 15 October, 1985, which in Art. 4, on 
the scope of activity of local government, recommends that the management of public 
affairs should generally speaking be the responsibility of authorities that are closest to the 
citizens, and that decisions going against that principle should take into account the scope 
and nature of the task, as well as considerations of efficiency and economy. 
Attempts have also been made to define the principle of subsidiarity in legislative work 
in Poland. The initial guidelines for the draft law on activity of public benefit (a term used 
to describe non-govemmental organizations) carried a formula that could have led to a 
related constitutional principle: "Activity of public benefit should be conducted in 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, consisting in that public authorities 
(government and local government) engage in direct operational activity in the field of 
public benefit only provided that: 
(1) the obligation to engage in a particular kind of activity follows from existing 
regulations [...] or (2) the public tasks in this field are not adequately executed by non-
public agents engaged in activity of public benefit."20 
During the proceedings of the National Assembly, an attempt was made to introduce 
the principle of subsidiarity into Chapter 1 of the draft in wording proposed by deputy Jerzy 
Ciemniewski ("The Republic of Poland protects voluntary individual and collective activity 
of the citizens within the field of implementing public goals, and restricts the social and 
economic functions of the State to activities indispensable for the implementation of the 
tasks of public authorities"). However, it ended in failure because it stressed the need to 
reduce the organizational and social welfare role of the State to a bare minimum. This 
proves that many who support including the principle of subsidiarity in the Constitution 
associate it with imposing an obligation upon the State to provide assistance to communities 
and individuals incapable of achieving their goals on their own, while at the same time they 
treat as marginal the idea of requiring such communities and individuals to undertake efforts 
to solve their problems relying on their own resources. This results from, among other 
things, the features of Polish society, where the prevalent attitude expects the State "to 
provide for the people", the ability to organize is rather poorly developed and efficient 
"intermediate levels" are very few. 
It is worth stressing that introducing the principle into the Constitution was especially 
important with regard to the scope of State interventionism in the economy (cf. the formula 
used by an expert of the Constitutional Committee, Prof. Piotr Winczorek; "Public 
authorities should engage in only such kind of economic activity that cannot be independently 
undertaken by non-State economic entities and associations").21 In one version of the 
constitutional draft (completed on 19 June, 1996), which did not envisage a preamble, the 
constitutional principle of the inviolability of ownership (providing for expropriation only 
for public purposes and only for adequate compensation) could have led to privatisation 
becoming illegal. That danger was avoided, while the Constitution in its Preamble contains 
the principle of subsidiarity, which also relates to the subsidiary character of the State's 
economic activity. 
No doubt, the realization in constitutional law of the principle of subsidiarity is 
conducive to the development of civil society, one that is aware of its rights and duties and 
20
 Izdebski, H.: Fundaeje i stowarzyszenia. Teksty i objasnienia [Foundations and associations. 
Sources of law and explanation], Warszawa, 1996, 177. 
21
 Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly. Bulletin No. XIV, 74. 
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able and willing to defend them, and also one that respects the rights and freedoms of 
others. On the other hand, though, the success and effectiveness of legal solutions inspired 
by that principle depends largely on citizens' civic maturity and political culture, e.g. on 
their willingness to compromise, respect for minority rights and so on. In countries that 
were deprived of democratic political practice for many decades, it is most important that 
those restructuring State and society should be guided by the postulates that together make 
up the principle of subsidiarity, yet achieving the full effect is bound to take time. For this 
reason introduction of the definition of the principle of subsidiarity into the Constitution 
would have been highly desirable. 
* * * 
Although created (at least by the groups that held the majority in the National Assembly, 
which decided on its adoption in the current version) with an assumption of juridicality, the 
Polish Constitution contains a large number of axiological references, especially in the 
Preamble. They enable us to decode the vision of the State assumed by the constitutional 
legislator, manifested in particular in the definition of the State as a special organization of 
society, built on the basis of certain principles, and locate it in the international context. In 
addition, the functioning of a society/community in the broadest sense, both inside and 
outside of the State, corresponds to the same assumptions: putting in first place the individual 
with his/her freedoms and rights and solidarity and cooperation in realising everything that 
is the common good at each stage of the organisation of human society. 
Compared to the previous constitutional regulation, the currently applicable 
fundamental law contains many elements that are saturated with axiology. Before October 
17, 1997, the basic norm determining the values upheld by the Republic of Poland was the 
then Art. 1 of Constitutional Provisions Maintained in Force, which provided that "the 
Republic of Poland shall be a democratic state ruled by law implementing the principles of 
social justice". From this principle, in its case law the Constitutional Court derived the 
axiological foundations of the relationship between the State and the individual in Poland, 
such as the right to life, right to trial, or right to privacy, as well as the principles of the 
functioning of the State organization: the supreme place of the Constitution in the system of 
laws, the autonomy of courts and impartiality of judges, the special role of a statute as the 
basic source of law, the operation of public authorities exclusively within the limits of, and 
pursuant to, the law, as well as the principle of non-abusive legislation, including prohibition 
of retroactive laws and the principle of protecting the citizen's trust in the State. 
The constitutional regulation covers unequivocally and quite exhaustively the 
"component" principles of a state ruled by law, especially those relating to the rules 
governing the functioning of the state and its legal order. Therefore, the Constitutional Court 
has considered the principle of a state ruled by law, repeated in Art. 2 of the 1997 
Constitution, as mainly an interpretation hint to assist in construing other norms (e.g. 
judgment К 28/97), and as an independent model for constitutional review where the 
Constitution did not offer sufficient regulations, for instance, with reference to the law-
making principles (e.g., judgment К 10/98). 
The principle of a democratic state ruled by law gained a new dimension in the new 
constitutional context. Both the notion of a "state ruled by law" and the "principles of social 
justice" it implemented must now be read through the lens of basic assumptions underlying 
the constitutional order in Poland and as implementing and protecting the set of values 
expressed in the Constitution. "Consequently, one cannot judge the respect for the principle 
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of a state ruled by law without taking into account the values identified in the Preamble to 
the Constitution and neglecting the principle expressed in Art. 1 of the Constitution: that 
Poland is the common good of all its citizens" (judgment TK 8/98). The concept of justice 
expressly mentioned in the Preamble became, together with other values referred to there, 
one of the principles that everyone is to treat "as the unshakeable foundation of the Republic 
of Poland". Respect for these principles and values is also a duty on the part of the legislative 
power. In this context (the juxtaposition of Art. 1 and Art. 2 of the Constitution) the main 
focus is on the principle of justice understood as a factor conducive to fairness or, in other 
words, a just balance of the interests of the society as a whole (common good) and interests 
of an individual. 
The Republic of Poland was defined, as early as in the first article, as "the common 
good of all its citizens" (a similar expression is used in the Preamble and in the context of 
citizens' duty of concern for the common good-Art. 82), and subsequently as a state ruled 
by law "implementing the principles of social justice" (Art. 2). "The inherent and inalienable 
dignity of the person" was recognized as the source of freedoms and rights of persons and 
citizens (Preamble and Art. 30), while the Constitution-the basic law for the State—was 
declared as based (among other things) on "social dialogue as well as on the principle of 
subsidiarity in the strengthening of the powers of citizens and their communities" 
(Preamble). Therefore, the definition of the Polish State in the Constitution refers to values 
typical of the Christian-democratic theory on the system of government (the social teaching 
of the Catholic Church). 
Social dialogue, solidarity and subsidiarity should be, according to the letter of the 
Constitution, the basic tenets of the State's law-making activity. These values assume 
special importance in the situation, where the principles of the market economy have 
become solidified in a country, with all the related social costs, which are particularly 
onerous in a period of poor business trends and the impoverishment and marginalisation of 
large groups of the population. 
However, the quite clear and consistent axiology of the Constitution is realised only to 
a limited extent in the contents of legislation or in the assessment of conformity of lower-
ranking instruments to the Constitution. There were sporadic, though increasingly frequent, 
cases in which the Constitutional Court based its judgments on this issue on the so-called 
"constitutional values", whereas applicants invoked them to support their theses as to the 
incompatibility of the challenged provisions with the more "specific" constitutional norms. 
This moderation is rooted in the opinion of the Constitutional Court that "constitutional 
values" are chiefly a starting place for interpreting other provisions of the Constitution. And 
so, the principle of subsidiarity is mainly referred to when elaborating on the interpretation 
of another constitutional principle, that of decentralization, while "common good" is used 
by the Court mainly to stress the interdependency between the rights of individuals and 
their duties to the whole of society, and the need to balance the interests of the individual 
and public interest. 
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Constitutional Cour t was the precept o f the reunification of Germany. A c c o r d i n g to most au thor i t ies on 
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whatsoever. 
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1990 preambles to the Grundgesetz, the precep t of reunification of Germany as a no rmat ive directive b e f o r e 1990, 
the reference to G o d (invocatio dei) 
A) Introduction 
Preambles, i.e. prologues or prolegomena, to operative parts of legislation take different 
shapes, and legislators pass normative acts together with such preliminary sections for quite 
different reasons.1 Constitutional preambles might include references to the historical or 
political circumstances leading to the making or to the amending of a constitution. They 
might identify the bearers of the constituent power with respect to a particular territorial 
entity, or epitomize the political and moral conceptions of the drafters of the new 
codification. As will be seen, both versions of the preamble to the German Basic Law (the 
preamble of 1949 and the revised version of 1990, replacing the original wording upon 
German reunification) are very much related to the legal circumstances and political 
conditions leading to their adoptions at the resepctive date of their origin. Especially the 
original preamble of 1949, but, albeit to a lesser extent, the preamble of 1990, were also 
intended to point to the future. 
Whereas the federal consitution of Germany, i.e. the Basic Law, as well as 14 out of 
the 16 constitutions of the federated Laender of Germany contain preambles, ordinary legal 
acts drafted after 1949, only rarely are preceded by introductory sections. Only statutory 
instruments (so-called "Verordnungen"), shall, according to article 80 of the German Basic 
Law, contain an introductory statement of their legal basis.2 
* Professor, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of International and European Law, University of 
Göttingen, D-37073 Platz der Göttinger Sieben 5, Göttingen. 
E-mail: intecolaw@gwdg.de 
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 On preambles in general see Fögen, M. T.: Das Lied vom Gesetz. Munich, 2006; Siedentopf, 
H.-Huber , N.: Präambeln, Vorsprüche und Zweckbestimmungen in den Rechtsordnungen der 
westlichen Welt. In: Hermann, H. (ed.): Gesetzesvorspruch. 1988, 37; Varga, Cs.: The Preamble: 
A Question of Jurisprudence. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 13 (1971), 101. 
2
 Cf. Papenheim, A.: Präambeln in der deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte seit Mitte des 19. 
Jahrhunderts. Doctoral thesis, Münster, 1998, passim. 
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In other legal orders, introductory sections of ordinary legal acts frequently refer to the 
normative or constitutional basis of the particular act in superior legal norms, or they give 
reasons for or justify that act of legislation. Such references and justifications preceding the 
operative part of a law are known from the EU regulations or directives according to art. 
296 TFEU3 and they are commonly applied, e.g. in Spain, in the UK and the USA. In 
Germany, if the legislator deems it appropriate to give reasons for or justify his particular 
act of legislation, one ore more articles will be included in the operative part of the law, 
usually in an introductory section, holding so-called "Leitvorschriften", i.e. guiding rules. 
And even in the few cases where a preamble has preceded a legal act in German legislation 
since 1949, the operative articles of that act contained additional guiding rules, stating the 
purpose of legislating or containing definitions. 
B) Preambles in German legislation 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the legislator's general dislike of proems to normative 
acts may be explained with the preceding practice of the Third Reich and the practice of the 
German Democratic Republic and, possibly, also with an aversion to the legislation of the 
authorities of the Allied Forces occupying Germany, Allied directives frequently including 
detailed introductory sections on the purpose and scope of a particular act. In the Third 
Reich and, to some extent, also in the German Democratic Republic, preambles to laws 
were quite a costumary way of informing the public of the ideological basis for and, thus, a 
manner to determine the content of a normative rule, and they were sometimes of more 
importance for the interpretation of a concrete act of legislation than the wording of the bill 
itself. As one author said in 1988, many legal acts passed under National Socialism, were 
literally opposed with their preambles. Such preambles were sometimes longer than the 
operative sections and they were deemed to be more closely related to real life and 
considered as more immediate and, therefore, less questionable manifestations of the will of 
the legislator. Thus, one could get the impression that the proems were intended to 
undermine the positive normative rules following.4 
In spite of the mentioned general dislike of preambles, in exceptional cases, the 
German legislator, when passing a legal act, still felt it appropriate to make some delcaratory 
statement and include it by way of an introductory statement, even after 1949. Thus, in the 
case of the Lastenausgleichsgesetz (Equalisation of Burdens Act) of August 14, 1952, the 
preamble contained an acknowledgement of the special sufferings of the ethnic German 
expellees from the East with, however, no practical relevance for the system of equalization 
of burdens. The preamble was merely meant to be a political statement and it was not a 
substitute for those "Leitvorschriften", i.e. guiding rules in the first section of the law, 
especially art. 1, stating the "goals" of the compensatory payments to individuals for losses 
during and after World War II and the further articles containing definitions. 
When, after World War II, the Austrian State regained its independence from the 
Germany, the authorities of Western Germany and Austria disagreed on the question, if and 
at what moment legal personality and capacity of Austria had been restored and whether 
Austrians had lost German citizenship as of April 26, 1945, or at some later date, or not at 
3
 Art. 253 EC which has been replaced by art. 296 TFEU as of Nov. 1st, 2009, has been analyzed 
by Naumann. К.: Eine religiöse Referenz in einem Europäischen Verfassungsvertrag. Tübingen, 2008, 
115-117. 
4
 Siedentopf: op. cit. 42. 
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all. When regulating the loss of German citizenship by Austrians in 1956, the German le-
gislator deemed it appropriate to state the official German legal point of view concerning 
the fate of the Austrian State in 1938 in a preamble to that act. According to that preamble 
the German Act of 1938 on Reunification of Austria and Germany had been valid at the 
time it was enacted, and it had only ceased to be in force at the end of World War II. Thus, 
Germany explicitly disagreed with the Austrian position, claiming that the law declaring the 
"Anschluß" had been void ab initio.5 
C) The Constitutional Preamble 
While ordinary laws generally were passed without preambles in the Federal Republic of 
Germany after 1949, the federal Basic Law of 1949, like the Weimar Constitution of 1919, 
contained a preamble-as do, according to an Austrian scholar, 143 out of 191 contemporary 
constitutions worldwide.6 The original preamble to the Grundgesetz had the following 
wording: "The German People in the Laender Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, 
Hesse, Lower Saxony, Northrhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, 
Wuerttemberg-Baden and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, conscious of its responsibility 
before God and Men, animated by the resolve to preserve its national and political unity 
and to serve the peace of the World as an equal partner in a united Europe, desiring to give 
a new order to political life for a transitional period, has enacted, by virtue of its constituent 
power, this Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
It has also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied. 
The entire German people is called on to achieve in free self-determination the unity 
and freedom of Germany." 
After World War I, in the Case of the 1919 Constitution, it was the general view that 
the preamble contained only some delcaratory remarks concerning freedom, justice, peace 
and progress. As Hermann von Mangoldt has stressed in his monograph explaining the 
Basic Law,7 "under the present circumstances", i.e. the situation of the year 1949, the 
significance of the introductory remarks to the Basic Law must be viewed quite differently, 
having regard to certain aspects of the history of origin of the Grundgesetz (von Mangoldt 
was the leading public law expert among the CDU-membcrs of the Parliamentary Council, 
whose members, from September 1, 1948, to May 8, 1949, were drafting the Grundgesetz 
basing themselves on proposals of the Council of Experts convened in Herrcnchimsee in 
August 1948). 
The legal moment of those introductory remarks, i.e. of the preamble to the 
Grundgesetz, could, of course, not be predicted when passing the Basic Law in 1949. One 
reason is the unforeseeable future state of Germany. Another aspect should be mentioned, 
too: According to the German Gmndgesctz, the Federal Constitutional Court was and still is 
to be the Court of last (and in most cases also of first) instance in all questions concerning 
the authentic interpretation of the Grundgesetz and of judiciary review, and it is considered 
by some authors to be the equivalent of a permanent constitutional assembly. However, it 
cannot be doubted that the drafters of the preamble to the Basic Law in the Bonn 
5
 Cf. Hailbronner, K.-Renner, G.-Maaßcn, H.-G.: Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht. 5th ed., Munich, 
2010, 2. StAngRegG marginal no. 2. 
6
 Schambeck, H.: Verfassungsrecht, Religion und Geschichte. In: Kohl, G.-Neschwara, 
Ch.—Simon, T. (eds): Festschrift für Wilhelm Brauneder. Vienna, 2008, 469, 474. 
7
 von Mangoldt, H.: Das Bonner Grundgesetz. 1st ed., Berlin, 1953, 29. 
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Parliamentary Council, wanted their constitution to be read and interpreted subject to certain 
provisos, based on the special circumstances of post-war Germany, which should be 
included in a preamble. 
D. The Situation of 1949 mirrowing in the Preamble to the Grundgesetz 
In 1948/49, it was the Western Allied Powers, who suggested to the Laender of the 
American, British and French zones of occupation to form a federal West German State. Its 
constitution should be drafted by a constituent assembly elected by the people in the several 
Laender and it should then be ratified by the Military Governors. Finally, it was to be 
submitted to popular vote and it was supposed to enter into force upon being accepted by a 
simple, though not qualified, majority of voters in at least two-thirds of the Laender. 
The offer of the Western Allies to support the foundation of a West German Federation 
was considered to be a mixed blessing by the Laender. The Minister-Presidents, i.e. the 
heads of Laender governments, got into a state of conflict: There was the real danger that a 
State limited to the Western Zones of occupied Germany would further deepen the division 
between East and West. The Laender Prime Ministers accepted the offer of the Western 
allies albeit only with important reservations. The federal State to be established by the 
Laender in the Western Zones of Germany should be set up as a transitory entity and it 
should cease to exist upon Germany regaining its unity. Therefore, the assembly drafting 
the Constitution of that provisional State was not to be a constituent assembly elected by 
the people at large, but it was rather conceived as a Parliamentary Council, whose members 
were to be elected by the parliaments of the several Laender. The constitutional draft 
presented by that Parliamentary Council should not be submitted to popular vote as 
suggested by the Allied Powers; instead of being accepted by the people at large it should 
by ratified by a qualified majority of the Parliaments of the Laender involved in the drafting 
process. And to make it clear that the new fundamental law of the provisional federal State 
to be established was supposed to be provisional or transitional as well, that act was to be 
called Basic Law (Grundgesetz) instead of Constitution (Verfassung). In the beginning of 
the drafting process it was planned to conceive the Basic Law merely as an organisational 
statute of an occupied country. The Parliamentary Council wanted the preamble to the Basic 
Law, among others, to mirror the special circumstances of occupation, and the Council had 
therefore intended to adopt the following reference in the preamble to the limitations 
imposed upon the independence of the Federal Republic by the occupying powers: "The 
occupation of Germany by foreign powers has subjected the exercise of the right [to the 
free formation of national life] to severe limitations." 
At a later stage, the General Drafting Committe of the Parliamentary Council, however, 
thought that a preamble stressing the restrictions to sovereignty caused by the Allied 
occupation would sound too much like resignation, and, finally, they avoided any mention 
in the Basic Law of the occupation regime and the legal relationship of the German law-
maker to it. The historical circumstances of 1948/49 were, rather on the contrary, even 
veiled by the final draft of the preamble: Though the members of the Council drafting the 
Grundgesetz were neither chosen by immediate popular election nor did they submit the 
Grundgesetz to a popular referendum, the preamble stated that "the German People in the 
[enumerated] Laender, has enacted, by virtue of its constituent power, this Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany." When the drafting process of the Basic Law was completed, 
the fundamental law for Federal Germany was, therefore, no longer considered as just an 
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organisational statute of an occupied country. It had, rather, in the Words of the Constitutional 
Court, "ultimately assumed the guise of the constitutional charter of a sovereign state".8 
With respect to the unforeseeable future, the Parliamentary Council had been very 
fortunate to drop its complaints for the lack of sovereignty and not to stress in the preamble 
to the Basic Law that, in 1949, the Parliamentary Council lacked self-determination and, 
therefore, could not pass a constitution proper. In 1990, those voices that were stressing the 
provisional character of the Grundgesetz of 1949 by referring to the preamble, and, upon 
reunification, were therefore pleading for its replacement by a genuine constitution for the 
whole of Germany, could easily be ignored. Upon reunification of the divided State of 
Germany in 1990, it would have been, however, much more difficult to refrain from drafting 
a genuine new constitution, had there been any explicit reservation in the original draft of 
the Grundgesetz, as to the lack of of German sovereignty in 1949. 
Besides the dropped proviso concerning the lack of sovereignty of the entity to be 
called Federal Republic of Germany, the Parliamentary Council, when drafting the 
Grundgesetz, wanted several provisos to be included in its preamble. According to von 
Mangoldt9 they were a) the right of the German people to self-determination, b) German 
unity, c) the enforced territorial limitation of the order to be established to only one part of 
Germany, i.e. Western Germany, d) the invitation of other, still excluded, parts of Germany 
to accede to the newly formed State, e) the name of the newly formed entity and f) its 
relationship to the German Reich, i.e. the question of continuity or State succession, then, 
under g), the provisional character of the fundamental Law to be passed, and, finally, h) the 
dropped statement on the lack of sovereignty. Except for the last point, all provisos had 
been somehow referred to in the Titel of or in the preamble to the Basic Law in 1949. 
Already the title "Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland" ("Basic Law for 
the Federal Republic of Germany") was meant to be an allusion to the last three provisos 
and the legal viewpoint of the majority of the members of the Council. The first part, 
"Federal Republic", replacing "Reich", was to indicate some distance from the Reich, 
especially the "Third Reich". That "Federal Republic" was used as an attributive noun to 
qualify Germany, was, of course, also meant as a plea for German unity. But calling the 
new State "Germany" should first of all demonstrate the identity of the Federal Republic 
with the Reich. Not only the official name of the Federal Republic, but also the statements 
in the preamble, according to which the "the German People [...] has enacted, by virtue of 
its constituent power, this Basic Law" and that the "German People" was "animated by the 
resolve to preserve its national and political unity", referred to the identity of the Federal 
Republic with the German Reich that was supposed to be "preserved". Besides calling the 
constitution "Basic Law", the preamble expressed the desire for a "new order to political 
life for a transitional period". 
The references to the German people and to national and political unity alluded also to 
three underlying aspects of the situation of divided post-war Germany, which, according to 
von Mangoldt, had to be taken into account by the preamble to the Grundgesetz. These 
aspects were the question of German unity, then, the enforced territorial partition, allowing 
the new order to be established only in the Western parts of Germany, and, finally, the 
invitation of other, still excluded, parts of Germany to accede to the newly formed State. 
The 2nd sentence of the preamble, therefore, declared that the German people, by enacting 
8
 Decisions of the BVerfG, Vol. 1, Part I, Baden-Baden, 1992, 19. 
9
 von Mangoldt: op. cit., 30. 
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the Basic Law, "has also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was 
denied". And the 3rd sentence of the preamble was not only a mere declaration, but it called 
upon "the entire German people [...] to achieve in free self-determination the unity and 
freedom of Germany". Though the preamble was silent on and avoided any hint at the 
infringements of the occupation, this last sentence explicitly adverted to the right of the 
German people to self-determination as a precondition for the German people to become, as 
the preamble declared in its first sentence, "an equal partner in a united Europe". Thus, the 
authors of the Grundgesetz were demanding for the German State equal treatment and non-
discrimination according to the general principles of international law. 
E. The Legal Relevance of the Preamble 
The reach of any legal impact of the original preamble could, of course, not be predicted at 
the time of the passing of the Basic Law in 1949. As mentioned before, it was up to the 
Karlsruhe Constitutional Court to ascribe material import to the preamble.10 And until 1990, 
the only normative directive read into that preamble by the supreme constitutional judges, 
was the precept of reunification of Germany. It was their 1957 judgment ordering the 
dissolution of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and thereby forbidding any further 
activities of the KPD, which is considered to have been the guiding decision concerning the 
legally binding commitment of all German State organs to reunification. 
When the Communist Party was to be dissolved, because it was said to oppose and 
fight the free democratic basis order established under the Grundgesetz, the attorneys 
defending the party argued that dissolution of the KPD would impede reunification and 
would, therefore, violate the Basic Law. In the first hcadnote of its dissolution order of 
August 17, 1956, the Court confirmed that the preamble to the Basic Law, though of special 
political importance, had also legal implications for the State organs. All State organs of the 
Federal Republic were obliged to aspire "with all strength" German unity and to refrain 
from actions impeding or making impossible reunification. The dissolution of the KPD was 
therefore decreed under the resolutory condition of all-German elections, in the case of 
which a Communist party would be allowed to run again. 
The precept of reunification played a role again in the case concerning the Basic Treaty 
of December 21, 1972 between the Federal Repulic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic initiated by Bavaria. Only after its entry into force, on July 31, 1973, the Court 
gave an interpretation of that treaty in the light of the reunification precept of the preamble. 
The treaty was qualified as an inter se agreement between to segments of Germany that 
were separated from each other not by an international border but by a border similar to that 
between to West German Laender. If Karlsruhe had handed down that opinion, binding on 
the State organs of the Federal Republic, before ratification documents had been exchanged 
between Bonn and East Berlin, the German Democratic Republic would probably have 
stopped the exchange procedures. Therefore, the German Constitutional Court did not even 
grant an injunction demanded by Bavaria, but decided ex post, on July 31, 1973. 
Except for the precept of reunification with its very limited influence on practical 
politics, the legal significance of the old preamble can be neglected. But the hazards of 
interpretation might have led to quite some problems in 1990. At that time a serious 
10
 A list of the nine decisions of the Constitutional Court having referred to the preamble until 
2009 is presented by Hobe, S. In: Berliner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz. Berlin (looseleaf, instalment 
of December 2009), marginal nos. 150-158. 
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discussion took place, as to whether Germany could continue with a Basic Law intended to 
be provisional. In this connection, along with its preamble, the final article of the old 
constitution could also be mentioned, where it said that "This Basic Law shall cease to be 
inforce on the day on which a Constitution adopted by the free decision of the German 
people comes into force." Read in conjunction with the desire expressed in the preamble "to 
give a new order to political life for a transitional period", the Constitutional Court could 
have possibly disagreed with the perpetuation of the Basic Law by transforming it into a 
regular constitution. 
In the end, however, the provisos concerning the transitional and provisional character, 
which were inserted into the premable of the Grundgesetz in 1949, did not prevent the 
German legislator to extend the territorial scope of the original Basic Law to the former 
German Democratic Republic as of October 3, 1990. 
F. The New Preamble of 1990 
Upon reunification, some provisions of the Basic Law became out of date, however, and 
internationally improper. According to the "Two-plus-Four" Treaty of September 12, 1990, 
terminating the Allied rights and responsibilities for Germany, the existing outer frontiers of 
the two German States were to be final, and Germany undertook not to raise any further 
territorial claims. Therefore, art. 23 of the Basic Law of 1949, allowing admission of "other 
parts of Germany" to the territorial scope of the Basic Law, had to be cancelled. Concerning 
the preamble, the present order could no longer be conceived as to be meant for a transitional 
period of time only. According to the "Two-plus-Four" Treaty, there were also no longer 
any "Germans to whom participation was denied". The new preamble therefore reads: 
"Conscious of its responsibility before God and Men, 
Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united 
Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constitutent power, have adopted this 
Basic Law. 
Germans in the Laender of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, 
Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Northrhine-
Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein 
and Thuringia have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination. 
This Basic Law thus applies to the entire German people." 
We have already mentioned that, if at all, the preamble of 1990 was only to a lesser 
extent intended to point to the future than the original preamble of 1949. Its main importance 
lies in the delcaratory remarks concerning the territorial saturation of the German State after 
reunification and concerning the end of the transitional period. 
Still, in a decision of 2009, the German Constitutional Court referred to the 
"determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe". Proclaimed 
in the preamble to the Basic Law. In itself, that statement docs, of course, not stipulate any 
obligations for the State organs taking part in international efforts to develop a closer 
European Union, but as the Court held on June 30, 2009, in the decision concerning the 
Lisbon Treaty, the preamble emphasises the "moral basis of responsible self-determination" 
and, on the other hand, the "willingness to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united 
Europe".'1 This willingness becomes operational only, if read in conjunction with the ope-
rative clauses of the Basic Law on integration (arts 23, 24, 26). It is these clauses that lend 
11
 BVerfG, Lisbon Decision of 30 June 2009, marginal no. 222. 
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empowerment to the declaration of willingness, declared in the preamble.12 Therefore, it is 
from art. 23.1 of the Basic Law "and its preamble" that follows the "constitutional mandate 
to realise a united Europe".13 Needless to say that the Court could have reached its 
conlusions as well without any reference to the "determination to promote world peace as 
an equal partner in a united Europe" as declared by the preamble. 
G. "Conscious of its responsibility before God ..."—On the reference to God 
in the Grundgesetz 
"Conscious of its responsibility before God and Men" (or mankind?) is the initial phrase, 
one might say the preamble to the preamble, of both the 1949 and the 1990 versions of the 
introduction to the Basic Law. The preamble to the Weimar Constitution did not refer to 
God,14 and also the Herrenchimsee proposal of August 1948 did not yet containing any 
nominatio dei.15 It was only at a late stage of its drafting by the Parliamentary Council that 
the quoted initial phrase of the Grundgesetz was first included in the preamble. There, "God 
and Men" as two cumulative points of reference for the reclaimed responsibility of the 
legislator of the Grundgesetz, were placed next to each other. Technically speaking, the 
introductory phrase of the preamble does not imply an "invocatio dei", but a "nominatio 
dei", a mere reference to God. The juxtaposition of God and Men minimizes, of course, the 
plausibility of any assertion of a specific religious connotation of the reference to God. It is 
hardly justifiable or arguable, at least as far as the original version of 1949 is concerned, to 
read more into the two references, made simultaneously and equally, to God and to Men, 
than a mere demonstration of awareness of the historic situation that led to the drafting of 
the new Basic Law and a change of consciousness due to the experiences, the German 
people had made during the years of National Socialism. Therefore, and considering the 
strict religious and ideological neutrality decreed by several operative articles of the Basic 
Law (first, by art. 4 on religious freedom, then, by art. 3 paragr. 3 and art. 33 paragr. 3, 
explicitly forbidding discrimination for religious or ideological reasons, and, finally, also by 
art. 140 with regard to religious association), most authorities on the Grundgesetz will agree 
that the reference to God in the preamble has "no legal connotation".16 
Still, authors, of course, differ in their interpretations of the invocation of "God" in the 
preamble, and, notwithstanding the juxtaposition of God and Men, the historic circumstances, 
and the operative clauses in the Grundgesetz on strict religious neutrality, some constitutional 
lawyers see it differently. As late as 2009, one author commenting on the preamble wrote 
that the invocation of God, though not decreeing a State religion, was meant to refer to the 
threefold God of Christianity.17 The author differentiates between the responsibility before 
God and that before Men, devoting five times more space to his remarks on God than to 
12
 Lisbon Decision, marginal no. 222. 
13
 Lisbon Decision, marginal no. 225. 
14
 According to Schambeck: op. cit.. only 65 out of 143 contemporary constitutional preambles 
refer to God. 
15
 On the different proposals concerning a naming of God (nominatio dei) or an invocation of 
God (invocatio dei) in the Basic Law, cf. Murswiek, D. In: Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz. 
Heidelberg (looseleaf, instalment of September 2005), Präambel, marginal no. 19-24. 
16
 Leisner, W. G. In: Sodan, H.: Grundgesetz. Munich, 2009, Präambel, marginal no. 2. 
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 See Hillgruber, Ch. In: Epping, V.-Hillgruber, Ch. (eds): Grundgesetz. Munich, 2009, 
Präambel, marginal no. 7. 
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those on Man. That interpretation would bring the God of the German preamble close to 
that of the Irish and Greek constitutions, the main difference beeing that Germany, of 
course, has no State Religion, the lack of a State religion beinig explicitly confirmed by art. 
140 of the Basic Law. 
The predominant view on the preamble, therefore, minimizes the importance of God. 
In the already quoted monograph of von Mangoldt on the Basic Law any reference to the 
invocation of God is missing. Von Mangoldt, himself a Christian Democrat, was commenting 
every other phrase of the preamble, also stressing differences between the Weimar and the 
Bonn preambles, but he did not even mention the introductory phrase of the Bonn preamble 
of 1949 concerning the responsibility before God and Men, although, in this point, the 
Weimar preamble was quite different. In 1991, Dieter Hőmig, then member of the Federal 
Administrative Court, dropped only one sentence on the reference to God, when commen-
ting the preamble of the Basic Law. He wrote that nothing could be drawn from the reference 
to God and Men but an indication to the "ideological state of the legislators" in 1949.18 In 
2010, the author, after having served on the bench of the Karlsmhe Constitutional Court, is 
less harsh, without, however, changing his opinion substantially. According to the 2010 
edition of his comment, the reference to God still does not contain any religious or 
ideological message in the stricter sense. In his view, stressing the responsibility before God 
an Men, is tantamount to a rejection of all forms of totalitarianism and to confessing a 
minimum standard of pre-set values.19 
Hömig's conception of the introductory clause of the preamble seems to be the 
prevailing understanding of it. That his interpretation is correct, can be seen from the limited 
or rather non-existing practical relevance of the "nominatio dei" in constitutional jurisdiction. 
It has not been referred to by the German Constitutional Court, especially in the recent 
cases concerning religious instruction in East Germany. It has also not been discussed, when 
the Court had to decide on the question of shop closing hours, where the special protection 
of Sundays and religious holidays by the Basic Law was affirmed by the Court, or in the 
case concerning removal of crucifixes from class-rooms. If the appelants in a constitutional 
complaint (e.g. concerning religious instruction in Brandenburg) argue with the invocation 
of God in the preamble, the Court dismisses that argument for procedural reasons without 
referring at all to the invocation in the merits, because no enforceable rights can be drawn 
by appellants of a constitutional complaint out of the preamble. 
As to the several Laender of the Federal Republic of Germany, nine out of the 16 
constitutions of the Laender do not refer to God in their preambles at all20 (the Constitutions 
of Saarland and of Schleswig-Holstein do not contain preambles at all)-already before 
reunification, it was seven out of eleven constitutions, among them the Saarland: Contrary 
to the French conception of secularism, the constitution introduced in the territory of 
Saarland, when it was under French control after World War II, contained a preamble with a 
reference to God.21 Upon reintegration into the Federal Republic of Germany, in 1957, the 
18
 Hőmig, D.: Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. (Seifert, K.-H.-Hömig, D. 
eds), 2nd ed., Baden-Baden, 1991, Präambel, marginal no. 2. 
19
 Hőmig: op. cit., 9th ed., 2010, Präambel, marginal no. 2. 
20
 In Austria, neither the federal constitution nor the basic laws of the federated Laender-with 
the exception of the preamble to the Tyrolian constitution of 1989-contain references to God. Cf. 
Moser, M.: Nicht jedem Anfang wohnt ein Zauber inne. Vom B-VG 1920 zur gegenwärtigen 
Präambeldiskussion. In: Ehs, T. (ed.): Hans Kelsen. Vienna, 2009, 193 (201). 
21
 Bosig, R.: Die Verfassung des Saarlandes. Cologne, 2001, 128. 
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preamble was removed. On the other hand, the provisional Constitution of Lower Saxony 
of 1951 and the Constitution of 1993 did not contain a preamble. But in 1994 the 
representative organs of the Protestants, the Catholics, and of the Jews in Lower Saxony 
were demanding the inclusion of God into the new Constitution, and they succeeded in 
collecting 120 000 signatures in a popular initiative. Thereupon, the Parliament of Lower 
Saxony amended the Constitution. An introductory clause, similar to the first part of the 
prologue to the Grundgesetz, was adopted, proclaiming that "The people of Lower Saxony, 
conscious of its responsibility before God and Men, has, by their representatives, enacted 
the following Constitution". 
Any invocation of God seems to be of little relevance, however, and moderate as well 
as orthodox theologians even find it presumptious to have God invoked in a secular 
constitution. In the fedarated State of Brandenburg, the two Christian Churches themselves 
agreed on the omission of God from the new constitution.22 In 1949, it was, among others, 
the prominent Protestant Bishop of Berlin, Otto Dibelius, who rejected any reference to 
God in the Grundgesetz.23 In 1990, Wolfgang Ullmann, an outstanding Protestant cleric and 
East German dissident, deputy of the last Parliament of the German Democratic Republic 
and, after reunification, till his death in 2004, member of the Bundestag and the European 
Parliament for the Green Party, had suggested to completely drop God from the preamble of 
the Federal Basic Law.24 Therefore, not only the lack of legal significance should make 
legislators refrain from referring to God in State Constitutions. 
With regard to the missing ideological or religious homogeneity, in Germany and its 
Laender as well as in most of the other European States, the invocation of God might not 
prove to be fateful or momentous, but it has created and will create problems, e.g. at present, 
in Germany, with its Muslim minority. Here, Christian Wulff, now the German President, 
had appointed the first Muslim State Minister, when he was still head of government of 
Lower Saxony. When the nominee took her official oath, adding, "so help me God", she 
was asked what invoking God meant in her case, and she told an astonished audience that 
she was invoking Allah. 
Following the much disputed remarks on integration in the speech held by the German 
President, Christian Wulff, on October 3, 2010, the discussion on whether there are religious 
values underlying the order of the Grundgesetz, has become more heated. Only ten days 
after that controversial speech, on October 13, 2010, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, a protestant 
scholar at the Munich University, internationally of great academic repute and of high 
theological standing, warned of the consequences of "babtizing" the Grundgesetz.25  
According to Graf, it would be utterly wrong to assert that the Grundgesetz is based on a 
"Christian-Jewish heritage", the German constitution being the result of enlightened 
thought. And he cautioned against qualifying or modifying the difference between rights 
and religion and between rights and morals. 
Thus, it seems that respect and esteem for God should make us hesitate to invoke Him 
carelessly in the secular and profane context of any secular Basic Law or Constitution. 
22
 Papenheim: op. cit. 163. 
23
 Murswiek: op. cit. marginal no. 23. 
24
 Papenheim: op. cit. 123. 
25
 Wir sollten das Grundgesetz nicht taufen [We should not babtize the Basic Law], An Interview 
with Friedrich Wilhelm Graf. Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 13 October, 2010. 
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I. Historical backgrounds before the naissance of the organic civil service code, 
in brief 
The first steps towards creating a professional civil service in Hungary were taken in the 
third quarter of the 19th century. Since that time a great number of measures have been 
implemented to regulate the legal relationships of state employees. Up until the outbreak of 
the First World War, a strongly career based civil service system was creatcd in our country, 
with all of characteristics of the Weberian-type civil service, regulated by many arborescent 
legal instruments. No unified civil service code has existed to date, but every clement of the 
ideal-typical career civil service system1 was regulated, except what is surely the most 
important one: for the recruiting and selection of civil servants there existed no unified 
regularization.2 
The career civil service system existed until the end of the Second World War. After 
the subsequent elections, the winning communist party wanted to control all the important 
* Ph.D., Research fellow, ECOSTAT Institute for Research of Economy and Society, H-1024 
Budapest, Margit krt. 85. 
E-mail: viktoria.linder@t-online.hu 
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 Bekke, H. A. G. M.-van der Meer, F. M.: Civil Sendee Systems in Western Europe. Cheltenham-
Northampton, (MA), 2000; Gajduschek, Gy.: Közszolgálat. A magyar közigazgatás személyi állománya 
és személyzeti rendszere az empirikus adatok tükrében (Civil Service. On the Personnel and Personnel 
System of the Hungarian Public Administration with empirical Data). Budapest, 2008; Weber, M.: 
Gazdaság és társadalom 1 (Economy and Society I). Budapest, 1987. 
2
 Lőrincz, L.: A személyzeti politika változásának szakaszai a magyar közigazgatásban 1945 
után (The Changes of Periods in Personnel Policy in the Hungarian Public Administration af ter 1945). 
Budapest, 1986; Lőrincz, L.: A szocialista zsákmányrendszertől a merit-system küszöbéig (From the 
Spoil System in Socialism until the Door-step of the Merit-system.). In: Lőrincz, L.: A magyar 
közszolgálat. Közigazgatási szakemberképzés a XX. században (Hungarian Civil Service. Training of 
Public Administration Experts in the XXth Century). Budapest, 1995. 
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posts in public administration and thus polish off the ancien régime. So, the public 
administration bccame "cleared" of all of the professional civil servants of the "rotten" old 
regime. The newly created posts were filled with faithful party-comrades, no matter if they 
were ill-educated and incompetent at carrying out the tasks of administration. The direct 
and inevitable consequence of these actions was the radical and disastrous decrease in the 
working standards of the administration.3 As in those days it was the state, which exclusively 
owned all companies, the communist party proclaimed that there was no need to regulate 
the employment relationships of people serving in administration differently to those of 
other employees working in any branch of the economy. Legally speaking, by using the 
fiction of all employees working for the state-no matter if they worked in industry, 
agriculture, education or administration-all belonged organically under the scope of the 
nationwide applicable, unitary labour code. From the 70s and 80s onwards, however, it was 
gradually recognized that the tasks of public administration differ in several respects from 
other occupations. Consequently, various measures were taken over the years in order to 
accentuate the differences in the regulation of these employment relationships (this has also 
been the case concerning other branches of state power-courts, state attorney offices, etc.). 
II. The advent of the organic civil service code 
During the period of political transition in the 1990s Hungary, was the first country in the 
Central Eastern European region to accept a new form of civil service regulation.4 After the 
collapse of the communist regime, for the new democratic states in transition there were 
plenty of Western examples to choose from in shaping the basic institutions of the new rule 
of law, taking into consideration the requirements of the division of power, etc. This was 
also the case in shaping the new structure of public service. As the transition period in 
Hungary ran in parallel with the first steps of Europeanization in creating the new personnel 
system in public administration, there existed a need to settle it in a way which suited the 
standards of the European Union, too. For the Central and Eastern European Countries, the 
fonning of the new personnel policy first of all meant the need to conceptualize a new set of 
principles for the civil service. After the change of regime in Hungary the new, democratically 
clected Parliament had to answer several fundamental questions. So, it was necessary to 
decide whether it was rational to regulate the employment relationships of public employees 
differently from the general labour code. (As was mentioned earlier, in the last years before 
the change of regime the differences became increasingly evident.) Furthermore, the 
question of how to delimit the notion of public service demanded an answer-in order to 
decide whether all employees of the state and municipalities should belong under the scope 
of a single framework code, or whether the different categories of the public service should 
be subject to different codes depending on their various special characteristics. There was 
also another question to be answered, namely, where the regulatory dividing line between 
elected officers and employed professionals lay. Finally, there was the fundamental question 
of where to draw the demarcation line between the political sphere and the executive power. 
3
 Lőrincz.: A személyzeti politika változásának szakaszai... (The Changes of Periods in Personnel 
Policy...), op. cit.', Lőrincz: A szocialista zsákmányrendszertől... (From the Spoil System in 
Socialisme...), op. cit. 
4
 Balázs, L: Rugalmasság a közigazgatásban (Flexibility in Public Administration). In: Fogarasi, 
J. (ed.): A közigazgatás személyi állománya (The Personnel of Public Administration). Budapest, 
1995. 
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In response to these questions and the prevailing circumstances the Hungarian 
Parliament gave their answer in 1992, by accepting several codes regulating the employment 
relationships of different categories of persons employed by the state and private sectors. 
This year also saw the passing of code No 23 of 1992 regulating the legal relationships of 
the civil service organically, but separately from the employees belonging under the scope 
of the general labour code and also separately from other categories of the public service, 
who-depending on their status and special characteristics-belonged under the scope of 
other codes. The code on the civil service enumerated the types and specified the concrete 
organs which employed civil servants. These were the organisations of the public 
administration on central, territorial and local level-both in the state administration and in 
municipalities. (In addition there are some offices of other state organs which also employ 
civil servants to run the offices of these state organs.5) Other categories of public employees 
include public servants, judges, state attorneys, officers of armed forces, etc.-their legal 
status and employment relationships are regulated by separate laws. In Hungary elected 
officers do not fall under the notion of "public employee". The basic and "background" law 
for employment relationships is the Labour Code. 
The civil service code passed in 1992 was the first in Hungary to regulate the legal and 
employment relationships of civil servants organically, but many other legal instruments 
(government decrees, decisions, etc.) have appeared which complement it. The structure of 
the civil service regulation of 1992 aimed to create a career civil service system-similar to 
the one which had existed until the end of World War II. In most of its dispositions and 
arrangements it has also succeeded in fulfilling this endeavour. This regulation, under the 
scope of public law, determined the different elements of civil servants' employment 
relationship, such as admission requirements, career development, promotion and 
remuneration, the training and appraisal system, the question of life-time tenure and 
dismissal, etc. However, as was also the case with the regulation from the inter-war period, 
this code did not address the question of access to the civil service; that is, recruitment and 
selection as a whole.6 
III. The context of modernisation efforts in the civil service after the millennium 
Turning to the most important developments in Hungarian civil service legislation after the 
millennium, several factors ought to be mentioned, which prompted the new measures and 
also correlated with each other. These factors are part of the constant endeavour to motivate 
civil servants better, with the aim of enhancing their performance, in order to cut down the 
expenditures and costs of the public sector, and at the same time to meet the needs of 
citizens for a better public administration in the 21st century. These ideas are very common 
in discussions about civil service modernisation in the whole of the developed world. The 
5
 After 18 years of this type of categorization, from June 2010 a new law (No LV11I of 2010 on 
the status of civil servants of central government) has come into force after being passed by the newly 
elected Parliament. This law draws several distinctions between the civil servants of the organs 
belonging to the central government and those of municipalities and other state organs. This paper 
does not analyse this newly published legislation. 
6
 Linder, V.: Versenyvizsgák a közigazgatásban (Councours in Public Administration). Magyar 
Közigazgatás, (2006) 12; Lőrincz, L.: Kiválasztás a közigazgatásban (Selection in Public Admi-
nistration). Magyar Közigazgatás, (2000) 6. és (2000) 8; Lőrincz, L.: A közigazgatás alapintézményei 
(Basic Institutions of the Public Administration). Budapest, 2005. 
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tools for accomplishing these tasks have also been widely tested since the 1980s. Since 
then, in the course of different civil service reforms in various countries there have been 
many attempts to adapt the human resources management tools used in the private sphere to 
the needs of the public sector. The idea behind this was that public servants-including civil 
servants-should be motivated by the same measures as ordinary people employed on labour 
market; that the rigidity of the normatively regulated, non-responsive carrier systems should 
be lessened, and that civil servants should be personally interested in working and serving 
in a more effective and efficient way. 
In a mere 20 years, since 1992, the Hungarian civil service code has been amended 
more than 70 times.7 The most important amendments and at the same time the most 
relevant ones-in connection with the dichotomy mentioned in the title of this article-the 
career vs. position-based systems-have been introduced since the millennium. From that 
time onward the most committed believers in civil service modernisation have introduced a 
lot of new measures in the Hungarian civil service legislation, hoping to solve-at least 
partially-the problems of the costly, slow acting civil service. These deep seated problems, 
which were far from new, could not be deal with in one or even several blows. The 
modernisation measures introduced "from abroad" were not new. The countries, which 
began to apply these internationally known, quite similar modernisation attempts in the 
course of the 1980s and 1990s have by now accumulated a wealth of experience. But these 
experiences have also been enough to declare that these initiatives were not the "miracle 
cures" for all of the problems of the civil service.8 The slogans heard in the Hungarian civil 
service during the last decade were the same as those proclaimed in Western countries, 
7
 Hazafi, Z.: A karrier rendszerű szabályozás múltja, jelene, jövője a közigazgatásban a 
köztisztviselők jogállására vonatkozó törvény változásainak tükrében (The Past, Present and Future of 
the Career-type Regulation in Public Administration, with Special Regards to the Changes of Civil 
Service Act). Budapest, 2006. 
8
 See for example Bouckaert, G.: La réforme de la gestion publique change-t-elle les systèmes 
administratifs? Revue française d'administration publique, (2003) 105-106; Bouckaert, G.: 
Moderniser l'État. La route à suivre. Le Commentaire. Revue Internationale des Sciences 
Administratives, 72 (2006) 3; Bouckaert, G.: Changing World, Changing Public Administration: New 
European Trends. Conference Paper. Budapest, 2009; Gajduschek, Gy.: Egyéni teljesítményértékelés 
a magyar közigazgatásban. Egy funkcionális elemzés (Personal Performance Evaluation System in 
the Hungarian Public Administration. A Functional Analysis). Vezetéstudomány, 38 (2007) 1, 
Gajduschek, Gy.: A köztisztviselő munkájának értékelése: a magyar jogi szabályozás és a gyakorlat 
elemzése az empirikus adatok tükrében (Evaluation of the Civil Servant's Work: Analysis of Empirical 
Data in Respect of the Regulation and Praxis in Hungary). Humánpolitikai Szemle, (2007) 11-12; 
Gajduschek: Közszolgálat... (Civil Service), op. cit.-, Haque, M. S.: Moderniser l'État. La Route à 
Suivre. Sa Contribution et sa Critique. Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives, 72 (2006) 
3; Kettl, D. F.: Moderniser l'État. Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives, 72 (2006) 3; 
Linder, V.: A magyar közszolgálati humánerőforrás-gazdálkodás nemzetközi összehasonlításban (The 
Human Resource Management in the Hungarian Civil Service in International Context). Budapest, 
2009; Lőrincz, L.: A kormányzás modernizációja (The Modernization of the Government). Magyar 
Közigazgatás, (2006) 11; Lőrincz, L.: Közigazgatási reformok: mítoszok és realitás (Reforms in 
Public Administration. Mythes and Reality). Közigazgatási Szemle, (2007) 2; Premfors, R.: 
Modernising government. The way forward. International Review of Administrative Science, 72 
(2006) 3; Talbot, C: Modernising Government: The Way Forward-A Comment. International Review 
of Administrative Sciences, 72 (2006) 3; OECD: Modernising Government: The Way Forward. Paris, 
2005; OECD: Performance-related Pay Policies for Government Employees. Paris, 2005. 
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which have tried to solve the problems in their civil services-or speaking in a broader 
context in their public service-in the 1980s, and consisted mostly of applying the solutions 
of the New Public Management. However, and despite our late attempts to try to adapt 
these solutions, we paid scant any attention to the clear warnings that "Context matters".9 
These warnings imply that modernisation efforts, which have met with some success in one 
country, will not necessarily succeed in others-particularly if the timing, economical and 
social contexts, cultural and administrative traditions, etc. are not taken into consideration. 
Another key issue and one of the potential causes of the difficulties with the modernisation 
efforts in the Hungarian civil service has been the fact that the starting point of every reform 
measure has always been codification. This has meant that every time a modernisation 
measure has been introduced, a new legal instrument has been passed or maybe an old one 
amended. It is hardly surprising then, that when for example a management tool "copied" 
from private sector human resource management is introduced by legislative tools into a 
career civil service system, with no significant adaptation or testing, for almost 100 thousand 
civil servants, from one day to another, is not a success. Indeed, this kind of implanting has 
proven de-motivating for civil servants.10 Several examples of this type of attempt at reform 
can be found as we will see in the next chapter. 
IV. The most important developments in legislation in recent times 
Under the aegis of the modernisation of civil service employment relationships in Hungary, 
a scries of new measures have been introduced by legislative tools over the last decade. 
Most of these initiatives-following one trend-have aimed to open up the thus far quite strict 
career system, while others-following a different trend and in other aspects-have tried to 
reinforce it. 
The most relevant guiding principle behind these processes has always been the aim of 
enhancing the performance of the civil service, in order to better serve the needs of the 
citizens for a better public administration, and at the same time to realize this task in a less 
costly manner. The tools for carrying out this endeavour have been first and foremost 
practices adapted from human resources management in the private sector. In consequence 
these tools-which have been widely tested in the civil services of many countries in recent 
years-have been adopted by passage of legislation in Hungary, too. However, due to the 
fact that the Hungarian legal system is of the German-type, a quite grotesque situation has 
emerged. Thus, the management tools which were adapted, such as various types of 
individual personal performance appraisal systems, performance-related pay and competency 
management have been accompanied by very detailed and exhaustive legal regulation. 
Furthermore, this regulation has been nationwide and unitary in character-without taking 
9
 Bouckaert: Moderniser l'Etat... op. cit.; Haque: Moderniser l'État... op. cit.: Kettle: Moderniser 
l'État, op. cit.; OECD: Modernising Government... op. cit.; Premfors: op. cit.; Talbot: op. cit.; OECD: 
Modernising Government... op. cit. ; OECD: Performance-related Pav Policies... op. cit. 
10
 Following the collocation of the different stages of convergence in the field of public 
administration modernisation by Christopher Pollitt, these solutions in Hungary incorporate the so-
called »decisional convergence«-when a decision is adopted on the introduction of a measure which 
fits into a modernisation trend. The phases specified by Pollitt in series are discursive convergence, 
decisional convergence, practice convergence and results convergence. Pollitt, Ch.: Clarifying 
Convergence. Striking Similarities and Durable Differences in Public Management Reform. Public 
Management Review, 3 (2001) 4, 471-492; Pollitt, Ch.: Convergence: The useful myth? Public 
Administration, 79 (2001) 4, 933-947. 
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into consideration the different branches of public administration, local conditions, the type 
of work, etc. Let us now consider these in greater detail. 
In 2001 the organic civil service code was amended in many of its provisions. It was 
then that the compulsory individual personal performance appraisal system for the whole 
civil serv/ce-including central, territorial and local level, state administration and 
municipalities"-was introduced. At the same time performance-related pay (PRP) was 
connected with this process. According to the provisions of the code, the head of the 
organisations of public administration had the right to adjust civil servants' annual salaries 
by as much as minus or plus 20%, according to the results of their performance appraisal.1243 
Of course, the payment of the performance related pay also depended on the financial 
circumstances of the public administration organ. According to the results of research 
carried out by the Hungarian Institute of Public Administration14 after the introduction of 
performance related pay, the civil servants were initially keen on it and felt motivated by 
the new HR-instrument, which sought to replace the existing rigid system of remuneration 
connected to seniority. After some years of experience, however, the results have been 
disappointment and demotivation: the causes of the failures were just the same as in other 
countries that had introduced PRP earlier, for example not enough budgetary tools for 
compensating good performance,15 deficiencies in measuring performance objectively, 
inequity in distribution among the organisations, but also among organisational units or 
civil servants, too many administrative tasks associated with the appraisal system, etc. 
Having confronted the failures in the functioning of PRP, but having then failed to 
remedy them, the government decided to implement a new individual personal performance 
appraisal system alongside the old one. From 2007 onwards, another type of personal 
performance appraisal system was gradually introduced for civil servants of the central state 
administration. This type of appraisal system was connected to the payment of bonuses. 
The new individual personal performance appraisal system involved a very complicated 
process, implying also a lot of administrative tasks for evaluated civil servants, as well as 
for managers and HR staff. To give an example of the complexity of the system, the new 
type of appraisal was meant to take place 4 times per year (including the self-appraisal of 
the civil servant), then at the end of the year a 5th, complex appraisal was to be carried out, 
including the whole-year evaluation of the civil servant. When it came to awarding bonuses, 
depending on the budgetary tools of the public administration organ, the number of civil 
servants awarded was pre-determincd at different levels, using different methods.16 The 
amounts of the bonuses awarded also depended on the salary of the civil servant. The 
calculation method for civil servants differs from that of managers; it is of course more 
advantageous for the latter. Despite the name of this HR-tool, the new performance appraisal 
system doesn't measure only the civil servants' performance itself, but also his/her 
comportment and the development of his/her competency level. This means that performance 
management, competency management and performance related pay have all been included 
11
 Up to 100 thousands civil servants then. 
12
 The process of the performance appraisal have taken place at the end of the year. 
13
 This rate is quite higher then the average in international praxis. 
14
 After decades of existence the Institute was dissolved in 2006. 
15
 In spite of the absence of satisfactory budgetary tools, the rate of the performance related pay 
has been modified in the code later up to - 2 0 % - +30%. 
16
 In fact, civil servants awarded by bonuses are few in numbers, but the amounts awarded for 
the few are quite high (although, in consequence of budgetary restrictions, they have been cut back). 
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in one single HR-managemcnt process. This is a situation, which the international praxis 
and literature explicitly warns against, due to the fact that competency management should 
be connected to input while performance management is linked to output. Merging them in 
a single management process is a hopeless undertaking, with many obstacles.17 
It is a quite strange phenomenon that with the introduction of the new forms of 
appraisals in the last decade, there exist at present 3 types of appraisal systems in the 
Hungarian civil service. As the third type of appraisal, called the "evaluation system", has 
been in place for many years now I will not discuss it in detail here. This evaluation system 
takes into consideration the results of the performance measurement and other facts, which 
may be relevant in connection with the work of the civil servant. This "old" evaluation 
system parallels and overlaps with the other two forms of appraisal currently in place. 
Taking into consideration the experience gained over recent years, the present setup is a 
costly, time consuming process, whose functioning has been rather demoralising for civil 
servants and managers.18 It is clear then that in order to make it more efficient it needs to be 
fine tuned in the future. 
Another element already mentioned in connection with the newly applied performance 
appraisal system is the introduction of competency management in the Hungarian civil 
service. In recent years competency management has been applied 
- as an evaluation criterion of the subsequently introduced personal performance 
appraisal (bonus) system, and 
- as an element of the newly introduced recruitment and selection system. 
Below I will briefly describe the new recruitment and selection system of Hungarian 
civil servants, with the accent on newly introduced elements. As mentioned below, the 
unified access into the civil service was not regulated in Hungary until recently. As a true 
novelty, the introduction of the centralized recruitment and selection system, which has 
taken place gradually since 2008, has been an important and widely discussed change in our 
civil service legislation. This very detailed and complicated new system has been a step in 
the direction of a strict career-like system.19 According to the legislation in force from 2008 
until 2010, applicants wishing to be employed in the civil service must meet the following 
requirements:20 
1. the general conditions of acceptance-uniformly regulated for the whole civil 
service; 
17
 Horton, S.-Hondcghem, A.-Farnham, D.: Competency Management in the Public Sector: 
European Variations on a Theme. Amsterdam, 2002. 
18
 Based on data collected during our research named »The staff of public administration« in 
the framework of the European Union's Regional Operative Programme 3.1.1 carried out in the 
Hungarian Institute of Public Administration (leader of the research team: György Gajduschek). 
19
 While other measures taken at the same time-for example the facilitation of the dismissal of 
civil servants, or the restraining of the severance pay for them, among others-have broken up the 
career-like system. 
20
 After the parliamentary elections in 2010, this newly elaborated recruitment and selection 
system has been suspended in most of its elements. At the moment (summer 2010) the so-called 
councours (competitive entering exam) can be passed voluntary, and the competition process is not 
generally obligatory any more. 
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2. the 3-stage competitive entrance exam, the so-called "concours" (1st part: multiple 
choice test, 2nd part: a set of other types of written examination, 3rd part: oral examination)-
as a general condition for acceptance; 
3. the specific conditions for acceptance-determined for specific posts; 
4. the generally obligatory competition procedure (carried out centrally in central 
administration; and also centrally published at other levels of public administration); 
5. the competency evaluation(s)-in certain cases including 3 types of evaluations 
[a) interviews, b) tests for assessing the suitability of the candidate, c) assessment centres]; 
6. any further types of assessments when the head of the public administration organ, 
advertising the vacant post feels it necessary; 
7. the generally compulsory half year-probation period.21 
As the general and specific conditions of acceptance, these are quite similar as those 
which are in place in the other member states of the European Union, which have a civil 
service with elements of a career system. From 2009 onwards, passing the "competitive" 
entrance examination, the so called concours, has also become a general condition for 
nomination. The design of the newly introduced Hungarian concours was drawn up 
according to international standards, based on international praxis (on French examples and 
the praxis of the institutions of the European Communities). In its other fundamental 
elements, however, it has failed to meet the requirements of a real concours; a real 
competitive entering examination. In a nutshell, the Hungarian-type concours is not a truly 
competitive examination. This is due to several factors: First of all, every candidate for a 
civil service position is required to take the entrance examination, but no provision has 
been made to ensure that the candidates will be ranked according to the results they achieve. 
The new central organ responsible for the coordination of the human resources management 
of the government is able to rank candidates while taking into consideration other factors 
too (it is not clear exactly how.) In addition, the head of the organisation wishing to fill a 
vacant post has the right to choose new colleagues at his/her discretion. The other problem 
has been that all candidates-regardless of their qualification, profession, the post to be filled, 
etc.-must pass the same examination with the same content. The topic is the same for every 
candidate. (The only distinction is that people with secondary education have to meet lower 
requirements22 than those with tertiary education.) So, for example a biologist has to 
compete with a lawyer. Perhaps civil servants in English speaking countries, with completely 
different administrative cultures (and education systems) may wonder why this is a problem 
in our country. But in Hungary, with its German-type legal system, where public 
administration studies are also strictly determined by legal thinking and the knowledge 
required (also) for this examination is dominated by legal materials, equality of opportunity 
becomes highly questionable using this method. After functioning for a short period of time, 
it has become clear that if the "Hungarian-type concours" is to function in the future, this 
anomaly requires correction. 
Competency management is another newly adapted HR-management tool, which has 
recently been introduced in the Hungarian civil service system. This management tool, first 
applied to the HR-practice of market oriented companies several decades ago, has been a 
quite new phenomenon in public administration. In many countries competency management 
21
 binder, V.: A közigazgatás személyi állománya (The Personnel of the Public Administration). 
In: Kilényi, G. (ed.): A közigazgatási jog nagy kézikönyve (The Big Handbook o f Public 
Administration). Budapest, 2008. 
22
 In fact the thematic has been less comprehensive for them. 
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has gained ground gradually in public organisations, too. Public managers began to feel it 
necessary to adapt competency management, and use it in the HR-activity of their 
organisation in order to make it more effective and more responsive to the requirements of 
modem HR-managcment.23 The most important HR field, where most of these countries-or 
to be precise most organisations in different countries—have applied competency management 
is the selection process and the definition of training needs. In this respect, Hungary also 
fits into the wider trend, and there is no doubt that this management tool can add value and 
develop traditional approaches in positive ways. But there are some aspects which require 
further consideration: it is disputable whether competency management should be regulated 
by law and government decree as it is in Hungary. The real purpose of this management 
tool is to serve the needs of an organisation according to local circumstances. In order to 
meet this need it is usually the public managers who decide on its application. It is also 
unusual, and both theoretically and methodologically questionable that the evaluation of 
competencies-and what is done with the results of such evaluations-has been directly 
connected with the process of performance management and with the payment of bonuses 
(!), as we saw earlier. 
As to other elements of the relatively recently introduced, and for the moment 
suspended unitary selection system (for example the generally obligatory competition), 
which have tended-from one point of view-to strengthen the civil servants' career system, 
it remains for the moment unclear, whether they will function in the future and when they 
do, in which way. 
V. Conclusions 
This article analyses the Hungarian civil service's tentative path between the traditional 
career and the so-called position-based systems. During the transition period from the 
communist regime to a democratic rule of law, the legislation of the Hungarian civil service 
has taken the form of organic civil service legislation, which has regulated the employment 
relationships of Hungarian civil servants'-in most of its provisions-in a career system. After 
the millennium, reacting to the modernisation needs of the personnel system of public 
administration, the Hungarian legislatures introduced a lot of new measures-all of them by 
legal instructions. The new legal instruments and the amendments of old ones started to 
change the system in two directions. While some new elements aimed to dismantle the 
career-like system (for example the introduction of the performance management system 
and performance related pay, the extending of the possibilities for dismissal, etc.), others 
have deepened the career-elements (for example the introduction of a new generally 
obligatory recruitment and selection system-in a detailed and complicated procedure). 
These very frequent but not at all consistent modifications to civil service legislation have 
resulted in an incertitude, which has done a lot of damage to the prestige of the civil service. 
After the new government came to power in the spring of 2010, it is not possible to predict 
which trend will continue in the future. The only sure thing is that the current decision 
makers would like to amend-and have already partially amended-the civil service legislation 
with just the same aims, which motivate the reform processes in all countries of the 
developed world and which have also been witnessed since roughly the middle of the 1990s 
in Hungary: cutting the costs of public administration, motivating civil servants and 
enhancing the capacity and reliability of the civil service in order to better serve the citizens' 
needs. The newly published solutions must be analysed in another paper. 
23
 See Horton—Hondeghem-Farnham: Competency Management in the Public Sector... op. cit. 
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From Original Sources-Neo-Kantian Legal Philosophical 
Thinking in Hungary 
The traditions of Hungarian legal philosophy followed the various periods of the Continental 
legal philosophical thinking until the mid-20th century. The oeuvres of the most significant 
legal philosophers are not restricted to the interpretation of the achievements of the more 
developed legal cultures, but are also reflected in independent theoretical efforts. In addition, 
Hungarian neo-Kantian theorists have created a number of works acknowledged 
internationally. 
Among these studies, Juristische Grundlehre] by Felix (Bódog) Somló and Rechts-
soziologie2 by Bama Horváth distinguish themselves, being frequently cited in international 
legal literature and available in renowned libraries across Europe. In addition, a number of 
other studies written by the above-mentioned authors in the German language must be 
mentioned. In addition, a number of references by European contemporaries, especially to 
Julius (Gyula) Moór's works, appeared in publications between the two World Wars as well 
as in the years afterwards. 
Somló's monograph, first published in 1917, was reissued by the same publisher' ten 
years later, due to its favourable reception and general interest, and this was then followed 
by a third reprint by Scientia Verlag in 1973.4 Horváth's Rechtssoziologie rivals its great 
predecessor's reputation. The monograph, published in 1934 by the aforementioned well-
known publisher, attracted the attention of scholars both in Europe and overseas. This is 
proved by the fact that the first part of Rechtssoziologie, complemented with other studies 
which had been published earlier in German, was republished by Buncker and Humbolt in 
1971.5 The Theory of Civil Law and Society by Ágost Pulszky, the founder of Hungarian 
legal positivism, published in London in 1888, is also to be mentioned here.6 His work, 
comprised of his university lectures, is considered the peak of his efforts to create an 
independent theory, which may be regarded as one rivalling any other contemporary 
achievement of the kind. 
These papers and their afterlives prove that there exists a segment of legal philosophical 
tradition in Hungary that is renowned even outside the country's borders in professional 
circles. For the sake of Hungarian jurisprudence, all the significant achievements of 
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Sociology of Law, H-4010 Debrecen, P.O. Box 81. 
E-mail: szabadfalvi.jozsef@law.unideb.hu 
1
 Somló, F.: Juristische Grundlehre. Leipzig, 1917. 
2
 Horváth, В.: Rechtssoziologie. Probleme der Gesellschaftlehre und der Geschichtslehre des 
Rechts. Berlin, 1934. 
3
 Somló, F.: Juristische Grundlehre. Leipzig, 1927. 
4
 Somló. F.: Juristische Grundlehre. Aalen, 1973. 
5
 Horváth, В.: Probleme der Rechtssoziologie. Berlin, 1971. 
6
 Pulszky, Á.: The Theory of Civil Law and Society. London, 1888. 
7 4 J Ó Z S E F SZABADFALVI 
international standards should be made accessible for the world. In this field our great 
predecessors have provided a good example through providing the world with their 
evaluations of Hungarian legal philosophical thinking.7 The evaluations had, at that time, an 
orientating effect on contemporary international scientific attitude, and are still regarded 
worthy of consideration. For the past two dccadcs great efforts have been made to re-
discover the traditions of Hungarian jurisprudence. A number of essays, monographs, 
volumes of studies, and reprints of the oeuvres of legal philosophers representing the major 
trends have been published, which has resulted in the revaluation of the "bourgeois" legal 
philosophy, to use the Marxist term that had been forgotten before the change of regime 
(1989/90).8 Today all of these possibilities and sources of information are available for 
those interested in legal philosophy. 
Hereafter I wish to call the reader's attention to a series of books that aims to make 
public the achievements of Hungarian legal philosophy published in foreign languages in 
the early 20th century. The title of the series is "Philosohiae Iuris", edited by Csaba Varga, 
with its sub-series in foreign languages called "Excerpta Historica Philosophiae Hungaricae 
Iuris", which contain essays representing perhaps the most prosperous period of Hungarian 
legal philosophy, partly as faximile reprint as well as the first edited publication of 
manuscripts. 
In the volumes published so far the reader can find essays mostly in German, but also 
in French, English and Italian, which are supplemented with short biographies, lists of 
publications, and lists of essays introducing the oeuvres, and in the end, lists of names and, 
in two cases, of legal sources. All reflect a unified editorial concept.9 
Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie™ by Felix Somló ( 1873-1920), professor of Nagyvárad 
Academy of Law as well as of the Faculty of Law at Kolozsvár University, was published 
as the first in this series in 1999. This edition includes the essays and book reviews written 
and published between 1907 and 1914 by the professor of law, who achieved international 
fame for Hungarian legal philosophy in the early 20th century. Another point of interest of 
the book is that it contains the first critical reviews by Joseph Kohler, Leonidas Pitamic and 
Robert Rcdslob in 1917-1918, as well as a preface written by Gyula Moór in Somló's 
Gedanken zu einer Ersten Philosophie," a fragmented posthumous work from 1926, which 
established his legal value principle. The volume also includes Moór's preface to the second 
edition of Juristische Grundlehre in 1927. 
7
 See Somló, F.: Die neuere ungarische Rechtsphilosophie. Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschafts-
philosophie, 1 (1907-1908) 315-323.; Horváth, В.: Die ungarische Rechtsphilosophie. Archiv fiir 
Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 24 (1930) 31, 37-85. 
8
 See about contemporary Hungarian legal philosophical thinking In: Szabadfalvi, J: Transition 
and Tradition. Can Hungarian Traditions of Legal Philosophy Contribute to Legal Transition? 
Rechtstheorie, 33 (2002) 2 -4 , 167-185. [Krawietz, W.-Varga, Cs. (eds): On Different Legal Cultures, 
Premodern and Modem States, and Transition to the Rule of Law in Western and Eastern Europe. II. 
Sonderheft Ungarn.] Revaluation of Hungarian Legal Philosophical Tradition. Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie (ARSP), 89 (2003) 2, 159-170; Varga, Cs.: Philosophysing on Law in the Turmoil 
of Communist Take-over in Hungary (Two Portraits, Interwar and Post-war). In: Leszkiewicz, M. 
(ed.): The 2005 ALPSA Annual Publication of the Australian Legal Philosophy Students Associations. 
Brisbane, 2005, 82-94. 
9
 The volumes of this series of books are accessible on www.stephanus.hu website. 
10
 See Somló, F. in: Varga, Cs. (ed.): Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie. Budapest, 1999. 
11
 Somló, F.: Gedanken zu einer Ersten Philosophie. Berlin-Leipzig, 1926. 
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These are less known but nevertheless significant essays if the evaluation of an oeuvre 
is considered. While the writings in the appendix offer the evaluation of Somló's work after 
his neo-Kantian turn, the previous studies and reviews provide an introduction to the break 
with the sociological-positivist traditions of a Julius Pikier student following Spencer, as 
well as his acceptance of the neo-Kantian paradigm. Important milestones in this process 
are his study on the new Hungarian legal philosophy of positivism (Die neuere ungarische 
Rechtsphilosophie) and his essay on the application of law (Die Anwendung des Rechts), as 
well as his lecture, reflecting his change of paradigm, which was delivered at a conference 
on legal philosophy in Germany in 1911 (Das Verhältnis von Soziologie und Rechts-
philosophie, insbesondere die Förderung der Rechtsphilosophie durch die Soziologie). The 
lecture was based on the definition of law and the examination of the justness of law as two 
fundamental issues in the philosophy of law. The latter question is discussed in more detail 
in his study on the value standards of law (Massstäbe zur Bewertung des Rechts) published 
in 1909. In his investigation of the right law, moral values are considered as the most 
appropriate tools for evaluating law as the norm of act. 
The publication of these studies provides an opportunity for those interested in gaining 
insight into the revival of Hungarian legal philosophy in the decade after the turn of the 
19th—20th centuries. The neo-Kantian philosophy being established in those years on the 
Continent surpassed the traditional theories of natural law and legal positivism as well as 
the historical view. Jurisprudence, seeking new paths, emphasized a new approach to law 
through modem methodology and value theory, and Somló had a laudable role in this 
process. His works created a possibility to abolish the previous delay in development and to 
establish in Hungary the then leading neo-Kantian legal philosophy. This all resulted in his 
being considered the number one representative of Hungarian legal philosophy for decades. 
The essays included in this volume may help us to understand the process. Hungarian legal 
philosophy can be proud of the fact that Somló, alongside Rudolf Stammler, Gustav 
Radbruch, Hans Kelsen and Alfred Verdross, is considered to be among the great 
representatives of the European neo-Kantian philosophy of law. 
The second volume of the series, published in 2002, is devoted to Abriss eines 
realistischen rechtsphilosophischen Systems12 written by István Losonczy (1908-1980), a 
reserved, rather eccentric figure of legal philosophy in Hungary, who had comprehensive 
knowledge of not only jurispmdence but of natural and medical sciences as well. Besides 
the "realistic" legal philosophy promised in the title, the book also contains, in the appendix, 
a study published in a professional journal. Losonczy wrote this study upon Alfred Verdross' 
request at the tum of 1948-1949 to be published in Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht, however, it was not issued due to the socio-political changes at that time. 
This study was originally published under the title Über die Möglichkeit und den 
Wissenschaftscharakter der Rechtswissenschaft in 1937. Here the author discussed issues 
on jurispmdence as a field of science, including mainly problems of theories of existence, 
the theory of knowledge, and methodology. The editor of the series, as a former student of 
Losonczy, may have appreciated this study the most, since it allowed the young jurist 's 
philosophical oeuvre to be reconstructed starting from the 1930s. 
The essays included in the volume allow insight to be gained into the attempt to surpass 
the neo-Kantian paradigm. Losonczy expressed his concept of law against Kelsen's "pure 
12
 See Losonczy, I. in: Varga, Cs. (ed.): Abriss eines realistischen rechtsphilosophischen Systems. 
Budapest, 2002. 
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theory of law"—representing a real challenge for his contemporaries. According to 
Losonczy's theory, law is a phenomenon including logical, explicative and normative 
elements, which seems to be evident regarding jurispmdential research, originating in 
statute law. By refusing Kclsen's dogmas, he stands for applying a complex or in other 
words a "synthetic method", which is based on the recognition of rules that constitute law. 
In his view, "purified" synthetic methodological theories have already been created, among 
which he emphasizes the theories represented by Bama Horváth, Albert Irk, and Julius 
(Gyula) Moór, as well as Erik Kaufmann, Wilhelm Sauer and Alfred Verdross in the German 
scholarly literature. It is a great loss for the Hungarian philosophy of law that after 1949 
Losonczy, as well as some of his contemporaries such as József Szabó and István Bibó, or 
the few years younger Koméi Solt (Scholz), were not allowed to continue their research. 
They either had to change careers or were forced into inner exile, or, in the worst case, they 
were imprisoned. Losonczy, for the sake of Hungarian jurisprudence, was able to continue 
his activity as a criminal lawyer. 
The most extensive edition was published in 2006, Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie,13 
a volume of studies by Julius (Gyula) Moór ( 1888-1950), professor of legal philosophy at the 
universities of Szeged and Budapest. This is a book of 500 pages in excellent faximile quality, 
comprising seventeen studies in German, two in Italian and one in French, published between 
1922 and 1943, representing his whole oeuvre in a comprehensive manner. Moór insisted on 
making his writings, in which he primarily expressed his views on the philosophy of law, 
available for the international community of scholars. In this respect, he can be regarded as 
the most internationally-aware author in the Hungarian literature of legal philosophy in the 
first half of the 20th century. Unfortunately, a monographic representation of his synthesis on 
legal philosophy is missing, to the great disappointment of this field of study. 
The collected and published essays provide a retrospective overview on the work of 
the most beloved student of Somló, the number-one personality of legal philosophy in 
Hungary between the two World Wars, who was in the early 1920s rightly called by his 
famous colleague Barna Horváth the creator of the "new Hungarian philosophy of law" as 
well as its "representative man". Moór's philosophy of law was fundamentally determined 
by his acceptance of the neo-Kantian view, which he openly declared as a starting point in 
philosophy. However, he admitted that neo-Kantianism with its numerous trends allows 
very different philosophical conclusions to be drawn. 
His system of legal philosophy (fundamental doctrine of law, sociology of law, legal 
axiology, and methodology of jurisprudence) was characterized by a complex view on 
posing problems, it was not by chance that he considered his own view to be among 
"comprehensive philosophical views of law", which involves an overall concern with 
"eternal" issues of jurisprudence. Moór was inspired to create a system based on the most 
significant literature of jurisprudence, drawing conclusions from the mistakes of previous 
doctrines, and exempt from one-sided extremes. 
Moór was from the beginnings of his career an advocate of neo-Kantian philosophy 
who, considering the distinction between reality and value to be fundamental, attempted to 
settle the relationship between these two spheres. A cornerstone of his reasoning was his 
doctrine on the dual character of law, which emphasized duality between reality and value 
in law. In his view, law is a complex phenomenon composed of elements belonging either 
to the world of existence or to that of values. This concept was first described in the starting 
13
 See Moór, J. in: Varga, Cs. (ed.): Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie. Budapest, 2006. 
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study of the volume titled Macht, Recht, Moral ( 1922), which is at the same time a brilliant 
summary of his basic doctrine on law. Another study, titled Das Logische im Recht (1928), 
summarizing his fundamental views on legal dogmatics and methodology, was included in 
the volume as his leading work from the 1920s. Among the works representing the 1930s, a 
study Reine Rechtslehre, Naturrecht und Rechtspositivizmus (1931) published in "Kelsen-
Festschrift" can be read, which provides interpretation and criticism on the most significant 
system of legal theory of the 20th century. Furthermore, Reine Rechtslehre: Randbemerkungen 
zum neuesten Werk Kelsens (1935) is to be mentioned as the first evaluation of Kelsen's 
synopsis'4 in Hungary, in which Moór expressed his opinion as a contemporary of equal 
standing to Kelsen, professor in Vienna. 
As part of the notional analysis of law, Recht und Gewohnheitsrecht (1934) discussing 
the issue of common law is also included in the volume, as well as the following studies: 
Das Wesen der Philosophie nach Pauler (1936) on the issues of the philosophy of science, 
Creazione e applicazione del diritto (1934), discussing the problems of creating and 
applying law, and Öffentliches und privates Recht (1938) and Das Rechtssystem (1939) 
discussing his special point of view on the system of law. Das Problem des Naturrechts 
(1935), one of the works of key importance in that decade, is a summary of Moór 's 
"negative or limitative natural law". In his study, similarly to most contemporary Hungarian 
neo-Kantian philosophers of law, he expressed his opposition to Kelsen's view, which 
attempted to simplify reality, as well as to the extremes of legal positivism. 
The first study in the series from the 1940s is Der Wissenschafts-Charakter der 
Jurisprudenz (1940) discussing issues of theory and methodology of science, followed by a 
study on the problems of legal loopholes, titled Sulla questione delle lacune nel diritto 
(1941). Recht und Gesellschaft (1942) discussed causal connections in detail. The closing 
study in the volume, Was ist Rechtsphilosophie? ( 1943) is Moór's last comprehensive work 
written in German, which might as well be considered as a final synopsis of his legal 
philosophical views. In Moór's view pointing towards a synthesis, a decisive tum occurred 
during the 1930s and in the early 1940s, and a synthesis of characteristic changes appeared, 
mainly in the philosophical basis of his philosophy of law. This new kind of view represented 
a new trend, which had developed from a synthesis of neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian views, 
whose legal philosophical consequences were not subsequently elaborated in detail. 
This brief overview does not provide the opportunity to describe and emphasize the 
importance of each study written by Moór. Nevertheless, it seems a pity that the volume only 
includes a short resume of two important studies [Metaphysik und Rechtsphilosophie (1929) 
and Soziologie und Rechtsphilosophie (1934)]. Mainly this latter study could have represented 
the progress that had occurred in Moór's oeuvre resulting in his describing law as a 
phenomenon in the empire of "valuable reality". In spite of all this, the volume represents this 
diverse life's work in a sufficient way. The author of the review aims to call the attention of 
the reader to another issue which with Moór was concerned in the 1920s, namely the problem 
of pacifism and anarchy. He published a book and a study in this topic in German.15 
14
 Kelsen, H.: Reine Rechtslehre. Leipzig-Wien, 1934. 
15
 Moór, J.: Zum ewigen Frieden. Grundriss einer Philosophie des Pazifismus und des 
Anarchismus. Leipzig, 1930; Das Wesen des Pazifismus und die darin enthaltenen ethischen, logischen 
und soziologischen Probleme. In: Studi Filosofico-Giuridici dedicati a Giorgo del Vecchio bel XXV 
anno di insegnamento (1904-1929). II. Società Tipografica Modenese, Antica Tipografica Soliani, 
Modena, 1931, 146-159. 
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A unique picce in the series is the volume The Bases of Law / A jog alapjai16 by Barna 
Horváth (1896-1973), professor of philosophy of law at Szeged and Kolozsvár universities. 
A point of interest in this publication is that although it was originally written in English 
around 1947-1948, it is also available in Hungarian translation. A brief biography and a list 
of references in English are supplemented with two further studies by István H. Szilágyi, 
who has long been concerned with Horváth's oeuvre. These essays give an insight into the 
author's career and also provide information on the mutual intellectual influence of Horváth 
and István Bibó, his former student. The published manuscript bears a further point of 
interest in that an important element concerning the oeuvre was focused on through giving 
an answer to the question of how Horváth reconsidered his system of the theory of law 
prior to his emigration at the end of 1949. 
The originality of Horváth's legal philosophy, which he preferred to call "pure legal 
sociology", considering Kelsen's terminology, lies in his synoptic attitude and the closely 
related processual legal view, which was discussed in detail in his Rechtssoziologie of 1934 
and in A jogelmélet vázlata (Outlines of legal theory),17 published three years later. The 
originality of the theory is included in harmonizing two paradigms that were in contradiction 
within the contemporary legal philosophy. The parallel effectiveness of the continental neo-
Kantian view and the pragmatic-empirical attitude of Anglo-Saxon origin proved to be a 
pioneering idea not only in Hungarian but in European legal thought as well. Horváth, 
through applying the synoptic method, provides a completely original interpretation of one 
of the fundamental issues of neo-Kantian legal philosophy, namely the relationship between 
value and reality. He evolved his method from the essence of the activity of lawyers and 
modelled it as the schcme of thoughts in the judge ' s head. The proccssual view, connected 
to the synoptic one, claims that law is not simply a norm but a theoretical norm of behaviour 
and the related actual behaviour, which is nothing else but the procedure. A continuous co-
ordination (of synoptic character) between a legal case and the legal norm creates the 
procédural process. The significance of Horváth's oeuvre lies in the fact that he creatcd new 
perspectives for further development in the national legal theory through combining the 
familiar German-Austrian ties with views on jurisprudence in the English-speaking world. 
The novelty of the recently published volume lies in the fact that Horváth, possibly 
thinking of emigration, chose the English language to summarize (practically word for 
word, as István H. Szilágyi pointed out) the view that he had elaborated a dccade earlier. At 
the same time he reactcd to the critical remarks included in István Bibó 's-his former student 
and by that time colleague-Zvtwjg, Recht, Freiheit (1935). However, it is problematic why 
only a decade later he, an author completing research in the history of theory, sociology and 
the history of law, considered a return to legal theoretical roots an issue of great importance. 
After his emigration two dozen reviews and articles were published, mostly in English. The 
period of more than two dccades that he spent in the USA brought about only one important 
paper in English, published in Australia, which revealed his attempt to think over the 
synoptic method. This work resulted in high professional interest and international 
discussion and a imed to describe the theory of " law field" in law. The underlying idea of 
this view was a change in the concept of the physical world due to the findings of modem 
physicists (Einstein and Maxwell). The theory of law field is not an elaborated view, it is 
16
 See Horváth, В. in: Varga, Cs. (ed.): A jog alapjai (The Base of Law). Budapest, 2006. 
17
 Horváth, В.: A jogelmélet vázlata (Outlines of Legal Theory). Szeged, 1937. 
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rather an exciting theoretical experiment worth reconsidering.18 In addition to this, in the 
1950s he began to translate into English his monograph Angol jogelmélet (English legal 
theory),19 which was published in Hungarian in 1943, but was unable to complete it. The 
only professional recognition for him was the publication of the previously mentioned 
Probleme der Rechtssoziologie. 
It deserves a mention that Horváth 's other studies written in foreign languages are to 
be issued in the near future as part of this series. The three volumes will include writings by 
Horváth on processual legal theory, the theory of justness and studies published during his 
years abroad, written mostly in German and English.20 These further volumes will make 
available the entire works of Horváth published in foreign languages. 
Finally, the volume Die Schule von Szeged completes the series.21 The subtitle 
(Rechtsphilosophische Aufsatze von István Bibó, József Szabó und Tibor Vas) aims to inform 
the less-informed reader on those authors whose legal philosophical studies are included in 
the book. Even today we know little about the "School of Szeged", a community composed 
of former students of Horváth.22 Nevertheless, even if it cannot be compared to the "new 
Austrian school" marked by Hans Kelsen, Adolf Merkl, and Alfred Verdross, which had a 
great effect on the European legal philosophical thinking after the turn of the century, still, 
as the only Hungarian school of jurisprudence, it has a considerable importance in national 
as well as in international jurispmdence. 
The first publications by the members of the school of Szeged, approaching the world 
of law through the neo-Kantian paradigm represented by their professor, were issued from 
the mid-1930s. The first part of the volume includes István Bibó's (1911-1979) legal 
philosophical studies. Under the title Zwang, Recht. Freiheit a summary in German of his 
major work on legal theory is included, which was printed in 1935 when he was a student 
of law.23 This detailed resume clearly reflects the fact that the young legal theorist attempted 
to compose his own view even in this early work. In those years each legal philosopher 
expressed his own views. Bibó carried out this challenging undertaking with a thoroughness 
and moderation contrary to his age. According to his aim, he wished to grasp the essence of 
law in the connection between force and freedom. 
When elaborating his theory, he adapted two major categories used by Bama Horváth, 
the idea of synopsis and the term of social objectification. In terms of Bibó's definition, law 
simultaneously exercises the most objective force and performs the most objective freedom. 
This two-faced character of law is not a novelty in legal theory and a number of views have 
emerged emphasizing one or the other of its faces. According to Bibó, this kind of double 
18
 See Horváth, В.: Field Law and Law Field. Österreichische Zeitschrift fir öffentliches Recht, 
8 (1957), 44-81. 
19
 Horváth, В.: Angol jogelmélet (English Legal Theory). Budapest, 1943. 
20
 Horváth, В.: Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie. I. 1926-1948: Prozessuelle Rechtslehre; IL 
1926-1948: Gerechtigkeitslehre; III. 1949-1971: Papers in Emigration, (hrsg. Csaba Varga), Budapest, 
2011 (in preparation). 
21
 Varga, Cs. (ed.): Die Schule von Szeged. Rechtsphilosophische Aufsätze von István Bibó, 
József Szabó und Tibor Vas. Budapest, 2006. 
22
 See Szabadfalvi, J.: Bibó István és a szegedi iskola (István Bibó and the School of Szeged). 
In: Dénes, 1. Z. (ed.): A szabadság kis körei. Tanulmányok Bibó István életmüvéről (Small Circles of 
Liberty. Studies on the Life-Work of István Bibó). Budapest, 1999. 125-152. 
23
 Bibó, L: Kényszer, jog, szabadság (Zwang, Rechts, Freiheit). Acta Litterarum ac Scientiarum 
Reg. Universitatis Hung. Francisco-Josephinae. Sectio: Juridico-Politica, Tom. VIII. Szeged, 1935. 
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tension will provide the real strength of law as objectification. In concluding this study, 
József Szabó's contemporary review published in German is included, which is a credit to 
the editor. Szabó, as a contemporary in close connection with Bibó, called the attention of 
the public opinion to this early achievement of the school of Szeged in a significant legal 
journal in the year of publication. 
Furthermore, two complete studies by Bibó-originally written in French and German-
are included, which provide a thorough analysis on certain minor problems of legal 
philosophy. It is not by chance that all this is expressed as criticism of the great theory with 
respect to Kelsen's theory. A study Le dogme "bellum justum " et la théorie de l'infaillibilité 
juridique (1936) is a critical paper of Kelsen's pure theory of law. In this paper Bibó gives 
an immanent judgement on the debate-inspiring study, which had been published two years 
earlier. He is concerned with the infallibility of law, with the problems of obligation, 
awareness of international law, those of sanctioning acts and with the normative character 
of Kelsen's method. 
In his paper Rechtskraft, rechtliche Unfehlbarket, Souveränität ( 1937) the author 
discusses his view regarding legal force, infallibility and sovereignty, through a different 
method from the pure theory of law, on the infallibility of law and other related issues. The 
paradigm of neo-Kantian philosophy is again considered, namely the problem of dualism of 
"Sein" and "Sollen" and its capability to be transmitted. Bibó seems to be sceptical of the 
views emphasizing a complete separation of the two spheres and he stands for the feasibility 
of Horváth's synoptic approach. 
The second part of the volume is composed of two papers by József Szabó (1909-
1992) and a short summary in German of a study in written in Hungarian. This study is 
titled Ort und Stelle der Rechtswissenschaft in dem menschlichen Denken (1942), which is 
an explanation for a wider audience of his new-realistic ("neurealistischen") view being 
formed at that time. We can read, as one of his complete studies, Wahrheit, Wert und Symbol 
im Rechte (1943), which was issued, along with the studies of Moór and Horváth, in the 
"Ungarn-Heft" of Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie discussing contemporary 
Hungarian legal philosophy.24 The main aim of this study was to summarize the theses on 
jurisprudence previously elaborated only in Hungarian. According to Szabó, a number of 
neo-Kantian theories emerging from the duality of existence and validity attempted to find a 
connection between these two spheres of the world in highly different ways. The reason 
that most attempts were unsuccessful may lie in the fact that existence and validity are not 
to be found in the objective world but in the subjective one. 
Szabó claims, based on the views of theory of knowledge referring back to Hume, that 
the world of human subjectivity is one where existence and validity, object and norm have a 
differentiating sense. The deepest roots of law are to be sought in human subjectivity. This 
idea allows him to trace back the validity basis of law to moral considerations in human 
consciousness. Psychological considerations play, not by chance, an important role in his 
theory, as well as the fundamental idea that the world of law is to regarded as a symbol or a 
system of symbols. The task of jurisprudence is to find the meaning behind symbols. The 
24
 József Szabó applied the term "new-realistic" to describe his concept of law in the title of a 
paper published in 1948. See Szabó, J.: Der Rechtsbegriff in einer neurealistischen Beleuchtung. 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffenliches Recht, 1 ( 1948) 3, 291 -311. (A point of interest in the paper 
is that it is word by word equal to his study "Wahrheit, Wert und Symbol im Rechte" published five 
years earlier.) 
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paper goes into detail about the connection between formalism and justness. Perhaps the 
most significant feature of Szabó's new-realistic theory is the fact that he could find answers 
to questions of neo-Kantian philosophy due to his knowledge of philosophy and 
jurisprudence of the English-speaking countries, which had been inspired by his one-time 
schoolmaster. Thus in Szabó's theory the views of two great legal cultures are in creative 
inter-connection. Unfortunately, the author did not have the chance to further elaborate his 
theory. 
The second Szabó paper was originally published in 1974. From Chaos to the Rule of 
Law, containing his earlier views on jurisprudence, was published in a Festschrift in honour 
of René Marie. It is to Szabó's merit that, despite his scientific isolation, he was up-to-date 
in following with attention the international literature in the field, which is reflected in the 
references. 
In the final part of the book. Die Bedeutung der transzendentalen Logik in der 
Rechtsphilosophie (1935), a work by Tibor Vas (1911—1983)—a former fellow student and 
friend of Bibó-published by his alma mater is included, which is followed by a review 
written by József Szabó. Vas in his paper is concerned with the importance of transcendental 
logics in legal philosophy; nevertheless, he includes his critical remarks as well. In the first 
part he introduces in detail the Kantian origins of transcendental logic and its progress in 
neo-Kantian philosophy, including the efforts by the schools of Marburg and Baden. In the 
second part the application of the transcendental method is examined through the views of 
the three most significant representatives of neo-Kantian legal philosophy (Stammler, 
Kelsen and Somló). The author provides criticism regarding all three theories and proves 
how the terms applied as prerequisites of general validity in law can lead to the application 
of meta-legal terms of natural law. The methods of jurisprudence will help to solve this 
problem of considering not only one but two objects of knowledge in law and denying the 
possibility of a unified knowledge of law; consequently they do not apply a constitutive 
method but a reflective one. Among the views that are considered as modern in surpassing 
the transcendental method, he emphasizes Horváth's synoptic view and Gurvitch's ideal-
realistic method, which consider the dual-objectivity of law. Vas seems to be very consistent 
in undermining the illusory conviction in the transcendental approach. All this allows him 
to seriously criticize the neo-Kantian philosophy of law. 
Having briefly introduced the current volumes, the author has no other task than to 
express his wish that the volumes published so far and the ones being or planned to be 
published will achieve the editor's goal, the international re-discovery of Hungarian legal 
philosophy. It is the future responsibility of book distributors that this series of publications 
should become available for their target audience.25 
25
 The first review on the first volume of the series: Funke, A.: Die Definition des Rechts und 
die Brille auf der Nase der Juristen. Rechtstheorie, 36 (2005) 4, 427-433. 
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ANNA T . LITOVKINA* 
"Where There's a Will There's a Lawyer's Bill": 
Lawyers in Anglo-American Anti-Proverbs 
Introduction 
1. Anti-proverbs 
Proverbs have never been considered sacrosanct; on the contrary, they have frequently been 
used as satirical, ironic or humorous comments on a given situation. For centuries, proverbs 
have provided a framework for endless transformation. In the last few decades they have 
been perverted and parodied so extensively that their variations have been sometimes heard 
more often than their original forms. Wolfgang Mieder has coined the term "Antisprichwort " 
(anti-proverb) for such deliberate proverb innovations (also known as alterations, parodies, 
transformations, variations, wisecracks, mutations, ox fractured proverbs) and has published 
several collections of anti-proverbs in German and English.1 
Like traditional gems of wisdom, anti-proverbs appear in a broad range of generic 
contexts, from personal letters to philosophical journals, from public lectures and sermons 
to songs, from science fiction to comics and cartoons, from fables to poetry. They arc also 
found in great abundance on the Internet, in advertising slogans, in the titles of books and 
articles, and in magazine and newspaper headlines. Anti-proverbs are commonly quoted in 
collections of puns, one-liners, toasts, wisecracks, quotations, aphorisms, maxims, quips, 
epigrams and graffiti. There is no sphere of life where they are not used. It should be noted 
that while some anti-proverbs negate the "truth" of the original piece of wisdom completely 
[for example, Crime pays—be a lawyer {Crime doesn't pay}2], the vast majority put the 
proverbial wisdom only partially into question, primarily by relating it to a particular 
context or thought in which the traditional wording does not fit. Typically, an anti-proverb 
will elicit humor only if the traditional proverb upon which it is based is also known. 
Otherwise, the innovative strategy of communication based on the juxtaposition of the old 
and "new" proverbs is lost. Anti-proverbs may contain revealing social comments. More 
often than not, however, being based on mere wordplay or puns, they arc playful texts 
generated primarily for the goal of amusement. 
All 's fair for anti-proverbs: there is hardly a topic that they do not address. As Mieder 
states, "Just as proverbs continue to comment on all levels and occurrences in our daily life, 
so do anti-proverbs react by means of alienating and shocking linguistic strategies to 
* Ph.D., Tomori Pál College, Center of Foreign Language Teaching, H-6300 Kalocsa, Szent 
István király út 2-4 . 
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1
 For a summary of relevant research sec T. Litovkina, A. -Mieder , W.: Old Proverbs Never Die, 
They Just Diversify: A Collection of Anti-Proverbs. Burlington-Veszprém, 2006, 1 -54 . 
2
 For the reader's ease all anti-proverbs are followed by their original forms, given in { } 
brackets. 
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everything that surrounds us".3 There is a wide range of professions and occupations 
subjected to mockery in Anglo-American anti-proverbs, embracing politicians and doctors, 
accountants and policemen, teachers and writers, whores and housewives, among many 
others: 
Politics makes strange bedfellows-rich. {Politics makes strange bedfellows} 
What can't be cured supports the doctor. {What can't be cured must be endured} 
Those who can do; those who can't, teach; and those who can't do anything at all, 
teach the teachers. {Those who can do; those who can't, teach} 
Crime doesn't pay, except for the writers of detective stories. {Crime doesn't pay} 
You can lead a whore to culture but you can't make her think. {You can lead a horse to 
water, but you can't make him drink} 
All work and no pay makes a housewife. {All work and no play makes Jack a dull 
boy}. 
Without any doubt, the lawyer4 is the most popular target of Anglo-American anti-
proverbs. 
2. Lawyers as object of people's scorn and butt of American lawyer jokes 
In "Legal Ethics: A Comparative Study" common complaints about lawyers from around 
the world were classified into five general categories:5 
- abuse of litigation in various ways, including using dilatory tactics and false evidence 
and making frivolous arguments to the courts; 
- preparation of false documentation, such as false deeds, contracts, or wills; 
- deceiving clients and other persons and misappropriating property; 
- procrastination in dealings with clients; and 
- charging excessive fees. 
As has been pointed out by Anna T. Litovkina in a previously published analysis of 
American lawyer jokes from the Internet6 (collected from hundreds of websites in spring 
2009),7 the greatest anger and irritation in the jokes is directed at lawsuits, the high income 
3
 See Mieder, W.: American Proverbs: A Study of Texts and Contexts. Bem, 1989, 244. 
4
 See T. Litovkina, A.: Professions and Occupations. In: T. Litovkina, A.: Old Proverbs Cannot 
Die: They Just Fade into ParoDY: Anglo-American Anti-Proverbs. Habilitation essay (manuscript). 
Budapest, 2005, 107-112. 
5
 Hazard, Jr. G. C.-Dondi, A.: Legal Ethics: A Comparative Study. 2004, 60. 
6
 In the early 1980s, a new joke cycle appeared in the USA, and has continued to flourish ever 
since. This is a lawyer joke cycle. Lawyer jokes have been published in book form, and have also 
been displayed on various American websites. According to a 1997 Internet search by a legal 
journalist, 3,473 sites were devoted to lawyer jokes (see Yas, D. L.: First Thing We Do Is Kill All the 
Lawyer Jokes. Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, 1997, 20 October, 11). For more, see T. Litovkina, A.: 
Law is Hell: Death and the Afterlife in American Lawyer Jokes. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 50 (2009) 
3,311-328. 
7
 See T. Litovkina, A.: Greed, Lies and Negotiable Justice: Stereotyped Lawyers in American 
Lawyer Jokes. Acta Ethnographica Hungarica, 2011 (in press). See also Galanter, M.: The Faces of 
Mistrust: the Images of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes and Political Discourse. University of 
Cincinnati Law Review, 66 ( 1998) 3, 827. For more on the stereotypical traits of lawyers see Galanter, 
M.: Lowering the Bar: Lawyer Jokes and Legal Culture. Madison, 2005; Galanter, M.: The Great 
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of lawyers, and lawyers' greed and stinginess. According to the jokes, attorneys frequently 
bill their clients services that they fail to provide. To drain more and more money out of 
their clients, lawyers deliberately try to delay justice by focusing on technicalities and legal 
procedures. Lawyers' ignorance, skillful manipulation, corruption and dishonesty are also 
common themes. Since lawyers are inveterate liars, they are not to be trusted under any 
circumstances. They take advantage of their own clients, and they frequently take sexual 
advantage of them. They are pushy, arrogant and snobbish. They associate with Devil. 
These are only the most common stereotypical traits of the lawyers who are ridiculed in 
American lawyer jokes from the Internet. Not surprisingly, considering all these negative 
traits, lawyers should be exterminated.8 The place where they go after they die is Hell.9 
3. The focus of the present study 
The present study focuses on stereotypical traits of lawyers according to the Anglo-
American anti-proverbs. What are the dominant stereotypical traits of a lawyer and his 
behaviour? What negative features is he hated for? Why is it that the lawyer, and not the 
representative of any other profession or occupation, is the figuire who is most often mocked 
in American anti-proverbs? Does the lawyer's stereotype in American anti-proverbs contain 
any truth? These and many other questions may be posed in regard to Anglo-American 
anti-proverbs about lawyers. 
The anti-proverbs discussed in the present study were taken primarily from American 
and British written sources. The texts that follow, along with others too numerous to include, 
were drawn from hundreds of books and articles on puns, one-liners, toasts, wisecracks, 
quotations, aphorisms, maxims, quips, epigrams, and graffiti. All of the anti-proverbs quoted 
here (together with references to their sources) can be found in the book "Old Proverbs 
Never Die, They Just Diversify: A Collection of Anti-Proverbs".10 
While certain themes occur pervasively in anti-proverbs about lawyers, others appear 
in only a few. For this reason, my discussion may sometimes appear to be uneven and the 
treatment of certain thematic categories may seem to be disproportionately broad or narrow, 
but in all cases my examples reflect the proportions found in my source collections. It must 
also be mentioned here that a number of our anti-proverbs treat several thematic categories 
simultaneously. Such examples could be discussed in various parts of the present study. As 
a rule, anti-proverbs that embrace more than one theme will be quoted and discussed only 
once, except in cases in which only a few anti-proverbs have been identified to illustrate a 
specific theme. 
American Lawyer Joke Explosion. Humor-International Journal of Humor Research, 21 (2008) 4, 
387-M13; Davies, Ch.: American Jokes about Lawyers. Humor-International Journal of Humor 
Research, 21 (2008) 4, 369-386. 
8
 Lawyers' extermination is a theme of one of the largest groups of American lawyer jokes, 
and also one of the themes of two of my articles see T. Litovkina: Law is Hell. . . op. cit.; T. Litovkina, 
A.: Az ügyvédekkel történő leszámolás különböző módjai az amerikai ügyvédviccekben (Various 
Methods of Reckon with Lawyers in American Humor). In: Gecső, T.-Sárdi, Cs. (eds): Új módszerek 
az alkalmazott nyelvészeti kutatásban (New methods in Applied Linguistic Research). 
Székesfehérvár-Budapest, 2010, 191-197. 
9
 Hell is a theme of another largest group of American lawyer jokes, and also one of the themes 
of my other article see T. Litovkina: Law is Hell... op. cit. 
10
 See T. Litovkina-Mieder: op. cit. 
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Although this study focuses on anti-proverbs, in a few cases-in order to make a point, 
or to confirm or challenge some statements expressed in anti-proverbs-I could not resist the 
temptation to quote American lawyer jokes or other humorous texts (they are generally 
cited in notes with precise reference to their sources). 
I. Discussion 
Before presenting an analysis of stereotypical traits of lawyers according to Anglo-American 
anti-proverbs let us at first examine some American proverbs conccming law, lawsuits and 
lawyers." 
1.1. American Legal Proverbs 
Donald F. Bond stated that "Perhaps no profession has contributed more to our proverbial 
stock than the law".12 Elsewhere he wrote: "the view of the law reflected in proverbs reveals 
the distrust of legal matters which the common man has long held. The dangers of becoming 
involved in law suits, the expense, the interminable progress of litigation, the uncertainty of 
justice-on all these points his instinct has been to steer clear. Similar lines-and equally 
unflattering-form the picture of the lawyer in proverbial lore".13 
Let us first see how law is reflected in American proverbs. It is better to observe the 
law, and not be involved in any legal procedure: Keep the law and keep from the law. 
Indeed, after a legal case has been started, its outcome cannot be predicted: To go to law is 
to go to sea. 'Law' is depicted as something extremely cruel: In a thousand pounds of law 
there is not one ounce of love. Moreover, it justifies disorder and madness: Law often 
codifies disorder and make madness legal. People who don't know that something is against 
law can still be punished for doing it: Ignorance of the law is no excuse. This idea is 
contested in the following two proverbs: Laws are made to be broken; Laws are made to be 
evaded. Laws should not be too gentle, neither should they be too severe, since Laws too 
gentle are seldom obeyed; too severe, seldom executed. Where there are many laws, there 
will be definitely a lot of offenders, since there will be always a chance to find various ways 
to overcome such laws: The greater the number of laws, the more thieves there will be; The 
more laws, the more offenders. By using money, and through corruption, one might turn the 
law in whichever direction is needed, as affirmed in the proverb, The law is like an axle: 
voit can turn it whichever way you please if you give it plenty of grease. Justice is given to 
the rich, therefore. There is one law for the rich and one for the poor; Who will have law, 
must have money. While petty criminals are punished, large ones are frequently allowed to 
go free: Laws catch flies and let hornets go free. Someone in need might be forced to do 
illegal things: Necessity knows no law; Where there is hunger law is not regarded, and 
where law is not regarded there will be hunger. In times of misfortune, no one pays attention 
to laws, and, therefore, they are constantly broken; more than that, those who break them, 
are not punished: Laws are silent when wars are waging. 
11
 The proverbs quoted here were recorded in the USA at the second part of the XX century see 
Mieder, W. (ed.): Kingsbury, S. A. Harder, K. B. (eds): A Dictionary of American Proverbs. New 
York, 1992, 362-364. 
12
 See Bond, D. F.: English Legal Proverbs. Publications of the Modern Language Association. 
1936, 51,935. 
13
 See Bond, D. F.: The Law and Lawyers in English Proverbs. American Bar Association 
Journal, 1935, 21, 725. 
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How is the nature of the lawyer revealed through American proverbs? A good attorney 
is seen as a very bad person: A good lawyer, a bad neighbour. Lawyers are pushy and 
arrogant: Lawyers earn their bread in the sweat of their browbeating. Attorneys' frequent 
task is to deal with dishonest people and criminals. Just in vein, the following proverb 
emphasizes: If there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers. Lawyers' ability 
to "change white into black" and reshape reality is emphasized in the proverb Lawyers, like 
painters, can easily change white into black. Attorneys delay justice by focusing on 
technicalities and legal procedures. Instead of trying to reach harmony and timely resolution 
of their cases, they do anything possible in order to foment and prolong conflicts. The better 
a lawyer is, the longer his case can last, that is, the more money he can make. Indeed, as the 
proverbs stress, Lawsuits were invented to make lawyers rich; The longer the lawsuit, the 
larger the lawyer s fee. The proverb No matter who loses, the lawyer always wins points out 
the 'win-win' situation of a lawsuit-for an attorney. In fact, lawyers are not needed when 
laws speak: The best government is that in which the law speaks instead of the lawyer. 
A few additional American proverbs about law, lawsuits and lawyers: 
A man who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client. 
Always tell your doctor and your lawyer the truth. 
Possession is nine points of the law. 
Lawmakers should not be lawbreakers. 
Where there's no law, there's no bread. 
Where law ends, tyranny begins. 
The execution of the laws is more important than the making of them. 
Fond of lawsuits, little wealth; fond of doctors, little health. 
If one family has a lawsuit, ten families arc involved. 
Now let us turn to the main point of our discussion, Anglo-American anti-proverbs 
that target lawyers, and let us examine the dominant features of lawyers and their behavior, 
according to these biased anti-proverbs. My discussion is organized in six sections. The first 
two sections focus on the main stereotypical traits associated with lawyer in Anglo-
American anti-proverbs: the cost of lawsuits, the high income (and fees) of lawyers, and 
their stinginess, greed and general fondness for money. While the first section treats these 
themes in general, the second reflects how lawyers are portrayed in comparison with doctors 
and accountants. The focus of the third section is on lawyers' ignorance and stupidity, and 
the fourth discusses such basic features of lawyer profession as lying, dishonesty, cleverness, 
and cunning, as well as skilful ability to manipulate. The fifth section, portraying two special 
breeds of lawyer-defense attorneys and those dealing with marital law-depicts their main 
features. Last but not least, the sixth section displays other stereotypical qualities of lawyers, 
for example, their feeding on the troubles, misfortunes and conflicts of others, as well as 
their fighting nature, toughness, arrogance, and so on. 
1.2. Anglo-American Anti-Proverbs about Lawyers 
1.2.1. "Practice does not make a lawyer perfect, but enough of it will make him rich " 
The greatest anger and irritation in Anglo-American anti-proverbs are directed at the cost of 
lawsuits, the high income of lawyers, their fondness for money and greed: 
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Time is money, especially when you're talking to a lawyer or buying a commercial. 
{Time is money} 
Possession is nine points of the law, and lawyers' fees are the other ninety-one points. 
{Possession is nine points of the law}. 
Despite the fact that some attorneys do not attain professional competence and might 
not have enough legal experience, they still charge their clients a lot of money, and can 
make quite a good living: 
Practice does not make a lawyer perfect, but enough of it will make him rich. {Practice 
makes perfect}. 
Nowadays, the fees of American lawyers (especially of those who are "high-powered", 
"good", or "first-class") are incredibly high. Not surprisingly, quite a lot of Anglo-American 
anti-proverbs from our corpus treat this topic: 
Ignorance of the law is no excuse, unless you can afford to hire a good lawyer. 
{Ignorance of the law is no excuse} 
After a man has had occasion to employ a first-class lawyer it is useless to tell him that 
talk is cheap. {Talk is cheap] 
An honest confession is not always good for the soul, but, in most cases, it's cheaper 
than hiring a high-powered lawyer. {An honest confession is good for the soul} 
Honesty is the best policy, because good lawyers come high. {Honesty is the best 
policy}. 
These days lawyers are even called "money grabbers". There is a belief that they put 
their hands in their clients' pockets, and try to empty them.'4 They are especially good at 
prospering by their clients' deaths. This is why a diligent, hardworking person who, by 
accumulating wealth and taking care to save his money, only contributes to the financial 
well-being of his heirs and, consequently, of their lawyers: 
Take care of the pennies and the dollars will take care of your heirs and their lawyers. 
{Take care of the pennies and the dollars will take care of themselves}. 
The numerous transformations of the proverb Where there's a will, there's a way 
express a similar idea. All the anti-proverbs below are based on different connotations of 
the noun "will",15 for example, "the legal statement of a person's wishes concerning the 
disposal of his property after death"; "the document containing this", indicated by the 
parodies below: 
14
 If, however, a lawyer's hands are in his own pockets, as the following humorous text suggests 
(although not an anti-proverb), it might be only due to the fact that it's cold: 
"It was so cold last winter that I saw a lawyer with his hands in his own pockets." 
http://www.scroom.com/SCROOMtimes/Humor/Lawyer.shtml 
15
 The popularity of the proverb. Where there's a will, there's a way, for homonymous punning 
(i.e. based on sound identity) may be explained by existence of different connotations of the noun 
"will". By seeing the words "dissatisfied relative", "lawsuit", "inheritance tax", etc. introduced into 
the context of the following transformations one has to reinterpret the original meaning of "will" from 
the proverb text and switch it to other connotations. 
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Where there's a will-there's a greedy solicitor getting in on the act. 
Where there's a will there's a lawyer's bill. 
Where there's a will-there's a dissatisfied relative. 
Where there's a will, there's a lawsuit. 
Where there's a will, there's an inheritance tax. 
1.2.2. "The lawyer agrees with the doctor that the best things in life are fees " 
There is a wide range of professions and occupations depicted in American lawyer jokes, 
along with the career of a lawyer. Very frequently lawyers show up together with 
professionals who, similarly to them, are also assumed to have skills based on extensive 
theoretical knowledge, and professions which also enjoy a high social status, regard and 
esteem (for example, medicine, scripture, accounting, or engineering). Most frequently, the 
lawyer shows up simultaneously with his eternal rival, the doctor. It is not surprising, since 
these two professions are considered to be two of the most preferred, prestigious and valued 
professions in American society. Accountants, engineers and priests are very frequent 
companions of lawyers and doctors in American lawyer jokes.16 In the same vein, according 
to a 1997 Internet search by a legal journalist,17 there were 3,473 websites devoted to lawyer 
jokes, while 227 sites displayed jokes about doctors, and only 39 featured accountant 
jokes. 
Many parents dream that their children will choose a career in medicine or law, which 
will definitely bring them financial success: 
When you grow up, son, you can be whatever you want-a lawyer or a doctor, (caption 
to a cartoon)18 
These two professions are especially popular with Jewish parents: 
Two Jewish women meet on the street, one with children. The other says, "Such 
beautiful children how old are they?" 
"The doctor is seven and the lawyer is five."14 
What happens to a Jewish boy who can't stand the sight of blood and who stutters? 
Unfortunately he cannot become a lawyer, and he cannot become a doctor either. Therefore, 
according to the joke below, the only prestigious profession left for him is the career of an 
accountant: 
What is the definition of a C.P.A. (Certified Public Accountant)? 
It's a Jewish boy who can't stand the sight of blood and who stutters.20 
16
 For more on professions and occupations in American lawyer jokes, see T. Litovkina, A.: 
"Advice Is Cheap...Except When You Consult a Doctor or Lawyer or Tax Accountant": Lawyers, 
Doctors and Representatives of Other Professions in American Lawyer Jokes, 2011 (in press). 
17




 See Dundes, A.: Cracking Jokes: Studies of Sick Humor Cycles and Stereotypes. Berkeley, 
1987, 124. 
20
 See Dundes: Ibid. 
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As in American lawyer jokes, in Anglo-American anti-proverbs the lawyer's most 
frequent companion is his eternal rival, the doctor. The following anti-proverb deals with 
the theme of lawyers and doctors' greed, stinginess, and their fondness for money: 
The lawyer agrees with the doctor that the best things in life are fees. {The best things 
in life are free}. 
The proverb transformation above employs a technique of punning, one of the most 
popular techniques of eliciting humor in anti-proverbs: the word "free" is substituted by the 
word "fees", which sounds and is spelled similarly but not identically,21 and is antonymous 
to "free", thus completely negating the meaning of the original proverb text (i.e. the most 
important things do not cost any money and can't be bought for any money). 
In the following anti-proverb lawyers, doctors and tax accountants-the choice left to 
the "Jewish boy who can't stand the sight of blood and who stutters" in one of the jokes 
above-are shown as formidable and greedy economic predators, unwilling to move without 
fees: 
Advice is cheap...except when you consult a doctor or lawyer or tax accountant. 
{Advice is cheap}. 
1.2.3. "Necessity knows no law, and neither does the average lawyer" 
The havoc created by an ignorant lawyer is also one of the commonest themes of Anglo-
American anti-proverbs about lawyers. Observe the four examples below reworking a 
popular legal proverb of Latin origin {Ignorantia iuris non excusat}, the proverb Ignorance 
of the law is no excuse. Our first example is in the form of a joke: 
The judge interrupted proceedings to observe, "Ignorance of the law is no excuse in 
the eyes of the law." "I should like to ask, Your Honor," inquired the prosecuting 
attorney, "if your remarks are addressed to the defendant or to his lawyer?" 
If one can be punished for not being familiar with law, and, consequently, for breaking 
it, lawyers who are not familiar with law are exempted from being punished for their 
ignorance of the law: 
Lawyers arc the only persons in whom ignorance of the law is not punished. 
Moreover, they might be even rewarded (that is financially, by getting their fees), 
despite the fact that their pour counsel might even do harm to their client: 
Ignorance of the law excuses no man who retains poor counsel. 
The following text is in the same vein as the American proverb No matter who loses, 
the lawyer always wins:22 
21
 Such kind of punning is called paronomasia. 
22
 Here is a humorous definition of a contingent fee: 
When asked, "What is a contingent fee?" a lawyer answered, "A contingent fee to a lawyer means, if 
I don't win your suit, I get nothing. If 1 do win it, you get nothing", http://www.notary.com.sg/law_ 
jokes_3.htm 
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Ignorance of the law prevents a lawyer from winning your case, but not from collecting 
his fee. 
Both the proverb and the anti-proverb above aim at the 'lose-lose' situation of a 
lawsuit-for a client (that is if a client loses a case, he gets nothing, since a claim bankrupts 
him; if, however, he wins, the situation is the same, and he gets nothing, since he has to pay 
his lawyer's fees). Thus, lawyers always win, even if they are poor professionals, and are 
not familiar with law. 
The three transformations of another legal proverb, Necessity knows no law (also of 
Latin origin {Nécessitas non habet [frangit] legem!), touch upon the topic of the lawyer's 
ignorance as well. In the second and third texts lawyers are even sarcastically given a 
nickname23 ("Necessity", the first word of the original proverb): 
Necessity knows no law, and neither does the average lawyer. 
As a student in law school, they called him "Necessity" because he knew no law. 
The trial had been proceeding for some time and everyone was amused by one lawyer's 
consistently referring to the opposing lawyer as "Mr. Necessity." After awhile, the 
judge inquired, "May I ask, Mr. Jackson, why you always refer to learned counsel as 
'Mr. Necessity'?" "Simply, Your Honor," was the reply, "bccause he knows no law." 
In spite of the fact that the vast majority of anti-proverbs stress lawyers' cleverness, 
intelligence, and cunning (dominant traits lawyers needed for lawyers; see the last section 
of the present study), nevertheless, according to the following anti-proverb in the form of a 
wellerism,24 some lawyers might be stupid, although stupidity is not one of their stereotypical 
features. The fact that the cabbage-head is compared to the head of the lawyer simply speaks 
for itself: 
"Two heads are better than one," as the cabbage-head said to the lawyer. {Two heads 
are better than one}. 
23
 Employing puns that play on personal names is a frequent technique of proverb transformation, 
for example "A Chicago man calls his sweetheart Revenge because she is so sweet" jRevenge is 
sweet! (for more on punning in Anglo-American anti-proverbs see T. Litovkina, A.: The Pun Is 
Mightier than the Sword: Types of Punning in Anglo-American Anti-Proverbs. In: McKenna, K. (ed.): 
The Proverbial Pied Piper ': A Festschrift Volume of Essays in Honor of Wolfgang Mieder on the 
Occasion of His Sixty-Fifth Birthday. New York, 2009, 141-154; T. Litovkina, A.: Paronomasia, 
Homonymy and Homophony in Anglo-American Anti-Proverbs. In: Soares, R. J. B.-Lauhakangas, O. 
(eds): 2 Colóquio Interdisciplinar sobre Provérhios-Actas—2nd Interdisciplinary Colloquium on 
Proverbs-Proceedings. Tavira, 2009, 275-288. 
24
 Wellerisms, named for Charles Dickens' character Samuel Weiler, are particularly common in 
the USA, Great Britain and Ireland. This form of folklore is normally made up of three parts: 1 ) a 
statement (which often consists of a proverb or proverbial phrase), 2) a speaker who makes this 
remark, and 3) a phrase that places the utterance into an unexpected, contrived situation. The meaning 
of the proverb is usually distorted by being placed into striking juxtaposition with the third part of the 
wellerism. 
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1.2.4. "There's honor among thieves—at least, until they begin to deal with lawyers" 
Some of the most stereotypical traits of the legal profession according to Anglo-American 
anti-proverbs are connected with lying and dishonesty. Let's demonstrate this with two 
examples. The proverb mutation below plays on two different words pronounced and 
spelled identically:25 to lie (to deceive), as opposed to lie26 (to be in a reclining position; or 
to be at rest). In fact, the transformation does not use explicitly the words "lying" but only 
implicitly refers to them: 
Any time a lawyer is seen and not heard, it's a shame to wake him. {Children should 
be seen and not heard}. 
The anti-proverb above might also be considered an allusion to the proverb Let sleeping 
dogs lie, indicating one should never do anything that might instigate trouble from a lawyer. 
The anti-proverb might also refer to other qualities popularly associated with lawyers, such 
as their ability to talk too much, to use language that is hard to understand, and to complicate 
things, creating chaos and confusion. 
The anti-proverb below is a clear indication that honest lawyers simply don't exist, and 
therefore, they should never be trusted or relied upon. Indeed, lawyers are even depicted as 
less honest than thieves:27 
There's honor among thieves-at least, until they begin to deal with lawyers. (There's 
honor among thieves}. 
25
 As we can see from the two texts below, the two different connotations of the word "lying", 
which have already been discussed above, are played upon again, this time in American lawyer 
jokes: 
"What do lawyers do after they die? 
They lie still." 
http://www.lawyer-jokes.us/modules/news/article.php?storyid=77 
"How does an attorney sleep? 
First he lies on one side, and then he lies on the other." 
http://wilk4.com/humor/humorm353_lawyers.htm 
26
 These words are some of the most frequently used words for punning in Anglo-American 
proverb transformations: 
"Truth lies at the bottom of a well, but if it lies, how can it be the truth?" {Truth lies at the bottom of 
a well} 
"As you have made your bed, why lie about it?" (As you make your bed, so you must lie on it} 
"Politics makes strange bedfellows, but they are always willing to lie on their own side." (Politics 
makes strange bedfellows}. 
27
 Not surprisingly, lawyers are called thieves in a number of jokes: 
"If you see a lawyer on a bicycle, why don' t you swerve to hit him? 
It might be your bicycle." 
http://jokeparty.com/ 
"A lawyer and a physician had a dispute over precedence. They referred it to Diogenes, who gave it in 
favour of the lawyer as follows: 'Let the thief go first, and the executioner follow'." 
http ://xar. us/funny/lawyer/shortjokes.html 
Or, as the next rhyme suggests: 
"Between grand theft and a legal fee, 
There only stands a law degree." 
http://www. vakilno 1 .com/lawoneliner.htm 
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We have already mentioned above that one of the frequent tasks of lawyers is to work 
for dishonest people, for those who in pursuit of getting more money (or power, or fame, 
etc.) "help themselves" by breaking the law. As we know from everyday life experience and 
from a well-known proverb, Evil communications corrupt good manners: 
Lawyers help those who help themselves. {God helps those who help themselves} 
If God helped those who help themselves, those who help themselves wouldn't have to 
hire expensive lawyers. 
The two examples below even recommend that a person breaking law-in order to save 
money-should honestly confess everything (obviously, not to a lawyer), so that it will not 
be necessary to hire a lawyer, which would force him to pay high fees: 
An honest confession is not always good for the soul, but, in most cases, it's cheaper 
than hiring a high-powered lawyer. {An honest confession is good for the soul} 
Honesty is the best policy, because good lawyers come high. {Honesty is the best 
policy}. 
As can be seen from the two alterations above, being honest and hiring a lawyer are 
perceived to be two contradictory things. Either you are honest, and you are forgiven for 
everything, or you employ a lawyer; in other words, the quality of honesty is not considered 
to be one of a lawyer's stereotypical features. 
Other basic features of the legal profession-skillful ability to manipulate, as well as 
cleverness, cunning and slyness-are presented sarcastically in the following anti-proverb: 
Where there's a will, there's a way-out for the lawyers. {Where there's a will, there's a 
way}. 
The mutation above is also an example of one of the most dominant themes reigning in 
American lawyer jokes: "Smart guy wins." 
As has already been mentioned above, one of the tasks of lawyers (especially those 
who deal with criminal law) is to help people who do not know laws, or more than that, 
who do not respect them, and, therefore, break them. The anti-proverb below stresses that 
good lawyers-for high payment-are ready to falsify reality, in order to 'clear' their clients 
and, therefore, to help them to win their cases: 
Ignorance of the law is no excuse, unless you can afford to hire a good lawyer. 
{Ignorance of the law is no excuse}. 
1.2.5. "How to make crime pay: become a lawyer" 
As we have seen from the examples quoted above, the overwhelming majority of Anglo-
American anti-proverbs treating the lawyers speak about them in general. Two special 
breeds of lawyers are, however, mentioned in a number of our anti-proverbs: defense 
attorneys and lawyers who deal with marital law. Let us have a look at some representative 
examples. 
Quite a few of anti-proverbs in our material deal with criminal defense lawyers, a 
breed of lawyer specializing in the defense of those charged with crimes. While the original 
proverb Crime does not pay means that although crime may be profitable for a while, it will 
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not pay in the long run, its transformations below express the opposite idea: crime does 
pay; what is more, it might pay you very well, especially if you are a lawyer defending 
criminals: 
How to make crime pay: become a lawyer. 
Crime pays-be a lawyer. 
The following joke, employing a punch-line in a form of a proverb, enlarges the 
criminal lawyer's ignorance and incompetence to the extent that it leads to his clients 
(unjustifiable) conviction (or even death sentence). And the fact his clients cannot reveal 
any secrets ("being almost invariably convicted"), helps the lawyer attract new clients 
whose fate might be similar to those who have never had a complaint about the way he has 
looked at their interests, and practice law for years without knowing it properly: 
A criminal lawyer whose clients, especially when tried for murder, were almost 
invariably convicted, boasted in the hearing of Montague Williams, "I have been forty 
years at the Bar, and I have never had a complaint about the way I have looked after 
my clients' interests." "That's because dead men tell no tales," retorted Williams. 
{Dead men tell no tales}. 
Lawyers dealing with marital law are brought up in the following variations. The first 
one portrays an overcritical lawyer by indicating that a lawyer gets acquainted with all the 
negative deeds (naturally, very frequently enlarged) of their clients' spouses: 
No man is a hero to his wife 's lawyer. {No man is a hero to his valet}. 
While the original proverb -Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned emphasizes that 
no one is angrier than a woman who has been rejected in love or otherwise offended, its 
transformation below modifies the original text. Such a fury becomes her lawyer. It is not 
surprising if we just think of how much lawyers hear about extra-marital affairs of their 
clients' spouses: 
Hell hath no firry like the lawyer of a woman scorned. 
1.2.6. "Old female lawyers never die; they just lose their appeals " 
After discussing the main stereotypical traits of American lawyer, according to these biased 
anti-proverbs, in the last section of the study let us focus on a few more features that lawyers 
possess. A feature typically associated with the legal profession is that lawyers feed on the 
troubles, misfortunes, and conflicts of others: 
Necessity knows no law, but it is intimately acquainted with many lawyers. {Necessity 
knows no law}. 
The proverb transformations below and an American proverb Lawsuits were invented 
to make lawyers rich also support this statement: 
Clothes make the man, and suits make the lawyer. {Clothes make the man} 
It takes two to make a bargain...and a lawyer to write the contract. {It takes two to 
make a bargain}. 
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The fo l lowing text i l lustrates such stereotypic traits of a l a w y e r as fighting na tu re , 
toughness and arrogance: 
In court, wrang l ing be tween lawyers is n ine points of the law. {Possession is n ine 
points of the law}. 
However tough lawyers are, they can ' t a lways win their suits, despi te the fact tha t one 
o f the dominant themes of an t i -proverbs about l a w y e r s is "Smart g u y wins" . The f o l l o w i n g 
proverb a l te ra t ion- the only e x a m p l e in our co rpus which emphas i zes the female2 8 g e n d e r 
and the age of a l awyer - i s a pun on an appeal submi t t ed in cour t b y lawyers and the sex 
appeal of age ing female lawyers: 
Old female lawyers never die; they just lose their appeals,29 {Old soldiers n e v e r die, 
they jus t f a d e away 3 0}. 
It has to be pointed out h e r e - a n d this is no t surprising at all—that the figure o f the 
honest , t rus tworthy or kind a t torney hardly ever a p p e a r s in our mater ia l . A rare excep t ion , 
however , just p roves the rule. T h e fol lowing p rove rb variation dep ic t s a lawyer who , w h e n 
he sees that there is no chance for winning a lawsui t , s imply r e c o m m e n d s his c l i en t to 
forget about his case , despite the fac t that the l awyer will not be ab le to make any m o n e y on 
this case: 
Let bygones be b y g o n e s . . . u n l e s s your l a w y e r thinks you h a v e a good c h a n c e of 
winning a lawsuit . {Let b y g o n e s be bygones} . 
28
 According to numerous examples from the corpus of Anglo-American anti-proverbs, some of 
the most stereotypical female features are vanity, female beauty and sexual attractiveness. Naturally, 
youth is an important aspect of women's physical attractiveness and sex appeal. Unfortunately youth 
does not last forever. For more on women in Anglo-American anti-proverbs, see T. Litovkina, A.: The 
Nature of Women as Revealed Through Anglo-American Anti-Proverbs. In: Proverbium: Yearbook of 
International Proverb Scholarship. 2011, 28 (in press). 
29
 In order to understand ambivalent puns (as in the cited example) one needs an ability to view 
one situation from two, or sometimes more than two, different perspectives. Let us view two more 
ambivalent puns from my data, both of which arc mutations of the proverb "Old soldiers never die, 
they just fade away'. In both of the mutations the word "balls" may stay for two concepts: (1) a 
spherical object for use in a game or (2) testicles: 
"Old rugby players never die. They simply have their balls taken away." 
"Old golfers never die, they just lose their balls." 
30
 The proverb "Old soldiers never die, they just fade away", which generated the largest number 
of parodies in my corpus of Anglo-American anti-proverbs (79), has provided a template for ridiculing 
a wide range of other professions and occupations (for example accountants, politicians, physicians, 
salesmen, etc.): 
"Old accountants never die; they just lose their balance." 
"Old physicians never die; they just lose their patients." 
"Old politicians never die-they just run once too often." 
"Old postmen never die. They just lose their zip." 
"Old salesmen never die-they just get out of commission." 
Good jokes never die; they only pass along. Example: The comedian's wife sued for divorce, claiming 
he tried to joke her to death, (for more on the mutations of this proverb see T. Litovkina-Mieder: op. 
cit. 244-248. 
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Many more stereotypical traits of lawyers' character and behavior could be discussed 
and exemplified in the present study but now I must conclude. 
Summary 
The present study has focused on the profession subjected to the greatest mockery in Anglo-
American anti-proverbs (or proverb transformations), the profession of lawyer. In the 
present study the most stereotypic traits of lawyers and their behavior have been discussed, 
as illustrated by some representative examples of Anglo-American anti-proverbs. As has 
been demonstrated through a number of proverb transformations, the greatest anger and 
irritation are directed at the cost of lawsuits, the high income of lawyers, and their greed. 
Lawyers' ignorance and their skillful manipulation are also common themes. Lawyers are 
inveterate liars. Finally, the list of lawyers' vices encompasses a number of other negative 
qualities as well, including stupidity, aggression, cunning, and dishonesty. Lawyers most 
frequently appear in Anglo-American anti-proverbs together with doctors, and accountants. 
Representatives of all three professions are seen as hungry in their pursuit for money. 
The present study has shown that, like traditional Anglo-American proverbs in general 
(for example, A good lawyer, a bad neighbour; Lawyers, like painters, can easily change 
white into black; No matter who loses, the lawyer always wins), the overwhelming majority 
of legal proverb parodies are also extremely demeaning to lawyers. It is not my task here to 
discuss if the stereotype of the lawyer in Anglo-American anti-proverbs accurately portrays 
the traits and behavior of American legal professionals. As one of the leading American 
folklorists, the late Alan Dundes, pointed out at the end of eighties: 
In the United States, as elsewhere, individuals acquire stereotypes from folklore.. ..The 
stereotypes may or may not be accurate character analyses-they may or may not be in 
accord with actual, empirically verifiable personality traits. The point is that folk 
stereotypes exist, and that countless people make judgments on the basis of them. 
There is probably no other area of folklore where the element of belief is more critical 
and potentially more dangerous, not only to self but to others.31 
Elsewhere in the same book, Dundes added: "Folklore does not create society; it only 
mirrors it. If the mirror image is unattractive, does it serve any purpose to break the 
mirror?"32 A few years later Edward J. Bander emphasized that "law reflects, rather than 
molds, society. If a society is mean, craven and litigious, it is not the lawyers that are 
responsiblc-they simply fill the vacuum that could be sweetness and light with a mean 
spirit and acts of vengeance".33 
Implications for Further Research 
This study has focused on Anglo-American anti-proverbs that make fun of lawyers. It would 
also be important to discuss proverb mutations treating other professions and occupations 
(for example, politicians and doctors, accountants and policemen, teachers and writers, 
31
 Dundes, A.: Cracking Jokes: Studies of Sick Humor Cycles and Stereotypes. Ten Speed Press, 
Berkeley, 1987, 116. 
32
 Ibid. 38. 
33
 Bander, E. J.: The Lawyer as Devil's Advocate. In: The Lawyer and Popular Culture: 
Proceedings of a Conference. Littleton, 1993, 178. 
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w h o r e s and housewives ) , and c o m p a r e the s tereotypical features associated with these 
profess ions and occupat ions with those attached to lawyers. Since proverbial l anguage is 
sa id to reflect the sys tem of values a n d convent ions o f a country, it w o u l d be useful not on ly 
t o discuss A m e r i c a n attitudes p r e sen t ed in an t i -proverbs treating the legal profession, bu t to 
conduc t cross-cul tura l comparison and contrasts involving the U n i t e d States and o the r 
countries.3 4 An intercultural c o m p a r i s o n of Ang lo -Amer ican legal ant i -proverbs to legal 
ant i -proverbs in o t h e r languages w o u l d be also o f g rea t interest and signif icance.3 5 
34
 Legal anti-proverbs are not partieularly popular in Hungary. In the corpus of over 7000 
Hungarian anti-proverbs recorded by Anna T. Litovkina and Katalin Vargha only six proverb 
transformations about lawyers have been found. For more on Hungarian legal humor see Fenyvesi, 
Cs.: A jog humora (The Humour of Law). Pécs, 2003; Fenyvesi, Cs.: A jog humora és rejtélyei (The 
Misteries and the Humour of Law). Pécs, 2010; T. Litovkina, A.: Minden, amit tudni akartál a jog és a 
rendőrség humoráról, de nem volt kitől megkérdezned (Everything what you wanted to know about 
the Humour of the Law and the Police but had nobody to ask). Interview of Anna T. Litovkina with 
Csaba Fenyvesi, advocate, lecturer, editor of the book Humour of Law). In: T. Litovkina, A.-Barta, 
P.—Hidasi, J. (eds): A humor dimenziói (Dimensions of Humour). Budapest, 2010, 237-245. 
35
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ANDRÁS BRAGYOVA* 
Kant and the Constitutional Review 
Kantian Principles of the Neo-constitutionalist 
Constitutionalism 
Es ist süss sich Staatsverfassungen auszudenken. 
Kant: Streit der Fakultäten' 
Abs t r ac t . Kan t s political and legal theory is now though t to be one of the most important contr ibut ions to the 
theory of m o d e m constitutionalism. The paper is an a t tempt to distil the fundamenta l principles of constitutional 
law as implemented in m o d e m constitutional rev iew f rom the writings of Kant. It examines the idea of the 
constitution as a social contract and its relation to popular sovereignty. Second, the principles of "republican 
const i tut ion"-l iberty, equality and independence (au tonomyf- fo l low. These principles condense the essence of 
what we n o w call fundamental constitutional rights. Thi rd , the transcendental max im of legislation, that is, the 
publicity is analysed; the principle of the publicity of legislation is (under var ious names like equali ty, public 
reasoning a n d discussion, f reedom of speech) fundamenta l for modem consti tutionalism (or neo-constitutionalism). 
Consti tutional courts are organs of the "public use of r ea son" so important for Kant and revived recently by Rawls. 
The last sec t ion is a discussion of the relationship of moral i ty and constitutional government. Kant regarded the 
law as a coerc ive order a precondit ion for moral au tonomy but he did not qualified constitutional principles 
"moral". T h u s , the Kantian interpretation of const i tut ional ism does not support the moral reading or interpretation 
of the const i tut ion; instead, the principles of the " l a w f u l " constitution are based (like the maxims of moral i ty) on 
practical reason. 
K e y w o r d s : Kant , constitutional review, consti tut ionalism, constitutional rights 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Writing about the relationship of Kant and constitutional review of legislation as we know 
it today is literally an anachronism: Kant is not the theoretician of constitutional review, 
since in his age and for him it was simply non-existent.2 Still, Kant has a lot to say for 
constitutional review and I hope this will become manifest from the following lines. Kant's 
political and legal philosophy was for a long time neglected as the symptom of his elderly 
* D. Sc. . judge, Constitutional Court of Hungary, H-1015 Budapest, Donáti u. 35^45; research 
professor , Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H 1014 Budapest, 
Országház u. 30. 
E-mail: bragyova@jog.mta.hu 
1
 "It is a pleasure to invent constitutions for ourselves." Still, he continues: the attempt of the 
people to realise them shall be punished. (SA XI 366.) 
2
 Fichte, a follower of Kant (at least he thought he was), in his Natural Law of 1796 deduces the 
necessity of constitutional review. See Fichte, J. G.: Grundlage des Naturrechts (Hrsg.: Medicus, F.), 
Leipzig, 1907, 175 skk. 
9 8 A N D R Á S BRAGYOVA 
spiritual weakness according to the familiar disrespectful remark3 of the otherwise Kant-
admirer Schopenhauer. Even the nco-Kantians as Stammler and implicitly Kelsen accepted 
this view. Nowadays they are regarded as a major part of his work. It suffices to mention 
the political philosophy of John Rawls, who relies on Kant, furthermore, the philosophy of 
Jürgen Habermas and Ottfried Höffe as well as of János Kis in Hungary.4 
The recent rediscovery of the legal philosophy of Kant was undoubtedly supported 
by the widespread acceptance of what I propose to call substantive constitutional review. 
By substantive constitutional review I mean the examination of the legal validity of legal 
substance, i.e. legally binding, permitted, etc. conduct based on constitutional justifiability, 
while the standard of constitutional justifiability is substantiated by fundamental 
constitutional rights and other constitutional principles defining the substance of law.5 
Putting aside details of legal history, it is important that constitutional review is a relatively 
new development, since it appeared gradually in the form familiar today in Europe mainly 
after the II World War (and much earlier in the United States which remained a solitary 
phenomenon for a century or more). Present-day substantive (or content-based) constitutional 
review is conceptually closely related to the rational law cultivated also in the age of Kant, 
on which he delivered lectures at university.6 In modem substantive constitutional review, 
which in the following I will call neo-constitutionalism7, several issues, which in the age of 
Kant and in the following centuries for a long time were discussed as matters of natural or 
rational law, that is, philosophical matters "within the boundaries of pure reason", are in our 
days adjudged by constitutional courts as positive issues of constitutional law. Present-day 
constitutions incorporate "lauter Prinzipen a priori" [a priori principles] as legal principles 
and if the constitution is regarded as part of the legal system (which is the prerequisite of 
constitutional review), it will be also applied as positive law. A consequence of this is that 
during reasoning in constitutional review similar issues need to be adjudged by similar 
arguments like formerly the followers of the natural law school did. The followers of the 
rational law school including Kant—as the Streit der Fakultäten proves-examined these 
issues theoretically as philosophical ones (as issues of practical reason), whereas today in 
neo-constitutionalist constitutional review these issues need to be settled via legal reasoning. 
3
 Schopenhauer, A.: Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I. In: Schopenhauer, A.: Sämtliche 
Werke. (Hrsg.: Freiherr von Löhneysen, H.-W.), Frankfurt am Main, 1986, 1. 707. (The parody of the 
Kantian style). For a similar opinion see Arendt, H.: Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (ed.: 
Beiner, R.). Chicago, 1992, 8. 
4
 See Kiss, J.: Vannak-e emberi jogaink? (Do We Have Human Rights?) Budapest, 1986 (3rd 
ed., Budapest, 2003). 
5
 Ferrajoli, L.: Diritto e ragione. Teória del garantismo penale. Bari, 2000, 904 skk. 
6
 See data and resources on page XXI skk. in the foreword to the edition of Metaphysik der 
Sitten. In: Vorländer, К.: Philosophische Bibliothek. Hamburg, 1959. The course books used by Kant 
(Baumgarten, Achenwall) can be found in the volumes Akademie Ausgabe. Deutsche (formerly 
Königlich Preussische) Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Berlin, 1900, (AA) XIX skk. Cf. 
Busch, W.: Die Entstehung der kritischen Rechtsphilosophie Kants. Berlin, 1979. 
7
 This appropriate term in this sense is primarily applied in the legal literature of Neo-Latin 
countries. See, e.g. Carbonell, M. (ed.): Teória del neoconstitucionalismo. Ensayos escogidos. Madrid, 
2007. 
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What in Kant's age was subject only to the "Verfassungsrichterstuhl der Rechtsvernunft"8  
(the constitutional court of legal reason), in many legal systems in our days it is subject to 
the jurisdiction of constitutional courts, therefore, it is conceived as positive law. 
Simultaneously, a lot has changed: positive law has a greater role in the concept of 
Rechtsvernunft, hopefully not to the detriment of Vernunft. At any rate, legal reasoning and 
decision-making have more institutional, procedural and substantive constraints than 
philosophical and pure rational legal reasoning. At any rate the ultimate controlling role of 
practical reason in legal reasoning cannot be given up.9 
The relationship between practical (including legal) reason and present-day 
constitutional review is not accidental: the theory of modern constitutionalism originates in 
the Enlightenment and Kant is the greatest philosopher of the Enlightenment. Therefore, it 
is the provisional negligence and not the re-discovery of Kant's legal philosophy that is 
astonishing. In Kant's legal and political philosophy we can find the fundamental principles 
of the modern constitutional state and neo-constitutionalist constitutional law. In the 
following, I will examine some of the related issues analysed by Kant, which are 
foundational in contemporary constitutional theory, as well. I will neither engage in a Kant 
exegesis, nor in the interpretation of Kant, but in the paraphrase of some of his thoughts. 
The first issue to be examined will be the concept of the constitution as a social 
contract, the second one will be our meaning of the principles of the "republican 
constitution", then I will analyse the maxim of legislation and its relation to constitutional 
review. Finally, while examining the thinking of the greatest moralist of all the times, we 
cannot fail to mention the relationship of the constitution and morality. Needless to say, 
however, for order's sake let me mention that a great many of Kant's relevant thoughts will 
be disregarded. 
II. THE CONSTITUTION AS A SOCIAL CONTRACT 
For Kant, the concept of the constitution is not an idea of positive law, but a Vernunftidee 
[an idea of reason], that is, it is not subject to written law, or, in Kant's terms, empirical (or 
statutory) or positive law, in other terms to experience, therefore, it is not an issue pertaining 
to the faculty of law (that is, the jurisprudence of positive law). Accordingly, Kant does not 
apply the concept of the constitution in our terms. There is nothing special about this, since 
in that era and for a long time subsequently the constitution was not primarily a legal, but a 
normative political concept. The constitution became the object of empirical legislation, 
which is Kant's term for positive law, via the constitutional charters in Kant's age, at the 
end of the 18lh century.10 Written constitutions, such as the French constitution of 1791 
were not legal constitutions: they were rather political principles derived from a political 
philosophy and written down in a solemn charter. This was entailed by the natural law or 
rather the rational legal conception prevalent in that age, according to which evident legal 
principles just as the rules of logic need not be, or as others think, must not be enacted as 
8
 Kersting, W.: Wohlgeordnete Freiheit. Berlin, 1984, 222. (3rd ed., Paderborn, 2007); and 
Kersting, W.: Der Geltungsgrund von Moral und Recht bei Kant. In: Kersting, W.: Politik lind Recht. 
Veilerwist, 2000, 304 skk. The following considerably differs from the construction of Kersting. 
9
 This is the meaning of Alexy's so-called "Sonderfallthese", according to which legal reasoning 
is a special case of practical reasoning as construed by Habermas, R. A.: Theorie der juristischen 
Argumentation. Frankfurt am Main, 1978 ( 1983), 32 skk., 263 skk. 
10
 Troper, M.-Jaume, L. (eds): 1789 et l'invention de la constitution. Paris-Brussels, 1994. 
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statute-law but at most they can be solemnly declared." What in our days we designate as 
constitutional or fundamental rights, in the age of the Enlightenment they were valid not on 
grounds of positive law, but out of practical reason. According to Kant, positive law has 
always and only contingent content and has nothing to do with the validity of the necessary-
and for this reason non-contingent-principles of law.12 No matter how we conceive of the 
legal nature of the constitutions of the 18th— 19th centuries, they were indisputably not 
designed to be applied by the judiciary, since such courts did not exist and that was no mere 
chance.13 
For Kant, the concepts of the state and the constitution are of course related, since the 
constitution determines the form of government and the relation of state powers. However, 
its foundation is the "Ursprünlicher Vertrag". As he formulates: "Der Akt, wodurch sich das 
Volk selbst zu einem Staat konstituiert, eigentlich aber nur die Idee derselben [...] ist der 
ursprunglüche Kontrakt, nach welchem alle ... im Volk ihre äussere Freiheit ausgeben ... 
seine Freiheit überhaupt in einer gesetzlichen Abhängigkeit, d.i. in einer rechtlichen Zustand 
... zu finden; weil diese Abhängigkeit aus seinem eigenen gesetzgebenden Willen entspringt." 
[The act, or rather its mere idea, by which a people constitutes itself as a state consists in 
the original contract, according to which the people resigns its externa! freedom, so that it 
should find its freedom in dependence on the law, i.e. in the condition of the law.] (SA VIII 
434) Of course, the idea of the social contract is not the invention of Kant, whereas, the 
pure normative application of the social contract as a regulative idea may derive from him, 
at least in its radical form. Kant had excellent "anthropological" knowledge (see e.g. SA 
XII 399), he did not believe that any kind of contract constitutive of a society could have 
really obtained. On such grounds he associates the concept (idea) of the constitution with 
the idea of the social contract and defines the constitution as a pactum unionios civilis (SA 
XI 144). He literally sets forth in "Eternal Peace": "Verfassung ... welche aus der des 
ursprünglichen Vertrags hervorgeht" [constitution deriving from the original contract] (SA 
XI 204). As we sec, Kant explicitly considers the constitution to be a social contract. 
By conceiving the constitution as an idea, Kant regards the people which constitutes 
itself in the constitution as an ideal people. Since the people does not exist before (and 
without) the social contract, it cannot reason about the origin of the supreme power (SA 
VIII 437). Thereby, he articulates the foundational idea of constitutionalism: people's 
sovereignty dissolves in the constitution, since the Volkswille and the Souverän are qualified 
as mere Gedankending, which "keine objektive praktische Realität hat" [the people's will 
and the sovereign are mere thoughts, which do not have any objective practical reality] (SA 
VIII461). Thus, the constitution absorbes the sovereignty of the people through transforming 
it into an idea. According to Kant, we can distinguish two elements in the constitution: the 
establishment of the political constitution or constitutional law, the rules of government and 
11
 The term of declaration clearly implies the acknowledgement of the already existant more 
explicitly than the Hungarian term of "nyilatkozat": The Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 
1789 as its text elucidates only openly acknowledges, but does not constitute the always existing (and 
persisting) rights. Sec Troper, M.: La declaration de droits de l'homme et citoyen en 1789. In: Troper, 
M.: Pour une théorie juridique de l'Etat. Paris, 1994, 317 skk. 
12
 This is how we can construe Kant's remark on the concept of law of lawyers in the Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft, as it is pointed out by Bódog Somló. Somló, F.: Juristische Grundlehre. 2nd ed., 
Leipzig, 1927, 52 skk. 
13
 The jury constituionnaire as conceived by Sieyes has miscarried in practice. Pasquino, P.: 
Siévès et l'invention de la constititution en France. Paris, 1998, 193. 
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"the legal condition" (Rechtszustand), especially in the republican constitution (which 1 
shall discuss separately). For Kant, the constitution is the foundation of the validity of the 
law (to use modern terms); therefore, the concept of the constitution is closely related to 
Kant's concept of law. This concept is dual: on the one hand, the contents of law ensures 
the reconciliation of the external freedom of individuals, which I shall examine in the next 
section. On the other hand, according to Kant, law is based on coercion ("Befugnis zu 
zwingen" SA VIII 338): without coercion no positive law can exist. However, coercion in 
this case means the legitimacy of the use of coercion, not its actual application. 
The conception of the constitution as a social contract facilitates the understanding of 
the link between the constitution and people's sovereignty (as the substance of the 
constitution). Kant conceives the constitution not simply as the establishement of social life 
unter Rechtsgesetzen, that is, under the rules of law but he identifies the people with those 
who unite on the basis of such a contract. People's sovereignty is the criterion of the 
substance of the correct (just) constitution, but it cannot manifest itself in the practical 
activity of the people. The constitution as a social contract and popular sovereignty in the 
representative-according to Kant's and the contemporary general terminology: republican-
constitution are essentially identical. Kant repudiates democracy, by which he means direct 
democracy, whereas, he considers representational and necessarily constitutional democracy 
to be a necessary element of a lawful (that is just) constitution. 
These thoughts proved to be very productive in modern constitutional theory especially 
in the neo-constitutionalist school of thought in constitutional law, as well as in modern 
political philosophy, which is according to Rawls the theory of constitutional democracy.14 
In terms of constitutional law, the conception of the constitution as a social contract provides 
an acceptable theory, which is legally interprétable, that is, applicable in constitutional legal 
reasoning as to the interpretation of people's sovereignty under constitutional law. The 
construction of the popular sovereignty in modern constitutions as a social contract has 
many advantages. On the one hand, neither the people as the subject of the social contract, 
nor the social contract or the idea of the constitution are empirical concepts. This conception 
results in several important consequences as to the substance and interpretation of the 
constitution. The most important of these with regard to the modem neo-constitutionalist 
constitutional practice is that only such an interpretation of the constitution complies with 
the substance of the constitution, which also complies with the constitution construed as a 
social contract. That is, the ultimate criterion of truth as to the interpretation of the 
constitution consists in the fact whether the result of the interpretation is acceptable as the 
substance of the constitution as a social contract.'5 
Another advantage of the construction of the constitution as a social contract is that it 
clearly articulates that the constitutive and foundational concept of constitutional democracy 
is the equality of those living in unity of title in the constitutional state. It follows, then, that 
popular sovereignty and constitution are not simply normative but meta-normative concepts. 
14
 Rawls, J.: Political Liberalism. New York, 1993, XXVII., 135. And see Kis, J.: Alkotmányos 
demokrácia (Constitutional Democracy). Budapest, 2000. 
15
 Let's see an example instead of further explication. If I do not know whether 1 am a homosexual 
or not, whether 1 am a man or a woman, would 1 accept the discrimination of homosexuals or women 
under the constitution as the substance of a social contract, that is, such an interpretation of the 
constitution, according to which, e.g. the limitation of the political rights of women is constitutionally 
justifiable. Therefore, the ultimate standard of the correctness of the interpretation of the constitution is 
whether the result of the interpretation could be an independent constitutional norm. 
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That means that the popular sovereignty cannot correspond to any empirical-social fact: the 
constitutional people as a sovereign exists only in the constitution, or rather in its idea.16 
The notion of the constitutional people implies ideal unity of the titular of the constitutional 
powers (the pouvoir constituant) and each person subject to the constitutional law and order 
ut singuli. Which at the same time determines the constitutional relationship between the 
collective people, which can only be a majority, and the people as a set of free individuals. 
The collective people in the political constitution of constitutional democracy can manifest 
itself only in a voting and decision-making procedure: majority decision replaces unanimous 
decision which is impossible in practice. Consensus in modern constitutionalism is replaced 
by the parts of the constitution which are excluded from majority decision and not revisable 
by constitutional amendments. These include primarily fundamental rights (such as the 
complex of legal positions unconditionally due to each individual), which cannot be limited 
by majority legislation, furthermore, the fundamental rules of the constitution, without 
which the constitution could not persist. In this perspective, majority voting is but a technical 
device and not the essence of constitutional democracy. 
In modern legal systems the constitution has two fundamental legal functions: the 
constitution is the legal foundation of the legality of the legal system (formally, the highest 
source of law): this is the minimally necessary constitution for the persistence of the legal 
system. The second, and in nco-constitutionalist legal systems the basic function of the 
constitution is the legal determination of the contents of the law. In this latter role, the 
constitution determines the mandatory and prohibited substance of the law: the norm-
principles, which must justify the norms regulating the conduct of the individual in the 
legal system.17 The constitutional norm-justifying principles, in particular the constitutional 
rights can be considered the content of the constitution as a social contract (even if they are 
simultaneously principles of political philosophy or of natural law). I construe fundamental 
rights or constitutional rights as the complex of legal positions guaranteed for each member 
of the society, which can be acknowledged as legal positions due to each person by all 
rationally thinking persons in a society. This elucidates the contrafactic character of the 
constitution as a social contract. The social contract theory is a thought experiment aiming 
at the justification of a social condition or complex of norms (the constitution in our case). 
It is a thought experiment questioning whether ideally rational and fully informed persons 
would accept the constitutional norms or the social condition established under the 
constitution. 
The conception of popular sovereignty as a social contract demands constitutional 
justification in two distinct steps. The first step is the justification of the content of the 
constitution, that is, the constitutional rights and other constitutional properties of the 
society. A justification may consist in the Rawlsian abstraction from the social status of the 
16
 János Kis attributes considerably more reality to the sovereignty of the people, than I do. See 
Kis, J.: Népszuverenitás. A klasszikus tan és kritikája (People's Sovereignty. The Classical Doctrine 
and Its Critique). Politikatudományi Szemle, 15 (2006) 1, 5 skk. 
17
 For the sake of simplicity, i will not deal with the organisational parts of the constitutions 
determining the form of government, that is, the political constitution in the strict sense. If the 
constitution is part of the positive legal system, the same applies to its organisational rules and to its 
norm-justifying norms. Kant's explications about the political constitution do not add anything to that 
of Montesquieu (trias politico): therefore, they have only historical significance. We need to note that 
Kant was a subject of Frederick the Great, a fact he mentions with some irony [Weischedel, W. 
(Hrsg.): Studienausgabe. Frankfurt am Main, (SA) 1977. XI 267]. 
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individual upon the selection of fundamental constitutional norms (behind "the veil of 
ignorance"),18 or else in an ideal discourse-situation as proposed by Habermas. By the 
constitutional properties of a society I mean all the properties of a society which cannot be 
but unique and the same for each and every member in a society. Examples of constitutional 
property are the legal system, the form of government (a state can not be a monarchy and a 
republic at the same time), the system of ownership, territory, etc. The second grade of 
justification consists in the application of the social contract embodied in the constitution, 
which in neo-constitutionalist legal systems adopting constitutional review equals the legal 
construction of the constitution. Here I cannot engage in a detailed justification of theory 
set out in outlines above. Suffice it to say that the constitution does not consist of rules of 
conduct, but of norms about norms, therefore, constitutional review consists in the 
interpretation and application of constitutional norms in the examination of the 
constitutionality of the norms of the legal system. 
III. PRINCIPLES OF THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: 
FREEDOM, EQUALITY AND "INDEPENDENCE" 
Kant held that the telos of human history is the achievement of the constitutional state 
(vollkommene Staatsvervassung) (Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher 
Absicht. SA XI 33, 45) making possible the full expansion of the capabilities of mankind. 
Kant explicates in three of his works that a constitution of full value can be but the 
republican constitution (SA VIII 432 skk; SA XI 144 skk; 204). The Kantian republican 
constitution based on reason is very close to the neo-constitutionalist constitution, since the 
republican constitution is not a political constitution (it is not concerned primarily with the 
forma imperi). It is a legal constitution, which "aus dem reinen Quell des Rechtsbegriffs 
entsprungen" (derives from the pure source of the concept of law). Thus, Kant distinguishes 
the political constitution (though he does not designate it as such) from the legal constitution, 
which in his time existed only as rational or natural law. In Kant's age and for a long time 
afterwards, in terms of positive law, constitutions were at best mere political constitutions, 
whereas the legal constitution obtained as a political or natural legal principle. 
The republican constitution is the constitution about the contents of the legal system. 
According to Kant, the essential content of the legal system is a certain kind of freedom: 
"Das Recht ist also der Inbegriff der Bedingungen unter denen die Willkühr des anderen 
nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze der Freiheit zusammen vereignt werden kann." [Law is 
therefore the set of conditions, under which the freedom of one can be united with that of 
the others under the general laws Freedom.] (SA VIII 337) The other element of the concept 
of law, the distinctive feature of positive law, is the relationship with coercion (Befugnis 
zum Zwingen): law entails the limitation of freedom. The other element of the concept of 
positive law, what Kant designates as the publicity of law, is public law (öffentliches 
Recht=public law) "Inbegriff der Gesetze, die einen allgemeinen Bekanntmachung bedürfen, 
um einen rechtlichen Zustand hervorzubringen." (SA VIII 429). In our terms, the "lawful 
condition" for Kant can be described as the existence of the legal system, since the meaning 
of the Kantian "Gesetz" is norm in our terms.19 Therefore, without the publicity 
(promulgation) of the norms of the legal system no positive law can exist. We need to note, 
18
 Rawls, J.: A Theory of Justice. Oxford, 1971. 
19
 See Stemmer, P.: Normativität. Berlin, 2008, 155. 
1 0 4 A N D R Á S BRAGYOVA 
however, that for Kant, certain principles of private law and constitutional law, not to 
mention morality, are a priori given for practical reason and as such, do not need publication 
at all. 
The first principle of the republican constitution is freedom, so far as according to 
Kant, man has a single innate and simultaneously positive right: "Freiheit (Unabhängigkeit 
von eines anderen nötigenden Willkühr), sofern sie mit jedes anderen Freiheit nach einem 
allgemeinen Gesetz zusammen bestehen kann" [Freedom (independence from the coercive 
arbitrariness of others), so far as it can persist jointly with the freedom of everyone else on 
grounds of general laws] (SA VIII 345).20 This concept of freedom is extremely interesting 
from the point of view of the neo-constitutionalist theory of constitutional review. As it is 
clear from the quotation, for Kant freedom includes several fundamental rights, such as 
equality, the protection of privacy and freedom of speech, which can be deduced from the 
Kantian concept of freedom from the outset. In other words, the Kantian concept of freedom 
implies the entirety of fundamental rights to be guaranteed for all in the lawful condition 
(that is, in the legal system of constitutional state). In terms of contemporary constitutional 
law, Kant here discusses fundamental constitutional freedoms or constitutional rights. These 
are "innate" rights, and as such that they are due to each person equally and that freedom 
(that is, fundamental rights) does not have to be "acquired" or "deserved" like ordinary 
rights under any legal system. 
It is manifest so far that Kant considers constitutional freedoms, in other words 
fundamental rights, to be the legally necessary (by which Kant means obligatory) content of 
the legal system.21 Modern constitutional review docs the same: the constitutional review of 
legislation is a means to protect constitutional rights taken over from rational law or if one 
prefers, natural law. 
In strict terms, we cannot claim that modem constitutional courts reviewing legislation 
"enforce" constitutional rights as mandatory contents of legal norms, since these categorical 
legal principles are meta-norms about the norms of conduct of the legal system. The 
determination of the standard of goodness or justifiability (frequently identified with justice) 
of legal norms used to be the function of natural law, also shared by Kant. For the rationalist 
thought the principles commanded by reason are categorical, as the famous categorical 
imperative is. Being categorical means that neither the mandatory force, nor its validity 
may rationally be challenged. (The categorical imperative is, according to Kant, synthetic a 
priori. See e.g. Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten. SA VII 49, Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft. SAVI 49, 67.) There are categorical, unconditional legal principles22 included in 
the Kantian concept of freedom, that are valid without positive law-making as the standard 
of the correctness of law, but they do not form part of positive law. Constitutions regulating 
the content of legal order contain (mainly in the forms constitutional rights) the standard of 
justification of legal norms, not unlike the natural law. The relationship between the sub-
constitutional law and the constitutional principles is conccptual and derivative. A good 
case demonstrating such a justificatory reasoning in constitutional law is justification the 
20
 H. L. A. Hart formulates almost in so many words. Hart, H. L. A.: Are There Any Natural 
Rights? In: Waldron, J. (ed.): Theories of Rights. Oxford, 1984, 77 skk.-however, without mentioning 
Kant. 
21
 According to Kant, the obligatoriness (Verbindlichkeit) of conduct consists in its normative 
necessity in present-day terms. 
22
 On the term see Höffe, О.: Kategorische Rechtsprinzipien. Frankfurt am Main, 1995. 
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limitation of fundamental rights as applied in many European constitutional jurisdictions. 
Constitutional review essentially decides on the constitutional validity (admissibility) of 
norms including norms governing the conduct of citizens, not about the interpretation and 
application of norms of conduct or primary norms. 
In Kantian constitutional theory, as mentioned above, the rational state establishes the 
legal condition (Rechtszustand) among its citizens. Legal freedom consists in lawful 
freedom and an equal subjection to law: legal freedom is protected by state coercion (SA 
VIII 338) through the enforcement of the law. This is the constitutional concept of freedom 
in the 18th century prevalent until the mid-20th century, classically formulated by 
Montesquieu: anybody subject only to law is free.23 According to the modern concept of 
law under constitutional law, law as expression de la volonté générale has two basic 
properties: it is a general rule, and is deemed to be accepted by people through its adoption 
by a representative organ, like the Parliament. This conception does not distinguish the 
between constitution and the ordinary law, thus it excludes by virtue of conceptual necessity 
the possibility of an unconstitutional law. The constitution is a set of rules about the law-
making, including the sources of law; any law adopted in a regular procedure is necessarily 
constitutional.24 This constitutional theory locates the guarantee of the correctness of the 
law in the legislative procedure: the law-making procedure (its publicity and discursive 
nature) is regarded as sufficient to ensure a reasonable outcome. Today, the main argument 
against modern, especially neo-constitutionalist constitutional review is the reasonableness 
of the legislative procedure, and the argument that the legislation is better suited for the 
proper interpretation of the constitutional rights than the judicial procedure of constitutional 
review.25 This argument, to be sure, does not contradict to the maxim of legislation, which 
Kant describes as a "blosse Idee der Vernunft" [mere idea of reason] (SA XI 153). 
According to Kant, the third element of the republican constitution following the 
equality of citizens is what he calls Unabhängigkeit, which is especially interesting from 
our point of view. Kant, like the French constitution of 1791, distinguished active and 
passive citizens and secured political rights exclusively for citizens with self-sufficient 
economic-social existence. On the basis of his examples, it is obvious that only citizens 
who are their own masters (sui iuris) owing to their property or by virtue of their profession 
may be citoyen with the right to vote in legislation or the elections. However, they are to be 
considered equal whatever the difference among their properties may be (SA XI 150; as 
well as VIII 432). Kant was not an early adherent of the welfare state; rather, in his notes he 
23
 Montesquieu: De l'esprit des lois, XI. 3 (ed. Pléiade II. 395.): "La liberté est le droit de faire 
tous que les lois permettent". Cf.: Bragyova, A.: Alkotmány és szabadság: a szabadság alkotmányos 
fogalma (The Constitution and Freedom: the Constitutional Concept of Freedom). Fundamentum, 1 
(2003) 3-4 , 5 skk. and Bragyova, A.: The constitutional concept of the freedom of the individual. 
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (ARSP), 91 (2005), 379M08. 
24
 Jellinek, G.: Gesetz und Verordnung. Tübingen, 1887 and Carré de Malberg, R.: La loi, 
expression de la volonté générale. Paris, 1931. 
25
 In modem Anglo-Saxon literature, the most famous defendant of this view is Jeremy Waldron 
(e.g. The Dignity of Legislation, Cambridge, 1999 and Law and Disagreement, Oxford, 1999). These 
views were already discussed in 19th century and later French and German literature. A characteristic 
opponent of constitutional review is Lambert, E.: Le gouvernement des juges. Paris, 1921, especially, 
224 skk. In recent continental theory, Habermas and his followers, e.g. Ingeborg Maus are sceptical as 
to substantive constitutional review. See Maus, L: Zur Aufklärung der Demokratietheorie. Frankfurt 
am Main, 1992. 
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appears to be (one could say) a forerunner of Hayek: "Die Wohltätigkeit kann nur auf 
Kosten der Unterhanen ausgeübt werden." [Public welfare is possible exclusively at the 
expense of the subjects.] (AA23. 354) Here I cannot discuss the relationship of the welfare 
and the constitutional state; suffice it to say that the welfare state is the consequence of the 
radical implementation of the Kantian principles of the constitutional state. The principle of 
equality and the maxim of legislation (to be discussed below) and the idea of the constitution 
as a social contract make the welfare state conceptually inevitable. The freedom and the 
autonomy of the individual depend on social conditions: those not possessing the conditions 
of freedom and autonomy could claim, on the basis of the principle of equality the same 
conditions others have. Not for Kant, since as he says independence is in part (but only 
partially) acquired and not innate right, like freedom. At the same time, it is problematic to 
postulate a rational individual who would accept that his independence (social non-
dependence) is subject to contingency, in Kant's terms, empirical social circumstances. In 
today's constitutional democracies, the equality and independence of the citizen has become 
inseparable, while in Kant's age they were still separable.26 
Kant and generally the Enlightenment were not democrats in our terms. They accepted 
the representative system based on the separation of legislation and executive power (which 
Kant as the authors of the Federalist Papers27 call republican), but they did not accept 
democracy based on the participation of the empirical people as a whole. The requirement 
of Unabhängigkeit [by the German term Kant means personal and financial non-dependence 
(,sibisuffitientia)] excludes a great part of the empirical people from among active citizens. 
Modern constitutional democracies are in an ideal case and in Kantian terms simultaneously 
republican and democratic constitutional systems, which Kant and his contemporaries held 
impossible. Nevertheless, Kant's is right in claiming that constitutional democracy can exist 
only as representative democracy; however, representative democracy presupposes the 
social freedom of the individual, which requires the guarantee the minimum of the social-
economic independence of the individual (pace Kant, who regarded external freedom as 
independence from others' coercion). In other words: constitutional democracy (and here 
one must agree with Kant) requires the freedom of the cives as individual not subject to the 
power of others, which simultaneously requires a kind of "social democracy" (to use 
Tocqueville's term). Today, an influential trend of modern liberalism, called republicanism 
postulates that freedom is grounded on the non-subjectcdness to the power of others.28 The 
same is implied by Kant's concept of "non-dependence". True in Kant's case it lead , to the 
exclusion of those subject to the power of others (such as wage workers and servants) from 
among active citizens. Still it is possible to argue on the same ground in the contrary 
direction as many supporters of modern constitutional welfare rights in fact do. 
IV. THE MAXIM OF LEGISLATION 
AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW 
26
 Luf, G.: Freiheit und Gleichheit. Die Aktualität im politischen Denken Kants. Wien, 1978. 
150 skk. 
27
 Wright, В. F. (ed.): The Federalist. Cambridge, 1972, 133, 150. (No. 10.,14.; the author of 
both is Madison, J.). 
28
 See Pettit, Ph.: Republicanism. Oxford, 1997 and Spitz, J-F.: La liberté politique. Paris, 
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In the former section we saw that the freedom of the individual in a constitutional state 
consists in her being subject exclusively to general and public rules of law. Therefore, the 
procedure of legislation, the content of the law and its general validity are fundamental in 
maintaining constitutional freedom. The freedom (autonomy) of the individual can be 
exercised so that it should not conflict with others, thus, equal individual autonomy for 
everybody can be guaranteed only by equal limitations imposed upon each others' freedom-
and this is the function of the legal order. Also, this is the source of the maxim of legislation. 
By the concept of the maxim Kant means "the subjective principle of action" (Willkühr 
=choice, empirical will), which the actor makes the rule of his own action (Rechtslehre 
Einleitung IV, SA VIII 332). Therefore, the maxim of legislation as the principle determining 
and justifying all actions is either correct or incorrect. The maxim of the law is identical 
with the principles justifying legislation as an action. On these grounds we can analyse 
Kant's explications on the maxim of legislation. 
According to this maxim, the legislator has to make law (=norm), which could derive 
from the whole people and which can be regarded by each subject (at law), as if he approved 
of it. "Denn das ist das Probierstein der Rcchtsmässigkeit eines jeden öffentlichen Gesetzes. 
[The criterion of the lawfulness/correctness of all public law.] (SA XI 244) In Zum ewigen 
Frieden Kant formulates the transcendental formula of public law, that is, law-making to be 
proclaimed and applying to all,29 which he designates as the principle of publicity. As he 
sets forth: "all actions related to others' rights are unlawful (unrecht), if their maxim does 
not tolerate publicity". Thereby, Kant unites the idea of the social contract with the concept 
of the rational justifiability of the norm (long before Habermas and Rawls). As for Kant, the 
law is lawful, i.e. correct, if it complies with the maxim of legislation and the transcendental 
formula of publicity,30 otherwise lawful law would be a tautology. 
For Kant, the ultimate identity of the two formulas, i.e. rational admissibility and 
publicity derives from the concept of reason. Kant associates rationality with publicity. The 
fundamental concept of Kant's philosophy is reason (Vernunft), the use of which is generally 
public, just as in science.31 The society can never be deprived of the right of the public use 
of reason, i.e. thinking as he formulates in his writing "An Answer to the Question: What Is 
Enlightenment?" (SA XI 55). The consent of the subject (of law) is not a real consent-this 
is provided by the participation in the law-making of the representative organ (Parliament). 
The standard (criterion) of the justifiability of the law is that the rational subject at law 
would have made (adopted, accepted) the same law if he had the necessary knowledge.32 
This reformulated maxim of legislation is closely related to the discourse theory of 
Habermas, according to which rationality is identical with the norm (or other statement) 
acceptable in the ideal discourse-situation. The law (the legal norm) is rationally acceptable, 
29
 Das öffentliche Recht ist der Inbegriff öffentlicher Gesetze (d.i. solcher die durch einen 
machthabenden Gesetzgeber allen denen eine Pflicht obliegt verkündigt werden). AA 23. 347. [Public 
law implies the entirety of public laws to be mandatorily proclaimed by the legislative power.] 
30
 The transcendental nature of the formula postulates that its validity does not depend on 
empirical circumstances, which could influence the decision of the legislator, such as economic or 
practical, etc. considerations, but it needs to be applied to these. 
31
 As many have noticed, Kant usually draws a parallel between the activity of reason and that 
of the judge or the legislator, but we must restrict ourselves to a note. This by all means implies the 
publicity or public justifiability of judgement (by which Kant also means cognitive statements). 
32
 There is a slight difference between the two formulas, since according to the latter one, 
several admissible versions are possible. 
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if the participants of the ideal discourse, which excludes coercion and is conducted under 
ideally good conditions, would have adopted it as a reasonable norm. Clearly, the main 
difference between the concepts of reason of Kant and Habermas is that Kant examines the 
rationality of arguments, whereas Habermas examines the procedure of reasoning, i.e. the 
relationship of arguments and compares the force of arguments, which in an ideal case 
facilitates the success of "zwanglose Zwang des besseren Arguments" [the forceless force 
of the better argument]. 
In modem political and legal philosophy, the discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas and 
the political liberalism of John Rawls arc directly and admittedly related to Kant's principle of 
publicity. In Political Liberalism, Rawls applies the anglicised term of public reason and 
considers the constitutional court-in the form the US Supreme Court-as its main forum. 
Habermas considerably departs from Kant (and in this repect, from Rawls too), since he 
defines the public use of reason to be a social institution (procedure). The difference between 
the two views is manifest in their attitude towards majority decision-making, and its proper 
roel in modem constitutional democracy. The Kantian standard is counterfactual: the reason 
examines whether the subjects would have adopted a norm. This is the requirement of the 
rational justifiability of a norm, the decision on which depends on the correct use of reason. In 
the discourse theory of Habermas, especially in Faktizität und Geltung, discourse consists in 
communicative action and as such, embedded in a social context. On the other hand, the 
concept of the ideal discourse situation is as normative as Kant's maxim of legislation. 
According to Habermas, "Gilt nur das Recht als legitim, das aus der diskursiven Meinungs-
und Willensbildung gleichberechtigter Staatsbürger hervorgeht".33 [Only the law is legitimate, 
which derives from the discursive formulation of the opinion and will of equal citizens.] In the 
same work, Habermas expounds: "Discourse theory explains the legitimacy of the law via the 
legally institutionalised procedural and communicational conditions."34 Habermas also needs 
to explain what Kant does not: in a procedural democracy protecting a set of fundamental 
rights (Habermas calls this "System der Rechte"), especially the rights of minorities? Habermas 
also accepts the principle of publicity, since in void of modem communicational rights it is 
impossible to make legitimate law (Kant calls this rechtsmässig), however, he regards both the 
principle of publicity and people's sovereignty as discourse and procedure. 
From the point of view of constitutional theory, the relationship between rationality 
and public justification is the most important. In politics, the use of reason is collective and 
public: constitutional rights and constitutional decision-making procedures, such as political 
participation rights, elections, legislation and the entirety of communicational rights as 
safeguards of the freedom of the social communication process as a whole facilitate political 
decision-making based on public reasoning and debate. It is a crucial issue in the justification 
of constitutional review whether discursive democracy as a procedure-including the 
principle of publicity, which, like its counterpart, the categorical imperative is formal in the 
sense of being devoid of content-is sufficient to guarantee the constitutional rights, freedom 
and equality, which are also foundational for Kant. Majority decision cannot be deduced 
from the principles of discursivity and publicity, but it's a practically necessary procedural 
rule (at least as second best) in the legislative procedure. This is expressly acknowledged by 
Kant in Gemeinspruch (SA XI 152-153). In practice, democratic collective self-legislation 
33
 Habermas, J.: Faktizität und Geltung. Frankfurt am Main, 2. Auflage. 1992, 492. 
34
 Ibid. 499. 
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(Selbstgesetzgebung)35 is based on the majority principle, although the theory of discursive 
democracy requires considerably more than the (political) majority of legislation in the 
interest of the establishment of democratic legitimacy. Although, "the democratically 
legitimate formation of opinion and will" is impossible without constitutional rights, and it 
is based on constitutional rules of procedure, they are ex definitone insufficient to protect 
the rights of the individual against the majority. Thus, a discursive-rational procedural 
constitutional democracy also needs the judicial protection of the constitution. It is 
impossible to justify satisfactorily procedural rules by other procedural rules, nor can the 
content of the law be justified by the correctness of the law-making procedure. The 
constitution understood as a social contract in Kantian terms is capable to justify both. 
Constitutional democracy is impossible without appropriate institutions and rules, thus 
the constitution conceptually (and historically) precedes democracy. Trivially, democracy is 
a constitutional regime: it cannot exist but through democratic constitutional norms. The 
function of ensuring the impartial observation of procedural rules rationally cannot be 
entrusted exclusively to the participants of the procedure. The procedural justification of 
constitutional review is based on this insight. For Habermas, the principle of publicity is a 
subsidiary principle in terms of the judicial construction of the constitution since the 
content-based criteria of legitimate, i.e. constitutionally valid law are to be found in the set 
of fundamental rights (System der Rechte). Fundamental constitutional rights are legal 
positions of the individual defining for the legislator part of the content of law entailed by 
the maxim of legislation. In this sense, fundamental rights are a sort of positive natural law 
not subject to legislative disposal not guaranteed by the procedure of constitutional 
democracy.36 For those who are familiar with neo-constitutionalist or just modem 
constitutional law, the requirement of "rational (i.e. public) justification" is not a 
philosophical, but a legal dogmatic term. In applying the constitutional equality rule most 
constitutional courts use the principle of public justifiability as a test of reasonableness of 
classification by the legislator.37 
Constitutional review is a lawful way to exercise the right of resistance against 
government. Kant rejected the right to active resistance against the "unrechtmässig " (unjust 
or unlawful) power; even if it infringed the maxim of legislation.38 But he did not reject 
resistance through public argument and reasoning. As he wrote in the Dispute of the 
Faculties: "Why hasn't any sovereign dared to say that he didn't recognise any right of the 
people against himself?" (SA XI 359). The answer is: because the principle of publicity is 
an indispensable element of the legitimacy of legislation. Since the principle of publicity 
necessarily includes the possibility of public räsonnieren, we can infer that Kant recognises 
resistance via reasoning. Kant, who always expressed his appreciative views about Hume's 
35
 Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten [Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals] 
(SA VII 63). 
36
 Maus, L: Freiheitsrechte und Volksouvcrenität, Rechtstheorie, 26 (1995) 507-562. Here for 
lack of space we cannot introduce the immanent limitations of procedural democracy. For a part of 
the relevant literature see Bragyova, A.: Alkotmánybíráskodás és demokrácia (Constitutional Review 
and Democracy). Acta Juridica et Politica, 55 (1996), 135 skk. 
37
 Bragyova, A.: Egyenlőség és alkotmány (Equality and the Constitution). In: Lamm, V. (ed.): 
Van és Legyen a jogban. Tanulmányok Peschka Vilmos tiszteletére (Is and Ought in Law. Studies in 
Honour of Vilmos Peschka). Budapest, 2000. 
38
 Spaemann, R.: Kants Kritik der Widerstandrechts. In: Batscha, Z. (Hrsg.): Materialen zu 
Kants Rechtsphilosophie. Frankfurt am Main, 1976, 347. 
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works and callcd him "a man of sharpest wit" in the Prolegomena (SA V 116), might have 
agreed with the statement of Hume, according to which "[i]t is ... only on opinion that 
government is founded."34 He understood very well that the greatest limitation of political 
power is publicity or, in modem terms, public opinion. Thus, we can understand Kant's 
explications, namely, that resistance has one lawful means, which he calls "Freiheit der 
Feder" (SA XI 161, XII 409) and this means the freedom of the press, naturally, the 
reasoning press. The freedom of the pen is "das einzige Palladium der Volksrechte" [the 
only safeguard of people's rights] (XI 161), which as a freedom is the control (Prüfung) of 
the scientific propositions in science and of "the correctness of the judgement" of the state 
power, the monarch in politics (XII 409). Thus, according to Kant, there is no monarch, or 
a fortiori any political power and decision-maker, that would not be in need of the constant 
criticism of "the correctness of its judgement". 
For Kant, the "freie Rechtslehrer, d.i. die Philosophen" [free legal scholars, i.e. 
philosophers] (SA XI 363) are to protect natural rights by public reasoning which they 
address to the state with due veneration (ehrerbietig). In Kant's age, the protection of what 
we now call fundamental rights devolved on free legal scholars, who—according to the Streit 
der Fakultäten, where he claims that only the lower, that is, the philosophical faculty is 
free, whereas the others, such as the faculty of law is bound by positive regulations (SA XI 
280-287)-could only be philosophers, not lawyers. This is a consequence of the Kantian 
idea of rational law: the constitutional rights constitutive of the positive legal system in 
neo-constitutionalism were generally not considered to be positive legal rights in the 18 lh-
19th (and in a large part of 20lh) centuries, even though they were incorporated into the 
constitution.4" It was publicity-public opinion-that protected the constitutional rights, which 
corresponded to the judgement of the educated general public emerging in the age of 
Kant.41 
The modem public sphere (analysed masterfully in well-known book of Habermas),42  
is far cry from the reasoning public consisting mainly of the educated middle and upper 
classes of the 18th ccntury. The ideal discourse situation of Habermas-closely related to the 
Kantian principle of publicity, since ideal discourse consists in the public use of reason-
cannot be identical with modem political public, let alone the empirical public opinion. 
Therefore, modem constitutional review can be regarded as the forum of the public use of 
reason43 which enforces the maxim of legislation, if the empirical political legislator failed 
to do so. Hence, it is reasonable to claim that modem constitutional review consists in the 
institutionalisation of publicly reasoning resistance, which is always permissible in Kant 's 
terms and which we can designate as reasoning resistance. This conception derives directly 
from the principle of publicity presented above. This is a forceful corroboration of the 
procedural justification of constitutional review, which can be accepted by Habermas as 
well as the democrats rejecting constitutional review. 
39
 Hume, D.: Essays. In: The Philosophical Works of David Hume. Edinburgh, 1826, 
Vol. Ill, 31. 
40
 This is summarised perfectly in Duguit, L.: Traité de droit constitutionnel. Paris, 2nd ed., 
Tome III., 1923, 566 skk.; and Troper: op. cit. 
41
 Tönnies, F.: Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung. Berlin, 1922. 
42
 Habermas, J.: Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. 1962 (new ed.: Frankfurt am Main, 1990); 
on the principle of publicity: 178 skk. 
43
 In this issue, Rawls is more far-reaching than Habermas, who is more trustful with regard to 
procedural-discursive democracy. See, e.g. Rawls, J.: Political Liberalism, op. cit. 212 skk. 
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As it is clear from the Hufeland-review (SA XI 809), Kant concurred with Hobbes that 
nobody is obliged to obey coercion. Therefore, the state needs to be able to crush physical 
opposition by force or convince the subjects about the "legality" of its power (legitimacy in 
our terms). A state or government bound to protect and observe fundamental rights can use 
only limited force against its subjects (citizens); therefore, it can exist for a longer period 
only if the citizens bear at least benevolent indifference towards it. Of course, the machinery 
of the power of the state can function further on without this, but only as long as coercion 
(and the efficiency of the threat of its application) actually enables it to do so. Therefore, 
the legitimacy of the constitutional state is positively based on the limitation of the lawful 
use of force thus giving the priority to the communicative power against the coercive one. 
V. CONSTITUTION AND MORALITY 
To conclude, I wish to discuss the question of constitution and morality with the help of 
Kant. According to the idea of the constitution in Platonic terms (that is, in reality never 
perfectly realised) which is in accordance with the natural rights of man, everybody bound 
by the law (norm) is simultaneously a legislator on equal footing with others. For Kant this 
is the respublica noumenon, the transcendental norm of all constitutions (SA XI 364). The 
realisable form of the respublica noumenon, i.e. the respublica phaenomenon is the 
republican constitution. The republican constitution is conceived as a version of the state 
("Vereinigung einer Menge der Menschen unter Rechtsgesetzen") [the association of men 
under of law] (SA VIII 431), in which the constitution is "oberste formale Bedingung 
(conditio sine qua non) aller übrigen äusseren Pflicht" [the principal formal condition of all 
external obligations] (SA XI 144). In my terms, the legal system for Kant primarily and 
practically consists in the inevitable limitation of freedom of conduct, the primary objective 
of which is the protection of the external freedom of the individual (including property). 
The constitution and the legal system arc morally necessary for the individual primarily 
because they establish the external conditions of moral life: the "bürgerliche Gesellschaft" 
[civil society] cannot exist without a Staatsverfassung [a constitution] (SA XII 687). 
Kant's conception of mankind was sufficiently pessimistic so that he could not conceive 
a society without legal force and political power. Therefore, the political society, i.e. the 
constitutional Rechtszustand is not based at all on the morality of the participants, but on 
practical necessity and rationality. Therefore, "Das Problem der Staatseinrichtung ist, so 
hart wie es auch klingt, selbst für ein Volk von Teufeln (wenn sie nur Verstand haben), 
auflösbar." [The problem of the foundation of the state, however harsh it may sound, can be 
solved by even a people (if it has understanding) consisting of devils] (SA XI 224). The 
foundation of the existence of the state (for Kant, that implies the law and order and public 
laws) is not a moral or other high motive, which devils would lack, but it is practical 
necessity conceivable merely by understanding (Verstand) and not by reason (Vernunft) 
including also the moral a priori. Therefore, law accounts for not the morally, but the 
practically necessary conduct, which "Mechanism der Natur durch selsbsüchtige Neigungen 
... von der Vernunft zu Mittel gebraucht werden kann... (SA XI 225)." "Die Natur will 
unwiderstehlich, dass das Recht zuletzt die Obergewalt enthalte." [Nature irresistibly wants 
law to possess the supreme power]. Let me add that Kant's works on legal philosophy 
mostly deal with a part of the metaphysics of law-the title of his legal theory is 
Metaphysische Anfangsgründe-and by metaphysics Kant means a priori knowledge. 
Besides, Kant admits the legitimacy of "purely empirical legal theory", undoubtedly with 
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the limitation that it resembles the wooden head in the tale of Phaedrus, namely, it can be 
beautiful but unfortunately it does not have a brain (SA VIII 336). In one of his reflections, 
he clearly distinguishes the empirical-political (we could say contingent) elements from the 
rational ones (deriving from reason) in constitutions. As he formulates that: "Staatsklugheit 
ist bios auf empirische Prinzipien gegründet, Staatsrecht auf rationale. Man vermengt die 
Bedingungen der ersten bei dem Begriffe einer Staatsverfassung überhaupt mit dem 
letzteren." (R. 6855. AA XIX 181) [The theory of governance is based on purely empirical 
principles, whereas constitutional law is based on rational ones. In case of the general 
concept of the constitution of the state, the conditions of the first one are united with these 
of second one.] 
Kant's work on the philosophy of religion, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der 
blossen Vernunft (Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone) is most instructive from the 
present point of view, since here Kant's standpoint is clearly expressed: the legal condition 
(rechtlich-bürgerlicher or political Zustand) is at the same time an ethical state of nature. In 
the state of nature everybody is simultaneously one's own legislator and judge (SA VIII 
753): in the legal order the state of nature persists with regard to morality. We can add that 
if it did not persist, the autonomous moral life in Kant's terms would be impossible. Since 
moral virtues are duties towards ourselves, exclusively we can be our own judges in these 
issues. According to Kant, the State is not a moral, but a legal community; therefore, the 
constitutional State cannot be a moral community either. This precludes the moral 
interpretation not only of the constitution, but of law altogether. For Kant, the moral 
community (ethisches gemeines Wesen) can only be conceived as "Volk Gottes" (the people 
of God) "und zwar nach Tugendgesetzen" (viz. only on grounds of moral laws) (SA VIII 
757) where there is no place for external force. Religion consists in the recognition of our 
duties as divine commandment (SA VIII 762, 788), whereas virtue consists in the voluntary 
fulfilment of moral duties (SA VIII 526). It is only God who knows whether the individual 
was guided in the voluntary accomplishment of his moral duty by the motive of the respect 
for moral duty alone, or by also something else (and for Kant the conduct is not moral in 
the latter case). 
Thus, according to Kant, the constitution establishes merely a Rechtszustand, but not 
an "ethical" community based on virtue. The establishment of an ethical community, the 
moral constitution proper cannot be the objective of the constitution. Moreover, Kant wams 
against the legal enforcement of virtue (moral conduct) in the following paragraph of 
Religion innerhalb..."Wehe aber dem Gesetzgeber, der eine auf ethische Zwecke gerichtete 
Verfassung durch Zwang bewirken wollte. Denn würde dadurch nicht allein gerade das 
Gegenteil der ethischen bewirken, sondern auch seine politische Untergraben und unsicher 
machen". [Woe is the legislator, who intends to implement a constitution directed at ethical 
objectives by force. In doing so, he would achieve not only just the opposite of the ethical, 
but he would also undermine and shake the political constitution.] (SA VIII 754) As he 
explicates, it is the legal force that protects (external) freedom and thereby maintains the 
ethical natural state, necessary for the existence of autonomos moral life. However, the 
ethical natural state differs basically from the legal natural state, to which the command of 
exeundo est e statu naturali applies. For Kant "alle politischen Bürger" exist in an ethical 
state of nature (ethischer Naturzustand) which is at the same time the constitutional-legal 
condition. 
Thus, for Kant, the constitutional-legal condition is simultaneously moral state of 
nature: the moral, but not the legal, freedom of each and every person is complete in this 
condition. The legal meaning of constitutional rights, the Rechtszustand, as we have seen is 
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triadic for Kant: freedom, equality and independence for the propertied citizens (cives). 
These rights are political in the sense that they can be construed exclusively as constitutional 
rights, as part of a social contract. In other words, these are not moral rights but the 
constitutional properties of a society based on legal principles, which establish the external 
conditions of moral and social autonomy. Nevertheless, these attributes are not moral for at 
least two reasons. First, the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the collectivity of 
individuals promotes the coordination of their conduct affecting others under general 
coercive laws. In morality, however, everyone is simultaneously legislator and judge: this is 
the ethical state of nature guaranteed in a constitutional condition of the law. The intervention 
of the legislator, which transforms moral duty into legal duty, inevitably destroys the moral 
nature of the conduct, since it is not any more based on autonomous (inner) legislation.44 
At the same time, for Kant, not all constitutions are just (rechtsmässig). It is helpful as 
to the translation of the terms rechtens or rechtsmässig that Kant frequently adds the Latin 
equivalent of the terms: iustum. It is altogether clear that Kant does not refer to any kind of 
positive lawfulness in connection with the "lawful" constitution, but he means a constitution 
which corresponds to reason and is based on the practical use of reason. In this constitution 
it is primarily the transcendental principle of publicity that can guarantee the agreement 
between morality and public law (SA XI 244 ff.). This principle, which I discussed in the 
previous section, is simultaneously ethical (pertaining to the doctrine of virtues) and legal 
(affecting the rights of man). In the quoted place Kant discusses the people's right to 
resistance, which cannot be positive law from the outset.45 Therefore, the content of the 
constitution may he in harmony simultaneously with morality and law, but the constitution 
itself is not a moral institution. The combined effect of the principles of the republican 
constitution and the transcendental formula of publicity facilitates that in the modem 
constitutional state the legal system be rational without being exclusively or primarily a 
moral state. The idea of law, which consists in guaranteeing external freedom for each 
individual, is incompatible either with the legal enforcement of morality or with individual 
happiness as an objective of the state (Antropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht SA XII 686). 
Both of these would limit the autonomy of the individual to a greater extent than absolutely 
necessary. One is tempted to say that the moral principles determine the proper scope of the 
law: it ought not invade into the properly moral sphere of individuals, the latter being 
reserved for the working of autonomous moral life. 
Thus, the principles of the republican constitution are legal, not moral principles. The 
modern, especially the neo-constitutionalist constitutional state may closely resemble what 
Kant considered to be "the constitution in accordance with man's natural rights" (Streit der 
Fakultäten SA XI 360). Modem constitutions usually include the principles of the Kantian 
republican (lawful, that is, just) constitution as constitutional rights, and principles. If so, 
the constitutional rights can hardly be regarded as moral principles in Kantian terms, since 
the constitution is not a moral institution, either. Simultaneously, Kant identifies a close 
relationship between morals (Sitten) and the principles of the constitutional state. This 
relationship, however, does not pertain to morality but it is part of the practical reason. For 
Kant, as we saw, the principles of the republican constitution can be recognised and accepted 
44
 For a similar view: Dreier, H.: Kants Republik. In: Gerhardt, V. (Hrsg.): Kants Streit der 
Fakultäten. Berlin, 2005, 134 ff. 
45
 Scheffel, D.: Kants kritische Verwerfung des Revolutionsrechts. In: Brandt, R. (Hrsg.): 
Rechtsphilosophie der Aufklärung. Berlin, 1981, 178 skk. 
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through (the necessarily collective) use of reason, just as morally correct conduct can be 
recognised by the use of reason. Therefore, the legal nature of constitutional rights is not 
based on their moral content but on practical rationality. 
* * * 
Nearly all the works of Kant quoted above are available in several excellent English 
editions. Still, I quote Kant's works from the standard German editions, giving my own 
translation. I do so not by reason of disrespect for the translators, but simply because I used 
these texts. The quoted passages are easily identifiable and controllable in the standard 
English translations. The German texts are quoted from the Studienausgabe, except when 
the quoted text cannot be found there; in that case I quote it from the Akademie-Ausgabe. 
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to apply to the European Ombudsman. This right, stemming f rom European citizenship, is furthermore exp la ined 
in Art. 228 T F E U (ex Art. 195 TEC), stating that any citizen of the Union or any natural o r legal person res iding o r 
having its registered office in a Member State can complain in instances of maladministrat ion in connection wi th 
the activities of the Union institutions, bodies , offices or agencies.1 The European Parl iament , as one o f these 
institutions, represents next to the Council o f the European Union the legislative p o w e r of the EU. From this 
starting point, the study aims to analyze the type of relation be tween an institution with decades-long history and 
an office with a history not much more than a decade and a half. 
Keywords : European Parliament. European Ombudsman , petition, complaint , independence 
The establishment of the European office was the result of a long way, formed among many 
by the attitude of the European Parliament and its Committee on Petitions.2 If we try to 
describe the relationship between the European Ombudsman and the Parliament, the word 
"specific" seems to be the most adequate: the relation has more levels and these levels with 
connecting and complementing each other create its special nature and this can be 
approached or characterized from more sideways. 
1. The petition and the complaint 
Before the establishment the Office of the European Ombudsman by the Maastricht Treaty, 
the Committee on Petitions made an attempt to draw up a definition for the petition in the 
Resolution on the deliberation of the Committee on Petitions during the parliamentary year 
1993-1994, declaring that petitions arc all complaints, requests for an opinion, demands for 
action, reactions to Parliament resolutions or decisions by other Community institutions or 
bodies forwarded to it by individuals and associations.3 The necessity of further specification 
led the Committee to engage again in the issue and as a result, with little change in the prior 
* Ph.D., Research Fellow, Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30. 
E-mail: friedery@jog.mta.hu 
1
 Except the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in judicial role. 
2
 See more Friedery, R.: The Role of the European Ombudsman in Dispute Solving. Acta 
Iuridica Hungarica, 49 (2008) 4, 359-376; Friedery, R.: Az Európai Ombudsman Hivatalának 
történelmi és intézményi aspektusai (Historical and Institutional Aspects of the Office of the European 
Ombudsman). In: Balogh, M. (ed.): Diszciplínák határain innen és túl (Within and Beyond the 
Borders of Disciplines). Budapest, 2007, 125-139. 
3
 Report on the amendment of Rule 161 of Parliament's Rules of Procedure, 16 December 1997, 
Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities (Rapporteur: 
Brian Crowley). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference= A4-1997 
-0416&language=EN#top 
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definition, a petition was to be regarded as a requests for intervention, for action, for change 
of policy or for an opinion, submitted to the Parliament by any citizen of the Union and any 
natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, individually 
or in association with others.4 
The TFEU and the Ombudsman's Statute offer also a guide to make a difference 
between the petition and the complaint. If we compare Art. 228 TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC) to 
Art. 227 TFEU (ex Art. 194 TEC) then the difference between the complaint and the petition 
can be clearly noticed. The former stipulates that the Ombudsman is entitled to receive 
complaints about alleged maladministration in connection with the activities of the Union 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, the latter states that the European Parliament can be 
petitioned on matters belonging to the Union's fields. Thus, in the case of the petitions the 
complained activity must relate to the fields of the European Union,5 while in the case of 
the Ombudsman this phrase cannot be seen6. This constitutes the main difference between 
the two non-judicial dispute resolution forums; it is possible to address a petition to the 
European Parliament in connection with Member States' authorities. The right to petition is 
of more general nature, whereby complaints can be in connection only with maladministration 
performed by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. The Ombudsman helps to 
shed light on maladministration, the Committee on Petitions has the task to give adequate 
answer to complaints or opinion of natural or legal person in connection with the 
Parliament's resolution or decision of institutions and bodies. Art. 228 TFEU (ex Art. 195 
TEC) states that a complaint can be lodged not only directly to the European Ombudsman 
but as well through a Member of the European Parliament: because there is no need for 
individual or direct interests to lodge a complaint, the person affected can persuade a 
Member of Parliament or other person fulfilling the personal requirements to refer the 
complaint on his or her own name to the Ombudsman.7 8 This possibility earns significance 
in cases, where the complainant does not fulfil the personal requirements, e.g. is not a 
European citizen. Contrary to this-although the subjects of the provisions are the same, 
thus any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered 
office in a Member State-, the person addressing the petition has to be directly affected by 
the matter and has to address the petition directly to the Parliament, thus has no options as 
in the case of the complaint. 
The procedures of the Committee on Petitions and the Office cannot be regarded as 
each other rivals. A basis for the co-operation is, when the lodged complaint regarding its 
content can be considered more a petition and vice versa. Hence, in this kind of cases the 
office will transmit the complaints toward the European Parliament's Committee on 
4
 Resolution on the deliberations of the Committee on Petitions for the parliamentary year 
1996-1997 (Rapporteur: Roy Perry). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sidcs/getDoc.do?type=REPORT& 
reference=A4-1997-0190&language=EN 
5
 According to Art. 227 TFEU (ex Art. 194 TEC) "...have the right to address ... a petition to 
the European Parliament on a matter which comes within the Union's fields of activity". 
6
 According to Art. 228 TFEU (cx Art. 195 TEC) ".. .empowered to receive complaints., 
concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies...". 
7
 In the first Annual Report of 1995, 8 from the 298 registered complaints had been lodged 
through a Member of Parliament. 
8
 Thus, complaints can be lodged actio populáris with the condition that both the complainant 
and the subject of the complaint can be identified. 
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Petitions, and the petitions, which are essentially complaining about maladministration, are 
automatically forwarded to the Ombudsman's Office.9 The necessity of a successful co-
operation between the two comes from cases when it is not clear to which body should 
citizens tum to, what the difference is between the two procedures. Since in the relevant 
legislation this procedure is only an option, a possibility and not a duty for the Ombudsman, 
it is not automatically made: the Ombudsman can only make use of the transfer if the 
complainant also agrees with it,10 and the Committee on Petitions must follow this way, 
too." ;12 We should point out that if a complaint has already been investigated as a petition 
by the Committee, it is usually not justified for a further investigation by the Ombudsman, 
only when new evidence has been submitted in the meantime,13 but the Ombudsman's 
inquiry as an additional procedure is only in the latter case possible. 
The relationship between the Parliament and the Ombudsman is even more toned: the 
Parliament even helps the Ombudsman to carry on the inquiry. This stems from the 
provisions that EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies are required-such as the 
Parliament-to supply the Ombudsman with the requested information and must guarantee 
the access to their documents necessary for the Ombudsman. National institutions and 
bodies are also obliged to provide at the request of the Ombudsman with all the information 
which could clear the EU institution from maladministration. In this case access can be 
granted only after the concerned Member State had been notified, with exceptions when the 
information required is subject to law, or to secrecy falling under administrative decision, or 
fall under provision which cannot be made public. If the Ombudsman does not receive the 
requested help, or the request is refused, the Ombudsman can notify the European 
Parliament, which steps in using its political power to requests the necessary information 
for the Ombudsman. Furthermore, with the aim to share information of common interest, 
the Committee on Petitions-where it finds it necessary-invites the Ombudsman to attend 
the meetings of general and specific nature and to discuss matters of common interest. 
9
 Soon after the beginning, during the year 1996, 10 petitions were handed over to the Office 
and 5 complaints were given to the Committee of Petitions, in both cases with the consent of the 
complainant. The European Ombudsman suggested in further 42 cases that they should tum to the 
Parliament. 
IU
 Art. 2(3) of the Decision of the European Ombudsman adopting implementing provisions, 
adopted on 8 July 2002 and amended by decisions of the Ombudsman of 5 April 2004 and 3 December 
2008. Furthermore Implementing Provisions. 
11
 See case 441/2002/ME, in which he advised that the submitted complaint should be forwarded 
to the Parliament. Indeed, the complainant alleged that the decision of the Council of the European 
Union limited his access to and the use of vitamins and minerals. Since the complaint contained no 
maladministration, but concerned the merit of Community legislation, therefore, the Ombudsman 
rejected it, but suggested to be referred as petition. See The European Ombudsman: AnnuaI Report 
2002. Luxembourg, 2003, 18. 
12
 The Ombudsman actcd similarly in case 2881/2004/JMA, where a group of complainants 
sent an open letter to the El Triangle newspaper in Barcelona about alleged discrimination, alleging 
that the European Constitution did not recognize the Catalan language as official. However, the 
complaint related to a proposal for amending the Treaties, and according to the Ombudsman it was 
not related to maladministration thus, it fell outside the scope of his mandate and was forwarded to 
the European Parliament as petition. See The European Ombudsman: Annual Report 2004. 
Luxembourg, 2005, 39. 
13
 The European Ombudsman: Annual Report 2000. Luxembourg, 2001, 21. 
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2. Subject of inquiry: the maladministration 
In the provisions regarding the European Ombudsman, we cannot find any further 
specification what they understand under the term of maladministration. It is only referred 
to in the Treaty and the Statute to the extent that the Ombudsman examines instances of 
maladministration. It is established that maladministration occurs, when an EU institution 
does not act in accordance with the Community law, or neglects or fails to take account the 
principles and rules created by the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. 
The uncertainty surrounding of the definition of maladministration made the European 
Ombudsman further clarification,14 and the definition was also adopted by a 1998 European 
Parliament decision. However, cases of maladministration cannot be listed exhaustively, 
which is proved by the complaints handed to the Ombudsman office. Indeed, a wild variety 
of situations must be taken into careful consideration, whether they have exhausted instances 
of maladministration or not.15 Regarding the European Parliament, limits of maladministration 
can be determined by the European Parliament's political power. The classical Ombudsman 
offices have been established within the frame of the parliament to control the administration, 
and not for the supervision of the parliament's legislative or other work. Although the 
situation cannot be fully compared to the European level, the activities of the European 
Parliament cannot be considered as administrative activities, thus complaints in connection 
with the European Parliament's and its Committee on Petitions' political activity are to be 
considered inadmissible. Therefore, for example in complaint 420/9.2.96/PLM/B the alleged 
maladministration, namely poor administration by the Committee on Petitions the handling 
of the petitions was more of a political issue than maladministration: as the right to petition 
laid down in the Treaty has a constitutional value, the Parliament's responsibility is to 
organize its services thus it can perform its institutional functions.16 Similarly, the decision 
of the European Parliament about the French nuclear tests in the Pacific was inadmissible 
because it concerned a political decision.17 
As we cannot see a clear division of legislative and executive powers at European 
level, so the European office does not meet the traditional image of Ombudsman ordered to 
the legislative power,18 and although basically he is a Parliamentary Ombudsman, the 
supervision is extended as well to the Parliament. Nevertheless, this control is limited: as 
complaints in connection with activities or decisions with rather political than administrative 
nature are not considered to be admissible, hence the Committee on Petitions cannot be 
supervised by the Ombudsman as its activities belong to the Parliament's political actions. 
14
 First in the annual reports of 1995 and 1997. 
15
 Sec more Friedery, R.: A hivatali visszásság, a maladministration az európai ombudsman 
nézőpontjából (Maladministration from the point of view of the European Ombudsman). Uj Magyar 
Közigazgatás, (2009) 10-11, 20—28; Friedery, R.: Az európai ombudsman tevékenységét érintő 
hatásköri kérdések (Questions Regarding the Mandate of the European Ombudsman's Procedure). 
Állam- és Jogtudomány, 49 (2008) 4, 473-495. 
16
 See complaint 420/9.2.96/PLMP/B in The European Ombudsman: Annual Report for 1996. 
Luxembourg, 1997, 14. 
17
 See The European Ombudsman: Report for the year 1995. Luxembourg, 1996, 9. 
18
 Meese, J. M.: Das Petitionsrecht beim Europäischen Parlament und das Beschwerderecht 
beim Bürgerbeauftragten der Europäischen Union. Frankfurt am Main, 2000, 182. 
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3. The decision-making of the Ombudsman 
In cases, where the Ombudsman finds maladministration at the end of the inquiry and there 
is still a possibility to redress the maladministration by the institution, body, office or agency 
concerned, or the maladministration is of general nature or more serious, the Ombudsman 
informs the institution concerned and the complainant about his finding with a report and a 
draft recommendation. The institution concerned has three month to explain its position in a 
detailed opinion. If the Ombudsman's draft recommendation is not accepted within the 
time-frame, it is refused, or the institution concerned cannot find any other acceptable 
solution, or the Ombudsman does not find the detailed opinion satisfactory then the 
Ombudsman has authority to make a special report.19 This report is submitted to the 
European Parliament, the concerned institutions and the complainant, in which the instance 
of maladministration is reviewed and a recommendation20 can be laid down, too. In this 
case emphasis is on the European Parliament, because it can help to resolve the situation: 
using the decisions of the Parliament to accept the recommendation and call upon the 
institution to solve the problem.21 The significance of the aforementioned is strengthened by 
the fact that the competence of the European Ombudsman is quite limited, because an 
Ombudsman decision has no binding power.22 This means that if there is no problem-
solving solution between the concerned institutions and the complainant, the Ombudsman 
turns to the last and most significant means: using the help of another institution. The 
importance of a special report is that the concerned institution's political adjudication is at 
stake. The first special report-concerning the public access of documents-was submitted to 
the Parliament in 1997 and the case ended successfully.23 The special report has no legal 
effects "...vis-à-vis third parties within the meaning of Art. 173 of the Treaty (ex Art. 230 
TEC) and is not binding to the Parliament", as stated by the Court of First Instance in Case 
T-103/99. Indeed, the Parliament is ". . .free to decide, within the framework of the powers 
conferred on it by the Treaty, what steps are to be taken in relation to it".24 Therefore, the 
Parliament can freely decide to adopt a decision about the Ombudsman's recommendation, 
namely, adopting a decision the Parliament calls upon the concerned institution to settle 
the case. 
However, the European Ombudsman has another reporting obligation, similarly to his 
other European counterparts. According to Art. 228 of TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC) and Art. 
3(8) of Decision 94/262 of the European Parliament, the Ombudsman has to submit an 
annual report at the end of each annual session in connection with the outcome of the 
inquires. Neither this report has binding effect to the Parliament, but in the frame of the 
19
 See more special reports on http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/specialreports.faces. 
20
 Art. 8(4) of the Implementing Provisions. 
21
 For example in case 713/98/IJH, after submitting a special report, the European Parliament 
called on the European Commission to hand over data requested before by the complainant. 
22
 See Case C-167/06 P Komninou and Others v. Commission [2007] ECR 1-141, para. 44. 
23
 Special Report by the European Ombudsman to the European Parliament following the own 
initiative inquiry into public access to documents (616/PUBAC/F/1JH) http://www.ombudsman. 
europa.eu/en/cases/specialreport.faces/en/378/html.bookmark 
24
 See Case T-103/99 Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete v. Ombudsman and Parliament 
[2000] ECR 11-4165, para. 50. 
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annual report the Ombudsman has the opportunity to give general observations regarding 
the conduct of the institutions'.25 '26 
4. Election and dismissal 
According to Arts. 228 of TFEU (cx Art. 195 TEC) and 194 of the European Parliament's 
Rules of Procedure, the Ombudsman is elected by the European Parliament. I must draw 
the attention to an earlier inconsistency, namely, that there was an election and a nomination 
procedure as well. First, the office had been filled by an election procedure, and after 
winning the election procedure the candidate was appointed by the European Parliament. 
Therefore, some authors have mentioned the European Ombudsman as an elected official, 
while others as an appointed one, since the Ombudsman was both clected and appointed. 
This quite inconsistent rule has been abolished by the Lisbon Treaty, sincc it amended the 
relevant article: according to the amendment the Ombudsman is elected by the Parliament, 
and thus the election procedure is not followed by a separate appointment. 
The amendment of the Lisbon Treaty has not only resolved the contradictions between 
the two terms, but the new wording reinforces the independence and the legitimacy became 
stronger. That is to say, the appointment carries dependency between the appointed and the 
appointer, as opposed to a democratic election. 
Art. 228 of the TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC) does not rule any specific requirements for 
the person holding the office. However, with a closer look, a number of conditions can be 
seen as a guarantee of impartiality and knowledge necessary for the performance of this 
duty. First, only EU citizen can take the office of the European Ombudsman, who must 
possess a füll range of civil and political rights, as well as every guarantee of independence. 
This person is necessary to meet the conditions for the exercise of the highest judicial 
position in his or her country, or have the acknowledged competence and experience to take 
on the duties of the European office.27 
From the point of view of the wording, the phrase "or" implies the possibility that it is 
not necessary to have legal qualification for the position if the person concerned has 
sufficient expertise and experience. Nonetheless, this expertise and experience has to be 
that thorough, which allows decision-making and task completing in complex legal issues. 
The requirement of expertise is underlined as well by the fact that so far only such persons 
have been elected to head the office, who, as national ombudsmen had gained sufficient 
experience.28 Analyzing their professional life, we shall draw attention to the fact that while 
Söderman29 gained wide experience thanks to its position in various fields of the 
25
 See the annual reports on http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreports.faces. 
26
 See Case T-103/99, para. 50. 
27
 Art. 6(2) of the Statute. 
28
 Jacob Söderman was a Finnish Ombudsman before the appointment, while the incumbent 
Nikiforos Diamandouros was before the first Greek Ombudsman. 
29
 The course of life of Jacob Söderman shows that an Ombudsman with experiences in different 
areas of the administration was elected: Minister of Justice in 1971, Member of Parliament in 1972-
82, Head of Labour Safety, Department in the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health in 1971-1982, 
Governor of the Province of Uusimaa 1982-89, Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland 1989-95. Of 
course, other positions in public or educational life were occupied by him, but basically he is a 
practical expert. Since September 2007 he works as a Member of the Finnish Parliament. 
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administrat ion, and Diamandouros 3 0 made notable career in the academic life. In short , 
while the first European O m b u d s m a n received the o f f ice as practical expert, the s e c o n d as 
academic professional . 
The provis ions regarding the appointment and removal fo l lowing the election can be 
found in the T F E U and the Rules of Procedures o f the European Parliament.3 1 At the ear ly 
stages the provis ions regarding the election soon p roved to be in need of a m e n d m e n t , for 
example the candidate elected by s imple major i ty o f the Commi t t ee on Petitions shou ld 
have been presented to the full meet ing, but the e lect ion twice fai led, hence the appo in tmen t 
of the O m b u d s m a n had to wait until June 1995. Indeed , these election rules went o v e r m a n y 
changes. The then President of the European Par l iament on 14 N o v e m b e r of 1994 ra i sed the 
question of amendmen t of the provis ions regarding the O m b u d s m a n ' s appointment . A s a 
result, the Commi t t ee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credent ia ls and 
Immunit ies decided to r ecommend the amendment o f Art. 159, and hav ing finished the draf t 
it was submit ted to the Parl iament on 29 November . 3 2 The Parl iament returned the repor t on 
its 14th December meet ing to the Commit tee , wh ich then prepared and presented a s e c o n d 
draft.3 3 This second report was repeatedly returned to the Commi t t ee on 14 March 1995, 
30
 Diamandouros was in 1980-1983 Director of Development at Athens College, in 1983—1988 
Program Director for Western Europe and the Near and Middle East at the Social Science Research 
Council, New York, in 1988-1991 Director of the Greek Institute for International and Strategic 
Studies, in 1995-1998 Director and Chairman of the Greek National Centre for Social Research 
(EKKE), has been Professor of comparative politics at the Department of Political Science and Public 
Administration of the University of Athens since 1993. In 1999 and 2000, he was appointed member 
of Greece's National Commission on Human Rights and the National Council for Administrative 
Reform, respectively, from 1998 to 2003 the first National Ombudsman of Greece. 
31
 While the Maastricht Treaty setting up the office was signed on the 7 February in 1992 
(entered into force in November 1993), the Statute of the Ombudsman was adopted by the Parliament 
only on the 9 March of 1994. 
32
 The report suggested the following amendments. According the amended Art. 159(4) the 
committee submits its candidates for vote in the order of votes obtained in committee instead of 
choice of candidate. The new subsection (6) says that in electing the Ombudsman the Parliament shall 
apply the provisions of Rule 14(1) by analogy instead of a secret ballot held on the basis of a majority 
of the votes cast. Subsections (5) and (8) were deleted, namely the vote shall be put on the agenda for 
the part-session following the forwarded proposal, and in case of negative vote the committee makes 
a new proposal or the President of Parliament issues a further call for nominations. See more Report 
on the amendment of Rule 159 of the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure concerning the 
appointment of the Ombudsman. Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials 
and Immunities, 29 November 1994 (A4-0085/94) PE 210.749. 
33
 According to the amendments 
- the President of Parliament shall not only after his election but in the cases referred to in Rule 
159(10) call for nomination, 
- the call is to be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, 
- the nominations must include all supporting documents, 
- three to five nominations shall be selected and then submitted in alphabetical order by the 
committee, except when there is only three or less nominations, in this cases these are automatically 
submitted to Parliament, 
- regarding the before mentioned, the proposals are to be placed on the agenda for the part 
session, 
- only the two candidates obtaining the largest number of votes can continue after the first 
ballot, and in the event of a tie the older candidate shall be elected. 
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which then submitted a third report34 proposing the amendments. The Parliament finally 
adopted a decision on May 16 amending the Rules of Procedure.35 
Following the amendments of the election process, Jacob Söderman, the first European 
Ombudsman was elected in June 1995 and then re-elected in 1999, whereas after his 
retirement on 1 April 2003 Nikiforos Diamandouros took charge of the office for the 
remaining time of the parliamentary term. Then, at the start of the new parliamentary term, 
Diamandouros was elected as the new European Ombudsman on 11 January 2005. 
Another aspect of the relation between the Office and the Parliament is that the 
Ombudsman's term of office has the same duration as of the Parliament, and the election 
takes place after every parliamentary election. Although the procedure for electing the 
Ombudsman is a little complex, it includes many elements of transparency,36 and this 
underlined for example by the provision that at the beginning of each parliamentary term 
the President of the European Parliament calls for the nomination of the Ombudsman either 
immediately after his election, or at the case of death or dismissal of the Ombudsman, and 
for the submission of nominations sets a time-limit.37 
According to the regulations the candidate must have the support of the representative 
of at least forty Member State, who are nationals of at least two Member States, and one 
representative can support only one candidate. To meet the criteria of openness and 
transparency, there are other guarantying provisions. The hearings are public for 
representatives. Thereafter, a list of the formal nominations in alphabetical order is to be 
submitted to the Parliament. After the secret vote, the majority of the votes decides and the 
vote may consist of three rounds, in eases if it fails to elect a candidate with an absolute 
majority in the first two rounds. In the third round only the two candidates with the most 
votes in the second round can be voted.38 In this case the simple majority of the present 
representatives decide, however in tie vote the older candidate prevails. Before the vote 
begins, the President must ensure that at least half of the Members of Parliament is present. 
Before the Lisbon Treaty, the Ombudsman was appointed by the qualified majority of the 
Parliament following the parliamentary elections. Because of the nature and the extent of 
the preparatory work regarding the appointment, the Committee on Petitions carried out a 
large amount of these works.39 
- the nominations received to the call are automatically to be considered admitted to the 
selection process until the renunciation of the person. See more Second report on the amendment of 
Rule 159 of Parliament's Rules of Procedure concerning the appointment of the Ombudsman. 
Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities, 21 February 
1995 (A4-0024/95) PE 211.013/fin. 
34
 Third report on the amendment of Rule 159 of Parliament's Rules of Procedures concerning 
appointment of the Ombudsman. Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials 
and Immunities, 25 April 1995 (A4-0094/95). 
35
 Decision amending Rule 159 of Parliament's Rules of Procedure concerning appointment of 
the Ombudsman, 16 May 1995 (Official Journal 1995 С 151, 33). 
36
 Picrucci, A.: Les recours au médiateur européen. In: Epaminondas, M. A.: European 
Citizenship. Maastricht, 1994, 114. 
37
 Rule 204 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament. 
38
 Ibid. Rule 205(5). 
39
 During Diamandouros's first electoral procedure in 2005, in the first round 564 voted in 
support for him from the 609 votes cast, thus it can be said that the representatives were convinced by 
his substitute for Söderman following the his retirement. OJ L21, 1.25.2005, 8. 
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The duties of the Ombudsman can be ceased when the current term of office expires, 
namely, with the entry into office of the new Ombudsman. This occurs when the Ombudsman 
is not re-elected to a new parliamentary term.40 If the mandate is terminated prematurely, 
for the remaining parliamentary term the Parliament appoints the successor within a three-
month time-limit. Except for the case of dismissal, the Ombudsman will remain in office 
until his successor takes office.41 Resignation, the event of death and dismissal can also lead 
to the duties to be ceased. To the request of the European Parliament the Court can dismiss 
the Ombudsman if he no longer fulfils the conditions, or is guilty in serious misconduct, 
and did not voluntarily resign. That is, according to Rule 206 of the Rules of Procedure of 
the European Parliament, one tenth of the representatives can request the dismissal. The 
request of the members is forwarded to the relevant committee, whose members will decide 
whether there are any well-founded grounds for dismissal. If there are, a report will be 
submitted to the Parliament and released to vote. However, before the vote, at his request, 
the Ombudsman can express his own views. Before the secret-ballot, the President of the 
Parliament ensures that half of the Parliament's component members are present. If they 
decide to remove the Ombudsman from the office, the Ombudsman resigns. Nonetheless, it 
can happen that the Ombudsman does not resign voluntarily then the President applies to 
the Court of Justice regarding the dismissal. So thus we can see in the case of the dismissal 
that after a vote of confidence, where the majority is in favour of the dismissal, the 
Ombudsman has the option of voluntary departure, namely to resign, and if the Ombudsman 
does not take this possibility, the drastic way follows. 
5. Aspects of independence 
Although it is generally accepted that the complété independence and impartiality is of great 
importance in every Ombudsman's position, independence is in particular emphasized in 
the case of the European Ombudsman,42 which is toned down by the fact that the power of 
the Ombudsman is always granted by some other body. The European Ombudsman's 
independence can be seen as a coherent one, whose elements arc following: independence 
laying in the person of the Ombudsman, independence of the office staff, independence of 
the office from budgetary side. 
5.1. Independence of the Ombudsman 
According to Art. 228 of the TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC) the European Ombudsman carries 
out his duties in complete independence, furthermore Art. 9 of the Ombudsman's Statute 
declares that the Ombudsman shall be completely independent. These provisions are taken 
into practice, when the Ombudsman takes an oath before the Court of Justice to perform his 
duties with complete independence. The rules limiting the scope of activity ensure the 
realization of the impartiality requirement: during the term of office the Ombudsman is not 
permitted to hold any political or administrative office, or engage in other occupations 
gainful or not, thus cannot engage any educational position, and following the election the 
Ombudsman must refrain from any other activities incompatible with this position. 
40
 Both Jacob Söderman and Nikiforos Diamandouros were re-elected. 
41
 Art. 7 of the Statute. 
42
 Gregory, R.: The European Union Ombudsman. In: Gregory, R.-Giddings, Ph. (eds): Righting 
Wrongs: The Ombudsman in Six Continent. Amsterdam, 2000, 159. 
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The requirement regarding independence is underlined by the provisions that the duties 
are performed with complete independence, in the general interest of the Communities and 
of the citizens of the Union, namely, the Ombudsman can neither seek nor accept instructions 
from any government or other body, and must refrain from any action incompatible with the 
nature of his duties. Whereas the Ombudsman acts in the general interest, accordingly, 
independence is essential for the undiminished confidence towards the fair procedures of 
the Ombudsman. 
It is very important to mention whether the independence is not affected by the 
possibility of election and re-election. Theoretically, it is possible that the Ombudsman-in 
order to be re-elected—tries to please to the Parliament during the official activities. On one 
hand, however, this is contradicted by the facts that in person an active official determined 
in many topics and subject matters took up the role as European Ombudsman as seen before 
in different cases, and his successor follows this path as well-both of whom had national 
experiences in this kind of work. On the other hand, the position of the European 
Ombudsman differs from several national Ombudsmen, because the supervision of the 
Parliament falls within the competence of this body. Furthermore, abandoning the 
nomination process by the European Parliament, strengthened the democratic nature. Here, 
we should point out that although the Ombudsman can be dismissed by the Parliament, it is 
only possible in cases of serious misconduct or the conditions for the performance of duties 
are not fulfilled any longer. 
5.2. Independence of the Office 
At the initial establishment of the office, the independence of the staff had not been 
sufficiently guaranteed, hence Section I regarding the European Parliament in the European 
Communities' budget planned for the financial year 1995 provided that staff engaged in 
investigation of cases in accordance with Art. 228 of TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC) is employed 
on temporary basis, while the rest of the staff is ordered by the Secretary-General of the 
European Parliament. The European Parliament had already held the view that in order to 
maintain the independence and effectiveness of the Ombudsman's activities the entire staff 
should be assigned to the Office during the period of the Ombudsman's mandate and the 
EU's three institution should record in a joint statement principles governing on one hand 
for the staff employed by the Ombudsman, on the other hand for the status of temporary or 
contract staff conducting inquires, in a way to ensure the effectiveness and independence of 
the Ombudsman.43 
The institutional independence is strengthened by several provisions. The current 
legislation states that the Ombudsman may specify the internal structural and internal rules 
of procedure. Furthermore the Ombudsman is assisted by a secretariat, and the principal 
officer is appointed by him. In matters concerning the staff, the Ombudsman has the same 
status as the institutions within the meaning of Art. 1 of Staff Regulations of Officials of the 
European Communities.44 The secretariat's officials and servants are subject to the rules and 
regulations applicable to officials and other servants of the European Communities, and 
their number per year is approved as part of the budgetary procedure. Those officials of the 
European Communities and of the Member States, who are appointed to the secretariat, are 
43
 European Parliament Resolution on the role of the European Ombudsman appointed by the 
European Parliament, 14 July 1995. OJ 1995 С 249, 226. 
44
 Art. 11(4) of the Statute. 
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to be seconded in the interests of the service and are guaranteed to automatic reinstatement 
in their institution of origin.45 The secondment is a decision by the institution of origin, 
which can be a Community institution or body or an institution from the Member States. 
The obligation to reinstate a certain official is therefore for the institution of origin. As far 
as the Community institutions are concerned, the secondment is foreseen in the staff 
regulations and the obligation for the administration is therefore clear. For institutions in the 
Member States, the Ombudsman could merely ensure, in the exchange of letters foreseen in 
the enclosed provisions, that the guarantee foreseen in the Statute of the European 
Ombudsman is offered to the official in question.46 
5.3. Budgetary independence 
In the preliminary period after the nomination of the first Ombudsman in 1995 and 1996, 
the Parliament made provision for the Office's staff and material needs, which support was 
based on an agreement between the Parliament and the Ombudsman of 22 September 1995. 
From the financial year 1997 all operating costs of the Ombudsman's secretariat was 
covered by its own budget; but the European Parliament still provided the assistance 
necessary for avoiding unnecessary duplication of staff and expenditure. In the first annual 
report of the Office in 1995, the office's budget was annexed to the Parliament's budget and 
regarded as "a guarantee of independence of the Ombudsman and which should be treated 
in the same way"47. The Statute originally provided that the Office's budget is annexed to 
the Parliament's one in the budget of the European Union, however, the Council later on 
agreed with a proposal suggesting the Ombudsman's budget shall be wholly independent, 
and after the decision from I January 2000 the budget can be find in a separate chapter in 
the Union's budget, currently in Section 8. 
* * * 
As shown in the study the complex nature of the relation means that the Parliament is 
represent almost in every momentum of the Office's life. The Office can be regarded as the 
extended arm of the Parliament, as a complementary of its control mechanism. However, as 
the analyzed aspects clearly underline, this complementary function does not mean 
dependent role but a co-ordinate relation, which is among others mostly strengthened by the 
fact that the Parliament was put under the Ombudsman's mandate, contrary to several 
examples in Member States. 
45
 Ibid. Art. 11(3). 
46
 The European Ombudsman: Rules applicable to the secondment of officials and agents from 
international, national, regional and local public administrations and bodies to the European 
Ombudsman and to the secondment of the European Ombudsman officials and of temporary agents to 
international, national, regional and local public administrations and bodies. The document was made 
available for research by the Office of the European Ombudsman. 
47
 The European Ombudsman: Report for the year 1995. Luxembourg, 1996, 6. 
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to the Constitutions of the Visegrád Countries** 
Preambles play an interesting role in the history and development of modem constitutions. 
So far, their conditions, function and legal relevance have raised considerable public debate. 
Although the aim of this article is not to describe these preambles in details, it is necessary 
to give a brief overview and point out some of their general characteristics. The term 
preamble comes from the Latin word preambulare, meaning 'going ahead'. Therefore, 
a preamble precedes the constitution as an introduction or a kind of foreword.1 A constitution 
may or may not have a preamble, its presence being an option and not a must. Hungarian 
history has known many important documents of public law with preambles: the Golden 
Bull of 1222, or Law No. I. of 1920, which was supposed to restore traditional 
constitutionalism and provisionally regulate the realisation of supreme power in the state. 
Further examples are Law No. I. of 1946, which declared the Hungarian Republic, and Law 
No. XX. of 1949 (the Hungarian Constitution). 
There are three main theories about the nature and function of preambles. The first one 
completely denies the legal significance of preambles. The second one suggests that 
preambles offer a basis from which legal obligation can be directly derived. According to 
the third theory, a preamble can help interpret the constitution. Hungarian legal tradition 
chiefly represents the last view: the preamble is used as an aid to the interpretation of law, 
rather than as a set of independent normative regulations. However, the guidelines of the 
preamble are supposed to be strictly followed in practice.2 
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 Sulyok, M.-Trócsányi, L.: Preambulum (Preamble). In: Jakab, A. (ed.): Az Alkotmány 
kommentárja (Commentary ont the Constitution). Budapest, 2009, 84. 
2
 Ibid. 90 -91 . 
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Not all modern constitutions are preceded by a separate introduction or preamble. For 
instance, the present Italian Constitution and the present Romanian Constitution do not have 
any preamble. Most European constitutions, however, include an introduction of some sort. 
Their function is to determine the historical and political basis and context which brought 
forth the given constitution. They also define the place the new law, which is just about to 
come to life, is supposed to occupy in the country's traditions of public law. Thus, preambles 
express the constitutional identity of the country, or at least specify what elements this 
identity relies on.3 
Most Central and Eastern European constitutions after 1989 have a preamble. In most 
cases, these introductions explicitly state the principles the new law relies on, the people on 
behalf of whom constitualisation is taking place, as well as the circumstances that surround 
the process. Several new democratic constitutions contain a considerable historical 
introduction, which usually specifies which are the traditions of the state that the constitution 
maker considered important. This is a common practice, especially among those states 
which recovered their independence as a state or were bom in the years following the 
regime change. However, there is no pattern or aid to interpretation that would define 
precisely what a proper modem democratic preamble is supposed to include. Such is the 
case of Central Europe and especially the Visegrád region: although these countries have a 
very similar historical background, the structure and the content of their preambles differ 
markedly. 
The present Hungarian Constitution, adopted in 1989, does not contain any historical 
narrative except for a refercncc to the promotion of peaceful historic transition. However, 
this appears to be an aim to achieve rather than a historical explanation.4 There is no attempt 
to specify the sources of legislative power. Although the Hungarian Constitution is based on 
the principle of the people's sovereignty, which is explicitly stated among its normative 
regulations, the preamble refers neither to the people as the source of power nor to the 
Hungarian political community. However, the scope of power delegated to the constitution 
maker is clearly specified: it is confined to the creation of a provisional constitution.5 
Nevertheless, the preamble of the Hungarian Constitution precisely defines its values and 
its goals to achieve, that is, multi-party system, parliamentary democracy, social market 
economy, constitutional state and peaceful political shift. 
Compared to the Preamble to the Hungarian Constitution, the introductory sentences 
of the other three Visegrád constitutions contain considerably more information as well as 
more symbolic and identity-related elements. These documents seem more elaborated in 
this respect. It is hardly surprising: whereas the Hungarian Constitution underwent major 
amendment (modification) in 1989, the other three documents came to life later and under 
more favourable circumstances-that is, avoiding that hectic shift called regime change. 
Another important factor is that the Czech, the Polish and the Slovak constitutions are not 
simply amendment acts but, formally, new constitutions. 
All three preambles mentioned specify precisely on behalf of whom constitualisation 
is taking place. The Czech Constitution starts with the following phrase: "We, the citizens 
of the Czech Republic in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. " There are two important elements 
in this formula. The entire group of citizens is considered as the source of state power in the 
3
 Garlicki, L.: Polskié prawo konstytucyjne (Polish constitutional law). Warszawa, 1999, 41. 
4
 Sulyok-Trócsányi: op. cit. 93. 
5
 Ibid. 92. 
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Czech Rebulic. The process of determining the constitutional foundations of the Czech state 
is thus characterised by clear preference for the civic principle instead of the ethnic principle. 
Secondly, the way the preamble presents the territorial division of the country is the 
provincial pattern of the historical Czech state. The commentary of the constitution affirms 
that the reason for using this pattern is to emphasize the historical roots and not to 
foreshadow the administrative and territorial division which is later introduced.6 We have to 
bear in mind that the Moravian regionalist interests were represented in the Czech legislation 
in the first part of the 1990s. Before 1992, one of their aims was to transform the 
Czechoslovak Federation, which had two members, into a tripolar structure, that is, to create 
a provincial state instead of the federal state. Later, when the independent Czech Republic 
carried out an administrative reform to create the level of regions, they made serious 
attempts to influence decision makers to take the borders of the ancient Czech provinces 
into account. However, Moravian regionalists failed to achieve their goal and later they lost 
the opportunity to take part in legislation. The fact that the preamble contains this formula 
was probably meant to be a gesture towards these forces in 1992. 
The preamble to the Slovak Constitution sparked off wider and more heated debate in 
1992. The preamble begins with the following phrase: "We, the Slovak nation..." The 
coalition of governing parties chose this formula to express the Slovakian nation's wish to 
pursue their right to self-determination, whose subject, inevitably, needed precise definition. 
However, Slovakia cannot be considered uniquely as the home of the Slovak nation. Firstly, 
there are several national and ethnic minorities in the country, so much so that Slovakia 
seems to be ethnically and culturally the most heterogeneous state of the Visegrád region. 
This is an area with important minority groups that have maintained their own separate 
national identity. Secondly, the term "nation" is used in the Slovak political and social 
discourse exclusively in a cultural and linguistic sense, both by majority and minority 
citizens. Most people are reluctant to accept the notion of a politically defined state-nation. 
Nevertheless, there were many liberal Slovak intellectuals, who together with the political 
representatives of the Hungarian minority, argued against defining the political community, 
which was just about to accept their constitution, as the Slovak nation. This dilemma 
appeared in social and political journalism as the so-called "debate of the followers of ethnic 
and civic principle". The final text of the preamble can be interpreted as a compromise 
between the two concepts: although it begins with the formula "we, the Slovak nation ", the 
"members of national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of the Slovak 
Republic" are mentioned as well. As a sort of summary, the closing lines of the preamble 
refer to a broader group of citizens, and thus a common platform is created: "we, citizens of 
the Slovak Republic, adopt through our representatives the following Constitution ". 
Unlike the Slovakian Constitution, which interprets the term "nation" culturally and 
linguistically, the preamble to the present Polish Constitution, adopted in 1997, uses the 
notion of'Polish nation' in the sense of a political state-nation: "We, the Polish Nation-all 
citizens of the Republic ". It is true that at several places the entire context of the preamble 
makes both direct and indirect allusions to the historical, religious and cultural traditions of 
the Polish nation. However, the term 'nation' is used in the political sense, referring to 
the state. 
6
 Pavlícek, V—Hrebejk, J.: Ústava a ústavní rád Ceské republiky. L díl Ústavni system 
(Constitution and constitutional order of Czech Republic. I. Constitutional System). Praha, 1998, 47. 
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The next question of central importance and symbolic value is how each Visegrád 
preamble relates to the former statehood and state traditions of the nation that brought them 
to life. Which traditions are emphasised and which are neglected? The answer varies 
substantially from country to country. Whereas two of the states (Poland and Hungary) 
underwent mere regime change in 1989, while all the other important attributes of the state 
(territory, population, name, etc.) remained the same, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist on 31 
December, 1992 and two successor states emerged: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. But 
even these two states are in a slightly different situation: the roots of independent Czech 
statehood date back much further in time than the roots of independent Slovak statehood. 
The way the two constitutions relate to the former Czechoslovak statehood is not entirely 
obvious. We might even say their relationship to the former statehood is rather obscure. 
However, this relation is firmly linked to the way they relate to the nations' right to self-
determination. 
The Czech Constitution was adopted in December, 1992. Its preamble interprets the 
historical moment of constitualisation as a time when the independent Czech state is 
supposed to revive. However, it fails to mention if the Czech nation wishes to pursue its 
right of to self-determination in this particular moment. This seems logical: both the text 
and the context of the preamble suggest that in 1992 the Czech members of parliament 
involved in the process constitutionalisation did not entirely refuse the former Czechoslovak 
statehood. On the contrary, they tried to remain loyal to "all good traditions of the ancient 
statehood of Czech Crown's Lands and the Czechoslovak State". The Czechs kept the 
former Czechoslovak state flag, even though the Constitutional Law No. 542 of 1992 on the 
dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Republic allows neither of the successor-states to use 
the symbols of the former federation. This, again, clearly signals their loyalty to the 
democratic Czechoslovak heritage. The Slovak party expressed indignation over this 
infringement of the law, but in no more than a few weeks they withdrew. In order to justify 
the legality of this step, Czech lawyers argued that their country did not infringe international 
public law, as the Czechoslovak flag had lost its "owner" and was not taken by any other 
legal subject. Thus, any country was allowed to use it. 
The Czech rule of law and system of symbols reflect Czechoslovak statehood in other 
ways as well. For instance, the highest Czech state award is still the Order of the White 
Lion, which was established in 1922 and used to be the highest Czechoslovak state award. 
However, it is important to note that the lion is traditionally an essential element of the 
heraldry and system of symbols of the Czech state-and not of the Slovak state. The statehood 
of the two 'ancestors' mentioned in the Czech preamble is firmly linked to the two Czech 
national holidays as well. One of them, 28 October, the day on which the independent 
Czechoslovak state was founded in 1918, is still considered as a sort of "Independence Day". 
The other, 28 September, was introduced in 2000 following a period of hot debate. Officially, 
this holiday is supposed to be a commemoration of Czech statehood, but in reality people 
celebrate the Czech patron Saint Vaclav and his cult. The criticism was directed not so much 
against the religious content of the holiday, as against the meaning that was connoted to the 
cult from the 20th century. Between 1939 and 1945 the German Nazi occupants and their 
local allies tried to use this cult to strengthen Czech-German relations and to emphasize the 
subordination of Czech territories, which cast shadow upon the Saint's memory. Finally, it is 
important to note that 1 January is not only New Year's Day in the Czech Republic, but also 
the day of the independent Czech state, even if citizens are not perfectly aware of the fact. 
However, the state lies equal emphasis on the two "Independence Days", 1 January and 28 
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October. This is unmistakably signalled by the fact that these arc the two days of the year 
when the Czech head of state hands out merit awards.7 
Slovakia developed a rather different relationship to Czechoslovak statehood. The new 
Slovak Constitution was adopted in 1992, and, of course, the Slovak Republic was one of 
the successor-states of the former Czechoslovakia, both from a legal point of view and in 
the practice as well. The country was neither able, nor explicitly willing to refuse what it 
considered positive f rom its Czechoslovak heritage, however, this attitude was not 
mentioned in the text of the preamble. Unlike the Czech document, the introduction to the 
present Slovak Constitution does not refer to the tradition of the Czechoslovak statehood at 
all. The only historical heritage mentioned is that of the Great Moravian Empire, far away 
in time and rather difficult to interpret f rom a legal point of view. Interestingly enough, the 
Slovak preamble is the only document among the Visegrád preambles to refer to the 
principle of natural law and claim the nation's right to self-determination. This implies that 
the Slovak constitution maker had the subjective feeling of fulfilling the Slovak nation's old 
wishes and, having pursued their right to self-determination, creating the independent 
Slovak statehood. This is supposed to be different from the former Czechoslovak statehood, 
which the Slovak nation greatly benefited from, but did not consider entirely as theirs. This 
subtle difference between the two states' preambles faithfully reflects their relationship to 
the former federal statehood. The Czech party, which formed the majority of the 
Czechoslovak federation, unequivocally identifies with its statehood, while the Slovak party 
(the former minority) takes a somewhat ambiguous attitude. This is expressed, for instance, 
in the fact that 28 October, the Czechoslovak "Independence Day" is not a bank holiday in 
Slovakia, only a day of commemoration. 
Nevertheless, it seems obvious for every true professional and intellectual in Slovakia, 
that modern independent Slovak statehood is not very closely linked to the Great Moravian 
statehood of the 9th century, as far as everyday state practice, public mentality and the 
society's deep reflexes are concerned. Czechoslovak state traditions of the period between 
1918 and 1992, and in some aspects Hungarian state traditions before 1918 seem far more 
relevant. During the 18th and 19th centuries, however, Great Moravian statehood became 
firmly rooted in Slovak historical and political public consciousness, interwoven with 
nationalist feelings, as the forerunner and the archetype of real Slovak statehood. During 
World War II the independent Slovak state lived in the shadows of Nazi Germany, and 
collaborated with it intensively. In 1992 most of the political forces that operated 
democratically refused to accept this heritage, and those who supported the idea did not 
have the possibility to formulate it in the preamble to the constitution. 
The Polish Constitution was adopted in 1997 as the final point of a process that begun 
in 1989 and led to major changes in public law. A text of considerable length, the preamble 
to the Polish Constitution is the most commonly cited preamble in Europe. It is considered 
exemplary in several countries, especially by political forces that are predominantly 
conservative. This is largely due to the invocatio Dei, formulated subtly but rather explicitly 
by the Polish constitution maker. The Constitution represents both those who "believe in 
God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty as well as those not sharing such faith 
but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources". The constitutional 
7
 Halász, I.: A Cseh Köztársaság állami és nemzeti szimbólumai (State and National Symbols of 
the Czech Republic). In: Glatz, F. (ed.): Alla/ni és nemzeti jelképek az Európai Unióban (State and 
National Symbols in the European Union). Budapest, 2005, 57 -58 . 
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power to have recognized "their responsibility before God" or "their own consciences" 
while drawing up the Constitution. 
However, other elements of the Polish preamble have received less attention. For 
instance, bits and pieces of the tradition inherited from the former statehood are considered 
positive in the preamble. Two of them are emphasized, the First and the Second Republic,8 
while the period of the People's Republic of Poland is explicitly ignored.g The document 
mentions the enormous sacrifices and fights that lead to the achievement of independence, 
and it interprets 1989 as a sort of new beginning for the country ("having regard for the 
existence and future of our Homeland, which recovered, in 1989, the possibility of a 
sovereign and democratic determination of its fate "). Interestingly enough, Article 1 of the 
normative text declares that the present Polish Republic has a value for each and every 
citizen, and the preamble defines the republic explicitly as the Third Republic. 
We can draw the conclusion that the preambles to the constitutions of the Visegrád 
countries do not generally refrain from selecting bits and pieces from their historic heritage. 
They also tend to prefer certain traditions of their nations' history of statehood to others, or 
even let some of them fall into oblivion. However, this should not lead to the restriction of 
historical and other scientific research and evaluation. This is clearly expressed in the so 
called 'Prague Commentary' on the present Czech Constitution, written by the professors of 
the Faculty of Law at Charles University. The authors argue that 'The text of the Constitution 
cannot be legally required to evaluate history, as this would contradict people's natural right 
to free thought and research. Consciousness and belief concerning science and worldview 
do not belong to the competence of the state.10 Sometimes law-makers, in a burst of 
enthusiasm, fail to respect this and commemorate great figures-or even objects-of history 
in a law. This has happened recently to two Czechoslovak founding fathers and later 
presidents, Tomás G. Masaryk and Edvard Bcnes in the Czech Republic or to Andrej Hlinka, 
vicar and leader of the People's Party in Slovakia. From a certain aspect, the law on the 
Holy Crown of Hungary is an example of the same phenomenon. 
Another interesting point is what other historical, political or cultural symbols can be 
found in the preambles of Central Europe, as they are of communicative value. For example, 
at least two constitutions in the Visegrád region have introductions that implicitly or 
explicitly allude to Christian traditions. The Polish preamble finds the nation's cultural roots 
in Christian traditions and in universal human values. The preamble to the Slovak 
Constitution refers to the spiritual heritage of Cyril and Method, Slavic missionaries and 
saints, the cult of whom started to strengthen among Western Slavic-espccially Czech, 
Moravian and Slovak-believers of Central Europe from the 18th century. In the Slovakian 
social and cultural context this heritage carries an essentially Christian, Slavic and 
nationalistic message. The Czech preamble does not contain such direct references to 
Christian roots. The tradition of Saint Vaclav, linked closely to medieval Czech statehood, 
is not mentioned in the document at all. This is easy to understand, especially if we bear in 
mind that Czech society has one of the most secularised and laic self-perceptions in Europe. 
Thus, it is rather surprising that even without considering Christmas and Easter, three of the 
8
 The term "First Republic" refers to the old aristocratic Poland, which ceased to exist during 
the partitions at the end of the 18,h century. Polish public opinion usually considers the period between 
the two World Wars as the Second Republic. 
9
 Garlicki: op. cit. 42. 
10
 Pavlícek-Hrcbejk: op. cit. 46. 
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bank holidays have very strong Christian background: on 5 June they celebrate Cyril and 
Method, Slavic missionaries symbolizing the beginnings of Slavic literacy, while on 6 June 
the execution of Jan Hus, prcacher and religious reformer is commemorated. 28 September, 
already mentioned, has been serving as the "Independence Day" of the Czech nation since 
2000, although it is closely related to the cult of Saint Vaclav. These holidays all convey 
some other message as well, alternative and more profane, but it is undoubtedly true that 
the roots of these holidays are Christian saints or religious reformers." 
The fight for political independence and the struggle that led to the birth of the nation 
or state are referred to by the Polish preamble and the Slovak Constitution only, while the 
Czech and the Hungarian documents ignore the question. 1989, the daybreak of a new 
epoch, is mentioned in the Polish and in the Hungarian preambles. It is referred to as a 
peaceful shift that marks a new historical beginning. The introductions to the Czech, the 
Polish and the Slovak constitutions suggest that these states consider themselves the 
members of the big family of nations or mankind, and they respect the norms of coexistence 
that these communities have established. Of course, all of these documents reflect their era: 
an epoch which had a tendency to extend rights, and was open to universal human rights as 
well as to democratic values. This conveys important political and legal message, but less 
symbolic significance that is rooted in the nation's past and culture. 
11
 For more details see Halász: op. cit. 57-60. 
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The population living in the territory of the state is divided into citizens and aliens based on 
the legal fact of (non-)belonging to that state. Regarding belonging to the state, in a 
narrower sense those are considered citizens who participate in the exercise of state power, 
that is, who have political rights. In this sense, so far as the history of the development of 
Hungarian citizenship before 1848 is concerned, membership in the Holy Crown implied 
belonging to the "body of the state". 
Before expanding on the demarcation of the scope of "the population constituting the 
state" legally determined by the doctrine of the Holy Crown, we'll briefly outline the 
Hunnish-Hungarian theory of medieval Hungarian national consciousness as elaborated by 
Simon Kézai. As Jenő Szűcs proves in a convincing argument, apart from the cult of Attila 
fostered by the House of Árpád, Kézai "imported" every element of the Hunnish-Hungarian 
identity from Western Europe and he created the entire conceptual construct and theory 
independently. Accordingly, Kézai posited the idea of two "nations": one of them is the 
people with Hungarian language and culture sharing the belief in a common origin related 
to the category of "nationality", the other one is the nobility constituting the "politically 
organised society", which was both Hungarian and alien with respect to nationality. Simon 
Kézai interwove these two elements so that originally every Hun-Hungarian was included 
in the politically organised society, therefore, nationality and political society were linked 
up. Nevertheless, those who did not answer conscription commanded by the community 
were excluded from the political community and thrust into servitude, whereas, compliant 
"nobility" constituted the rightful part of the Hungarian nation, that is, the nobility was 
equivalent to the nation.1 This theory was adopted by the most important work of medieval 
Hungarian judicial practice, scilicet, Tripartitum by István Werbőczy, which makes the 
division of the society into nobles and servants legally relevant.2 
Thereby, who belonged to the Holy Crown, that is, who were classified legally as 
belonging to the scope of "politically organised people" in medieval Hungary? Within the 
"corporation" of the Holy Crown, the head of the corporation was the king, whereas, the 
estates constituted the members. The members of the Holy Crown encompassed the nobility 
* Ph.D., Section Secretary, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Section of Economic and Legal 
Studies, H-1053 Budapest, Nádor u. 7. 
E-mail : kisteleki.karoly@office.mta.hu 
1
 Szűcs, J.: A magyar nemzeti tudat kialakulása (The Evolution of Hungarian National 
Consciousness). Budapest, 1997,432. 
2
 Magyar Törvénytár (The Hungarian Statute Book). Tripartitum by István Werbőczy. Budapest, 
1897, 58 -59 (Arts 1-6, Title 3, Part I). During the critical analysis of the opinions of classic Hungarian 
legal scientists, Gábor Hamza stated regarding the legal relevance of the Tripartitum that it does not 
fall under the scope of acts, decrees or statutes, but it is definitely classified as customary law 
("consuetude"). See Hamza, G.: Werbőczy Hármaskönyvének jogforrási jellege (The Legal Source 
Character of Tripartitum by Werbőczy). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 48 (1993) 1, 33. 
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(the magnates, prelates and the lesser nobility), the burghers of free royal towns endowed 
with corporate nobility supplemented by the members of the Jász-Kun (Jazygian-Cumanian) 
districts and of the Hajdú (Heyduck) towns, whereas, villeins ranked as commonalty were 
not included in this scope? 
Before the legal regulation of Hungarian citizenship under a separate act in 1879, 
Hungarian national status had been acquired by birth, naturalisation and by so-called 
reception without a formal procedure. Regarding acquisition by birth or descent, it can be 
stated that Hungary was a country that followed the principle of ins sanguinis. Furthermore, 
the broader construction of nationality and the bonds of the subject also encompassed the 
patriots ("indigenas ")4 regarded as members of the Hungarian Holy Crown. According to 
their particular rights and duties, they were distinguished from aliens,5 that is, exclusively 
an indigena could be granted nobility, prelacy or could hold state office. 
Naturalisation appeared in Hungarian legislation for the first time under Statute 50 of 
1542 and the procedure of naturalisation was regulated by Statute 77 of 1550. Accordingly, 
naturalisation was effected in the form of "végzemény" (ruling) by the King and the Diet 
jointly, when the Diet was sitting. However, when the Diet was not sitting, the King was 
empowered to confer indigenatus, thereby, Hungarian nobility. However, in this case the 
naturalised person had to apply subsequently to the Diet for enactment. This was followed 
by the oath of the naturalised person, which had to be taken before the Diet or in case of 
the absence of the Diet, before the Chancellor. The text and location of the oath and the 
name of the oath-taker were placcd on record. Subsequently, the would-be-indigena had to 
pay naturalisation fee determined by law to the national money-chests.6 Then the naturalised 
person could take out the royal patent ("diploma indigenatus ") from the Royal Hungarian 
Chancellery. 
When assessing the enumerated procedural instruments, it can be stated that enactment, 
oath taking and the payment of the prescribed fee were considered to be conditions of the 
validity of naturalisation, whereas, letters patent were mere means of certifying indigenatus. 
The effect of the acquired "country membership" entailed that the person concerned enjoyed 
3
 According to Werbőczy (Title 4, Part II): "Who are regarded as people and who are regarded 
as commonalty? Here the name and designation of people refers exclusively to the prelates, barons, 
other magnates and other nobles, not to the non-nobles. [ . . . ] Just as genus differs from species, 
commonalty shall differ from the people. Namely, the designation of people encompasses all nobles 
ranging from magnates to lower ranks and even to the non-nobles, however, the designation of 
commonalty refers merely to the non-nobles". See Werbőczy: op cit. 230-231. 
4
 The designation is explained by Agoas Ekmayer: "The sheer designation of indigena in our 
country sometimes means a native Hungarian, other times a hosted Hungarian". Ekmayer, Á.: 
A honfiúság (indigenatus) Magyarországban [Patriotism (indigenatus) in Hungary]. Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 1867, 29. 
5
 Ibid. 32. 
6
 The extent of this for laymen was 1,000 lions (Act 26 of 1688), later 2,000 lions (Act 41 of 
1741, Act 69 of 1790-91), for clergymen it cost 1,000 lions in case of a larger benefice (Act 17 of 
1741) or 200 lions in case of a smaller benefice (Act 70 of 1790). According to Act 37 of 1827, the 
naturalisation fee always had to be paid in lions and according to Act 17 of 1830, before payment, the 
future indigenatus could not be enacted. Ekmayer: op. cit. 39. 
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all r ights emanat ing f rom Hungar ian nobility and if the person h a d been a peer in his former 
country, he automatical ly b e c a m e a member of the Table of M a g n a t e s in Hungary, as well.7 
In the other case of the acquisi t ion of Hungar i an nationality, the alien b e c a m e merely 
a patr iot (indigena), but was not granted nobility ("indigenatus successivus"). This is 
called reception without formal procedure ("tacita receptio"), which ensued o w i n g to 
pe rmanen t set t lement in Hungary , long-last ing residence, b e c o m i n g enlisted a s resident 
and tax payer of a town or a chartered c o m m u n i t y and owing to holding public o f f i ce . 8 The 
acquisition of civic rights in a town was genera l ly not r egu la ted under con tempora ry 
Hungar ian statutes. Exclus ively municipal s ta tutes contained re levant regula t ions , which 
required the peti t ioner to cer t i fy his legal birth, his record, " g o o d morals", in addi t ion , in 
some p laces even marr iage was specified as a prerequisi te (e .g. Kassa, Kolozsvár , 1537), 
in o ther places, member sh ip of a guild or the possession o f real ty was n e c e s s a r y (e.g. 
Kolozsvár , Fiume, Kassa 1607).9 The town counci l could r ecogn i se aliens a s burghers, 
who, hav ing met the prev ious requirements w e r e obligated to p a y so-called bu rghe r -money 
and take an oath.1 0 
In case of aliens with a villein status, it suff iced if the lord of the land permi t ted the 
villein to settle down in the villein communi ty ei ther in words o r in writing. Th i s amounted 
to the tacita receptio of Hungar ian nationality, which as a mat te r of course en ta i l ed rights 
der iving f rom s e r f h o o d . " 
7
 The latter right became so narrowly circumscribed under Acts 49, 50, 51 of 1840 that 
naturalisation was linked up with membership in the Table of Magnates exclusively if the Diet had 
specifically conferred sitting and voting rights on the person. 
8
 Ekmayer: op. cit. 40. 
9
 Csizmadia, A.: A magyar állampolgársági jog fejlődése (The Development of Hungarian 
Citizenship Law). AI lam és Igazgatás, (1969) 12, 1078. 
10
 Ibid. 1077-1078. 
11
 At the time of the resettlement of desolate lands abandoned during the wars against the 
Ottomans, this process was intensified by a spontaneous internal migration and immigration on the 
one hand, and a deliberate governmental colonisation on the other hand. Recent research estimates 
that the population of Hungary at the beginning of the 18th century totalled at 4-4.5 million. At that 
time, the density of the population was 18.4 person/square kilometre in the territory of the former 
royal Hungary, 18.6 person/square kilometre in Transylvania, whereas, 8.4 person/square kilometre in 
the territory under the former Ottoman rule. Owing to the internal and external migration and to the 
colonisation organised by Hungarian landowners and government substantiated by Act 103 of 1723 
promising exemption from tax for 15 years for immigrant craftsmen and for 6 years for ploughmen, at 
the end of the century, the census of 1785 ordered by Joseph II with the correction of 1787 established 
a population of 8.5 millions in the country. However, recent research with respect to some corrections 
estimates that the number of the population was 9.9 million by 1790. On the basis of the estimates 
regarding the ethnic composition of that population, it can be stated that Hungarians, who had 
composed 80-90% of the population of the country before the Ottoman rule, became a minority in 
their own homeland. At the beginning of the 18th century, the proportion of Hungarians was 50-55%, 
which decreased to about 42% by 1790. At the same time, the proportions of other nationalities were 
as follows: 16% for Romanians, 10-10% for Germans and Slovaks, 9.5% for Croats, 7% for Serbs, 
3.5% for Ruthenes and 2% for other ethnic groups. See Barta, J. Jr.: A tizennyolcadik század története. 
Magyar századok-sorozat (The History of the 18th Century. Hungarian Centuries Series). Budapest, 
2000, 153—159; Kosáry, D.: Újjáépítés és polgárosodás 1711-1867. Magyarok Európában III. 
(Reconstruction and Bourgeoisification 1711-1867. Hungarians in Europe). Budapest, 1990, 55-59. 
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The French "Declaration of Rights of the Man and the Citizen" of 1789 highlighted 
the issue of civil equality before the law and indirectly even the claim to the establishment 
of a uniform citizenship status. This idea was embraced by the Hungarian Jacobins, whose 
prominent figure, Joseph Hajnóczy framed a constitutional draft during the Diet of 1790-91 
and it dealt with the issue of Hungarian nationality.12 However, the draft of 1791 was not 
debated at that time, therefore, the demand for the legal regulation of citizenship was 
formulated again in the Reform Era. This era was the age when nations acquired self-
consciousness, which implied the fundamental need for the definition of citizenship. In 
France it was the Code Civil, in the territories of the Habsburg Empire, it was the Austrian 
Civil Code that regulated the conditions of the acquisition and loss of citizenship. In these 
states, citizenship was a matter of civil law. In Hungary, however, the issue was dealt with 
within the confines of public law and this persisted as a basic characteristic of the Hungarian 
regulation. The related draft laws were submitted to two sessions of the Diet in 1843^14 
and 1847-48, but they were not adopted. 
Following the 1848^19 Revolution and War of Independence, after 1853 the relevant 
citizenship clauses of personal law under the Austrian Civil Code became operative in 
Hungary.13 According to the naturalisation practice pursuant to the respective legal 
regulations,14 the Minister of the Interior issued the letter of naturalisation for the petitioner, 
who had taken an oath, if the petitioner had certified that lie was not a subject of another 
state and that he had had residence in Hungary for 5 years, had paid tax regularly and there 
was no objection against him in terms of morals, wealth and politics. 
Finally, it was in 1879 that Hungarian legislature considered the issue of citizenship 
ripe for a definitive regulation. The debate of the draft law in the Lower House took merely 
one month, then the bill submitted to and adopted by the Table of Magnates was sanctioned 
by Francis Joseph on 20 December 1879. 
The first Supplementary Law of Hungary on Citizenship enacted as Act 50 of 1879 
entered into force on 5 January 1880. The act admitted five manners of the acquisition of 
citizenship: descent, legitimation, marriage, naturalisation and residence in the country.'5 
Accordingly, every person of legal birth, whose father was a Hungarian citizen, 
furthermore, even the illegitimate child of a Hungarian female citizen disregarding whether 
the place of birth was or wasn't Hungary could acquire citizenship by descent. 
The title of acquisition was legitimation, if the child was illegitimate and his mother 
was non-Hungarian, but his father was a Hungarian citizen. 
12
 Csizmadia, A.: Hajnóczy József közjogi munkái (The Works of József Hajnóczy on Public 
Law). Budapest, 1958, 71-72. 
13
 Haller, К.: Az Osztrák Altalános Polgári Törvénykönyv jelenleg még érvényes alakjában (The 
Austrian General Civil Code in Its Effective Form). Budapest, 1897, 23-24.; Eöttevényi Nagy, O.: 
Osztrák közjog (Austrian Public Law). Budapest, 1913, 46—47. 
14
 These include Act 42 of 1870 and Act 36 of 1872. 
15
 According to some views, the titles of the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship also included 
regainment and acquisition under established customary law (tacitly). Berényi, S.-Tarján, N.: 
A magyar állampolgárság megszerzése és elvesztése (honosság, letelepülés, kivándorlás, útlevélügy). 
Az 1879. évi 5. törvény-czikk és az ezzel kapcsolatos törvények s rendeletek gyűjteménye és 
magyarázata [Acquisition and Forfeiture of Hungarian Citizenship (National Status, Settlement, 
Emigration and Free Pass Issues). Act 50 of 1879 and the Digest and Reasoning of Related Acts and 
Decrees]. Budapest, 1905, 23. 
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An alien woman, who got married to a Hungarian citizen entered the bonds of the 
Hungarian state by virtue of the bonds of marriage. 
Two types of naturalisation were distinguished: ordinary and extraordinary 
naturalisation. Ordinary naturalisation could commence exclusively by petition and the 
competent authority was either the Minister of the Interior or the Governor of Croatia. The 
conditions were as follows: the petitioner had to be entitled to petition, his admission to a 
native community had to be anticipated,16 continual residence in the country and being 
enlisted as a tax-payer for 5 years, capacity for supporting his family and himself and 
correct conduct. However, the political rights of such a naturalised person were limited, 
because he was eligible to the Lower House only after 10 years and could be granted 
membership in the Table of Magnates only by the legislature and he could not be a Keeper 
of the Crown. In contrast, the person naturalised by a royal charter as an award for 
extraordinary merits was immediately eligible to the Lower House. 
Residence in the country resulted in the recognition of citizenship, if the person had 
been living in Hungary and had been enlisted as a tax-payer of a Hungarian community for 
at least 5 years before 8 January 1880. 
The ways of termination and forfeiture of citizenship included legitimation, marriage, 
absence from the country, release and administrative decision. The citizenship of an 
illegitimate child (with a Hungarian mother) was terminated by legitimation, if he had been 
legitimated under the law of the country of the alien father and subsequently he did not live 
in Hungary. If a Hungarian woman got married to an alien man, she forfeited citizenship via 
marriage. Hungarian citizenship was also forfeited under the absence clause, if a person 
had resided continuously beyond the borders of the Hungarian state for 10 years in void of 
the mandate of Hungarian Government or the Austro-Hungarian joint ministers. The 
forfeiture pertained to the wife and minor children of the absent man, as well. A petitioner 
could be released from the bonds of the state pursuant to a procedure initiated upon petition 
on condition that he had complied with compulsory military service. Furthermore, the 
person had to certify that he had the capacity of disposition or that his father or guardian 
had assented to his release via the permission of the court of guardians, that he did not have 
accrued rates and taxes and there was no ongoing criminal action or effective sentence 
against him in Hungary. In case all these requirements were met, the Minister of the Interior 
authorised to issue the releasing document could not deny the fulfilment of the petition, so 
the released person forfeited Hungarian citizenship. The forfeiture affected the wife and 
minors of the released person. 
The act also regulated the possibility of re-naturalisation in case the forfeiture of 
citizenship was caused by absence or release. Such a person could be re-naturalised even 
without residence in the country, if he applied for Hungarian citizenship after his return and 
he could regain it without the examination of other conditions. 
In the interest of the settlement of Bucovinian Székelys and Csángós and the increase 
of the proportion of ethnic Hungarians in the multinational country, Act 4 of 1886 on the 
16
 This condition was set forth under an effective act, i.e. Act 18 of 1871, the first act on 
communities. Art. 6 of which stipulated that "each Hungarian citizen has to belong to the bonds of a 
community". 
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Naturalisation of Re-Settlers En Masse17 stipulated that re-settlcrs en masse could acquire 
Hungarian citizenship free of charge pursuant to the regulations of re-naturalisation and via 
the establishment of their community residency ex officio.18 
If a Hungarian citizen entered the service of another country without the permission of 
the competent authority (Minister of the Interior, the Governor of Croatia and Slovenia, the 
Authority of the Military Frontiers) and did not quit such service against the order of the 
authority within the specified period, his citizenship was forfeited according to the 
administrative decision of the competent authority by virtue of Act 50 of 1879. 
Besides the legal consequences of the acquisition and forfeiture of citizenship, the act 
declared the recognition of dual (or multiple) citizenship. Last but not least, it contained 
legal technical regulations regarding the conduct of the procedures related to citizenship. 
The essential provisions of the statute remained in force until 1948, that is, almost for seven 
decades. 
Due to the amendments of the 20th century, essential changes were effected in our first 
supplementary law on citizenship due to various aspects of political tendentiousness. Owing 
to such an intention, discrimination clauses affecting the opponents of the timely political 
system were incorporated into the regulations, whereas, partly to counteract this, the claim 
for indemnity was also introduced into citizenship law. 
The discriminative regulations were connected to the forfeiture of citizenship. Among 
these we should emphasise deprivation, which was clearly a political-regime-spccific 
invention. Firstly, we have to mention Act 4 of 1939 on the Limitation of the Economic 
Expansion of Jewry usually quoted as the second anti-Jewish act in Hungarian legal history. 
Here the limitations introduced against Jewry were definitely based on race)4 Article 3 of 
this act prescribed on the one hand that Jews could not acquire Hungarian citizenship by 
naturalisation, marriage or legitimation, on the other hand, it stipulates measures in order to 
repeal the valid citizenship of Jewish persons, which was practically equivalent to 
deprivation. Act 13 of 1939 already applies the term of deprivation formally, as well. The 
prescriptions of Article 8 unequivocally demonstrate the legislative power of political 
judgement, namely, the political regime in power targeted the regulations pertaining to 
deprivation chiefly at communists and persons involved in the labour movement declared to 
be its primal enemies. We have to put special emphasis on the section which deprives of 
citizenship the individual who leaves for abroad via the violation or evasion of the law 
pertaining to abandonment of the territory of the country, which constitutes the legal case of 
the infamous defection, which proved to be the most viable reason for deprivation. 
17
 According to Ferenc Ferenczy, Act 4 of 1886 introduced the institution of "re-reception" for 
rc-settlers en masse. Ferenczy, F.: Magyar állampolgársági jog (Hungarian Citizenship Law). Gyoma, 
1928, 58. 
18
 Tarczay, A.: A magyar állampolgárság viszonya a magyar nemzetiséghez és a lakóhelyhez-a 
jogtörténetben és jelenleg (The Relation of Hungarian Citizenship to Hungarian Nationality and 
Residence-in Legal History and at Present), http://www.kettosallampolgarsag.mtaki.hu/tanulmanyok/ 
tan_30.html 
19
 The first anti-Jewish act was Act 15 of 1938, which on the basis of religion limited the number 
of Israelites among the employees to 20 in the areas of business and trade and in the chambers of 
journalists, engineers and doctors. According to estimates, about 15,000 people lost their jobs pursuant 
to the act. Romsics, I.: Magyarország története a XX. században (Hungarian History in the 20,h 
Century). Budapest, 2000, 194-195. 
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This is proven later by the so-called popular democratic acts, which were incl ined to 
apply this provision and thereby demonstra ted that there was no insuperable difference 
among the legal technical solutions of various political systems, since they were equally 
useful for various governments in power. 
Afte r World War II, the statutes regulating the legal institution o f cit izenship pro l i fe ra ted 
and besides three new supplementary laws, these were exclusively discr iminat ive or 
indemnificatory. 
The scope of discriminative statutes pr imari ly encompasses decrees that expatriated 
ethnic Germans and deprived them of Hungarian citizenship,20 as wel l as those acts o f 1947 
and 1948 wh ich confirmed s t rengthening political discrimination, wh ich were adop ted to 
deprive certain individuals residing abroad of their Hungarian cit izenship.2 1 
Act 15 o f 1946 on the Exchange of the Popula t ion between Hungary and Czechos lovak ia 
qualifies as a discriminat ive act on cit izenship because of the relocat ion of ethnic g roups . 
According to the agreement , every Slovak and Bohemian person wi th permanent r e s idence 
in Hungary w h o declared the intention of relocat ion shall be re located and on the d a y of 
relocation the person shall forfe i t Hungarian ci t izenship and shall become a Czechoslovak 
citizen on the basis of the fact of relocation. In a similar manner, e thnic Hungarians with 
permanent res idence in Czechos lovakia were relocated to Hungary in the same number as 
Slovaks and Bohemians were relocated f rom Hungary to Czechos lovakia . They lost their 
Czechoslovak citizenship under Decree 33 of 1945 of the Czechos lovak President.2 2 Apar t 
20
 Statute 9.550 M.E. of 1945 on the Repeal of the Naturalisation and Re-naturalisation of 
German Citizens; Statute 12.330 M.E. of 1945 on the Relocation of the German Population from 
Hungary to Germany. Nevertheless, the issue of the citizenship of expatriated ethnic Germans was 
open to discussion until 16 July 1946, when Statute 7.970/1946 M.E. was issued. Accordingly, 
Hungarian citizens relocated to Germany lost their Hungarian citizenship on the day they left Hungary. 
This also affected people who had been relocated to Germany before the statute came into force. 
21
 Under Act 10 of 1947 Government could deprive anybody of Hungarian citizenship who was 
staying abroad and an investigation was ongoing against him because of a crime defined under Act 7 
of 1946 on the Criminal Legal Protection of the Democratic Political System and the Republic, if he 
failed to return to the territory of Hungary upon the call of Government within 30 days (within 60 
days in case of residing beyond Europe) as of notification and failed to appear before Hungarian 
authorities. Under Act 26 of 1948 Government could deprive anybody of Hungarian citizenship who 
failed to return to the territory of Hungary upon the call of Government within 30 days from the 
publication of the call in the Hungarian Bulletin (within 60 days in case of residing beyond Europe) 
and failed to appear before Hungarian authorities. In this case, the law-maker ignored any reference 
to the facts of the case of conduct, thereby, the scope of discretion of the authority completely 
dissolved. The deprivation of citizenship came into force via the failure to return upon a cad with 
whatever content. The part of the statute on confiscation manifests the further extension of negative 
discrimination. The property of the person whose Hungarian citizenship had been repealed after 22 
December 1944 (under Article 8 of Act 12 of 1939 or Article 9 of Act 14 of 1939 or Act 10 of 1947) 
had to be confiscated. If the effect of the deprivation pertained to the wife and children of the deprived 
person, their property had to be confiscated, as well. 
22
 Under this decree, people who had acquired German and Hungarian citizenship by virtue of 
the Treaty of Munich and the Vienna Awards were not granted Czechoslovakian citizenship, although 
these treaties had been meanwhile annulled, therefore, these persons became stateless. On the basis of 
unequivocal ethnic discrimination, the decree did not grant Czechoslovakian citizenship to ethnic 
Germans and Hungarians not concerned by the Treaty of Munich and the Vienna Awards, but living in 
former Czechoslovakian territories, either. Then the Czechoslovakian Government redressed the 
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form these people, Czechoslovakia was also entitled to expatriate Hungarians accused of 
war crimes.23 The Hungarian Government confined itself in an agreement to admit these 
relocated people and to recognise them as Hungarian citizens on the basis of the fact of 
relocation ,24 
These antecedents led to the re-codification of citizenship law, consequently, Act 60 of 
1948 as comprehensive supplementary law regulated the issue. To expand on the 
discriminative rules of the act, we state that citizenship could be forfeited by marriage, 
legitimation, acknowledgement or ascertainment of paternity, release or deprivation. 
Pursuant to this act, the institution of forfeiture by reason of absence from the country or 
foreign nationality was ultimately terminated. The act affirmed the force of the provisions 
of Act 26 of 1948 regarding confiscation. On the whole, it can be stated that Act of 60 of 
1948, scilicet, the second Hungarian act on citizenship stabilized the discriminative 
regulation. 
Under Act 5 of 1957, our third uniform act on citizenship, the scope of 
discriminative regulations was narrowed in comparison with the former acts. Hungarian 
citizenship could be forfeited on grounds of two titles: release upon petition and deprivation. 
According to the new regulation, deprivation concerned the person who was staying abroad 
and seriously breached the fidelity of citizens,25 or who was validly convicted by a Hungarian 
or foreign court by reason of a serious crime. The effect of deprivation did not automatically 
pertain to the spouse and children, only if they were also staying abroad and the decision on 
forfeiture specially ordered it. Concerning the issue of deprivation, instead of Government, 
the Presidential Council of the Democratic People's Republic (NET) was authorised to 
make the decision, whereas, confiscation was not bindingly prescribed by law, but it was 
subject to the discretion of the NET. 
consequences of the disfranchising decree under Act 245 of 25 October 1948, which restored the 
Czechoslovakian citizenship of ethnic Hungarians on the day of taking an oath of citizenship. See 
Sutaj, S.: A magyar kisebbség Csehszlovákia világháború utáni politikájában (The Hungarian Minority 
in the Post-World-War Politics of Czechoslovakia). In: Popély, A.-Sutaj, S.-Szarka, L.: Benes-
dekrétumok és a magyar kérdés 1945-1948. Történeti háttér, dokumentumok, jogszabályok (The 
Benes-Decrees and the Hungarian Issue 1945-1948. Historical Background, Documents and Statutes). 
Máriabesnyö-Gödöllő, 2007, 4 2 ^ 3 . 
23
 The exchange of the population took place from April 1947 to the summer of 1949. Meanwhile, 
the Hungarian Government made enormous efforts related to the implementation of the agreement, 
which was disadvantageous from a Hungarian viewpoint, to enforce the parity of persons and property 
and to prevent the Czechoslovaks from exploiting the exchange of the population in the interest of the 
complete liquidation of Hungarians in Slovakia. Despite constant Hungarian protests, the enforcement 
of equal rates failed: 76,616 relocated Slovakian Hungarians left behind 16,000 acres and 15,700 
houses in Slovakia, whereas, 60,257 relocated Slovaks left behind only 15,000 acres and 4,400 houses 
in Hungary. Sutaj: op. cit. 26. 
24
 László Szarka draws attention to the fact that the agreement extraordinarily disadvantaged 
Hungary, because it authorized the Czechoslovak state to enlist Slovaks in Hungary and gave plenty 
of rope for the appointment of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia as subjects of the exchange of 
population. Szarka, L.: A csehszlovákiai magyar kisebbség felszámolását célzó dekrétumok és 
rendeletek (Decrees and Ordinances Targeting the Liquidation of the Hungarian Minority in 
Czechoslovakia). In: Popély-Sutaj-Szarka: Benes-dekrétumok... op. cit. 23. 
25
 The act came into force on 1 October, 1957 and as a matter of course it concerned the people 
who had fled from the country by reason of the consequences of the suppression of the Revolution of 
1956. 
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The regulations concerning indemnification were introduced under Act 33 of 1921, 
which ratified the Trianon Peace Treaty26 in Hungarian legislation. Indemnification was 
regulated under Art. 63 by the institution of "option". Accordingly, persons over the age of 
18 forfeiting their Hungarian citizenship and acquiring new citizenship under Article 61 
shall be entitled to opt for Hungarian citizenship within a period of one year as of coming 
into force of the treaty (from 26 July 1921 to 26 July 1922), if their residency had formerly 
been in the territory of Hungary, if an individual failed to opt within the specified year, the 
acquisition of Hungarian citizenship was feasible by re-naturalisation because of the term 
of preclusion.21 If the person had forfeited citizenship due to other factors, he could regain 
Hungarian citizenship by naturalisation following 26 July 1922. 
The right of option stipulated by the act enacting the Trianon Peace Treaty could not 
settle the issue ultimately. The term of one-year specified for option was too short to 
administer the cases in such a large volume and the procedure of re-naturalisation as 
regulated under Act 50 of 1879 resulted in unfair and protracted procedures. 
All these factors urged the Hungarian legislature to pass Act 17 of 1922 as an 
instrument of indemnification. Under Article 24, the act permitted the re-acquisition of 
Hungarian citizenship terminated by the Trianon Peace Treaty via preferential procedures. 
According to the act, the person who had forfeited Hungarian citizenship without release or 
an administrative decision after the outbreak of the World War I (26 July, 1914) and was 
living or intending to settle down in Hungary could be exceptionally re-naturalised at 
request by the Minister of the Interior in default of the requirements specified under Article 
38 of Act 50 of 1879 (on re-naturalisation), if the petitioner had reached the age of 18. was 
not incapable of action and if re-naturalisation was justified by circumstances worthy of 
appreciation. Taking advantage of the option under the provision of 1922, about 350,000 
ethnie Hungarians moved to Hungary, even though it was not easy to obtain permission to 
immigrate because Hungary was not prepared to handle immigration of such scale. 
However, the weakest point of the indemnification regulation was related to community 
residency, which wasn't originally linked up with citizenship, but with community self-
government. This is what community residency developed from, which was incorporated in 
domestic law under Act 13 of 1871, which established relationship between individuals and 
their communities on the basis of public law. According to Article 6, each citizen had to 
26
 The Trianon Peace Treaty binding Hungary was signed in the Great Trianon Palace of 
Versailles on 4 June 1920. Consequently, the territory of Hungary decreased from 283,000 square 
kilometres to 93,000 square kilometres and the population decreased from 18.2 million to 7.6 million. 
According to the data of the census of 1910, 3,320,058 native Hungarians resided beyond the borders 
of Hungary, within this scope, 1,664,000 native Hungarians resided in Romania, 1,072,000 in 
Czechoslovakia and 465,000 in the Serb-Croat-Slovenian Kingdom. Szarka, L.: Magyarország és a 
magyar kisebbségek ügye a párizsi béketárgyalásokon: határkijelölés, népszavazás, kisebbségvédelem 
(Hungary and the Issue of Hungarian Minorities at the Paris Peace Talks: Demarcation of Borders, 
Referendum and Minority Protection). In: Bárdi, N.-Fedinec, Cs.-Szarka, L. (eds): Kisebbségi magyar 
közösségek a 20. században (Hungarian Minority Communities in the 20th Century). Budapest, 
2008, 27. 
27
 The original requirements of re-naturalisation were: disposing capacity, belonging to a 
Hungarian community, continual residence in the country for 5 years, proof of proper housing and 
living circumstances, continual payment of taxes for 5 years, correct conduct. Obviously, these 
requirements could not be met by a person who had lost Hungarian citizenship under the changed 
circumstances, therefore, Act 17 of 1922 granted exemption from these conditions. 
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belong to the bond of a community, whereas, Act 50 of 1879 stipulated that individuals to 
be naturalised had to belong to the bond of a community or admission to a community had 
to be anticipated. Thereby, exclusively Hungarian citizens could gain community residency 
and each Hungarian citizen had to belong to the bond of a community. 
In practice, however, deadlocks occurred in several cases. Namely, a lot of communities 
recognised exclusively the residency of Hungarian citizens and issued certificates on 
residency merely for them. Therefore, the petitioner could not request naturalisation, since 
he could not certify his community residency, for which in turn he could not apply, because 
he was not a Hungarian citizen.28 
Subsequently to the Trianon Peace Treaty, the Minister of the Interior became the only 
legal authority that could make final decisions on community residencies via the exclusion 
of recourse. However, this provision could not solve the problems entailed by the new 
situation related community residency, either. 
In legal technical literature the opinion that community residency should be replaced 
by permanent or temporary residence gained ground.29 Thus, Hungarian legislation adopted 
according measures upon the settlement of the citizenship of persons living in the territories 
re-annexed pursuant to the Vienna Awards ( 1938-1940).30 
Act 6 of 1939 stipulated in connection with the re-annexed territories of Upper Hungary 
and Sub-Carpathia that those who were undoubtedly Hungarian citizens on 26 July 1921 
according to Hungarian law effective at that time and became Czechoslovak citizens under 
the Trianon Treaty regained Hungarian citizenship legally without an administrative decision 
as of 15 March 1939, if their domiciles had been in the re-annexed territories of Upper 
Hungary and Sub-Carpathia since 15 March 1929. Therefore, the legal basis of the 
reacquisition of citizenship was no longer community residency, which had caused 
confusions, but the domicile. While the quoted act prescribed a period of 10 years for the 
recognition of the existence of the domicile, this restriction was no longer contained under 
Act 26 of 1940 on the Unification of Re-Annexed Eastern and Transylvanian Territories 
with Hungary pursuant to the Second Vienna Award (30 August 1940). Accordingly, 
Romanian citizens who had domiciles in the above-mentioned territories on 30 August 1940 
acquired Hungarian citizenship without administrative measures. Ethnic Hungarians with 
Romanian citizenship who had domiciles in the territory of Romania subsequently had the 
28
 Besnyő, К.-Horváth, J.: A magyar állampolgárság megszerzése és elvesztése. Gyakorlati 
útmutató az állampolgársági ügyek intézéséhez (The Acquisition and Forfeiture of Hungarian 
Citizenship. A Practical Guide to the Administration of Matters of Citizenship). Budapest, 1985, 
33-34. 
29
 See, for instance, Kuthi, S.: Magyar állampolgárság (Hungarian Citizenship). Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 64 (1929) 24, 239-240; Rácz, К.: Az állampolgárság kérdéséhez (On the Issue of 
Citizenship). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 65 (1930) 14, 131-132. 
30
 As a consequence of the first Vienna Award (2 November 1938), Hungary regained some 
parts of its former territory in Upper Hungary. The treaty was ratified under Act 34 of 1938 in 
Hungarian legislation. The act referred the issues of citizenship and option to a joint committee 
composed of Hungarians and Czechoslovaks. On the basis of its work, Hungary acquired Sub-
Carpathia from former Czechoslovakia by reason of the German invasion in March 1939. Issues of 
citizenship related to the two territories were jointly regulated under Act 6 of 1939, which came into 
force on 23 June 1939. 
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right to opt for Hungarian citizenship.11 Act 20 of 1941 enacting the re-annexation of 
territories acquired from the Yugoslav Kingdom settled the issue in a similar manner. 
However, as a consequence of our part played in World War II, these re-annexed 
territories were lost again and the acts settling the issues of citizenship were annulled, 
therefore, the legal status of a great number of people became questionable. 
The citizenship problems originating in the Trianon Peace Treaty were generally 
regulated by the second citizenship act, scilicet, Act 60 of 1948. This conferred citizenship 
on those individuals including their spouses and descendants who remained Hungarian 
citizens upon the entry into effect of the Trianon Peace Treaty (26 July 1921) or took 
opportunity/exercised the right of option pursuant to the treaty. Furthermore, the act offered 
another possibility, that of preferential naturalisation. That could be requested from the 
Minister of the Interior by any person born within the borders of historical Hungary, whose 
domicile was in Hungary on 15 September 1947,32 who was staying here at the time of the 
submission of the petition for naturalisation, besides, the naturalisation was justified by 
circumstances worthy of appreciation. 
Act 6! of 1948 cancelled community residency and stipulated accordingly that if any 
law referred to community residency, it should be understood as domicile in case of 
Hungarian citizens living in Hungary and as last residence in Hungary in case of persons 
living abroad. 
A further scope of indemnificatory regulations consists of statutes which annulled the 
detrimental legal consequences of deprivation. Such indemnification was applied for the 
first time by the Socialist Government in connection with the persons discriminated against 
for opposing the Horthy-regime.33 
Owing to the political transformation in 1989-1990 the people who had been deprived 
of Hungarian citizenship under the Communist Regime after 1945 were restituted in 
compliance with the intention to guarantee indemnification.34 
Act 55 of 1993 is our fourth citizenship law, which regulates special citizenship 
procedures already in detail and lays down the basic rules concerning data protection and 
31
 The people who acquired Hungarian citizenship in the territories re-annexed pursuant to the 
Vienna Award, however, intended to become Romanian citizens, could acquire this by option within a 
six-month term. They had to leave the Hungarian territory within one year and Romania was obliged 
to admit them. 
32
 The date of entry into effect of the Paris Peace Treaty. 
33
 Ordinance 285 M.E. of 1945 regulated the restitution of the convicted or disadvantaged by 
reason of leftist political conviction and activity, but it was pursuant to Ordinance 9.590 M.E. of 1945 
promulgated eight months later that redressed prejudices in a more precise and ampler manner. 
Regarding the same people, the mentioned regulation was put into force under Act 60 of 1948 with a 
temporal limitation, that is, the restoration of the legal effect of citizenship pertained to people who 
returned to Hungary before 15 September 1948. Finally, Ordinance 200 M.E. of 1945 promulgated on 
6 February 1945 annulled the anti-Jewish acts and decrees. 
34
 Act 27 of 1990 annulled every particular decision on deprivation made under Act 10 of 1947, 
Act 60 of 1948, Act 26 of 1948 and Act 5 of 1957. The appointed persons re-acquired their Hungarian 
citizenship via a statement addressed to the President of the Hungarian Republic as of the date of 
making the statement. Act 32 of 1990 completed the provisions of the previous act by declaring that 
the people deceased meanwhile had to be regarded as if they had not lost their Hungarian citizenship 
as a consequence of forfeiting measures. In a similar manner, our fourth act on citizenship. Act 55 of 
1993 among its closing provisions extends the repeal of the particular decisions on deprivation to 
release effected between 15 September 1947 and 2 May 1990. 
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the protection of privacy. This act provides among the fundamental principles (para. 2 of 
Art. 1 ) that nobody can be deprived arbitrarily of their citizenship and of the right to the 
change of citizenship. With this significant statement the law-maker hopefully put an end to 
the tendency encompassing the legislature of the 20th century, in the spirit of which the legal 
institution of citizenship was applied for the purposes of political discrimination and in tum 
inevitable indemnification. In compliance with international practice, this act already 
contains the basic principles of citizenship law, which up to this point had been missing 
from Hungarian law. Our fourth citizenship law was first amended by Act 32 of 2001, then 
by Act 56 of 2003. 
In connection with Hungarian citizenship law, we believe it is important to expand on 
the concept of the Hungarian nation from the perspective of the state, furthermore, from the 
viewpoint of the political and cultural concepts of the nation. The nobility/aristocrats of the 
Hungarian Reform Era in the 19"' century defined the Hungarian people on the one hand as 
a cultured nation in contrast with the Habsburg, on the other hand as a political or nation 
state as opposed to the various ethnic groups in Hungary.35 As a consequence of the Trianon 
Peace Treaty, the Hungarian nation state was bom, but one-third of the cultured nation was 
excluded from this framework. After 1949 the state of "Proletarian Dictatorship" did not 
solve the problems originating in these two conceptions and in the spirit of internationalism, 
"nation" as an issue became taboo for a long time.36 
In the recuperation of the cultural concept of the Hungarian nation, the unassimilatcd 
nature of the massive shock caused by the Trianon Peace Treaty between 1945-1989 plays 
the main part and in the protracted polemics this concept mingles with the political concept 
of the nation, which is reflected in the statutes. Upon examining the Hungarian Constitution, 
we can state that basically the categories of the political nation are specified, whereas, the 
cultural concept of the nation is applied mainly in a complimentary manner both in the 
Constitution and in Hungarian public law, implying that the Hungarian state supports the 
individuals belonging to the cultural nation by helping with naturalisation and offering them 
support and advantages.37 
In the effective act on citizenship (Act 55 of 1993), the elements of the cultural 
conception of the nation arc relevant. The law-maker facilitated preferential naturalisation, 
meaning that if other requirements are met, continual residence for 8 years is not necessary, 
merely one-year continual residence is required, if the petitioner is a non-Hungarian citizen, 
but claims him/herself to be of Hungarian nationality and had an ascendant with Hungarian 
citizenship. These are not disjunctive, but conjunctive requirements. Therefore, for 
preferential naturalisation claiming oneself to be Hungarian shall not suffice officially, but 
one has to have a Hungarian citizen among one's ascendants. On the other hand, the 
conjunctive conditions are valid reversely, as well. Preferential naturalisation can be 
requested by the descendant of a former Hungarian citizen, who claims her/himself to be 
Hungarian. Thus, under the act on citizenship the cultural and linguistic conception of the 
nation has been reinforced after 1993.38 
35
 Szűcs: op. cit. 430-431. 
36
 Halász, I.: Állampolgárság, migráció és integráció (Citizenship, Migration and Integration). 
Budapest, 2009, 124. 
37
 Majtényi, В.: A nemzetállam új ruhája (The New Garment of the Nation State). Budapest, 
2007, 52. 
38
 Halász: op. cit. 121. 
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The latest amendment to Hungarian citizenship law was effected in May 2010 basically 
in the spirit of the cultural conception of the nation. First and foremost, the act sets forth 
that the child of a Hungarian citizen shall gain Hungarian citizenship not only by birth, but 
also by descent. After 1 January 2011, a non-Hungarian citizen can be naturalised 
preferentially, if one ascendant was a Hungarian citizen or her/his Hungarian origin is 
plausible and if s/he certifies the knowledge of Hungarian language, clean record and that 
this naturalisation shall not infringe either the public or national safety of Hungary. These 
procedures shall commence at individual requests, not collectively or automatically. 
Applications shall be submitted to the local registry or the Hungarian consulate, or to the 
authority in charge of the administration of citizenship procedures appointed by the 
Hungarian Government. 
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Transhitio imperii-T h о u gh ts on Continuity of Empires 
in European Political Traditions 
I. T h e myth of w o r l d epochs in A n t i q u e 
T h e symbolic d e s c r i p t i o n of the l a r g e epochs o f t h e wor ld f o l l o w i n g each o the r a p p e a r s 
f i r s t , in European l i terature, in the d idac t i c epic, t h a t is, instruct ive p o e m , ent i t led Erga kai 
hëmerai (Works and Days) of H e s i o d , w h o lived a p p r o x i m a t e l y b e t w e e n 740 and 6 7 0 В С , ' 
in w h i c h he d i v i d e s world h i s to ry into five l a r g e e p o c h s - i t s h o u l d be noted: w i t h o u t 
a l l oca t i ng them to a n y specific e m p i r e s . 2 People o f t h e golden age l ived l i fe s imi lar to gods ; 3 
t h e wor ld was g o v e r n e d by K r o n o s toge ther wi th t h o s e living on the O l y m p o s . 4 A f t e r that , 
Z e u s created m a n o f the silver a g e : t h e ch i ldhood o f t he m e m b e r s o f this genos las ted o n e 
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 On Hesiod's Erga kai hëmerai see Steitz, A.: Die Werke und Tage des Hesiodos nach ihrer 
Composition geprüft und erklärt. Leipzig, 1869; Kirchhoff, A.: Hesiodos' Mahnlieder an Perses. 
Berlin, 1889; Hays, H. M.: Notes on the Works and Days of Hesiod. Chicago, 1918; Buzio, C.: Esiodo 
nel mondo Greco. Milano, 1938; Krafft , F.: Vergleichende Untersuchungen zu Homer und Hesiod. 
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Inhalt von Hesiods individuellem Denken. Bonn, 1970; Edwards, G. P.: The Language of Hesiod in its 
Traditional Context. Oxford, 1971; Bona Quaglia, L.: Gli "Erga" dt Esiodo. Torino, 1973; Neitzel, 
H.: Homer-Rezeption hei Hesiod. Bonn, 1975; Pucci, P.: Hesiod and the Language of Poetry. 
Baltimore, 1977; Rowe , J. C.: Essential Hesiod. Bristol, 1978; Lamberton, R.: Hesiod. New Haven, 
1988; Hamilton, R.: The Architecture of Hesiodic Poetry. Baltimore, 1989. See also Paulson. J.: Index 
Hesiodeus. Lund, 1890 (reprint: Hildesheim 1970); Hofinger, M.: Lexicon Hesiodeum cum indice 
inverso. Leiden, 1975; Minton, W. W.: Concordance to Hesiodic Corpus. Leiden, 1976. 
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 On legal philosophy in Hesiod' ouvre see Fontenrose, J.: Work, Justice, and Hesiod's five 
Ages . Classical Philology, 69 (1974), 1-16; Reitzenstein, R.: Altgriechische Theologie und ihre 
Quellen. Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg IV. 1924-1925, 1 -19 ; Gagarin, M.: Dike in the "Works and 
Days" . Classical Philology. 68 (1973), 81-94; Palmer, L. R.: The Indo-European Origins of Greek 
Justice. Transactions of the Philological Society. 49 (1950); Gagarin, M.: Dike in the Archaic Greek 
Thought . Classical Philology, 69 (1974), 186-197; Nótári, T.: Hesiod und die Anfänge der 
Rechtsphilosophie. Annates Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae-
Sectio Iuridica, 47 (2006), 341-361. 
3
 Hesiod, Erga 109-126. 
4
 On the myth o f ages in Hesiod's Works and Days see Accame, S.: L'invocazione alla Musa e 
la „Veritá" in Omero e in Esiodo. Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica, 91 (1963), 257-281; 
Erbse, IL: Die Funktion des Rcchtsgedankens in Hesiods Erga. Hermes, 121 (1993), 12-28; Munding, 
H.: Die böse und die gute Eris. Gymnasium, 67 (1960), 409. sqq.; Kühn, J.: Eris und Dike. Würzburger 
Jahrbücher, 2 (1947), 259-294; Friedländer, P.: Prometheus-Pandora und die Weltalter bei Hesiod. 
In: Studien zur antiken Literatur und Kunst. Berlin, 1969, 65-67 ; von Fritz, K.: Pandora, Prometheus, 
and the Myth of the Ages. Review of Religion, 11(1947), 227-260. 
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hundred years, during this t ime they were brought up by their mother, however, a f te r having 
crossed the border of adolescence they lived for a very short t ime only.5 Having destroyed 
the people of the silver age Zeus created a n e w genos of copper, which Zeus did not need to 
destroy because they des t royed each other.6 Here, the line of ages characterised by metals 
discontinues since Zeus created the divine order of heroes f ight ing in Thebes and under 
Troy. Af t e r introducing the age of hëroi,7 Hesiod continues the enumeration of epochs 
marked by the line of poorer and poorer metals . H e divides the iron age into two phases , the 
first one is his own age,8 the second phase will c o m e in the fu ture when Zeus will w ipe out 
this race, too; Hesiod m a k e s the description of the latter age palpable by apocalyptic m o t i f s -
for example , by the image of children coming to the world with grey hair.9 
All this has seemed to be necessary to tell us here because authors of the Midd le Ages 
were qui te well-versed in classical literature and their thinking w a s affected to a great extent 
by the epoch myth emerg ing in several fo rms in Greek and Roman literature, somet imes 
interwoven with political motifs (let us think of Augustus ' s golden age ment ioned by 
Vergil).10 The eschatological narrative, already about empires, which can be read in the 
5
 Hesiod, Erga 127-142. 
6
 Hesiod, Erga 143-155. 
7
 Hesiod, Erga 156-173. 
8
 Hesiod, Erga 174-177. 
9
 Hesiod, Erga 178-201. 
10
 On the political context of Vergil's Aeneid and the tendencies of legitimation of the Principate 
see Heinze, R.: Virgils epische Technik. Leipzig, 1915; Bailey, С.: Religion in Virgil. Oxford, 1935; 
Büchner, К.: Der Schicksalsgedanke bei Vergib Freiburg im Breisgau, 1945; Brown, E. L.: Numeri 
Vergiliani: Studies in Eclogues and Georgias. Brussels, 1963; Boyancé, P.: La religion de Vergil. Paris, 
1963; Otis, В.: Virgil. A Study in Civilized Poetry. Oxford, 1963; Commager, S. (ed.): Virgil-A 
Collection of Critical Essays. New York, 1966; Segal, С. P.: Aeternum per saecula nomen, the golden 
bough and the tragedy of history, I—II. Arion, 4 (1965), 615-657; 5 (1966), 34-72; Wallace-Hadrill, 
A.: The Golden Age and Sin in Augustan Ideology. Past and Present, 95 (1982), 19-36; Kühn, W.: 
Götterszenen bei Virgil. Heidelberg, 1971; Pötscher, W.: Vergil und die göttlichen Machte. Aspekte 
seiner Weltanschauung. Hildesheim-New York, 1977; Monti, R. C.: The Dido Episode and the 
Aeneid. Roman Social and Political Values in the Epic. Leiden, 1981; Williams, G.: Technique and 
Ideas in the Aeneid. New Haven-London, 1983; Hardie, Ph. R.: Virgil's Aeneid: Cosmos and 
Imperium. Oxford, 1986; Wiltshire, S. F.: Public and Private in Vergil's Aeneid. Amherst, 1989; 
Zetzel, J. E. G.: Romane Memento: Justice and Judgement in Aeneid 6. Transactions of the American 
Philological Association, 119 (1989), 263-284; Kennedy, D.: "Augustan" and "Anti-Augustan". 
Reflections on Terms of Reference. In: Powell, A. (ed.): Roman Poetry and Propaganda in the Age of 
Augustus. Bristol, 1992, 26-58; Ziolkowski, Th.: Virgil and the moderns. Princeton, 1993; Gurval, R. 
A.: Actium and Augustus: the politics and emotions of civil war. Ann Arbor, 1995; Boyle, A. J. (ed.): 
Roman Epic. London-New York, 1993; Wifstrand Schiebe, M.: Vergil und die Tradition von den 
römischen Urkönigen. Wiesbaden, 1997; Zwierlein, O.: Die Ovid- und Vergil-Revision in tiberischer 
Zeit. I. Berlin-New York, 1999; Giebel, M.: Vergil. Reinbek, 1999; Grimai, P.: Vergil. Biographie. 
Düsseldorf-Zürich, 2000; Tarrant, R.: Virgil and the Augustan Reception. Cambridge, 2001; Perkell, 
Ch.: The Golden Age and Its Contradictions in the Poetry of Vergil. Vergilius, 48 (2002), 3-39; Adler, 
E.: Vergil's empire: political thought in the Aeneid. Maryland, 2003; Syed, Y.: Virgil's Aeneid and the 
Roman Self: Subject and Nation in Literary Discourse. Ann Arbor, 2005; Holzberg, N.: Vergil. Der 
Dichter und sein Werk. München, 2006; von Albrecht, M.: Vergil. Bucolica, Georgica, Aeneis. Eine 
Einführung. Heidelberg, 2006; Reed, J. D.: Virgil's gaze: nation and poetry in the Aeneid. Princeton, 
2007. 
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Bib le , in the Book of Daniel, e n d o w e d with specific poli t ical content by Christian au thors 
a n d Church Fathers , a l so constituted o n e of the pr inc ip les of medieval theory of the s t a t e . " 
II. T h e system of e m p i r e s in the O l d Testament 
In t he Book of Daniel, Nebuchadnezza r II,12 king o f Babylon saw a s ta tue in his d ream, 
w h o s e head was o f go ld , chest and a r m s of silver, be l ly and sides of brass , legs of iron and 
clay. One of the p r i soners , Daniel interpreted the d r e a m : the metals m a k i n g up the s ta tue 
m e a n four consecu t ive empires, the d iv ided , partly s t rong and partly uns table condi t ion of 
the las t empire is i m p l i e d by the legs o f the statue be ing partly of iron, par t ly of c lay. ' 3 
T h e decline charac ter ised by the line of poorer and poorer meta ls is in harmony with 
H e s i o d ' s Erga kai hémerai ages, and it is only seeming ly contradictory that whi le Hes iod 
cons ide r s his own a g e iron age, Danie l names N e b u c h a d n e z z a r ' s age go ldenage since the 
Book of Daniel w a s crea ted in the 2 n d century ВС, so, he brings up N e b u c h a d n e z z a r ' s rule 
as a n idealised e p o c h o f bygone days . A s a matter o f fac t , as these texts cannot be direct ly 
d e d u c e d from each o ther , we can p r e s u m e more of a c o m m o n source in their background. 1 4 
11
 On the influence of Hesiod on Ancient and Medieval literature see von Fritz, K.-Kirk, G. S -
Verdenius, W. J. et al.: Hésiode et son influence. Vandoevres-Genf, 1962. 
12
 On Nebuchadnezzar see Tabouis, G. R.-Hanotaux, G: Nebuchadnezzar. New York, 1931; 
Wiseman, D. J.: Nebuchadrezzar and Babylon: Schweich lectures in biblical Archaeology. Oxford, 
1991; Janssen, E.: Juda in der Exilszeit. Göttingen, 1956; Jursa, M.: Die Bahylonier. München, 2004; 
Edzard, D.-O.: Geschichte Mesopotamiens. München, 2003; Sals, U.: Die Biographie der "Hure 
Babylon". Tübingen, 2004; Wullen, M. (Hrsg.): Babylon. Mythos und Wahrheit, I-II. München, 
2008. 
13
 Daniel 2, 31-45. On Daniel's Book see Haevenrich, H. A. Ch.: Kommentar über das Buch 
Daniel. Hamburg, 1832; Charles, R. H :. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Daniel. 
Oxford, 1929; Porteous, N. W.: Das Danielbuch. Göttingen, 1962; Collins, J. J.: The Apocalyptic 
Visions of the Book of Daniel. Missoula, 1977; Ginsberg, H. L.: Studies in Daniel. New York, 1949; 
Collins, J. J.: Daniel-A Commentary on the Book of Daniel. Minneapolis, 1993; Koch, K.: 
Deuterokanonische Zusätze zum Danielbuch. Neukirchen-Vluyv, 1987; van den Wounde, A. S. (ed.): 
The Book of Daniel in the Light of New Findings. Leuven, 1993; Koch, K.: Die Reiche der Welt und 
der kommende Menschensohn. Studien zum Danielbuch. Neukirchen-Vluyv, 1995; Yarbro Collins, 
A.: Cosmology and Escathology in Jewish and Christian Apocalypticism. Leiden, 1996; Collins, J. 
J.-Flint, P. W. (eds): The Book of Daniel. Composition and Reception. / - / / . Leiden, 2001. 
14
 On the sources and the impact of the Book of Daniel see Baldry, С. H.: Who Invented the 
Golden Age? Classical Quarterly, 46 (1952), 83-92; Collins, J. J.: Current Issues in the Study of 
Daniel. In: Collins-Flint (eds): The Book of Daniel, op. cit. I. 1-15; van Henten, J. W.: Daniel 3 and 6 
in the Early Christian Literature. In: Collins-Flint (eds): The Book of Daniel, op. cit. I. 149-170; 
Koch, K.: Europa, Rom und der Kaiser vor dem Hinlergrund von zwei Jahrtausenden Rezeption des 
Buches Daniel. Göttingen, 1997; Kratz, R. G.: Translatio Imperii. Untersuchungen zu den aramäischen 
Danielerzählungen und ihrem theologiegeschichtlichen Umfeld. Neukirchen-Vluxn, 1987; Eshel, E.: 
Possible Sources of the Book of Daniel. In: Collins-Flint (eds): The Book of Daniel, op. cit. II. 387 -
394; Rowland, Ch.: The Book of Daniel and the Radical Critique of the Empire. An Essay in 
Apocalyptic Hermeneutics. In: Collins-Flint (eds): The Book of Daniel, op. cit. II. 447-467; Oelsner, 
J.: Kontinuität und Wandel in Gesellschaft und Kultur Babyloniens in hellenistischer Zeit. Klio, 60 
(1978), 101-116; Tcherikover, V.: Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews. New York, 1975. 
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III. The line of empires and the thought of translatio imperii in ancient Rome 
In his work entitled Apologeticum written at the turn of the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD (which 
responds to the arguments brought up by pagans against Christians and tries to refute that 
Christians endanger the existence of the state of Rome), Tertullian formulates a peculiar 
concept of the theory of the state regarding the thought of translatio imperii.15 All this took 
place because the arguments claimed that Christians, by not respecting Roman gods, 
committed crimen laesae maiestatis^ and, drawing gods' anger, thrust the whole empire 
into destruction.17 Tertullian emphasises that Christians are loyal subjects of the empire 
since they pray for the emperor and the empire,18 accepting Apostle Paul's statement 
(written to the Corinthians) that all power comes from god (omnis potestas a Deoj." The 
wish attached to the permanence of the empire by Christians is an honest aspiration-
Tertullian stresses-as termination of the Roman Empire would bring along the coming of 
the end of the world.20 That is, in his work he creates a kind of political theology based on 
the ideology of survival of the empire and the chain of consecutive empires. He expounds 
the content of what can be read in the Book of Danielf and he identifies the last one from 
among the four consecutive great empires with Rome. To this he connects what is described 
in Apostle John's Apocalipse, which asserts that the end of the world will be preceded by 
the fall of the great empire, "Babylon", which breaks the Antichrist free of his chains.22 
That is, he presents the fact that Rome as the last one possesses regnum (i.e. domination of 
the world, which can be possessed at one time only by one empire) as the criterion of its 
survival, the survival of the world. By that he as it were turns emperor Augustus's "Roma 
est aeterno " ideology around; at the same time, in the mirror of its own religious beliefs, 
15
 On Tertullian see Beck, A.: Römisches Recht bei Tertullian und Cyprian: eine Studie zur 
frühen Kirchenrechtsgeschichte. Halle, 1930; Roberts, R. E.: The Theology of Tertullian. London, 
1924; Stirnimann, J. K..: Die Praescriptio Tertullians im Lichte des Römischen Rechts und der 
Theologie. Freiburg, 1949; Lehmann, P.: Tertullian im Mittelalter. Hermes, 87 (1959), 231-246; 
Fredouille, J.-C.: Tertullien et la conversion de la culture antique. Paris, 1972; Barnes, T. D.: 
Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study. Oxford, 1985; Ecker, G.: Orator Christiamis. 
Untersuchungen zur Argumentationskunst in Tertullians Apologeticum. Stuttgart, 1993; Osborn, E.: 
Tertullian. First Theologian of the West. Cambridge, 1997; Adkin, N.: Tertullian and Jerome Again. 
Symbolae Osloenses, 72 (1997), 155-163; Randazzo, S.: Per la storia del diritto associativo 
tardoclassico: la testimonianza di Tertulliano. In: Atti dell'Academia Romanistica Constantiniana 15. 
Napoli, 2005, 95-105. 
16
 Bauman, R. A.: The Crimen Maiestatis in the Roman Republic and the Augustan Principale. 
Johannesburg, 1967; Keaveney, A.-Madden, J. A.: The Crimen Maiestatis under Caligula: the 
evidence of Dio Cassius. Classical Quarterly, 48 (1998), 216-220; Fleissner, D.: Die rechtshistorische 
Entwicklung des crimen laesae maiestatis mit einem Ausblick auf seine Nachwirkungen im geltenden 
österreichischen Strafrecht. Diss. Wien, 2008; Frydek, M.: Crimen maiestatis. In: Ceskoslovenské 
trestní právo V proménách vèku. Brno, 2009, 22-34. 
17
 Tertullianus, Apologeticum 1, 4. sqq.; 2, 8. sqq. 
18
 Tertullianus, Apologeticum 39, 2. 
19
 Paulus, Ad Corinthos 1,3, 11. 
20
 Tertullianus, Apologeticum 32, 1. sqq. 
21
 Daniel 2, 31. sqq.; 7, 1. sqq. 
22
 Iohannes, Acocalypsis 17.9. 
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h igh ly appreciates t he Roman Empi re s ince he p rov ides it with a role in the history of 
sa lva t ion . 2 3 
F or lack of space , it is not poss ib le to touch upon all the places where the ideology of 
translatio imperii o c c u r s in Roman li terature; therefore , I highlight two examples only. 
Iust in , w h o wrote the summary of P o m p e i u s Trogus ' s Philippica at the turn of the 3rd and 
4 th cen tu r i es AD, unambiguous ly speaks about four empi res , that is, the Assyr ian , Persian 
and Macedonian ( A l e x a n d e r the Grea t ' s ) empire is fo l lowed , as it were as the c rowning of 
h is tory , by the R o m a n Empire.2 4 Impact , much larger than by Iustinus, was p roduced on the 
empi re -ph i losophy o f t he Middle A g e s a n d through that the m o d e m age by the translator of 
the Vulgata, H i e r o n y m u s of Stridon,25 w h o in his c o m m e n t s on the Book of Daniel associated 
the above-men t ioned empi res with c l ea r historical-poli t ical content: that is, he considered 
R o m e the crowning o f world h is tory af ter Babylon , Persia and Greece (Hellas) , and 
c o n n e c t e d the fall o f R o m e with the coming of the e n d of the wor ld . It was owing to 
H i e r o n y m u s ' s immeasu rab ly great impac t , among others , that both in the wes t and the east 
for m o r e than one t h o u s a n d years severa l state fo rma t ions had striven to p rove their legal 
and organic cont inui ty with the R o m a n Empire, and m a k e it the basis of their power 
ideology. 2 6 
23
 Suerbaum, W.: Vom antiken zum frühmittelalterlichen Staatshegriff: Über Verwendung und 
Bedeutung von res publica, regnum, impérium und status von Cicero bis Jordanis. Münster, 1961, 
112. sqq.; Kölmel, W.: Regimen Cristianum. Weg und Ergebnisse des Gewaltenverhältnisses und des 
Gewaltenverständnisses (8. bis zum 14. Jahrhundert). Berlin, 1970, 35. sq.; Strobel, K.: Das Imperium 
Romanum im '3. Jahrhundert'. Modell einer historischen Krise? Stuttgart, 1993, 88. sqq.; Bähnk, W.: 
Von der Notwendigkeits des Leidens: die Thologie des Martyriums bei Tertullian. Hamburg, 2001, 
40. sqq. 
24
 On lustin and Pompeius Tragus see Ferrera, L.: Struttura e Metodo del Г Epitome del Guistino. 
Torino, 1957; Seel, О.: Die Praefatio des Pompeius Trogus. Erlangen, 1955; Alonso-Nunez, J. M.: An 
Augustan Word-History. The Históriáé Philippicae of Pompeius Trogus. Greece and Rome, 34 (1987) 
1, 56-72 ; Idem: Drei Autoren von Geschichtsabrissen der römischen Kaiserzeit: Florus, lustinus, 
Orosius. Latomus, 54 (1995), 346-359; Idem: La História Universal de Pompeyo Trogo. Madrid, 
1992; Richter, H.-D.: Untersuchungen zur hellenistischen Historiographie. Die Vorlagen des Pompeius 
Trogus für die Darstellung des nachalexandrinischen hellenistischen Geschichte (lust. 13-40). 
Frankfurt, 1987; Syme, R.: The Date Justin and the Discovery of Trogus. História, 37 (1988), 358-
371; Yardeli, J. C.: Justin and Pompeius Trogus. A Study of the Language of Justin's Epitome of 
Trogus. Toronto, 2003. 
25
 Fremantle, H. W.: The Principle Works of St. Jerome. London, 1893; Grützmacher, G.: 
Hieronymus. Eine biographische Studie zur alten Kirchengeschichte, l-III. Leipzig, 1901-1918; 
Cavallera, F.: Saint Jérôme. Sa vie et son oeuvre, / - / / . Paris, 1922; Feder, A.: Studien zum 
Schriftstellerkatalog des heiligen Hieronymus. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1927; Eiswith, R.: Hieronymus' 
Stellung zur Literatur und Kunst. Wiesbaden, 1955; Wiesen, D. S.: Saint Jerome as a Satyrist. A Study 
in Christian Latin Thought and Letters. Ithaca, 1964; Kelly, J. N. D.: Jerome: His Life, Writings, and 
Controversies. London, 1975; Rebenich, S.: Hieronymus und sein Kreis. Stuttgart, 1992; Rebenich, 
S.: Jerome. London-New York, 2002; Fürst, A.: Hieronymus. Askese und Wissenschaft in der 
Spätantike. Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 2003; Haie Williams, M.: The Monk and the Book: Jerome and the 
making of Christian Scholarship. Chicago, 2006. 
26
 Quirin, H.: Einführung in das Studium der mittelalterlichen Geschichte. Stuttgart, 1991, 49; 
Goetz, W.: Translatio imperii. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Geschichtsdenkens und politischen 
Theorien im Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit. Tübingen, 1958, 17-36. 
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IV. The thought of translatio imperii in Eastern Europe-Constantinople/Byzantium 
as Second Rome, and Moscow as Third Rome 
Byzantium (Byzant ion) was f o u n d e d cca. 660 В С by settlers of Mega ra , and its n a m e was 
given after its first mythic ruler, k ing Byzas (accord ing to the myth , a f ter the son o f the god 
of the sea, Pose ion and Creossa) . Throughout the Roman rule it e n j o y e d the status o f f ree 
city, however , it obtained s igni f icance in world h is tory in the 4 th cen tury AD when e m p e r o r 
Constant inus decided to f o u n d a second capital .2 7 Af ter s o m e cogitation, he chose 
Byzant ium-actual ly , Thessa loniki , Sardica (the present Sofia) and Troy could have been 
also taken into considerat ion: it wou ld have suppor ted Troy that accord ing to the legend the 
Romans c a m e f rom Troy.28 T h e city was consecra ted on 11 M a y 330: the consecra tcd 
Konstani t inoupolis , that is, " t he City of Cons tan t ine" officially b e c a m e the " n e w R o m e " 
(neu Rhômë) and "second R o m e " (deutera Rhômë).29 Reference to the empire by the n a m e 
"Byzantium" is actually the intellectual product the m o d e m age; the inhabitants o f the 
empire cons idered themselves Romans (Rhömaioi), and their ruler was basileus tön 
Rhömaiön, so his country was " the Roman E m p i r e " itself.30 The thought of Cons tan t inople 
27
 From the recent literature on Constantine see Vogt, J.: Constantin der Große und sein 
Jahrhundert. München, 1960; Barnes, T. D.: Constantine and Eusebius. Cambridge, 1981; Weiß, P.: 
Die Vision Constantins. In: Bleicken, J. (Hrsg.): Colloquium aus Anlass des 80. Geburtstages von 
Alfred Heuß. Kallmünz, 1993, 143-169; Bringmann, K.: Die konstantinische Wende. Zum Verhältnis 
von politischer und religiöser Motivation. Historische Zeitschrift, 260 (1995), 21-47; Clauss, M.: 
Konstantin der Große und seine Zeit. München, 1996; Bleckmann, В.: Konstantin der Große. Reinbek, 
1996; Mühlenberg, E. (Hrsg.): Die Konstantinische Wende. Gütersloh, 1998; Odahl, Ch. M.: 
Constantine and the Christian Empire. London, 2004; Brandt, FL: Konstantin der Große. Der erste 
christliche Kaiser. München, 2006; Girardet, К. M.: Die konstantinische Wende. Darmstadt, 2006; 
Herrmann-Otto, E.: Konstantin der Große. Darmstadt, 2007; Lenski, N. (ed.): The Cambridge 
Companion to the Age of Constantine. Cambridge, 2006; Schlange-Schöningen, H. (Hrsg.): Konstantin 
und das Christentum. Darmstadt, 2007; van Dam, R.: The Roman Revolution of Constantine. 
Cambridge 2007; Veyne, P.: Als unsere Welt christlich wurde. Aufstieg einer Sekte zur Weltmacht. 
München, 2008; Girardet, К. M.: Der Kaiser und sein Gott. Das Christentum im Denken und in der 
Religionspolitik Konstantins des Großen. Berlin-New York, 2010. 
28
 Erskine, A.: Troy between Greece and Rome: local tradition and imperial power. Oxford-
New York, 2001. 
29
 Gibbon, E.: The History of the Decline and Fall of Roman Empire, I-VIII. Oxford, 1827. II. 
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Byzantium. New York, 2009, 63. sq. 
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 On the ideological basis of the Byzantinan State see Bury, J. В.: The Constitution of the Later 
Roman Empire. London, 1909; Hungaer, H.: Prooimon. Elemente der byzantinischen Kaiseridee in 
den Arengen der Urkunden. Wien, 1964; Ahrweiler, H.: L'ideologie politique de l'Empire byzantin. 
Paris, 1975; Ostrogrosky, G.: Zur byzantinischen Geschichte. Ausgewählte kleine Schriften. Darmstadt, 
1973; Hunger, H. (Hrsg.): Das byzantinische Herrscherbild. Darmstadt, 1975; Anastos, M. V.: Vox 
populi voluntas Dei and the Election of the Byzantine Emperor. In: Studies in Byzantine Intellectual 
History, III. London, 1979; Simon, D.: Princeps legibus solutus. Die Stellung des byzantinischen 
Kaisers zum Gesetz. In: Nörr, D.-Simon, D. (Hrsg.): Gedächtnisschrift für Wolfgang Kunkel. Frankfurt 
am Main, 1984, 449-A92; Cicurov, L: Gesetz und Gerechtigkeit in den byzantinischen Fürstenspiegeln 
des 6.-9. Jahrhunderts. In: Burgmann, L.-Fögen, M. Th.-Schminck, A. (Hrsg.): Cupido legum. 
Frankfurt am Main, 1985; Cheynet, J.-C.: Pouvoir et contestations a Bvzance (963-1210). Paris, 
1990; Fögen, M. Th.: Das politische Denken der Byzantiner. In: Fetscher, l.-Münkler, H. (Hrsg.): 
Pipers Handbuch der politischen Ideen. 11. München-Zürich, 1993, 41-85; Haldon, J.: Das 
byzantinische Reich. Geschichte und Kultur eines Jahrtausends. Düsseldorf, 2002. 
1 5 2 TAMÁS N Ó T Á R I 
being a "New Rome " is from first to last present in Byzantine ideology, the most important 
legitimisation sources include the 3rd canon of the second general council ("The honorary 
priority after the bishop of Rome shall be given to the bishop of Constantinople since it is 
the new Rome. ") and the 28th canon of the fourth general council ("We too shall resolve and 
vote for the same on the privileges of the most sacred Church of the same Constantinople, 
New Rome; because the fathers justly granted privileges to the throne of the old Rome as 
that city ruled. "). 
The investigation of the theory of Moscow as "Third Rome " clearly reveals that the 
thought of "Third Rome" did not appear in the official ideology through the title of tsar 
used by Ivan III first in 1473 (one year after he married Sophia Palaiologa, niece of the 
emperor of Byzantium, through his representative, in the presence of Pope Sixtus IV in 
Rome). This was formulated first by Filofei, a monk of Pskov, between 1522 and 1524, in 
his letter written to Mihail Grigoryevich: "/ would have you know, my god-loving lord, that 
all Christian tsardom has come to its end, and has been united in our ruler s sole tsardom 
in accordance with the books of the prophets, that is, in the Russian tsardom: since two 
Romes have fallen, the third one still exists, and there will be no fourth Rome ".3I In Moscow, 
a metropolitan was elected for the first time in 1448, however, it became the seat of the 
patriarchate only in 1589 and that is how the Patriarch of Moscow becamc, in accordance 
with the so-called Constitutional Charter adopted at the synod of that time, the fifth in the 
order of patriarchs. And, albeit, the "Third Rome" theory was not accepted by orthodox 
canon law, it lived all the more vividly in the realm of state ideology and folk belief, and 
produced significant impact up to 1917.32 
V. The thought of' renovatio imperii in Western Europc-Sacrum Romanian Imerium 
Charlemagne, through being crowned emperor on 23th December 800, raised Imperium 
Romanum from the dead (renovatio imperii) also on the level of official ideology, and, at 
the same time, disputed that the hasileus had the right of continuity of the Roman Empire.33 
31
 See also van den Bercken, W.: Holy Russia and Christian Europe. East and West inthe 
Religious Ideology of Russia. London, 1999, 146. sqq. 
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 On the idea of Moscow as the third Rome see Lettenbauer, W.: Moskau das dritte Rom. Zur 
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Russia. A Study on Byzantino-Russian Relations in the Forteenth Century. New York, 1989; Idem: 
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Moscow, the Third Rome: the Origins and Transformations of a "Pivotal Moment". Jahrbücher für 
Geschichte Osteuropas, 49 (2001), 61-86. 
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 From the recent literature on Charlemagne see Abel, S.-Simson, В.: Jahrbücher des 
Fränkischen Reiches unter Kari dem Großen, /-/ / . Berlin, 1969; Braunfels, W. et al. (Hrsg.): Karl der 
Große. Lebenswerk und Nachleben I-IV. Düsseldorf, 1967; Langston, A. L.-Buck, J. O. (eds): 
Pedigrees of Some of the Emperor Charlemagne's Descendants. Baltimore, 1974; Epperlein, S.: Karl 
der Große. Eine Biographie. Berlin, 1982; Butzer, P. L. et al. (Hrsg.): Karl der Große und sein 
Nachwirken. 1200 Jahre Kultur und Wissenschaft in Europa, I-II. Brepols, 1997; Kerner, M.: Karl 
der Große. Entschleierung eines Mythos. Köln, 2000; Godman, P.-Jamut, J.-Johanek, P. (Hrsg.): Am 
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799. Berlin, 2002; Schieffer, R.: Die Karolinger. Stuttgart. 2006; Sypeck, J.: Becoming Charlemagne: 
Europe, Baghdad, and The Empires of A.D. 800. New York, 2006; Barbero, A.: Charlemagne: Father 
of a Continent. Berkeley, 2004; McKitterick, R.: Charlemagne: The Formation of a European Identity. 
Cambridge, 2008; Becher, M.: Karl der Große. München, 2007. On the imperialistic politics of 
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In his letter to Pope Leo III, in which he w a r n s the pope to engage a pious conduc t of life, 
C h a r l e m a g n e clearly revea l s the king's and the pope 's tasks and the division of the tasks: 
the ruler is obliged to protect the C h u r c h o f Christ f r om the attacks and destruct ion of 
pagans by arms, and to s t rengthen the Ca tho l i c faith; the p o p e ' s duty is to suppor t the king's 
acts by hands raised to god , jus t as Moses , in order to ensure him victory over the enemies 
of the n a m e of Christ .3 4 Thereby, the founda t ions of the " t w o swords theory" 3 5 made 
comple te by Pope Boni fa t ius VIII in 1300 h a v e been laid, and, s imultaneously, the emperor ' s 
imperial is t ic demands h a v e been acknowledged . 3 6 
O t t o I (936-973) , a f t e r he came to power , was called the greatest a m o n g European 
kings by a Saxon chronicler of the period. O t to laid claim to obtaining Italy and R o m e and 
thereby the emperor ' s c r o w n ; all the m o r e because he bel ieved that through his vic tory over 
the Hungar i ans and the successes of the Slavic mission he as "the defea ter of heathen 
barbar ians , disseminator o f Christianity a n d defender of the church" w a s entit led to 
e m p e r o r ' s dignity. The ce remony of c r o w n i n g him emperor took place on 2n d February 962 
in R o m e . From that t ime, German kings cou ld obtain e m p e r o r ' s title if they w e n t to Rome 
for b e i n g crowned (that is, only German k ings could b e c o m e emperor but not all German 
kings b e c a m e emperor). O t to I was a w a r e o f the actual scope and limits o f his emperor ' s 
power: he called himself " the emperor o f the Romans and Franks" . His g randson . Otto III, 
Charlemagne see Nótári, T.: Bavarian Historiography in Early Medieval Bavaria. Passau, 2010, 57. 
sqq.; Idem: An Early-Medieval Show Trial-Tasilo Ill's Dethronement. In: Beck Varela, L.-Gutiérrez 
Vega, P.-Spinosa, A. (eds): Crossing Legal Cultures. München, 2009, 141-158; Wolfram, I f : Die 
Geburt Mitteleuropas. Geschichte Österreichs vor seiner Entstehung. 378-907. Wien, 1987, 208. 
sqq.; Classen, P.: Karl der Große, das Papsttum und Byzanz. Die Begründung des karolingischen 
Kaisertums. Sigmaringen, 1985; Hagencder, O.: Das 'crimen maiestatis', der Prozeß gegen die 
Attentäter Papst Leos III. und die Kaiserkrönung Karls des Großen. In: Mordek, H. (Hrsg.): Aus 
Kirche und Reich. Festschrift für F. Kempf zu seinem 75. Geburtstag. Sigmaringen, 1983, 54-79; 
Schieffer, R.: Am von Salzburg und die Kaiserkrönung Karls des Großen. In: Dopsch, H.-Freund, 
S.-Schmid, A. (Hrsg.): Bayern und Italien. Politik, Kultur, Kommunikation (8.-15. Jahrhundert). 
Festschrift für K. Reindel zum 75. Geburtstag. München, 2001, 104-121. 
34
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Wien, 1989; Coste, J. (ed.): Boniface VIII en procès. Articles d'accusation et dépositions des témoins 
(1303-1311). Rome, 1995; Paravicini Bagliani, A.: Boniface VIII. Un pape hérétique? Paris , 2003; 
Matheus , M.-Klinkhammer, L. (Hrsg.): Eigenbild im Konflikt. Krisensituationen des Papsttums 
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1 5 4 T A M Á S NÓTÁRI 
u p o n the impact and suggest ion of h i s educator and f r iend , the greatest scientis t of the age, 
t he French Gerber t d 'Auri l lac 3 7 ( la ter Pope Sylvester II) announced the program of 
" r e n e w i n g the R o m a n empire" (renovatio imperii Romanorum). As a mat ter of fact, he 
t h o u g h t of the e m p i r e of Christian emperors , first o f all, of Constant ine the Great and 
Cha r l emagne , and Chris t ian mission p layed a central part in his concept . 3 8 He expressed 
th i s by adding the t i t le " the slave of Je sus Chris t" (serx'us lesu Christi) and later "the slave 
o f t he apostles" (servus apostolorum) to the emperor ' s title. The finishing s t roke was given 
to t he merely fo rma l ly existing Sacrum Romanum Imperium by the battle at Austerlitz. O n 
6 A u g u s t 1806 Franz I resigned f rom the emperor ' s t i t le.3 9 (We need to add that the n a m e 
u s e d in literature for Sacrum Romanum Imperium, the "German-Roman Empire" is 
unhis tor ical because it is the t ranslat ion of "Heiliges Römisches Reich deutscher Nation", 
w h i c h had never b e c o m e an official name . ) 
Ot to Frisingensis , in his work ent i t led Chronica sive História de duabits civitatibus, 
wr i t t en in the m i d - 1 2 t h century, w a n t e d to continue Augus t i nus ' s work ent i t led De civitate 
Dei. The work f o c u s e s on the line o f empires fo l lowing each other (,translatio imperii), 
w h i c h moves consis tent ly f rom east to west as t ime passes (Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, 
R o m a n s , Germans) , and prevails wi th in Europe too ( R o m e , Byzant ium, Char lemagne ' s 
E m p i r e , the Langobard Empire, the Sac rum R o m a n u m Imper ium) . The c rown ing of these 
e m p i r e s is Otto 's Ho ly Roman Empi re , which must surv ive until the end of the world.4 0 
37
 On Gerbert d'Aurillac see Eichengrün, F.: Gerbert (Silvester II.) als Persönlichkeit. Leipzig-
Berlin, 1928; Joubert, M.: Gerbert-Sylvestre. II premier pape français. Aurillac, 1938; Darlington, O. 
G.: Gerbert, the Teacher. The American Historical Review, 52 (1947) 3, 456^176; Werner, K. F.: Zur 
Überlieferung der Briefe Gerberts von Aurillac. Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters, 17 
(1961), 91-144; Kosztolnyik, Z. J.: The Relations of Four Eleventh-Century Hungarian Kings with 
Rome in the Light of Papal Letters. Church History 46 (1977) 1, 33^17; Riché, R: Gerbert d'Aurillac. 
Le Pape de l'An Mil. Paris, 1987. 
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Imperii Romanorum. San Francisco, 1970; Alfhoff, G.: Otto III. Darmstadt, 1997; Görich, К.: Otto 
III. Romanus Saxonicus et Italiens. Kaiserliche Rompolitik und sächsische Historiographie. 
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1984; Wamer, D. A.: Ideals and Action in the reign of Otto III. Journal of Medieval History, 25 
(1998) 1, 1-18. 
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Schnettger, M. (Hrsg.): Imperium Romanum-irregulare corpus-Teutscher Reichs-Staat. Das Alte 
Reich im Verständnis der Zeitgenossen und der Historiographie. Mainz, 2002; Schmidt, G.: Geschichte 
des Alten Reiches. Staat und Nation in der Frühen Neuzeit 1495-1806. München, 1999; Hartmann, P. 
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Gotthard, A: Das Alte Reich 1495-1806. Darmstadt, 2003; Stollberg-Rilinger, В.: Das Heilige 
Römische Reich Deutscher Nation. Vom Ende des Mittelalters bis 1806. München, 2009. 
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Historian and Man. Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, 80 
(1949), 393-402; Fischer, J. A. (Hrsg.): Otto von Freising. Gedenkgabe zu seinem 800. Todesjahr. 
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VI. An example of denial of continuity-official rejection of the name Third Reich 
It is a general delusion that the "Third Reich" (Drittes Reich) was the official name of 
Germany, after Nazis seized power, strongly urged by the party and state propaganda 
machinery, too. It is less known that Hitler always had strong reservations against this term, 
although before the NSDAP took over (Machtergreifung or Machtübernahme), what is 
more, in the period following it, it undoubtedly proved to be a useful, highly powerful 
propagandistic phrase.41 However, the decree issued by the propaganda ministry of the 
German press on 10th June 1939 expressly prohibited the official use of the phrase "Third 
Reich". In accordance with this decree, the official name of Germany-which is a so-called 
völkischer Staat,42 that is, a state based on the race idea (Rassenidee)-is "Great German 
Empire" (Großdeutsches Reich). A circular issued by the propaganda ministry (Reichs-
ministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda) of the German press years later, on 21st 
March 1942 orders-most probably following the pattern of "Empire" used by the British-
that the official name of the "new Germany" in the future shall be simply: "Empire" (Reich). 
The aim of the name "Reich" is to document to the public of the world the closed state 
unity of the territories that belong to the "new Germany". The same regulation restricts the 
application of the word "Reich" to Germany, stressing that there is only one "Empire" and 
it is Germany. 
The "Third Reich" as an empire compared to historical precedents, ancestors, marked 
with a "serial number" was not compatible with the imperialistic self-awareness of national 
socialism, which considered itself the crowning of German history. In historical terms, the 
"First Empire" means the Holy Roman Empire (Sacrum Romanum Imperium) founded in 
962, which existed until 1806. The "Second Empire" was founded, more exactly proclaimed 
on 18th January 1871 in the hall of mirrors in the Palace of Versailles and existed until 
November 1918. In German philosophical and political thinking, the idea of the "Third 
Frankfurt am Main, 1990; Deutinger, R.: Engel oder Wolf? Otto von Freising in den geistigen 
Auseinandersetzungen seiner Zeit. In: Dietl, C.-Helschinger, D. (Hrsg.): Ars und Scientia im 
Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit. Ergebnisse interdisziplinärer Forschung. Georg Wieland zum 
65. Geburtstag. Tübingen-Basel, 2002, 31-46; Arnold, A.: Otto von Freising. In: Wurst, J.-Langheiter, 
A. (Hrsg.): Monachia. München, 2005. 75. sqq.; Deutinger, R.: Das Privilegium minus, Otto von 
Freising und der Verfassungswandel des 12. Jahrhunderts. In: Schmid, P.-Wanderwitz, H. (Hrsg.): Die 
Geburt Österreichs. 850 Jahre Privilegium minus. Regensburg, 2007, 179-199. 
41
 See Hamza, G.: Die Idee des "Dritten Reichs" im deutschen philosophischen und politischen 
Denken im 20. Jahrhundert. Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös 
nominatae. Sectio Iuridica, 38 (1997), 11-22; Idem: Die Idee des "Dritten Reichs" im deutschen 
philosophischen und politischen Denken des 20. Jahrhunderts. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung, 
Germanistische Abteilung, 118 (2001) 321-336; Idem: The Idea of the "Third Reich" in the German 
Legal, Philosophical and Political Thinking in the 20th Century. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 42 
(2001) 1-2, 91-101; Neurohr, J. F.: Der Mythos vom Dritten Reich. Zur Geistgeschichte des 
Nationalsozialismus. München, 1957; Glum, Fr.: Der Nationalsozialismus. Werden und Vergehen. 
München, 1962; Kershaw, L: Hitlers Macht. Das Profil der NS-Herrschaft. München, 1992; Fritsche, 
K.: Politische Romantik und Gegenrevolution. Fluchtwege in der Krise der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft: 
Das Beispiel des "Tat"-Kreises. Frankfurt am Main, 1976. 
42
 On this topic in the contemporary literature see Nicolai, H.: Der Staat im nationalsozialistischen 
Weltbild. Leipzig, 1933; Huber, E. R.: Verfassungsrecht des Großdeutschen Reiches. Hamburg, 1939. 
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Reich" can be traced back to deep roots.43 It can be identified as early as in Fichte. The idea 
of the "Third Reich" was given a highly great part, often central significance in conservative 
cultural philosophy, primarily in Arthur Moeller van den Bruck's works.44 The national 
socialist regime clearly distanced itself from the idea of the "Third Reich" for historical and 
philosophical reasons already in the late thirties. In Germany, eventually, the view 
hallmarked by the name of Hans F. K. Günther, Richard Walter Darre and Alfred Rosenberg, 
who laid or intended to lay Führerprinzip on thcorctical bases, became the official ideology 
of the national socialist Germany, in which the idea of the "Third Empire" was given no 
role.45 
More in-depth analysis would be needed for accurately processing the ideology, which 
would demonstrate how the imperial ambitions of the modem age (for example, Spain, the 
British Empire and the United States of America) fit into the ideology of translatio imperii-
upon the termination of the religious background of this thought, by replacing it with a kind 
of cultural mission legitimacy. In my paper, I could, of course, highlight only a few points 
from the history of the ideology of translatio imperii; an overall analysis of the subjcct 
would call for an independent monograph. 
43
 Dempf, A.: Sacrum Imperium. Geschichts- unci Staatphilosophie des Mittelalters und der 
politischen Renaissance. Wien, 1929; von Mutius, G.: Die drei Reiche. Ein Versuch philosophischer 
Besinnung. Berlin, 1920; Schmitt, C.: Der Begriff des Politischen. Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und 
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 Moeller van den Bruck, A.: Das dritte Reich. Berlin, 1923. 
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recht, Einheitspartei. Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln-Mainz, 1987; Scheiner, U.: Die neuere Entwicklung des 
Rechtsstaates. In: Staatstheorie und Staatsrecht. Berlin, 1978, 205. sq.; Neumann, F.: Behemoth. 
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1989, 85. 
1216-2574/USD 20.00 
О 2011 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
M l C H A L S E J V L * 
The Changing Role of the State: 
The State as a Mirror of the Individual? 
If the topic o f t he w o r k s h o p is t he cont inui ty a n d d iscont inui ty o f t he state and law, it is 
poss ib le to t ack le the subject of the chang ing ro le a n d nature of t h e s ta te itself. T h i s c h a n g e 
can be p e r c e i v e d f r o m many pe r spec t i ve s and s o m e o f them are a l r e a d y almost t r ad i t iona l 
f r o m a l a w y e r ' s o r polit ical s c i en t i s t ' s point o f v i e w like the s ta te a n d g loba l i za t ion , the 
t r ans fo rma t ion o f the state ( typical ly , p o s t - c o m m u n i s t t r ans fo rma t ion ) , the s t a t e and 
(European ) in tegra t ion , the sh i f t f r o m state g o v e r n a n c e to (non -? ) s t a t e g o v e r n a n c e , the 
chang ing role o f the publ ic sec tor (v is -à-vis p r iva t i za t ion , pub l i c -p r iva te par tnersh ip) a n d so 
on . ' S o m e pe r spec t i ve s are "ho t t o p i c s " wai t ing t o b e e laborated d e e p l y in the nea r f u t u r e , 
e.g. the role o f the state in the c u r r e n t financial c r i s i s , the possibi l i ty o f es tabl ishing a " w o r l d 
g o v e r n m e n t " (g iven that cur ren t ly s tates are too w e a k to solve t he p r o b l e m s of " t o o b i g to 
f a i l " c o m p a n i e s ) ; o thers can be s e e n as topical in t he f u t u r e - o r m a y b e not.2 But h e r e I do 
not want to wr i t e about these compl i ca t ed i s sues , instead, I ' ll f o c u s on two abs t rac t 
specu la t ions I h a v e on m y m i n d . T h e first specu l a t i on has been in f luenced by the f a m o u s 
s ta tement of Car l Schmit t , name ly , that all c o n c e p t s of m o d e m s ta te theory are s e c u l a r i z e d 
theologica l concep t s . 3 From S c h m i t t ' s pe r spec t ive , th inking abou t t he state was i n f l u e n c e d 
by th ink ing a b o u t G o d (e.g. H o b b e s ' " L e v i a t h a n " w a s an a t t empt to create an e a r t h l y or 
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 For a relevant survey of these topics see, e.g. Flay, C.-Lister, M.-Marsh, D. (eds): The State. 
Theories and Issues. New York, 2006. 
2
 For example, during the time of writing this article I have been aware of the phenomenon of 
living in virtual worlds, such as Second Life. More and more people are using the possibilities offered 
to them by our technically developed civilization and are spending more and more time in virtual 
reality, where they cannot only amuse themselves (like in a computer game), but also work and earn 
money or establish sometimes permanent relationships with others (like marriage). If this trend gains 
more ground in future, we will face an interesting social phenomenon, namely, that a growing segment 
of the population will prefer this virtual world to our "real" world and care only about physical 
subsistence and fast Internet connection-other needs will be satisfied in the virtual world. Will this 
affect the life of states? Of course: socially passive people in the "real" world will be only marginally 
interested in the elections and parliamentary democracy (while in the virtual world they will form 
governments and organize demonstrations) or paying taxes (in the virtual world the duty to pay them 
has not been established yet). Does it sound like a science fiction such as "Matrix"? Maybe, but when 
we consider the fact that virtual dollars can be exchanged to "real" money and that some states have 
already opened their virtual embassies in Second Life (like the Maldives, Sweden, Estonia, Serbia, 
Colombia and the Philippines), it is possible that in the near future states will be increasingly interested 
not only in how to regulate these virtual worlds, but also in how to convince people, who have been 
"going virtual" to "return" and participate in the "real" life of the state. 
3
 Schmitt, С.: Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. (Orig. 
publication: Berlin, 1922), Cambridge-London, 1985, 36 et seq. 
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"mortal" God with almighty authority over its citizens). To put it shortly and maybe too 
simply, the state is perceived as a mirror of God in spite of the fact that modem states were 
born in the process of secularization.4 Thinking about this statement has entailed my first 
speculation: The concept of the state and its sovereignty is modelled according to the 
concept of the moral sovereignty (moral autonomy) of the individual. In the first part of this 
article I will try to support this hypothesis with arguments originating mainly in the history 
of ethics and the theory of the state. 
The second hypothesis I'll present here is a mere development of the first one: Do we 
face in our present-day world any changes in the moral characteristics of the individual? If 
yes, what are these changes and how can they possibly affect the features of the state? The 
description of some present-day changes in the individual's position and the changing role 
of the state stemming from them are the topics of the second part of this article. I will finish 
with a not very optimistic metaphor of the contemporary state conceived as an authoritarian 
insurance company. At the same time, these speculations are only a broader (and maybe 
deeper) version of my former ideas presented in previous workshops and published 
subsequently.5 
1. The first speculation 
If the majority of scholars agree that the roots of the modern concept of the state must be 
identified in the 16lh and 17lh centuries (e.g. Machiavelli was the first theorist to use the 
word "status" for the description of the state as "lo stato", Bodin was the first thinker to 
elaborate the concept of sovereignty lying "at the heart" of the concept of state, whereas, 
Hobbes offered us the first theoretical concept of the secularized state (to mention only the 
most famous and significant development in the fields of political science and law), and it 
was also at that time when the new concepts of individuality were born. The developments 
concerning individuality can of course be observed a long time before these centuries-some 
recognize them, e.g. in the use of the word "ius" as a subjective right in the philosophy of 
William of Ockham,6 others in the cultural and political advances of Italian city states7 or in 
the somehow personal, inner relationship with God, which evolved during the Reformation 
and so on. The classical work on the development of modern identity (and its three 
components, i.e. a sense of ourselves as beings of inner depth, the affirmation of ordinary 
life, which in contrast to the Middle Ages focuses on other aspects of life, finally, the 
expressionist notion of nature as an inner moral source) is the result of the lifelong research 
4
 How this process of secularization ensued was famously described by Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde. See Böckenförde, E.-W.: Vznik státu jako procès sekularizace (The Creation of the 
State as a Process of Secularization). In: Hanus, J. (ed.): Vznik státu jako procès sekularizace: diskuse 
nad studií Ernsta-Wolfganga Böckenfördeho. (Orig. publication: Berlin, 1991), Brno, 2006, 7-24. 
5
 The changing nature of citizenship (i.e. the relationship of the individual to the state) was 
presented and published in Sejvl, M.: European Identity and European Citizenship: The Case of the 
Missing Polis? International Journal of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe, 2 
(2008) 2, 49-56. The implications of these changes in moral attitudes to the state for the symbolic 
order (manifested in state symbols) were presented and published in Sejvl, M.: (Not Only) State 
Symbols in Danger? International Journal of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe, 4 
(2010) 1, 105-110. 
6
 See, e.g. Villey, M.: La Formation de la Pensée Juridique Modern. 4th ed., Paris, 1975. 
7
 See, e.g. classics like Burckhardt, J.: Kultura renaissancni doby v Italii (The Culture of the 
Renaissance in Italy). (Orig. publication: 1860), Prague, 1912. 
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of Charles Taylor.8 Taylor in particular argued against the notion of a disembodied, 
decontextualized and disengaged subject (rather simply, "against the notion of the modern 
atomistic individual"), instead, he focused on the fact that modern individuality is 
constructed (in contrast to the ideas of thinkers I will introduce later, such as Hobbes or 
Grotius) within the framework of "strong evaluations" that transcend the atomic individual's 
perspective-may it be a Platonic idea of the virtues of reason and self-mastery, the sense of 
honour (e.g. of medieval nobility) or the modern understanding of the expressive power of 
inner selves or the virtues of counting everyone's interests equally. 
Be that as it may, the notion of individuality so precious to liberalism and modernity 
was conceived some time at the beginning of the modem age and almost immediately had 
implications for the new (modem) conception of the state. In my opinion, it was Thomas 
Hobbes in his "Leviathan" who on a theoretical level issued the "birth certificate" of the 
modem state. Hobbes developed the new legitimacy of the state for the first time in the 
context of atomic individuals with their innate natural rights and broke off with the 
Aristotelian concept of the zoon politikon elaborated in "Politics". The Aristotelian ethics of 
virtue presupposed the naturalness of the polis (city-state) and explicitly rejected the concept 
of atomic individuality: " . . . and a man who is by nature and not merely by fortune 'citiless' 
ranks either low in the scale of humanity or above it", i.e. is a wild beast (therion) or a god 
(theos).9 Man's good life was the telos of the polis and vice versa Aristotle could not 
imagine a man living a good life without the polis. Thus, the theory of the state since the 
time of Aristotle and throughout the Middle Ages was always concomitant of the ethics of 
virtue and virtue itself was either rationally discovered in the world of ideas (for Plato and 
similarly yet differently for Aristotle) or rationally reconstructed by our understanding of 
ins naturale given by God (for Aquinas) or a result of God's command (for Ockham). I will 
now cite one example from private law as an illustration of such an ethics of virtue, which 
is easily understood by lawyers: Why should we keep the contract? According to Aristotle, 
there is a difference between the contract and performance on the bases of friendship and 
virtue. Only the contracts that are immediately performed (traditio in Roman law) are 
purely commercial transactions. If a promise is involved (a transaction with delayed 
performance), it shall not be a contract, but (in the end) a matter of a friendship and virtue. 
Thus, there is a duty to keep promises among friends because of virtue and the question of 
keeping contracts is not raised, because the offer and the acceptance ensues in the same 
moment (as in the case of traditio), therefore, the contract is a matter of the pure profit of 
the contractors. The matter is differently (and yet similarly) solved under Roman law-a 
"pure" promise is not legally protected and as such it shall not be enforceable in court 
(pactum nudum), therefore, its performance is only a matter of virtue, whereas only a 
promise concomitant to a formal contract (contractus) must be kept according to law. The 
duty to keep the contract is either a matter of virtue (among Aristotle's friends), or a matter 
of "economic" profit (in case of Aristotle's traditio) or a matter of form (in Roman law).10 
It was not a matter of an individual's will transferred to another person, simply because no 
8
 Taylor, Ch.: Sources of the Self. Cambridge, 1989. 
9
 Aristotle: Politics. 1253a. Cited according to the English translation by Rackham, H.: 
Cambridge-London, 1959, 9. 
10
 For these examples of adherence to contracts I am indebted to my colleague, Tomás Sobek. 
See Sobek, T.: Závaznost smlouvy (The Binding Character of Contracts). In: Havel, B.-Pihera, V. 
(eds): Soukromé právo na cestë. Eseje a jiné texty kjubileu Karla Eliáse. Plzen, 2010, 274-299. 
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clear concept of a morally autonomous individual obtained. It was rather an "external" 
virtue that guided the behaviour of man. 
Whereas, Hobbes posited autonomous individuals with natural rights as a necessary 
condition of the establishment of the state by a contract-thus, he invented the concept of 
social contract. This Hobbesian social contract must be adhered to neither because of virtue 
(how could we draw on the virtue of individuals who in a natural state behave like wolves?), 
nor because of "economic" profit (which plays a role in traditio, not for the future)," but 
because of the public force of the sovereign: "And covenants without sword are but words 
and of no strength to secure a man at all."12 We can see that in spite of the fact that Hobbes 
posited autonomous individuals, he deprives them of their autonomy in the moment they 
enter a state. At the same time, the sovereign is not necessarily endowed with virtue, since 
his/her "sword" is sufficient. We have to look elsewhere for the development of more fully 
elaborated concepts of the moral autonomy of the individual in the teachings of Hobbes' 
contemporary, Grotius (in the area of the obligatory character of private contract) and 
Hobbes' follower (and critic), Locke (in the area of the social contract, i.e. the obligatory 
character of "public" contract). As far as the ideas of Grotius are concerned, the form of a 
contract (or of a promise) is not an essential condition for adherence to a contract (or a 
promise); what matters is the will (or the intention) of the contractor (the promisor). We 
have the same power over our actions as we have over our property. The reason for 
adherence to the contract is the intention of the contractor to transfer a part of his/her will to 
another contractor. The promise consists in the alienation of a part of our freedom towards 
another contractor. Thus, even a pactum nudum has binding force, not necessarily according 
to positive law, but according to natural law. Thus, according to a different conception of 
the binding character of the contract, it lies in the individual's will. This constitutes an 
important step towards the moral autonomy of the individual, in spite of the fact that natural 
law is not conceived of as the product of the individual's moral choice yet, but it is still 
perceived as the rational duty of man ." As far as Locke is concerned, according to the 
"Second Treatise on Government", morally autonomous individuals retain their autonomy 
even after they have entered the state via a social contract (and thus retain their natural 
rights), therefore, the sovereign is bound by the contract (unlike Hobbes' sovereign) and 
cannot, e.g. impose the "right" religion on them (according to the "Letter on Tolerance"). 
This way the state that must respect the moral autonomy of individuals was created. 
We have seen how the notion of the moral individual slowly developed in the 16th and 
17th centuries and at the same time, often in the works of the same thinkers, new theories of 
the state (established via the social contract) emerged. Briefly, morally autonomous 
individuals create a legally autonomous state-of course, in those centuries it was primarily 
an absolutist state (of Hobbes or Pufendorf), with the exception of Locke's state. 
Nevertheless, the first complex philosophy of moral autonomy was introduced by Kant. For 
Kant, it is only possible to have moral laws, if these laws were autonomously chosen by an 
11
 It is true that for Hobbes the establishment of the state by a social contract was a matter of 
rationality and thus even a matter of "economic" profit-this is the reason why a sovereign could not 
deprive her citizens of their lives or personal property, because in that situation their position would 
not be any better than in the natural state. See Hobbes, T.: Leviathan. (Orig. publication: 1651), 
Prague, 2009, Chapter XXI, par. 11 et seq., 151 et seq. 
12
 See Hobbes, T.: ibid. Chapter XVII, par. 2, 117. 
13
 See Grotius, IL: On the Law of War and Peace. Translated by Campbell, А. С. (Orig. 
publication: 1625), London, 1814, Book II., Chapter XL 
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individual using a "test" of the categorical imperative-"act as if the maxim of your action 
could be universal law". I do not want to explicate his ideas deeply, since Kantian ethics as 
one of the most influential ethical conceptions is widely known. Nevertheless, I would like 
to point out that owing to Kant, the foundations of quite a different concept of the state 
have been conceived. He did not posit an absolutistic state, but a state bound by its own 
laws, i.e. a Rechtsstaat in German. In spite of the fact that the word "Rechtsstaat" cannot be 
found in Kant's works, many scholars claim that it was his intellectual influence that 
prepared the ground for various Rechtsstaat conceptions elaborated throughout the I9lh 
century.14 If we translate the Kantian idea of the morally autonomous individual, who binds 
himself/herself by moral maxims, into the realms of state and law, we reach the idea of the 
autonomous state that binds itself by its own laws embodied in Selbstverpflichtkeit ("self-
binding character") of the Rechtsstaat elucidated in Jellinek's Allgemeine Staatslehre,15 
Of course, we could mention theories of the state, which at first sight do not seem to be 
influenced by the concept of the morally autonomous individual. Now I'll present some of 
them and show that those state theories also reflect moral individuality-except that in these 
theories the individual is not perceived as a morally autonomous unit. The 19lh century 
brought forth many theories, which challenged the moral autonomy of the individual. For 
historicism, man was essentially the product of history, for nationalism, the product of the 
nation, for racism, the product of race, for conservative thinkers like Burke, the product of 
tradition, for Marxism, the product of impersonal economic forces. We can conclude that 
the morally autonomous individual was "dispersed" in history, tradition, nation, race or 
class. At the same time, the 19,h century produced new conceptions of the state, e.g. for a 
German nationalist, law and the state are essentially the product of "Volksgeist" (therefore, 
every nation has to have its suitable form of law, like for Savigny, or state, like, e.g. for 
Bluntschli). For Marxists (if there really obtains something like a Marxist conception of the 
state), the state is the instrument of the bourgeoisie employed to impose obcdience on 
powerless social classes; for organicists such as von Gierke, the state is merely one 
institution within the society besides, e.g. guilds and other associations. The important thing 
is that conceptions of the non-autonomous state (because it depends on nation, class, history 
etc.) feature along with the conceptions of the non-autonomous individual (that is, the 
individual "dispersed" in nation, class, history etc.). It is obvious that the conception of the 
state is modelled according to the conception of the individual.16 
14
 See Bluntschli, J. K.: Theory of the State. (English translation of the 6th German edition), 
London, 1885, 65 et. seq.; Jouanjan, О.: Présentation. In: Jouanjan, О. (ed.): Figures de l'Etat de 
droit. Le Rechtsstaat dans l'histoire intellectuelle et constitutionnelle de l'Allemagne. Strasbourg, 
2001, 13 et seq.; Heuschling, L.: Etat de droit, Rechtsstaat, Ride of Law. Paris, 2002, Chap. L, 
35 et seq. 
15
 Jcllinek, G.: Vseobecnástâtovëda. (Orig. publication: Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1900), Prague, 
1906, 508 et seq. 
16
 From this perspective, Hegel can be seen as an elaborator of the dialectical connection 
between moral individualism and the organic or historic conception of the state. On one side he posits 
civil society for expressing and ensuring individual interests; on the other side the state is posited at 
some higher moral level, which overcomes the differences in individual interests to form a public 
interest. This dialectical triumph is conceivable only within a particular conception of history, namely, 
the conception that history leads to the realm of freedom-in the sphere of the state, human freedom is 
more liberated than in the previous stages (the stage of civil society). 
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2. The second speculation 
Are we facing any changes in the conception of the morally autonomous individual at 
present? Maybe yes and I'll refer to one change that particularly worries me: the "free 
rider's" opportunistic moral. I mean something that was expressed by a French historian, 
Marcel Gauchet: "In front of our eyes a new ideological pathology is dcveloping-the 
pathology of non-belonging. It is the opposite of the non-normality of totalitarian times, 
when the individual was negated in the name of a collective that determined him/her (be it 
a race, a nation or a class). We arc now making the opposite mistake. The new entity of the 
pure individual is emerging, who does not owe anything to society, but demands everything 
from it. Duties towards a collective and bonds of a common history are becoming 
impossible... The collective is rejected if belonging to it causes any problems, but on the 
other hand there is a growing demand on a collective. An individual who wants to self-
govern himself/herself is taking shape, who exists by and for himself/herself, who does not 
want to belong to any entity, but in reality s/he demands guarantees for his/her very 
existence via this evasive entity.'"7 
What do I mean by the "free rider's" morality? The conception that our moral behaviour 
is the product of our individual choices is more or less accepted by various liberal 
conceptions (but of course not by the Aristotelian morality of virtue). The subject with a 
"free riding" morality is neither a Kantian subject, which has acquired his/her moral attitude 
due to the "test" of the categorical imperative. Why would it be rational to act in a way that 
the maxim of my action is universal law, if acting as I wish can be more effective for 
myself-why bother about paying for the ticket, if I can be a "free rider"? Of course, this 
"morality" cannot be universal (if everybody was a "free rider," the system of public 
transport would collapse), but why should the "free rider" bother? Of course, this "morality" 
cannot be sustained for the whole society in the long run (and many scholars of cthics argue 
that ethics has developed because it was rational not to be a "free rider" in the long run). 
"But in the long run, I will be dead anyway," a "free rider" could reply. In fact, "free riders" 
do not want freedom, because freedom implies responsibility; therefore, what they want is 
arbitrariness. They are not moral pluraliste, because moral pluralism in the end requires 
tolerance for the moral attitudes of others. Instead, they crave for "amorality" and 
arbitrariness, which are condemned by almost every book on ethics on the first pages. "Free 
riders" do not invoke tolerance or understanding for others, on the contrary, they are 
disinterested in the lives of others and respect sheer solutions that invoke power or force. 
"Free riders" neither treat others as ends in themselves (like in Kantian ethics), nor do they 
care about "greater happiness of great amount of people" (like in Bentham's utilitarism), on 
the contrary, they treat others as means to their own ends (their employees as the means of 
the production of profits, their lovers as the means of production of sexual satisfaction etc.) 
and they favour "public happiness" exclusively if they can benefit from it-not a minute 
longer. They live in variable social contexts according to their wishes (which in itself is 
nothing immoral) and switch them any time the specific social context expects them to 
contribute something. 
How the emergence of such "morality" is possible? I would like to offer a possible 
answer. In social reality not many people think about themselves explicitly as morally 
17
 Gauchet, M.: Dèjinny ûdël. Hovory s Francoisem Azouvim a Sylvainem Pironi. (Orig. 
publication: La condition historique, Paris, 2003), Brno, 2006, 180 and 191 (translated by the 
author). 
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autonomous subjects or do not formulate their moral attitudes explicitly. It is also possible 
for them to "switch" in various real life situations between different conceptions of morality 
and sometimes behave immorally. Modernity can be perceived as a process of emancipation 
that granted humankind (including slaves, women, various racial, sexual and ethnic 
minorities) the broadest possible freedom. However, during the process of modernization 
the evolution of the moral autonomy of the individual, which used to be the topic of ethics, 
was accompanied by various techniques of discipline, which has topicality for many 
historians, historical anthropologists and sociologists. Norbert Elias described how the rules 
of "proper" behaviour and politeness slowly emerged,18 whereas, Michel Foucault 
reformulated the history of modernity as a history of constant "normalization" called 
"biopolitics".19 Whether we agree with these theories or not, we reject these techniques or 
we endorse them as positive ones, still we can see that many perceptions of these thinkers 
are true. One of the conclusions of Foucault's theories could be that while we regarded 
ourselves in the course of history as more and more liberated (and every new bill of human 
rights seems to confirm this perception), our freedom as morally autonomous individuals 
was in fact facilitated merely by those techniques of normalization. But what happened 
when the "free rider's morality" emerged? The same processes of civilization and 
normalization gave rise to many mysterious organizations not necessarily originating in the 
state, which decide on our lives without care about our freedom. As one Czech sociologist 
claimed: "What is in fact rational about the fact that an atomic bomb can be dropped any 
time on people, who use their handkerchiefs and feel ashamed of taking the meal on the 
table as first? Civilization is at the crossroads, when polite behaviour does not lead to any 
rewards, but straightforward brutality is gaining ground as a result of the arrogant decisions 
of state bureaucracies... Modern society has reached the moment, when "normal" brutality 
is sometimes still punished, but politeness is no longer rewarded."20 This tenet can be valid 
not only from the perspective that modernity brought forth an all-powerful state, but also 
from the perspective that our safety and confidence (one of the "dearest" values we as a 
people have) are in danger not only because of the behaviour of the state, but also because 
of the powers our states are unable (or unwilling?) to control - and we could expound here 
extensively on the impacts of economic globalization with its financial crises and so on. If 
the "moral" behaviour of Kant's subject does not yield the "polite" social environment 
anymore, why not become "free riders"? 
The implications of the "free rider's morality" can be clear: The whole public sphere, 
which manifests itself in communication, rituals and gestures, as a sphere of the symbolic 
18
 Elias, N.: О procesu civilizace. (Orig. publication: Über den Prozess den Zivilisation, Basel, 
1939), Prague, 2006. 
19
 For the process of disciplining and normalization in the factories, schools and primarily the 
prisons of early modernity, see Foucault, M.: Doh/ízet a trestat. Kniha о zrodu vëzeni. (Orig. 
publication: Surveiller et punir, Paris, 1975), Prague, 2000. For disciplining as a universal technique 
applied to the whole population of the absolutist state, see Foucault, M.: Security, Territory, Population, 
Lectures at the College de France 1977-78, and Foucault, M.: Je treba bránit spolecnost. Kurs na 
College de France 1975-1976. (Orig. publication: II faut defendre la société, Paris, 1997), Prague, 
2005. For the problem of "homo oeconomicus", which is treated in a similar manner to our problem 
of "free riders", see Foucault, M.: Zrození biopolitiky. Kurs na College de France 1978-1979. (Orig. 
Publication: La naissance de la biopolitique. Paris, 2004), Brno, 2009. 
20
 Keller, J.: Nedomyslená spolecnost (Unconsidered Society). Brno, 1992, 42 (translated by the 
author). 
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order is in danger. For lawyers, the judicial ritual is jeopardised with regard to the future, 
because it does not connect people anymore in a common idea of justice.21 Claiming that "it 
is a gesture" means "it is a lie." As to the future, there are only words that try to manipulate 
with others and gestures that are empty. And if the public sphere is at stake, the distinction 
between the public and private will blur, as well: Are the people living in front of TV 
cameras in "reality shows" for twenty-four hours a day living their private or public lives? 
Are the people in virtual worlds such as Second Life living their private or public lives? 
3. Possible implications of the conception of the state: the state as an authoritarian 
"insurance company" 
Modem states declared they protected the interests of their citizens. The insurance of safety 
was the main motivation of the people who established the Hobbesian state. The absolutist 
state declared that it prevailed so as to grant people the "public good" (whether they wanted 
it or not). Later, states based on the rule of law declared that they were associations for the 
protection of human rights and modem democratic states claim to have power over what 
people have authorised them to do in the election process. Sovereignty is the "soul" of the 
state and the proclamation of people's sovereignty implies the necessary democratic 
legitimacy. 
Nonetheless, we are witnessing various changes in the concept of sovereignty, such as 
post-sovereignty or multi-level governance. Blurring the division of the public and private 
spheres has brought about the PPPs or the shift from government to governance. Is the state 
(as an actor that can effect changes in reality in favour of the interest of its people) 
disappearing? From the "free rider's" perspective the state has a mere simple function: it 
should act as an "insurance company", which helps "free riders," if some of their acts have 
failed to be successful. It is in fact indifferent, whether "free riders" are persons who lost 
their jobs or families or financial companies that face bankmptcy. The state can privatise, 
effect outsourcing or other activities that limit its role as an economic actor. But abandonment 
of functioning as an "insurance company" is impossible, otherwise "free riders" would have 
to behave in a responsible manner. The complete disappearance of the state (the aim of 
many anarchists or libertarians) is not a program for "free riders". Potentially all citizens 
arc "free riders," among whom bonds of solidarity do not obtain. It is indifferent whether 
"free riders" are successful in their personal lives (and consider their not-so-successful co-
citizens to be "losers" or "parasites") or unsuccessful (and think about successful citizens 
with envy and hatred). Since there is no solidarity in a society of "free riders", the state 
must force "free riders" to contribute something to the state. In view of that, the "insurance 
company" must be an authoritarian institution. The practices of the "policing state" are 
stronger and stronger (DNA and other databases collecting data about us, surveillance 
cameras and legislation sometimes clashing with our human rights etc.) and again they are 
open to privatization or outsourcing, but only in so far as private firms (as "good" "free 
riders") can benefit from these and the state does not fall prey to anarchy. If the inhabitants 
of the state are all potential "free riders", why shouldn't those who govern the state, i.e. 
politicians and bureaucrats be "free riders", as well? If discussions (that can effect change 
in somebody's opinion, because he or she is convinced by the arguments of the other party) 
are obsolete (because "free riders" change their opinions as they wish), can we still say that 
21
 See Garapon, A.: Le devenir de rituel judiciaire? In: Biet, Ch.-Schifano, L. (ed.): 
Représentations du procès. Droit, Théâtre, Littérature, Cinéma. Paris, 2003, 23 et seq. 
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we live in a deliberative democracy? Is our policy determined by democratic deliberation or 
rather by economic factors the state is unable (or unwilling?) to control? Or is it rather the 
fear of terrorism (that justifies almost anything including practices like "waterboarding") 
that dictates our laws? If "free riders" behave dangerously, we call them "rogue" and use 
force against them, if states behave dangerously, we call them "rogue states" and use force 
against them. If "free riders" fail in their personal lives, we call them "failed" and send 
them to an "insurance company", if states fail in their role as "insurance companies", we 
call them "failed states". Therefore, my conclusion is that the state is the mirror of the 
individual. 
1216-2574/USD 20.00 
© 2011 Akadémiai Kiadó. Budapest 
A C T A J U R I D I C A H U N G A R I C A 
52, No 2, pp. 166-170 (2011) 
DOI: 10. l556/AJur.52.2011.2.7 
VÎT ST'ASTNY* 
The Continuity and Discontinuity of the Titles of 
Supreme State Organs in the European Countries 
of the Communist Bloc with special attention to the Situation 
in Czechoslovakia 
The following contribution deals with the development of the titles of supreme state organs 
(i.e. heads of state) in European countries during the communist era with respect to the 
differences between these countries. The head of state is considered to be a symbol 
representing the state in relation to other countries and often functions as a living symbol of 
the unity of the state. 
Central European, South-Eastern and Eastern European countries with communist 
regimes would change the organ that served as head of state. These changes were motivated 
in some cases by the fact that monarchy had been deposed and replaced by the republic, but 
the countries that had been republics before the communist coups d'état changed their 
supreme organs, as well. The value of discontinuity was this way reinforced by titular or 
symbolic discontinuity. 
All the so-called Eastern Bloc countries (the Soviet Union and its satellites) used to be 
republics (monarchy is by definition precluded in such countries). Nevertheless, most of 
these countries refused the traditional concept that the head of the republic should be the 
President of the Republic. Although, some of them (mostly only for a limited period) were 
represented by the President of the Republic, most of these countries in accordance with the 
principle of collective leadership replaced the individual President by collective organs such 
as the titular head of state (the chairman of this collective organ was regarded as the head of 
the republic). However, despite the proclaimed principle of collective leadership, political 
life was organized on the basis of the leader principle. The Secretary General or First 
Secretary of the Communist Party (the Head of the Communist Party) was positioned on 
top of the pyramid. The Head of the Communist Party functioned sometimes as a head of 
state, sometimes as a head of government, but there was no common rule: the practice 
varied in different countries. Despite the specific practices in different Eastern Bloc 
countries, there were some common features. The basic common feature was the collectivity 
of the organ that served as head of state (if presidency had been abolished). The abolition of 
presidency often ensued after the death of the incumbent president or after the adoption of a 
new constitution. 
Before the description of the historical situation in Eastern Bloc countries, let me 
engage in a brief summary about the respective situation in our current world. Most of 
contemporary republics favour a constitutional system, in which the President of the 
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Republic functions as the head. Out of 194 independent states, 45 states are monarchies, 
149 are republics. The head of the monarchy is the Emperor (Japan), the King or Queen 
(Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
other 15 countries of the Commonwealth,1 Bahrain, Bhutan, Jordan, Cambodia, Malaysia, 
Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Lesotho, Morocco, Swaziland, Samoa, Tonga), the Grand Duke 
(Luxembourg), the Prince (Monaco, Liechtenstein) or two Co-Princes, respectively 
(Andorra), the Sultan (Brunei, Oman), the Emir (Qatar, Kuwait), the Pope (The Vatican). 
The United Arab Emirates constitute a monarchy, a federation of seven federal emirates 
(these emirates are monarchies), however, the head of all federations is the President. The 
remaining 149 countries are republics. The President is the head in 142 countries (if we 
include the United Arab Emirates, the President is the head of state in 143 countries). Seven 
other republics, where the President is not the head of state, include Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(collective presidency with 3 members and a rotating chairman), San Marino (two Captains-
Regent), Burma (Chairman of the National Council for Peace and Development), Niger 
(Chairman of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy), Cuba (President of 
the Council of State), North Korea and Libya, where it is questionable who the head of 
state is.2 
At present, therefore, the titles of the President of the Republic and the head of state 
don't overlap in merely seven republics. The number of republics where the President of 
the Republic doesn't coincide with the head of state decreased after the collapse of 
communist regimes in Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. In these countries, the 
characteristic collective state leadership without an individual President used to be 
common. 
In Poland after World War IÍ, presidency was restored in 1947. However, this post was 
abolished in accordance with the July Constitution of 1952, which copied the soviet model. 
Between 1952 and 1989, the Council of State functioned as the collective head of state of 
Poland. Following the Polish Round Table Agreement in 1989, the Council of State was 
abolished and its Chairman (Jaaizelski) became President of the Republic for a transitional 
period. Simultaneously, the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile also prevailed 
and it was headed by the President of the Republic (1939-1990). That secured the continuity 
with the Polish Republic before World War II. The last president in exile was Ryszard 
Kaczorowski, who resigned upon the election of Lech Watçsa as President of the Republic 
of Poland in 1990. The ninety-year-old Kaczorowski died in April 2010 during the air crash 
near Smolensk. 
The situation in the German Democratic Republic was similar to that in Poland. 
Although the GDR was a newly established republic under soviet control, its head was 
President of the Republic. Nevertheless, after the death of Wilhelm Pieck, the first president 
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(1960), the presidency was abolished and the Council of State as a new collective organ 
serving as head of state was set up in the GDR. This constitutional situation prevailed until 
the end of the GDR in 1990. 
In Hungary, presidency had existed until 1949 when in accordance with the new 
constitution it was replaced by the collective Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's 
Republic. The incumbent President became its first chairman. However, individual 
presidency was restored after the collapse of the communist regime in Hungary. 
In Romania, after the coerced abdication of King Michael I and the abolition of 
monarchy, the Chairman of the Presidium of the National Grand Assembly functioned as 
head of state. This status changed in 1961, afterwards the Chairman of the Council of State 
served as head of state. The next change ensued in 1974, when the ambitious Romanian 
communist leader, Ceauçescu proclaimed himself President. In communist Romania, the 
tendency was opposed to that in other communist countries, since a collective head of state 
was replaced by an individual President. 
In Bulgaria, subsequently to the abolition of monarchy, the departure of Tsar Simeon 
II to exile and the provisional presidency of Vasil Petrov Kolarov (1946-1947), in 
accordance with new constitution a titular head of state, i.e. the Chairman of the Presidium 
of the National Assembly was in office. After 1971, when next new constitution was 
adopted, the Council of State (with the chairman at the top) functioned as a collective head 
of state. This constitutional situation prevailed until the collapse of the communist regime 
in Bulgaria. 
In Yugoslavia, President Tito (before 1953 he had served as the Prime Minister) 
functioned as head of state. After Tito's death individual presidency was abolished and the 
Collective Presidency (with its rotating heads as representatives of the Yugoslav nations) 
functioned as head of state. The individual presidency was restored in 1992, but by that 
time the original Yugoslavia had already dissolved. 
During the entire communist period, the titular head of Albania was the Chairman of 
the Presidium of the People's Assembly. Presidency was restored in 1991. 
Finally, it was the situation in the Soviet Union, its constitutional and state system with 
its Stalinist constitution dating back to 1936 that were models for its satellites. From 1938, 
the titular head was the State Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (between 
1989 and 1990 only Chairman of the Supreme Soviet). The first and the last President of the 
Soviet Union, that is, Gorbachev was elected in 1990. 
In the second part of this article, I will describe the respective situation in communist 
Czechoslovakia. This situation was specific. The head of the Czech state from its formation 
had been the Prince, then the King. Since the end of the monarchy and the establishment of 
the Czechoslovak Republic, the head has been the President of the Republic. This 
presidential tradition was not disrupted cither in the era of communism. In contrast to other 
Eastern Bloc countries, the individual president in Czechoslovakia has never been replaced 
by a collective organ. 
The position of the President of Czechoslovakia (and of the Czech Republic at the 
moment) is peculiar not only from a constitutional, but also from political and sociological 
points of view. The President of the Republic enjoys full public confidence and the majesty 
of the position is accented by some (not only legal) circumstances, such as his seat is in the 
majestic Prague Castle, which is the largest coherent castle complex in the world, 
furthermore, his portraits are on display in schools, offices and other public spaces despite 
the lack of a relevant legal obligation. He is the only living person with portraits on post 
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stamps, finally, the President is welcomed by ceremonious fanfares signalling his arrival 
during official actions. 
The Czech presidential tradition was created by Masaryk, the first Czechoslovak 
president and his successors have always followed in his footsteps. We can cite a definitive 
historical publication that outlines the dominant view on President Masaryk: "The first 
president, T. G. Masaryk with his extensive education in philosophy, history and sociology, 
knowledge of foreign countries and languages, with important scientific and educational 
activities, significant political experience and exquisite personal morality has created a 
standard of statesmanship in Czech political culture and thereby has become an unattainable 
ideal for his successors".3 
In some respects, Masaryk followed the monarchical traditions of the Czech lands. He 
was called "taticek"-daddy (good father of the nation). This concept was partially transferred 
to his successors. This is important as to understanding the developments after the 
communist coup. 
The presidential tradition in the Czech lands was not disrupted even during World War 
II, since besides Benes, the president in exile, the so-called state president Hácha was in 
office in the Nazi-controlled Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia. 
After the communist coup d'état in February 1948 (formally perpetrated in accordance 
with constitution), the incumbent democratic president, Benes remained in office (in 
accordance with communist interests, since the legitimacy of the new regime was thereby 
strengthened). After President Benes' abdication (four months later), a new president, 
Gottwald, the leader of the Communist Party and Prime Minister was elected. The 
constitution of 1948 had been prepared before the communist coup and many legal 
institutions (including individual presidency) originated in the constitution of the first 
republic. Therefore, communist leadership benefited from the prestigious and popular post 
of the presidency. 
After Gottwald's death in 1953, the abolishment of the post of the President of the 
Republic became possible. The issue was discussed in leading organs of the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia, but the according proposals were rejected, since obviously, the 
Communist Regime intended to draw on the popularity of the presidential post. Relevant 
discussions resuscitated during the preparation of the new constitution in 1960, nevertheless, 
the establishment of a new collective head of state was rejected again. Although, the new 
so-called Socialist Constitution copied soviet models, the name of the country (Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic) changed and consequently, the national emblem was also replaced, 
whereas, the post of the President of the Republic was retained. This constitutional situation 
did not change until the end of the Czechoslovak communist era in 1989. 
The post of the President of the Republic used to be largely ceremonial, but its 
importance increased, since the head of the Communist Party was often elected to be 
President. Communist leaders considered this post to be a symbolic confirmation of their 
leading role in the country. 
Let me mention one example from 1975. Seriously ill President Svoboda refused to 
abdicate, therefore the Parliament adopted a special constitutional amendment. This act 
stated that the Parliament (the Federal Assembly) was authorised to elect a new president 
provided that the incumbent one was unable to carry out his official duties for a year or 
even longer. In Svoboda's case, his bad health made the act relevant. Immediately after the 
3
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adoption of this amendment, the Secretary General of the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia, Husák was elected new president, although except for symbolic power, he 
acquired no real power. 
Subsequently, the presidential tradition with its symbolic importance has continued 
undisrupted in the Czech Republic. 
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New trends of atypical contracts in Hungary 
1. Description of atypical contracts 
The regulatory bounds of Hungarian Civil Code were broadened by the development and 
phenomena of the market economy, which also led to the development of different legal 
"formations" relying on the contractual freedom declared by the great codices of natural 
law of the ninetieth century: 
- the professional, businesslike management (the regular producing, service providing, 
commercial activity in order to get profit), the establishment and application of newer and 
newer contracts became possible because of the so many financial connections and 
connection among goods, the enormous investments, the cross-border relations of legal 
transactions, and 
- new contractual techniques appeared which exceeded the traditionally institu-
tionalized basic types of contracts: these arc too detailed, self-regulating agreements tending 
to unification, standardization. 
The need of the establishment of the group of atypical-different from those contracts 
expressly mentioned by name in the Hungarian Civil Code-contracts arose because of the 
economic changes and changes in the legal practice in Hungary at the end of the 20,h 
century. 
The characteristics of these contractual relationships arc the following:1 
a) Atypical agreements has no Hungarian names generally, their names have foreign 
origin (e.g. leasing agreement, franchise agreement, concession agreement, syndication 
agreement, licence agreement) or they are designated in a complicated way that does not 
express the essence of the legal relationship precisely (e.g. consort agreement as an 
agreement with the purpose of taking part in the group of consumers; timesharing agreement 
as an agreement with the aim to acquire the right of utilization of a real estate for a definite 
and repeated period of time). 
b) The "Express contracts" (Part Four, Title III) of Hungarian Civil Code does not 
dispose of atypical contracts, they cannot be ranked among the contracts mentioned by 
their name. It must be noticed that this feature is relative: a new situation can evolve by the 
amendment and the recodification of the Hungarian Civil Code. 
c) The foreign patterns of practice and legislation and the domestic customs had a 
very important role in the establishment and development of the rules referring to atypical 
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contracts. The legal constructions formed this way became clear and they were regulated by 
law within a decade or even few years were enough for it. 
d) Except for the syndicate agreement and the franchise agreement, atypical contracts 
became codified by an act (e.g. concession agreement, independent commercial agency 
agreement) or governmental regulation (e.g. itinerant sale, "distance contract") or by an 
implemented international convention (e.g. factoring, leasing). 
e) In the European development of law several efforts to unification can be observed 
in connection with these agreements (e.g. Directive 85/577/EC about the itinerant sale, 
Directive 94/47/EC about the timesharing, Directive 97/7/EC about the "distance contracts") 
and by the harmonization of laws in the European Union its impact on the Hungarian 
regulation can be clearly seen. 
f ) According to the item 200( 1 ) of the Civil Code ("The parties are free to define the 
contents of contracts, and they shall be entitled, upon mutual consent, to deviate from the 
provisions pertaining to contracts if such deviation is not prohibited by legal regulation."), 
with regard to the freedom of the contractual (v/?e-abiding by the prohibition of violation of 
legal rcgulations-these agreements can be concluded with an optional content and the 
general rules of contracts (Civil Code, Part Four, Title I) also refer to them. 
g) Though there is no obligatory formality in case of some atypical contracts 
(syndication contract, franchise agreement, operative leasing agreement), the others 
(independent commercial agency agreement, consort agreement, timesharing agreement, 
concession agreement, factoring agreement, financial leasing agreement) must be concluded 
in a written form-according to the rules of law-, but in practice the written form is preferred: 
it is not necessary for the contract to become operative, but it is a kind of a guarantee and it 
has an important role as an evidence. 
h) The effort to create a detailed and precise formulation resulted in the application of 
general conditions of a contract and blank contracts. 
i) Generally there is an economic organization (point 685(c) of Hungarian Civil Code) 
or an undertaking in conformity with the Consumer Protection Act (point 2(b) of the Act 
CLV of 1997) as one of the subjects of atypical contracts but since the trade has been 
extended and has become more complex, both subjects of the contractual relation can be 
economic organization or undertaking (e.g. "distance contracts", factoring agreement, 
franchise agreement). 
j) Atypical agreements regulate long-term relations of the market therefore they tend 
to refer to a permanent legal relationship (except for the "distance contracts" and itinerant 
sale). 
The expression "atypical" itself is not new in the field of the regulation of contracts: 
in the 20s and 40s of the 20th century this or the category "non-typified" could be found in 
the literature.2 Those obligations relying on legal bases that are different from those 
institutionalized forms that can be complied with the classification created by Roman law 
were considered to call contracts without name/classification or innominated/atypical 
contracts. Licence agreements, syndication agreements, huckstery agreements, tariff 
agreements and the various compensatory trade agreements belong to this group. The 
2
 See also Villányi. L.: A magyar magánjog rövid tankönyve (Short Textbook of the Hungarian 
Private Law). Budapest, 1941. 
NEW T R E N D S OF ATYPICAL C O N T R A C T S IN H U N G A R Y 1 7 3 
content of these contracts were formed by the consent of the parties beyond the rules 
contained in the general provisions of contract law of the Hungarian Draft of Private Law.3 
2. Classification of atypical contracts 
In order to classify a part of the modern contracts, the category of mixed contracts 
(contractus mixtus) was established. Agreements including the services provided by express 
contracts in many ways belong to this group: 
a) it can be a contract that unites the different types (e.g. purchase agreement combined 
with donation), in this case the elements of different contracts are combined and they cannot 
be separated, it cannot be identified from which contract the provisions were originated 
from; 
b) or it can be a contract with a combination of types in it (e.g. theatre contract), in 
this case the features of different contracts are not combined with each other but they are 
mixed in a new contract in a way that they can be separated and remain identifiable; see the 
decision of Supreme Court Gfv. IX. 30. 018/2005., this decision is about the breach of a 
mixed contract-with elements of professional service, agency and leasing-and the Supreme 
Court separated the legal consequences by types of contracts; the agreement on the 
utilization of software also belongs to this group as it contains elements of professional 
service, leases, leasehold and leasing and it depends on the object of the dispute which 
contractual provisions shall be used (e.g. in case of software-utilization the elements of 
leases shall be used) (Metropolitan Court of Appeal 5. pf. 21. 373/2006/3.); 
c) or the object of the contract can be an entirely special service (e.g. agreement in 
order to manage the tasks of the caretaker; subtenancy agreement concluded for a definite 
period and combined with agency agreement referring to placing placard-Supreme Court 
Pfv. XI. 20. 314/2006.; mixed agreement covering a complex legal relation similar to the 
franchise agreement with elements of leasehold and utilization which refers to of the entry, 
utilization, operation of a parking system-SZIT-H-GJ-2008-89.), but as for its other features 
it is not special and not different from the contracts in Civil Code. 
Atypical contracts cannot be ranged -without anxiety -among any classes of mixed 
contracts; atypical contracts arc a group of independent, sui generis agreements for they 
include all types of mixed contracts or none of them; therefore the mixed contracts and 
atypical contracts are not the same category: atypical group is more (the combination of 
mixed types) and different (at the same time they cannot be classified among these types). 
The innominated contracts are not considered to be classified as atypical contracts. 
These contracts generally appear as "Agreements", there is no permanent legal relation 
regulated by them but they cover special legal transaction that does not arise regularly. 
Contrary to atypical contracts they have no names or nomination, they are not widespread 
but they are unique and exceptional contracts without normative regulation. The rights and 
obligations deriving from these innominated contracts can be settled by the application of 
common rules of contracts of the Civil Code; see e.g. decision of Supreme Court: Pfv. I/A. 
3
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20. 446/2001. (in connection with the agreement close to servitude but it cannot be 
considered as loan for use). 
Those nominated contracts that are regulated in "Express contracts" of the Civil Code 
are not atypical, but they are typical ones as the agreements concluded in everyday-life are 
compared to these contracts. 
According to the facts mentioned in the first two items, the following contracts are 
considered to be atypical: syndication agreement, "distance agreement", itinerant sale, 
independent commercial agency agreement, timesharing agreement, consort agreement, 
concession agreement, licence agreement, franchise agreement, leasing agreement and the 
factoring agreement. 
3. The attitude of the legislator and the judicial practice to atypical contracts 
The appearance of atypical contracts resulted in the abandonment of dogmatic traditions 
and-at the beginning-a very doubtful enforcement of law. 
As for the regulation of atypical contracts many views showed up:4 
a) absorption-theory: provisions referring to that express and namely designated 
contract of the Civil Code which is the most similar to that certain atypical contract 
(especially in regard to congruency of essential services) must be enabled to receive and 
"absorb" that atypical contract in question; 
b) combination-theory: making a "list" (coordination of the contractual facts and legal 
consequences) referring to the different aspects of the certain atypical contract under which 
provisions of the express contracts of the Civil Code can be judged; 
c) analogical theory: application of general rules of contracts of the Civil Code 
referring to atypical contract?; 
d) creation-theory: because of the complication to insert atypical contracts in the 
system of the Civil Code this area of jurisdiction must be codified in accordancc with the 
purpose of the contract and the interest of the parties by the creation of special rules. (This 
theory is followed by actual legislation in connection with atypical contracts.) 
At the recodification-that is still going on-of the Hungarian Civil Code the problem of 
regulating atypical contracts in a code became highlighted: in the promulgated concept of 
the new Civil Code (Magyar Közlöny Vol. II., No. 15., 31s1 January 2002.) the explanatory 
statements of some parts arc contradictory. We consider-by making the actual provisions 
more flexible-the "distance contract" can be inserted in the spécial conducts of contracts, the 
itinerant sale can be included in the special modes of sale, the independent agency agreement 
can be classified as a special agency, the factoring agreement can be inserted in the rules of 
assignment and contracts referring to financial services. The timesharing can be codified 
after its insertion (it depends whether it belongs to possession or contract law). The 
codification of concession agreement and franchise agreement among utilization contracts 
and the leasing agreement (relying on the two basic types: the financial leasing and the 
operative leasing) among the financial and utilization obligations must be considered. In our 
opinion the consort agreement and the syndication contract cannot be regulated in the Civil 
Code. Comparing to the earlier concept the new draft of Civil Code (31st December 2006.) 
is one step backward in connection with the adaptation of atypical contracts into the Civil 
Code: from the contracts of this book only two can be found in the Draft. The category of 
factoring is implied in the definition of assignment [section 5:167. An obligee (assignor) 
4
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shall be entitled to transfer his future, conditional claim that is against the obligor, to another 
person (assignee) by contract], but the provisions of the concept regulating the factoring 
agreement cannot be found in the Draft. Conversely the independent commercial agency 
agreement is regulated in the Draft; see: section 5:289. the agency agreement, section 5:96. 
the contract on solicitation, section 5:310. the characteristics of the solicitation of insurance 
and B&L association. The agency (intermediary) agreements-as an independent type of 
contract-are not regulated by the Civil Code; these contracts are considered to be agency of 
representation, more exactly they belong to commercial (market) agency (Metropolitan 
Court Gf. 75.600/2004.) According to recent developments there are two drafts of the Civil 
Code: the Expert Draft of the Codification Commission and the bill no. T/5949. of the 
Ministry of Hungarian Justice and Law Enforcement. The Expert Draft takes a stand on a 
code based on monistic view and the reason for it is that the contracts applied in the 
commercial life and constructed especially for the commercial life do not dispose of attributes 
that would require a special legal provision. In lack of suitable core to create a type, atypical 
contracts from the aspect of factoring, leasing and franchise agreements are not regulated by 
the Draft, but-according to it-it makes the existing contractual law able to solve the emerging 
legal problems. Similarly to the Draft of 2006 the Expert Draft of 2008 makes the application 
of assignment (sections 5:176—5:177.) possible for factoring agreement and settles the rules 
of agency (sections 5:308.-5:315.) and the provisions of the contract on solicitation (sections 
5:316.-5:331.). The draft of January, 2009 of the ministry is also suitable for the implication 
of assignment (sections 5:168-5:165.) and the factoring but instead of agency agreement the 
intermediary contract (sections 5:271-5:275.) is regulated and the solicitation contracts are 
reframed (sections 5:276-5:287.) and the leasing (sections 5:340-5:347.) and the factoring 
(sections 5:348-5:354) agreement are also wished to be codified. 
Atypical contracts are generally approached from the aspect of the result by the 
judiciary practice: they concentrate on the judgment of the legal transaction and not on the 
qualification. Therefore, based on the conditions of the transaction it examines: 
- the purpose of the potential intention of the parties; 
the commercial, economic aim wished to be reached; 
- the special attributes of the specified service; 
- and-apart from the above-mentioned-what the parties considered to be essential 
from the aspect of the conclusion of the contract when regulating their legal relationship. 
The type of the contract is not defined by the nomination given or wording used by the 
parties, but by its content based on the elements of the definition of the agreement. The 
openness and flexibility of the judiciary view are confirmed by one of the decisions of the 
Supreme Court: the title of the acquisition of a property can also be concluded from an 
atypical contract as according to the contractual freedom the agreement of the parties is 
legally binding even if the type of the contract cannot be found among the nominated, 
express contracts of the Civil Code (EBH 2009. 1843., LB Kfv. IV. 37.074/2007.). 
4. Groups of atypical contracts'' 
Atypical contracts cannot be classified by only one attribute and the usual classification 
related to contract law (based on the aspect of subject, object, service) has no result either. 
Therefore a different classifying is used, which is out of the ordinary: atypical contracts can 
be divided into independent and not independent (dependent) contracts. 
5
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The independent group is made up by agreements that arc independent from other 
legal relationships and other activities; therefore the concession agreement, the licence 
agreement, the factoring agreement, the franchise agreement and the leasing agreement 
belong to this group. 
The category of "non-independent" (dependent) contracts can be divided into two 
classes depending on the fact whether the atypical contract in question is based on another 
legal relationship or activity. The syndication agreement is an atypical contract connecting 
to another legal relationship, because it is based on the memorandum of association. The 
other group of atypical contracts relies on a certain activity-that is conducted professionally, 
in a businesslike manner by one of the parties-and in this case these contracts transmit the 
benefit of that certain activity towards the consumer. The distance contract belongs here, 
because it is related to the purchasing and service-providing activity of the undertaking, 
similarly to the itinerant sale, the independent commercial agency, the consort agreement 
and the timesharing agreement. (The regulation of this subdivision of the non-independent 
atypical contracts is highly influenced by the protection of consumers.) 
Atypical contracts can be divided into groups depending on whether their accessorial 
or essential characteristics are different from the contracts typically mentioned in the 
Hungarian Civil Code. The following contracts belong to the accessorial atypical 
contracts: 
- the distance contract, in this case the way of drawing up the contract means the 
difference; 
- the itinerant sale, bccause the place of drawing up the contract is special; 
- the independent commercial agency, because it is a unique commission; 
- the timesharing contract, as it regulates a special utilization right, which cannot be 
found in Hungarian Civil Code. Considering the substance, the indirect object (the service) 
of the contract, atypical contracts are fundamentally different from the agreements namely 
mentioned in the Hungarian Civil Code. 
Atypical contracts can be categorized by their codification too: whether they are 
regulated in a legal norm and if yes what kind of regulations or acts they are. 
5. New tendencies in the field of atypical contracts 
The category of atypical contracts is open and incomplete from many aspects: on the one 
hand they can belong to the namely codified contracts by a possible insertion in the system 
of Civil Code, on the other hand the regulation of legal relations by contracts is required 
because of the changing economic and social circumstances. If the essential elements of 
these agreements, reflecting the new phenomena, comply with the criterions of atypical 
contracts-after a certain period for "crystallizing ouf ' - they can be considered to fall under 
this contractual category. Hereinafter two contracts are presented that will belong to atypical 
contracts after some years of consolidation and stabilization: 
5.1. Treatment contract 
This name comes from the German "Behandlungsvertag" and it has Anglo-Saxon roots as 
well. This contract is inserted among service contracts in the Draft (Principles of Law; PEL) 
drawn up by the Study Group of European Civil Code.6 
6
 von Bar, C.-Clive, E.-Schulte-Nölkc, H. (eds): Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference. Munich, 2008. 
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The treatment contract is a kind of agreement according to which the provider of the 
medical service provides the mentioned medical service for natural persons receiving 
medical carc by abiding by the customs of that profession, the practice (protocol), the 
ethical rules and principles and in a manner that can be generally expected. The purpose of 
this contract is to provide a medical service that is suitable for the will and interest of the 
patient or the person who resorts this medical care (High Court of Appeal of Szeged Pf. 
III.20 308/2007.). The subjects of the treatment contract are the provider of the medical 
service (natural person, legal entity or an organization without legal entity with a license of 
the public health authority to provide medical services; item 3(f) of Act CLIV of 1997 on 
Health) and the person who receives this medical service (the generally used designation 
"patient" is not correct, for a natural person who goes to a screening test and other obligatory 
examinations/who is vaccinated or gives birth to a child cannot be considered to be ill so as 
to be a patient). The direct object of the treatment contract is to provide or receive medical 
service; the indirect object is the medical service itself. 
As for the subject matter of the treatment contract in connection with the rights and 
obligations of the health care workers (especially doctors) and patients the following 
statements can be made:7 
- they are in correlation with each other (the obligation on the side on the doctor 
appears as a right on the side of the patient; for example the duty to provide information-
right to information); 
- certain rights can only be effective by complementing each other (for example the 
right to receive medical service-right to consent); 
- in some cases the requirement of exercising a right is an obligation (for example the 
duty of documentation, data protection-inherent rights); 
- on the ground of treatment contract the patient has the right to receive medical 
service-which is a fundamental right provided by the constitution-so as to every patient has 
the right to receive medical care that is justified by his health, continuous, appropriate and 
without discrimination and the right to relieve the pain and suffer [Act on Health section 6, 
item 7(1)]. The rights to choose the attending physician and to initiate to be examined by 
another physician appear as sub-rights of the right to receive medical service. The right of 
the patient to health care is realized as a duty to provide health care on the side of the 
physician and he has the right to refuse the examination or treatment only in cases held by 
the Act on Health; if the obligation to provide medical service is not exercised according to 
the rules by the provider, it must bear the responsibility for the consequences emerging in 
connection with the violation of rules (Equal Treaty Authority 1419, 2006.). According to 
his right of self-determination, the patient can decide whether he exercises his right to get 
medical care by resorting it (completely/partly) or to refuse it. For the appropriate exercise 
of self-determination it is essential for the physician to exercise his own right to choose 
freely among the scientifically accepted methods of examination and therapy: relying on his 
special knowledge and expertise recommendations are made by him on issues related to 
examination/treatment and the patient voices his opinion about it. The right to self-
determination is closely related to the right to information: the physician must inform the 
patient about his state of health, the recommended examinations and operations, the 
advantages, the consequences of their postponement, the risks, the process and expected 
7
 Papp: Ibid. 18-21 ; Dósa, Á.: Az orvos kártérítési felelőssége (Doctor's Liability for Damages). 
Budapest, 2004; Jobbágyi, G.: Orvosi jog (Medical Law). Budapest, 2007. 
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outcome of the treatment and about other alternative possibilities. The physician does not 
have the duty to inform if the patient waives his right to information or regarding to his 
state of health the physician decides to retain certain information Act on Health item 135(1). 
The right of the patient to learn and examine the contents of his healthcare documentation 
and the request for information related to it is a sub-right of the right to information that can 
only be asserted by complying the duty of documentation of the provider of the medical 
service. The duty of documentation is related to the obligation of the physician to maintain 
confidentiality (the patient can give release from this or an obligation to provide data can be 
specified by the rules of law) and the data protection [according to the Act on Data-
Protection data in connection with the state of health is considered to be special and must 
have an enhanced protection, Act LXI1I of 1992, point 2 (2)b)]. The patient has the 
obligation to pay consideration in return for the provided medical care (in case of private 
practice/clinic directly, as for public institutions indirectly from the payments of employers 
and employees). 
The treatment contract is a consensual onerous, bilateral (in case of transplantations 
multilateral) agreement of "facere " nature that can be concluded in oral or written form or 
by conduct that implies acceptance. As for the position of the treatment contract among the 
other contracts, the commission and the contract for work can be noticed from the expressly 
and namely mentioned contracts of the Civil Code, 
- because of the limited possibility to choose institution on the one hand and because 
of the medical care became a service on the other hand, the personal procedural obligation 
of the agent and the confidential relation between the principal and the agent which 
characterize the contract of agency is not necessarily manifested in case of treatment 
contracts: the right to self-determination (and not right to give instruction) can only be 
exercised efficiently by the patient if the obligation to inform is discharged by the agent (the 
physician) with special knowledge; 
- according to the contract of professional service, contractors shall be obliged to 
create some result by work but this is not necessarily a part of each treatment contract [in 
case of making prosthesis it is (Pest Central District Court 31. P. 89. 625/1994.; Metropolitan 
Court 41. p. 21. 853/1997); even in case of esthétique operations, I.V.G. and sterilization 
procedures, but in case of heart transplantation and cranial operation the diligence is 
determinant)]. 
The treatment contract cannot be classed among mixed contracts: 
- it cannot be considered as a combination because it is very difficult to define which 
types of contracts are mixed in it (in case of a treatment in hospital, the elements of leases, 
deposit and contract of public utility can be mentioned besides the elements of contract and 
contract of professional agency); 
- it is not uniting the different types, as the combination of the contractual elements 
cannot be recognized: the contractual characteristics that can be determinant in the treatment 
contract are changing by the types of medical care; 
- the purpose of the treatment contract is always a special service that is changing in 
case of every type of medical care (difference between operation and pulmonary screening) 
and therefore they cannot be reduced to one special service. 
In our opinion the treatment contract is an independent, sui generis, atypical contract 
which isn't namely mentioned in the Civil Code. 
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5.2. Merchandising contract8 
The word "merchandising" (in Germany it is "Vermarktung") means trade/sales/promotion 
of purchasing goods. Merchandising is a legal institution and an economic phenomenon at 
the same time: the medium of promotion and marketing. In economic meaning the 
merchandising is the coordination of establishing a shop, furnishing the place, the 
presentation of goods, the decoration, the variety, the human relations, the packaging, the 
promotion and motivating the customers in a way that is suitable for fulfilling the needs and 
requirements of that certain group of costumers. 
From the aspect of law merchandising is considered to be an image-transfer. The 
purpose of the merchandising is the secondary utilization: the utilization of a well-known 
and accepted image in another field. 
As for the designation of merchandising, there are three different definitions: the 
restrictive category of the Council of Copyright Experts, the definition of image-transfer 
contract regulated in the Act on Sport and the one created by the International Association 
for the Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI). According to the Council of Copyright 
Experts (expert opinion no. 13/2003.) the purpose of the contractual relationship is the 
utilization of the typical figures and elements of a work of an author in order to increase the 
marketability of other works, goods and services. According to the image-transfer in the 
Act on Sport in return for consideration, under a marketing activity the name, image of an 
athlete, the name, arms of a sports association-body and other intellectual goods in relation 
with sports activity are used on boards, gifts and souvenirs, clothes, other objects and in an 
electronic way in order to influence the consumers (Act I. 2004, section 35). According to 
the International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property the contract has the 
feature of utilization under which symbols, trademarks, parts of a work of an author, the 
physical appearance real or fictive persons are utilized in order to motivate the purchase of 
goods and providing services (supposing that these signals in question are not used in 
accordance with their original functions but for purchasing goods and services by the 
general reputation or attraction of the figures). 
As for the three definitions we can agree with the one with the most extensive meaning, 
as the two more restrictive definitions are implied in it: the parts of a work of an author, the 
fictive persons are mentioned in the definition created by the International Association for 
the Protection of Intellectual Property and athlete belongs to the category of the real person 
and the arms/name of a sports organization/association/body are classified as a symbol/ 
trademark according to the extensive definition. 
The purpose of the conclusion of a merchandising contract is to influence costumers 
on the market by applying the name/image of a famous person/imaginary figures/characters 
of a cartoon/figures of novels and tales/trademark etc. in order to motivate them to buy. The 
motivation of sales, the increase of the marketability of goods are based on the positive 
consideration of the applied person/labeling and in reason of this merchandising is an 
effective way of product/scrvice/advertising (the costs of introduction to the market can be 
8
 Vida, S.: A merchandising védjegyjogi oltalma (Patent Law Protection of Merchandising). 
Védjegyvilág, (1995) 3, 10-17; Tattay, L: A merchandising és a szellemi alkotások (The Merchandising 
and the Intellectual Works), http://www.jak.ppke.hu/tanszek/polgjog/letolt/merc.doc; Strihó, К.: 
A merchandising szerződés (The Merchandising Contract), http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/striho33.mht; World 
Intellectual Property Organization: Character Merchandising-Report prepared by the International 
Bureau, WO/1NF/108. Geneva, Dec. 1994; Csécsy, Gy.: A szellemi alkotások joga (The Law of 
Intellectual Works). Miskolc, 2008. 
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reduced by the image-transfer). The turnover of the undertakings applying merchandise is 
increasing, they have extra profit and they are promoters of the competition in the market 
by using this legal construction extensively. 
The fields mostly affected by merchandising—as the medium of marketing-are: articles 
of clothing and fashion (e.g. Gucci bag, Benetton T-shirt), printed matters and stationery 
(e.g. postcard with Tweety on it), entertainment (e.g. the promotion of a concert by a popular 
tv personality), gifts and knick-knackery (e.g. a cup with Winny-the Pooh on it), food 
products (e.g. spice mix by Horváth Rozi), furnishing and household goods (e.g. Tiffany 
lamp ), sports goods and sports equipment (e.g. the sportswear of Nike is promoted by Roger 
Fcderer), toys (e.g. Harry Potter board game), goods of health- and beauty care (e.g. 
Penelope Cruz as the face of L'Oréal) and electronic commodities (e.g. the TAG Heuer 
watch is made popular by Tiger Woods). 
The subjects of merchandising are the merchandiser that uses image-transfer in order 
to increase the negotiability of his goods/service and the entitled (natural person, legal 
entity, organization without legal entity) that contributes to the commercial utilization of his 
name/image/parts of his work/corporate name/trademark/indication/logo etc. 
The direct object of the merchandising contract is the usage and utilization of the 
goodwill/image connecting to the indirect object, the indirect object can be personality (the 
name/image of a person alive/historical, corporate name of a not natural person), attributes 
of an imaginary person (name, voice, illustration, multi-dimension reproduction, see 
Spiderman, Rambo), trademark, illustration, emblem (e.g. sport association), corporate 
name, parts of a work of an author (characters of animals of a cartoon, melody, book/title of 
a film etc.) and prestige (e.g. a T-shirt with the name and arms of a famous university). 
One of the most important elements of the content of the merchandising-contract is the 
utilization of the image which does not requires assent (e.g. the promotion of Kaiser beer as 
"the beer") or it does require it (e.g. for the utilization of the image of a person alive, for the 
name of a historic person, the authorization of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences). The 
utilization for personal purpose can also be possible, in this case the created image 
(goodwill) is extended to other areas by an undertaking (e.g. a restaurant markets wines 
with its name on the label). The other important attribute is the legal protection of the 
entitled person on the one hand against the illegal image-transfer of the merchandiser, on 
the other hand against the utilization of image/goodwill by the rivals of the merchandiser 
without title and legal basis (thus without a merchandising agreement). To settle these 
problems varied ways of protection arc provided by law: 
- the provisions of Civil Code referring to personality (Act IV of 1959. sections 77-
80, 84-85); 
- the provisions of the Act on the Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Product 
Markings [Act XI. of 1997, point 5(1)a), section 7., item 12(2), section 27]; 
- the rules of Copyright Act (Act LXXVI of 1999, section 16.); 
- the section of the Act on Sport (Act 1 of 2004, section 35); 
- the norm of the Act on the Press [Act II. of 1986, item 3(1 )]; 
- the rules of the Act on Essential Conditions of and Certain Limitations to Business 
Advertising (Act XLVIII. of 2008. item 9(2), sections 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20); 
- the fact of the annex of the Act on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer 
Commercial Practices (the Unfair Commercial Practices Act) (Act XLVII. of 2008, annex 
point 3); 
- the section of the Act on the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices and Unfair 
Competition (Act LVII. of 1996., section 8., secondary protection as it regulates the 
possibility to act against the rival of the merchandiser). 
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Merchandising is a heterogeneous and complex legal institution of which qualification 
is influenced by its character of indirect object: it can include elements of the contract of 
publishing, adaptation to screen, utilization of products related to graphic images, utilization 
of applied graphic works, advertising, sponsorship, image-transfer, licence, franchise, 
utilization of commercial/corporate name collectively and severally. In consequence, relying 
on the varying and special object and content of the merchandising agreement (similarly to 
the treatment contract) it is an onerous atypical contract with the characteristics mentioned 
in this study in item 1. 
6. "False" atypical contracts9 
Those contracts can be considered "false" atypical contracts which-Ay their name and 
content-pretend to have some of the characteristics of atypical contracts (e.g. foreign name; 
apparently they do not seem to belong to the express contracts of the Civil Code; the role of 
foreign practice in their Hungarian establishment; applicability of general rules referring to 
contracts; they are mostly concluded in order to create a permanent legal relation between 
economic organizations); but as a matter of fact they can be classified as mixed contracts or 
a nominated, express contract. 
As for the definition of the type of a certain contract the name given and the terminology 
used by parties is not determinant, the content and elements of the definition of the agreement 
are decisive. 
Under the distribution contract"' the distributor-restricting his market of acquisition 
and purchase to a certain geographic area-purchases goods from manufacturer and in return 
for a discount he purchases these goods in his name and on his behalf, on the basis of a 
general contract that establishes a permanent legal relationship (Vb/01103; DCFR: 
Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law). As a synonym of 
distributor the expressions like importer, reseller, purchaser, dealer can also be applied. 
[Regulation of Ministry of Health no. 4/2009. (III.17.); 104/2007. VJ; 81/2006. VJ; 26/2006. 
VJ; 21/2006. VJ; 154/2004. VJ; 60/2004. VJ; VEF 2007.2; BDT 2007. 1533.] The 
distribution contract refers to the purchase and sale of a certain product therefore it can be 
identified with the purchase agreement (with the chain of purchase) regulated by the Civil 
Code. The distributor is a merchant who purchases and sells certain products-with regard to 
his profile of activity-professionally. Our point of view is confirmed by the decision of the 
Court of Appeal of Szeged Gf. I. 30 332/2007.; BDT 2008. 69.): there is no consignment 
between the foreign manufacturer and the domestic distributor if the product is purchased 
by a contract of sale by the distributor and afterwards he purchases the goods recorded as 
his own stock towards other resellers and users; the profit of his commercial transaction is 
covered by the margin applied by him. 
The content of the dealer contract can be the same as the essential characteristics of 
the distribution contract on the one hand: it can be aimed at a dealer activity [the judgment 
of the Court of First Instance in Fiatagri UK Ltd. and New Holland Ford Ltd. v. Commission 
of the European Communities (T-34/92.); the judgment of the Court of First Instance in 
John Deere Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities (T-35/92.) 51/2005. VJ; 
9
 Papp: Ibid. 23-25. 
10
 Újlaki, L.: A disztribútor szerződés fogalmának értelmezése (The Interpretation of the 
Concept of the Distribution Contract). Gazdaság és Jog, (2002) 6, 25-26; Vörös, I.: Nemzetközi 
gazdasági kapcsolatok joga II. (The Law of International Economic Relations IL). Budapest, 2004. 
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292/1996. VJ; 24/1995. VJ] and resale (26/2006. VJ; 2/2003. VJ). On the other hand the 
dealer agreement can be concluded with the content of consignee/agency and purchase at 
the same time (5/2004. VJ). Thirdly it may happen that the dealer purchases the product 
from the manufacturer and he concludes a carriage contract for it with the consumer 
(Taxation issues No. 1998/150). According to the above-mentioned sales contracts or a 
consignment or sale combined with an independent commercial agency agreement (and also 
combined with some elements of deposit) or a postponed sale combined with sale are 
covered by the dealer contract. 
The conclusion of an outsourcing contract1 occurs if a service (field of activity) or at 
least the main part of a service is entrusted to an outsider contractor-who is independent 
from the aspect of ownership and management-by an economic organization besides the 
demolition of his possible internal capacities. The reason of externalization is the reduction 
of the costs, its purpose can be the increase of its operational effectiveness, the concentration 
on the main activity and to reach a higher level of service. The outsourcing contract can be 
conducted for placing the processing, service of application, management of application, 
placing the system-infrastructure, placing the infrastructure, placing the system, placing the 
course of business, placing the business strategy etc. (87/2006. VJ; 176/2005 VJ; 40/2005 
VJ; 15/2003. VJ; 98/2002. VJ; 167/2001. VJ). In our opinion the outsourcing contract can 
be considered as a professional service contract combined with agency: on the one hand the 
right to command and the right of control, on the other hand the effort to diligent procedure 
in that certain case entrusted to him can refer to agency, and providing a service has the 
character of professional services (as it tends to another result reached by work). 
In the background of investment contracts'2 there is always a definite economic 
purpose: the effort of saving, extra profit or making profit; though the economic intention of 
the parties of the contract can be reached by different contracts (BH 2007.17.), and the most 
decisive from the aspect of law is how they reach it, in which legal form, under which 
nominated contract they are concluded (BDT 2001.398.). We agree with Gyöngyi Harsányi 
that we must make a difference between contracts regarding the fact whether the operation 
of investment is arranged by the investor personally or he has it arranged by a specialized 
undertaking. In case of "personal investment" the contract "with the purpose of investment" 
cannot be mentioned as a nominated, independent (sui generis) contract from the aspect of 
law: the economic intention is realized in existing types of contracts like loan/deposit/ 
security transactions/transactions of stock exchange/sales agreement/insurance contract/ 
taking a shareholding in an association etc. (Court of Appeal of Szeged Pf. I. 20/057/2005.) 
If the direct object of the agreement is an investment service provided by a specialized 
undertaking, in our opinion this agreement will be a mixed contract, a combination of types: 
with the character of agency (command, control, diligent procedure, portfolio-management, 
account-management), consignment/independent commercial agency-more exactly com-
modity exchange, investment of securities, real estate agency, B&L association and 
insurance agent-(agency/conclusion of transaction) and deposit (the custody of money/ 
security of handed over). 
11
 Sziebig, P.: Kiszervezve: Elmélet és gyakorlat az IT-outsourcingban (Outsourced; Theory and 
Practice in IT-outsourcing). Budapest, 2006. 
12
 Harsányi, Gy.: Befektetési jellegű szerződések kötelmi jog elemzése (Obligation Law 
Analysis of Contracts with Investment Character). Gazdaság és Jog, ( 1997) 3, 3-6. 
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DÁNIEL DEÁK* 
Removing Tax Barriers From The Clearing 
and Settlement of Cross-border Capital Market Transactions** 
Abstract . Where the insti tutions of the re ten t ion at source of taxes and the prevent ion of foreign financial 
intermediaries from a s s u m i n g in the source c o u n t r y the liability to file tax information and arrange for the payment 
o f tax in fair conditions comparable to their domes t i c counterparts are to be assessed in the light of the relevant 
C o m m u n i t y law as communica t ed by the ECJ , it is crucial whi le concluding whether national legal pract ices of 
wi thhold ing taxation are consistent with C o m m u n i t y law to apply the proportionality principle in specific cases. 
W h e r e the application o f the proportionality pr inc ip le dictates us in a specific case respect of the ef fec t iveness 
pr inciple in enforcing r ights both on the side o f the tax authorit ies and taxpayers, an avenue may open up for 
progress ively removing barr ie rs from the c lea r ing and settlement of securities t ransact ions across the border. This 
paper is to discuss how the EC principles of e f fec t iveness and proportionali ty are to be enforced by the European 
Cour t o f Justice with regard to removing barr iers f r o m the free m o v e m e n t of services and capital upon wi thholding 
taxat ion. 
K e y w o r d s : effect iveness principle, proport ional i ty principle, wi thhold ing tax, retention versus relief at source of 
or f r o m taxes, paying and information agent 
I. Procedural rule of reason and industry-specific problems 
As the procedural aspect is the compliment of, and corollary to, the exercise of substantive 
law rights,1 it is worth distinguishing between procedural and substantive tax law. Procedural 
possibilities that are available for taxpayers must be interpreted some times in the context 
of the positive standard of effectiveness as developed in Arcaro (and later in the tax case of 
Persche): national procedures are to be assessed in the light of the purpose that they should 
be aimed at ensuring fulfilment of the substantive law contents of Community freedoms. At 
the same time, the national public authorities must be consistent in interpreting national law 
in the light of Community law. Connection between procedural and substantive tax law can 
also be reversed: procedural law may fill the gaps left for lack of Community law 
harmonisation, substituting for substantive law. This is to proceduralise a substantive law 
problem. An example for this is Inizan or 446/03 Marks and Spencer: the national authorities 
are not required to change their legislation, but arc expected to grant the taxpayer an extra 
opportunity for the easy enforcement of rights consistently with the proportionality principle 
where the taxpayer has otherwise exhausted all other possibilities. 
Upon the clearing and settlement (finalisation) of cross-border capital market 
transactions, it is a common problem that foreign resident taxpayers and foreign financial 
intermediaries are discriminated, or even they are deprived from fundamental procedural 
rights. Domestic resident market players may also suffer from the lack of effectiveness in 
* Professor of Law, Corvinus University of Budapest, H-1093 Budapest, Fővám tér 8. 
E-mail: daniel.deak@uni-corvinus.hu 
** The study was written with the support of the TÁMOP-4.2.1/B-09/1/K.MR-2010-005 
project. 
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enforcing their rights. For example, the business of local paying agents with foreign 
investors may be burdensome or domestic resident taxpayers may face problems in their 
own legal system if they enter the border while investing between two Member States in 
the internal market. 
Even if the procedural rules are part of the constitutional order of Member States, 
harmonisation promoted by reference to the so-called procedural rule of reason.2 
Accordingly, the national legislation on procedural rights curtailing the taxpayer's claim 
may be compatible with Community law, it is subject to the following conditions, 
however: 
(i) it must not be intended specifically to limit the consequences of an ECJ judgment; and 
(ii) the restriction on taxpayer rights (e.g. the introduction of a time-bar) must be sufficient 
to ensure that the right to (re)paymcnt is effective (e.g. by introducing transitory 
provisions). 
The major industry-specific problems that will be discussed below in the light of the 
above considerations can be highlighted as follows: 
(i) Lack of effectiveness to be granted to foreign resident taxpayers can be mentioned 
in brief as follows: 
- access to fiscal relief may be difficult; relief at source is not always possible, e.g. in 
Germany or the Netherlands; 
- availability of quick refund procedures may be limited, delay in refund may occur 
(good examples are, on the contrary, e.g. in Germany: 
"Datentraegerverfahrcn" or "Data Medium Procedure"); 
- lack of European-wide harmonised relief models; and 
- foreign resident taxpayers may be deprived of procedural rights. 
(ii) Non-discrimination of foreign financial intermediaries can be highlighted at the 
major points as follows: 
- local tax ID is usually required for foreign financial intermediaries; representation 
through a national subsidiary or a local PE may be obliged to serve as a paying agent (e.g. 
in Italy); 
- payment to foreign intermediaries is not possible in gross; no responsibility is given 
to a foreign intermediary either to transfer information; 
foreign intermediaries have to bear strict and unlimited liability for any failure (high 
level of the standard of care) instead of applying a good faith standard; and 
limited possibility of self-certification through contracting out (good examples are, 
e.g. the "Know Your Customer" rules in the U.S. or the institution of "Qualified 
Intermediaries" in Ireland). 
(iii) Lack of effectiveness to be granted to domestic resident taxpayers active across 
the border can be exemplified as follows: 
- paying agents may be obliged to bear strict, and joint and several, liability for 
withholding taxation (e.g. in Hungary); 
- the centralised model developed in major European capital-exporting countries (e.g. 
through Euroclear, called "Central Securities Depository") has not yet been proliferated in 
many Member States (like in CEE countries); and 
- the opportunities of simplified reporting of taxpayer information (like the Dutch 
pattern of GGC or "Large Authorised Representative"), have not yet proliferated. 
2
 C-62/00 Marks and Spencer, ECR 2002, 1-6325, para. 36. 
R E M O V I N G TAX B A R R I E R S FROM... 1 8 5 
Lessons can be drawn in particular from the ECJ cases as indicated in a matrix below: 
C o m m u n i t y h a r m o n i s a t i o n 
of tax procedural r ights 
Cases n o t decided in f a v o u r 
of the M S 
Cases decided in favour 
of the M S 
(i) Procedura l rights: 
e f f ec t iveness to be g r a n t e d t o 
fo re ign resident t axpayers 
(exerc i s ing , as a last r e so r t , the 
f r e e d o m of capital) 
Fokus Bank (free movement of 
capital), ELISA (free m o v e m e n t 
of capi ta l ) 
F KP Scorpio (freedom to 
provide services) , Skatteverket v. 
A. ( f ree m o v e m e n t o f capital) , 
Rimbaud ( f ree m o v e m e n t of 
capital) 
(ii) A c c e s s to relief: e q u i v a l e n c e 
or non-discr iminat ion to b e 
g r an t ed to foreign res ident 
f inancia l intermediaries ( u s u a l l y 
exe rc i s ing the f reedom to 
p rov ide services) 
Svensson and Gustavsson 
( f r eedom to provide services) , 
Safir ( f r e e d o m to provide 
services) , Danner ( f r eedom to 
provide services) , Skandia and 
Römstedt ( f r e e d o m to p rov ide 
services) 
(iii) Procedura l rights: 
e f f ec t iveness as a pos i t ive 
s tandard to be granted t o f o r e i g n 
res ident cit izens and e n t e r p r i s e s 
(exerc i s ing the f reedom o f 
pe r sons ) to ensure f u l f i l m e n t of 
C o m m u n i t y f reedoms a n d t o b e 
cons i s ten t in interpreting 
nat ional law in the light o f 
C o m m u n i t y law 
Heylens ( f r e e movement o f 
workers) , Marleasing ( f r e e d o m 
of establishment), Vlassopoulou 
( f r eedom o f establ ishment) , 
Arcaro (harmonisation of the 
protect ion o f envi ronment) 
(iv) Procedura l rights: 
e f f ec t iveness to be g r an t ed to 
d o m e s t i c resident t a x p a y e r s 
ac t ive across the border 
(exerc i s ing , as a last r e so r t , the 
f r e e d o m o f capital) 
San Giorgio ( f ree m o v e m e n t o f 
goods), Barra ( f ree m o v e m e n t 
of w o r k e r s , non-discr iminat ion) , 
Pelerbroeck (freedom of 
establishment), Société Baxter 
( f r eedom o f establ ishment) , 
Vestergaard ( f reedom to p r o v i d e 
services), Metallgesellschaft and 
Hoechst (freedom of 
establishment), Laboratoires 
Fournier (freedom of 
es tab l i shment ) , Persche ( f r ee 
m o v e m e n t o f capital) 
Algera (not in f avour of more 
harmonisat ion) , Rewe ( f ree 
movemen t of goods) . Comet 
( f ree m o v e m e n t o f goods) , 
Deutsche Milchkontor 
( f ree m o v e m e n t of goods) , 
Berlin Butter (free movement of 
goods) , Inizan ( f r e e d o m to 
provide services) , Twoh Int. 
( f ree m o v e m e n t of goods) , 
X and Passenheim 
( f ree m o v e m e n t of capital) 
(v) Procedura l rights: 
e f f ec t iveness to be g r an t ed to 
d o m e s t i c and foreign r e s i d e n t 
t axpaye r s through the p o s s i b l e 
ha rmonisa t ion in fiscal m a t t e r s 
C-349/03 Commission v. UK 
(free m o v e m e n t of goods) 
C-338/01 Commission v. 
Council (not in f avou r of more 
harmonisa t ion) , C - 5 33 /03 
Commission v. Council (not in 
favour of more ha rmonisa t ion) 
II. Analysis of ECJ cases 
1. Effectiveness in the protection of the rights of foreign resident taxpayers 
The taxpayers who are active across the border want to benefit usually from the free 
movement of capital principle. In a few Member States, relief at source (based on a 
respective bilateral double tax convention) is not available. Instead, those who claim treaty 
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relief must enter into burdensome procedures to get tax refund. The difficulties arising from 
national practices in claiming treaty relief results in restriction on the fundamental 
Community freedoms, mainly on the freedom of capital. The national legislator or the 
national public authorities do not have the explicit intention to do discrimination. It can still 
be problematic that foreign taxpayers cannot get easy access to the national law facilities of 
the host Member State. They are thus not able to protect their rights effectively. 
It can be criticised that foreign resident shareholders do not always have rights as 
parties to administrative proceedings. It is apparently more comfortable for the national tax 
authorities to get in contact with the relevant domestic resident subsidiary. It is discriminatory, 
however, if foreign resident shareholders are not recognised as parties to the procedures of 
tax administration. Apparently, their interests are not necessarily the same as those of the 
subsidiary. They are thus deprived of the possibility effectively to protect their rights. 
The practice has spread over in the European Economic Area that foreigners are not 
given taxpayer rights upon the withholding of taxes.3 It comes from that foreign resident 
taxpayers are subject to tax in the source country without having been granted the right to 
protect their rights to be associated with the liability to pay tax. Quite frequently, foreign 
taxpayers are not allowed to initiate disputes with the local tax authorities concerning the 
title to, and the qualification of, the income they derive from the country. They will only be 
recognised as parties to administrative procedures if they apply for refund. 
National orders must not impair the individual rights flowing from the fundamental 
freedoms, the EFTA Court holds (in Para. 41 of Fokus Bank). Such an obligation of the host 
country follows from the effectiveness principle enshrined in both the EC Treaty and the 
EEA Treaty. Even if foreign resident taxpayers have the right to file complaints in the host 
country, they are not notified of the reassessment of withholding tax. They are thus deprived 
of the right to be heard (Para. 42). 
If the relief at source method is available for foreign taxpayers, they are not in a need 
of initiating procedures according to the host country's law, provided, however, that no 
dispute is (and will be) developed between the taxpayer and the tax authorities. During a 
tax audit, reassessment is not precluded. Then, the taxpayers subject to withholding tax 
should be recognised as parties to the procedure of tax audit. Refund is obviously less 
favourable for taxpayers than the use of the relief at source method. However, applying for 
tax refund, foreign taxpayers are most likely recognised as parties to the procedure of 
refund. This is a paradoxical development that comes from the sporadic nature of 
Community law harmonisation. 
In FKP Scorpio,4 the procedure of retention at source of tax was not found inconsistent 
with the freedom to provide services either at the level of the payment creditor (the foreign 
resident taxpayer) or the payment debtor (the domestic resident paying agent). Restriction 
can be justified in this case by the host Member State's need to ensure that the taxable 
income should not escape taxation. Fiscal supervision is thus a legitimate need (Para. 35). 
The ruling of ECJ does not concern, however, a situation where the EC Mutual Assistance 
Directive can be invoked, which was not available in this case (Para. 36). The national law 
procedure of retention at source was also scrutinised in the light of the proportionality 
principle. The ECJ concludcd that the national law restriction could also be justified in this 
respect. The question has eventually remained open how the retention at source procedure 
3
 E-l /04 Fokus Bank, judgment of the EFTA Court on 23 November 2004. para. 45. 
4
 C-290/04, ECR (2006), 1-9461, para. 39. 
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can be justified by the need of fiscal supervision in a situation where the affected Member 
States can rely on the armoury to be provided by the Mutual Assistance Directive. The ECJ 
also holds that it constitutes an obstacle to the freedom to provide services if tax relief can 
be taken into account at the various stages of the taxation procedure only upon production 
of a certificate issued by the home Member State, stating that the conditions for treaty relief 
are satisfied. This obstacle can be justified, however, by the need that the proper functioning 
of the procedure for taxation at source must be ensured (Paras 58-59). 
The judgment does not make an assessment of the affected national taxation procedure 
in respect of the requirement of certification. It only mentions about that certificates may be 
required. It does not give guidance of how certification must take place. It is thus not 
precluded that the requirement of certificates is burdensome, not being proportionate with 
the objective of the effectiveness in tax collection. 
The problem of FKP Scorpio is also raised in respect of a service-provider who is 
resident in a state outside the EEA. Although the freedom to provide services is not 
available for those who reside outside the EU, the Community freedom to provide services 
is applicable not only to the service-provider, but also to the recipient of services who is 
resident in an EU Member State (Para. 63 in FKP Scorpio). Indeed, the paying agent who 
is liable to respect the law on the retention at source of tax and to obtain certificates that 
prove eligibility for treaty relief must be provided with the possibility of benefiting from 
the Community principle that taxpayer rights must be effectively protected. In the specific 
case, the recipient of services (FKP Scorpio) is not entitled to benefit from the Community 
freedom to provide services because the provider of services is not established in an EU 
Member State (Para. 67). Any way, the difficulties arising from the retention at source 
procedure and from burdensome formalities of certification must in principle be assessed 
not only in respect of the provider, but also of the recipient of services if otherwise 
the services arc provided within the Community by those who are established in a Member 
State. 
In ELISA, it is clarified that the EC Mutual Assistance Directive does not preclude the 
application of a double tax convention. This is still spelled out not in general terms, but in 
the instance that the particular provisions of a double tax convention may prevent the 
requested Member State from collecting, using and transferring information by its laws in 
accordance with Art. 8 ( 1 ) of the Mutual Assistance Directive.5 This does not mean that 
restrictive national law practices, such as the procedure of taxation at source, could not be 
found in certain cases as inconsistent with the free movement of capital principle or with 
other Community freedoms. Procedural rules must eventually be assessed in the light of 
Community freedoms. National administrative practices need not be harmonised, and 
cannot be condemned, unless they prevent citizens and companies from exercising their 
Community freedoms. 
As it also comes from this ECJ case, national law may despite the harmonisation of the 
mutual assistance in tax matters constitute an obstacle to the exchange of cross-border tax 
information where a double tax convention excludes from its scope tax haven companies. 
This is why the French tax legislator felt to be legitimised while categorically excluding 
non-French companies from tax relief if the respective double tax convention does not make 
it possible to the French tax authorities to obtain information of them. It is yet another issue 
5
 Council Directive 77/799/EEC OJ L 336, 27.12.1977, 15, as amended significantly by Council 
Directive 92/12/EC, OJ L 76, 23.3.1992, 1; C-451/05 ELISA, ECR 2007, 1-8251, para. 55. 
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that it is not consistent with the proportionality principle if taxpayers will not be granted the 
opportunity to prove on the contrary to the legislative presumption that they meet the legal 
requirements for the grant of tax relief. 
As arises from Para. 102, the free movement of capital principle precludes national 
legislation when national law does not allow a company established in another Member 
State to supply evidence to establish the identity of its shareholders and, this way, prevents 
such a company from obtaining tax relief. The ECJ held that the taxpayer should not be 
excluded "a priori" from providing relevant documentary evidence enabling the tax 
authorities of the Member State imposing the tax to ascertain that the taxpayer would not 
attempt the avoid or evade the payment of taxes.6 Relief at source cannot thus be precluded 
if the taxpayer is successful in providing evidence for fulfilling the requirements for the 
treaty relief claimed. Obviously, the national tax authorities can also rely on the facilities of 
the EC Mutual Assistance Directive. Even if these facilities are not available for any reason, 
national law restrictions must not be in breach of the proportionality principle either. 
It can happen that there is no possibility to have resort to the framework of Community 
law harmonisation as provided for by the EC Mutual Assistance Directive. This is clear in 
eases Skatteverket v. A.1 and Rimbaud,K The proportionality principle cannot be invoked 
either. Indeed, the application of the proportionality principle does not seem to be appropriate 
where the source country entities reside in tax havens (in these cases, in a Swiss canton and 
in Liechtenstein, respectively), and the source jurisdiction is not willing to provide sufficient 
information to the residence country's tax authorities. 
In Scorpio, the legal framework provided for by the EC Mutual Assistance Directive is 
missing as well. The ECJ did not feel to be compelled to rely on the proportionality principle 
on its merits, however. The principle is just mentioned (in Paras 37-38), but it is not 
explained why the retention at source procedure is found to be consistent with the 
proportionality principle. While in the tax haven-related cases of Skatteverket v. A. and 
Rimbaud the tax authorities seem to be authorised not to relax their practices, this standpoint 
does not seem to be justified in Scorpio. It tells us the future only how much the Scorpio-
attitude can be maintained, and how the ECJ position taken in ELISA that is based on the 
application of the proportionality principle can be reconciled with its less ambitious 
approach taken in Scorpio. 
In Skatteverket v. A., the ECJ clarifies that the concept of restrictions on the free 
movement of capital is different, depending on whether the movement of capital takes place 
to or from third countries or within the Community (Para. 36). This is because the 
liberalisation of the movement of capital with third countries may pursue objectives other 
than that of establishing the internal market (Para. 31). Upon interpreting the procedural 
law infrastructure, it must not be out of consideration that it is not the same concept of 
restrictions on the free movement of capital that must be secured. The procedural law 
facilities could thus be restricted in respect of third countries where the free movement of 
capital principle is also restricted in its scope, to be compared to its application in the 
context of the single European market. As explained by the ECJ, where the legislation of a 
Member State makes the grant of a tax advantage dependent on satisfying requirements, 
6
 Para. 96. See also: Case C-254/97 Baxter ECR 1999, 1-4809, paras 19 and 20; Case C-39/04 
Laboratoires Fournier, ECR 2005, 1-2057, para. 25. 
7
 C-101/05 A, ECR 2007,1-11531. 
8
 C-72/09, ECR 2010, 00000. 
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compliance with which can be verified only by obtaining information from the competent 
authorities of a third country, it is, in principle, legitimate for that Member State to refuse to 
grant that advantage. This is the case, in particular, because that third country is not under 
any contractual obligation to provide information. Thus, it proves impossible to obtain such 
information from that country.9 
It has been the standard in the ECJ practice that the justification based on the fight 
against tax evasion is permissible only ifit targets purely artificial contrivances. Accordingly, 
a general assumption of tax avoidance or evasion fails to justify a restrictive national tax 
measure.10 The retention at source of tax procedure is a restriction on the free movement of 
capital at least because it discourages the taxpayer to be active in investment in another 
Member State if encountered with difficulties in enforcing treaty benefits. It cannot surely 
be justified by the general assumption of tax avoidance because-as held by the ECJ-such 
justification would be in breach of the proportionality principle. Even if the national tax 
authorities of a Member State are not able for any reason to have recourse to the exchange 
of tax information to be provided by the tax authorities of another Member State or EEA 
country, the tax authorities should conduct a case-by-case assessment of the information 
provided by the taxpayer whether this information can be verified, the Commission argues 
in Rimbaud (Para. 45). A case-by-case assessment could perfectly be possible in a procedure 
of claiming the relief of double tax conventions as well. The national tax authorities arc 
usually able to verify the information the taxpayer may have provided of fulfilling the 
conditions for treaty relief. 
The argument that the case of Rimbaud did not differ from that of ELISA due to the 
fact that the Luxembourg tax authorities were prevented from providing information like 
the Liechtenstein tax authorities was dismissed by the ECJ. The ECJ held that, even though, 
in the situation which was under consideration in ELISA, the Luxembourg authorities were 
not, by virtue of Art. 8(1) of Directive 77/799, under any obligation in principle to provide 
information, the fact remained that the regulatory framework was quite different (Para. 46). 
Such a regulatory framework for cooperation between the tax authorities of different 
Member States is usually not missing in a procedure of taxation at source. There is thus no 
reason to refrain from switching from the retention at source of tax method to that of the 
relief at source. The national tax authorities of a Member State should be able to verify the 
information provided by the financial intermediaries, who accompany their clients active in 
investing in another Member State. 
In the above cases, it was the main problem that foreign resident taxpayers were not 
granted effectiveness in protecting their rights. As a result, taxpayers were usually prevented 
from exercising their right to the free movement of capital. They are not only confronted 
with difficulties in claiming national law or treaty relief, but it can also happen in these 
cases that they are deprived of their procedural rights. Such mistreatment cannot be upheld 
in the light of Community freedoms, however. 
9
 Para. 63, reiterated in Rimbaud, para. 44. 
10
 C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, ECR 2006, 1-7995, para. 50, reiterated in Rimbaud, para. 34. 
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2. Equivalence accorded to foreign resident financial intermediaries 
The practice of Member States to apply withholding taxes at source may constitute barriers 
to the exercise of fundamental freedoms. This is to hurt foreign resident taxpayers, who 
derive income across the border. Being discouraged from cross-border investment, they will 
be prevented from exercising their right to the freedom of capital. Financial intermediaries 
may also be prevented from offering withholding agent services across the border if they do 
not enjoy a level playing field with their domestic resident counterparts. The restrictive 
practice of the retention of taxes at source may thus result in the infringement of both the 
free movement of capital and the freedom to provide services. 
The free movement of capital principle can be applied in parallel to the freedom to 
provide services (e.g. Svensson and Gustavsson).u In another legal case (Safir) , the freedom 
to provide services is carved out by the EC Court from the national court 's question relating 
to several freedoms, including the free movement of capital.12 It comes from Barrier 11 
(and 12)13 that the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital principles 
are highlighted as the two different sides of the same coin. It depends on the intonation only 
whether the stress is laid on the services provided by financial intermediaries rather than on 
the investor's choice. As it comes from the case of Svensson and Gustavsson, a rule that 
makes the grant of interest rate subsidies subject to the requirement that the loans have been 
obtained from an establishment approved in a certain Member State constitutes dis-
crimination not only against the applicant, but also against credit institutions established in 
other Member States, and is inconsistent with the freedom to provide services principle 
accordingly (Para. 12). This is the problem of the missing level playing field. Foreign 
financial enterprises may suffer from discrimination not only if they cannot gain access to 
clients who may apply for subsidised loans, but also in cases where they arc prevented from 
performing withholding services by transferring information and untaxed income in a 
custody chain if necessary. 
The taxpayer in Safir complains about that when a person holding a policy issued by a 
company not established in Sweden applies for an exemption from, or reduction of, tax on 
the life insurance premiums, "Skattcmyndigheten" requires precise information concerning 
the income tax to which the company is subject, unless the authorities already have such 
information. As Jessica Safir points out, such a requirement is particularly burdensome for 
the policyholder. It may also dissuade insurance companies, which do not operate on the 
Swedish market, f rom offering their services there, since it means that those companies 
must provide their potential customers with precise information relating to the tax system 
applicable to those companies in another Member State (Para. 28). Where a Member State 
introduces a burdensome procedure that is only applicable to cross-border cases, such a 
policy restricts among other things the Community freedom to provide services, 
discriminating against foreign financial enterprises. This is also the case with foreign 
financial enterprises if they are confronted with extra legal requirements associated with 
11
 C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson, ECR 1995, 1-3955. 
12
 C-118/96 Jessica Safir, ECR 1998, 1-1897. 
13
 Giovannini Group, Second report on EU clearing and settlement arrangements, Brussels, 
April 2003, 11. The results of the Giovannini reports are reflected within the Commission 
communication on "Clearing and settlement in the EU-The way forward", COM (2004) 312 final, 
under heading "3.2. Taxation issues". 
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withholding taxation, while offering services to their clients, who enter the market of 
another Member State. 
Finally, the ECJ did not find as legitimate the need to fill the fiscal vacuum arising 
from the non-taxation of savings in the form of capital life assurance policies taken out with 
companies not established in Sweden (Para. 34). In other words, the Swedish law that 
provides for the fiscal vacuum to be filled is in breach of the proportionality principle. 
Similarly, the assumption of a fiscal vacuum that is filled by the retention of tax at source 
may also be found as inconsistent with the proportionality principle. 
In Danner, national governments contend that the non-deductibility of contributions 
paid to schemes operated by foreign insurance enterprises is justified by the need to ensure 
the effectiveness of fiscal controls, and to prevent tax evasion.14 That argument cannot be 
upheld, the ECJ holds because first, Member States may rely on the EC Mutual Assistance 
Directive (Para. 49), secondly, they may request the taxpayer to provide sufficient proof of 
fulfilling the legal requirements (Para. 50). The reliance on the Mutual Assistance Directive 
and on the principle of proportionality are issues that are also relevant to the problem of 
discrimination both against foreign investors and foreign financial intermediaries that are 
confronted with the retention at source of income tax.15 
3. Effectiveness as a positive standard in the protection of the rights of foreign resident 
citizens and enterprises 
Foreign resident citizens or enterprises may be mistreated in a host Member State, where 
they are not granted effectiveness in law enforcement in the sense that national law practices 
omit to apply a positive standard. This means that national treatment should ensure 
fulfilment of Community freedoms. Then, procedural rules must be assessed from the 
viewpoint whether they constitute obstacles to the exercise of substantive freedoms. 
Procedural rules are thus not to be assessed taken by itself, but to the extent that they may 
constitute barriers to the exercise of substantive law rights. Besides, the national public 
authorities, while exercising their power, are expected to be consistent with Community law 
in interpreting national law. If this is not the case, Community freedoms may be violated. 
This problem usually concerns the freedom of persons. In the tax law area, no legal cases 
emerged for a long time to illustrate the above-mentioned positive standard (see, however, 
the tax case of Persche as discussed below in the next session). Still, it will be interesting to 
take a look at non-tax cases to try to learn from them with particular regard to the failure of 
national legal measures to grant foreign resident taxpayers the opportunity of the easy 
enforcement of rights. 
A procedure for the recognition of the equivalence of diplomas must enable the national 
authorities to assure themselves on an objective basis that the foreign diploma certifies that 
its holder has knowledge and qualifications, which are equivalent to those certified by the 
national diploma.16 The person, who is subject to a procedure before the national authorities 
must also be able to defend his or her rights under the best possible conditions and have the 
possibility of deciding with a full knowledge of the relevant facts whether there is any point 
in their applying to the courts (Para. 15). It is an effectiveness standard that is determined 
14
 C-136/00 Danner, ECR 2002,1-8147, para. 44. 
15
 Reiterated in paras 43 and 45, respectively, in C-422/01 Skandia and Römstedt, ECR 
2003, 1-6817. 
16
 222/86 Heylens, ECR 1987, 4097, para. 13. 
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by the ECJ in this case. The public authorities should have the right of full assessment of 
the private party's case, but the latter is also allowed to defend himself or herself effectively. 
An alternative to the taxation at source procedure by allowing relief at source could in 
principle be designed in a way that both the tax authorities and taxpayers could be granted 
the possibility of effectiveness in enforcing their respective rights. 
The Member States' obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged 
by the directive and their duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, 
to ensure the fulfilment o f tha t obligation, is binding on all the authorities of Member States 
including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts. It follows that, in applying 
national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before or after the directive, 
the national court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the 
light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achievc the result pursued 
by the latter.17 
There arc two standards the ECJ identifies in this case. First, the purpose of a national 
law procedure must be to ensure by all appropriate methods the fulfilment of legal 
obligations consistently with Community law. The national authorities are therefore not 
only obliged to refrain from what would be a barrier to the exercise of Community freedoms, 
but they have to do everything necessary to be consistent in their actions with Community 
law. This is a very high standard, in the light of which it is doubtful whether the "a priori" 
exclusion of a relief at source procedure is consistent with Community law. Secondly, the 
national authorities are obliged to give interpretation of national law in full compliance with 
Community law. The question is in this instance no longer about the enforcement of 
individual rights and obligations. Instead, the dispute is placed on a higher level. The 
consistent interpretation of national law principle is a meta-principle, on the level of which 
subjective rights cannot be discussed. It is still closely connected with the positive expression 
of the effectiveness principle in cases like Marleasing. Other examples for that are 
Vlassopoulou and C-168/95 Arcaro. 
Subjective rights cannot be enforced in the context of Community law unless they are 
built into the structure of Community law that has been developed. In addition to the 
enforcement of individual rights, the meta-principles of Community law-and even the 
principles of the operation of Community institutions-must be taken into account. Examples 
of the principles of the operation of Community institutions include the democracy principle 
and the subsidiarity principle. The principles of the superiority of Community law over 
national law or that of direct applicability are meta-principles of Community law. The 
principles of proportionality or legal certainty can also be considered as meta-principles of 
Community law. Meta-principles do not concern substantive rights or fundamental freedoms. 
They are authoritative as to the mechanisms, according to which the rules of Community 
law can be applied, serving as the legal foundation for decisions of the public authorities, 
where written sources of law fail to provide an answer. All these meta-principles are material 
to the enforcement of individual rights. They do not imply procedural rights as such, 
however. 
In Arcaro, the national court seeks to ascertain whether, upon a correct interpretation 
of Community law, there is a method of procedure allowing the national court to eliminate 
from national legislation provisions that are contrary to a provision of a directive which has 
17
 C-106/89 Marleasing, ECR 1990, 1-4135, para. 8, reiterated in C-340/89 Vlassopoulou, ECR 
1991,1-2357, see paras 17 and 22, and in C-168/95 Arcaro, ECR 1996, 1-4705, para. 41. 
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not been transposed, where the latter provision may not be relied on before the national 
court in criminal proceedings. The answer the ECJ has given is that there is no such method 
of procedure in Community law. However, the national authorities are obliged to follow a 
procedure in which it is possible to achieve the result envisaged by Community law (Paras 
39^40). In this instance, the ECJ reiterates what was already said in Marleasing. The relief 
at source procedure, and the deprivation of foreign financial intermediaries and their clients 
of procedural rights in the source Member State does not seem to be consistent with this 
standard of effectiveness to be granted to taxpayers. 
4. Effectiveness in the protection of the rights of domestic resident taxpayers 
The Community law principle of effectiveness is applicable not only to foreign, but also to 
domestic resident taxpayers, who are active across the border (exercising, as a last resort, 
the freedom of capital). Lack of effectiveness in the enforcement of rights may be a problem 
that concerns not only foreign resident investors or foreign financial intermediaries, but also 
domestic resident participants of European capital markets, that is, those domestic taxpayers, 
who are active as investors entering the state border, or who are the recipients of the services 
of foreigners. For example, there may be problems in claiming exemption of foreign earned 
income or foreign tax credit. Or, for instance, Fokus Bank as a domestic subsidiary or FKP 
Scorpio as a domestic resident recipient of the services of foreign artists may also encounter 
difficulties in handling the international tax issues of withholding taxation. 
The issues of public administration have emerged in the ECJ practice since the early 
times. Some examples for the matters that have been subject to the ECJ scrutiny are as 
follows: 
— revocation of administrative decisions and protection of vested rights; 
— partial validity of administrative decisions; 
— passing of time limits; 
— taking due care by the public authorities in obtaining information of the relevant 
facts and data; 
— burden of proof; 
— activity of monitoring; and 
— consideration of national tribunals seized of a matter of their own motion whether 
national law is compatible with Community law. 
It has been spelled out that although the solutions in Member States may vary, the ECJ 
is invited to rely on the learned writing and case law of Member States, reconciling 
differences if necessary.18 
(i) Equivalence and effectiveness 
As it comes from San Giorgio, it is incompatible with Community law to apply in a Member 
State legal presumptions or rules of evidence intended to place upon the taxpayer the burden 
of establishing that the charges unduly paid has not been passed on to other persons, or the 
national rules of special limitations concerning the form of the evidence to be adduccd, 
such as the exclusion of any kind of evidence other than documentary one. The court seized 
of the specific matter must be free to decide whether or not the burden of charges has been 
passed on to other persons.19 Where the procedure of producing evidence as provided for by 
18
 Joined cases of 7/56, 3/57 to 7/57 Algera, ECR, 62-63. 
19
 199/82 San Giorgio, ECR 1983, 3595, para. 14. 
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national legislation must not be burdensome to the extent that it would not be proportionate 
with legislative goals, the retention at source of taxation procedure must not be without 
alternatives either, and relief or simplified refund procedures should be available as well for 
both foreign resident taxpayers and the domestic paying agents assisting the former. 
A burdensome national law procedure of providing evidence may constitute a barrier to the 
exercise of Community freedoms (freedom of capital in respect of the investor and freedom 
to provide services in respect of the local paying agent or of foreign financial intermediaries 
that have accompanied their clients to another Member State). 
In Barra, the ECJ had the opportunity plainly to express the idea that it can be an 
impediment to the exercise of Community freedoms if not supported by appropriate 
procedural law institutions: 
"The right to repayment of amounts charged by a Member State in breach of the rules 
of Community law is the consequence and complement of the rights conferred on 
individuals by the Community provisions as interpreted by the court. Whilst it is true 
that repayment may be sought only in the framework of the conditions as to both 
substance and form laid down by the various national laws applicable thereto, the fact 
nevertheless remains ... that those conditions ... may not be so framed as to render 
virtually impossible the exercise of rights conferred by Community law."20 
To the extent that national law restricts repayment of the duty introduced in breach of 
the rules of Community law solely to plaintiffs, who brought an action for repayment before 
the delivery of the judgment in case 293/83 Gravier, where the ECJ found the imposition to 
foreign students of a national vocational training fee incompatible with Community law, 
actually deprives individuals who do not satisfy that condition of the right to obtain 
repayment of amounts unduly paid. Such a provision renders the exercise of the rights 
conferred by the effectiveness principle of EC Treaty impossible (Para. 19 in Barra). As it 
is clear from this judgment, the ECJ did not endorse the national law restriction of the 
possibility of repayment to those, who actcd in good faith in accordance with the national 
law assumption. In the light of this judgment, national law restriction of tax relief to those 
who are supposed to act in good faith cannot be accepted in cases either where the facility 
of relief at source is not available, based on the legislative assumption that tax avoidance or 
evasion cannot be precluded otherwise. 
The obligations imposed by national legislation on undertakings wrongly granted 
pecuniary advantages based on Community law must be no more stringent than those 
imposed on undertakings which have wrongly received similar advantages based on national 
law, provided that the two groups of recipients are in comparable situations and therefore 
different treatment is objectively unjustifiable.21 It also comes from Deutsche Milchkontor 
(Para. 33) that that Community law does not prevent national law from having regard, in 
excluding the recovery of unduly-paid aids, to such considerations as 
- the protection of legitimate expectation, 
- the loss of unjustified enrichment, 
- the passing of a time-limit, or 
- the fact that the administration knew, or was unaware owing to gross negligence on 
its part, that it was wrong in granting the aids in question. 
20
 309/85 Barra, paras 17-18. 
21
 Joined cases of 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor and others, ECR 1983, 2633, para. 23. 
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Furthermore, national legal rules may also apply to 
- the burden of proof, and 
- the monitoring activity of the public authorities within the limits of non-
discrimination (Para. 39) and loyalty to Community interests (Para. 45). 
In the light of the judgment in Deutsche Milchkontor, one cannot really argue that 
recourse to the relief at source or the equal treatment of domestic and foreign financial 
intermediaries would be precluded, or the smooth operation of paying agents, who provide 
information and apply withholding tax in respect of foreign investors would be impossible. 
Simplification and more generosity in legislation does not mean that the tax authorities 
would not enjoy freedom in raising objections to the taxpayer's conduct if necessary, 
withdrawing the possibility of having direct access to tax relief. The public authorities-
whether at a level of the Member State or the Community-may enjoy in certain areas (such 
as the Common Agricultural Policy) wide discretion as spelled out in the Berlin Butter 
case.22 The purpose of giving more emphasis to the effectiveness principle in the procedure 
of withholding taxation is not to restrict the scope of action of the tax authorities. It is only 
important to eliminate national legislation, the result of which would be to preclude 
simplified procedures and easy access to tax relief. 
The ECJ does not encroach upon the Member State's right to introduce national 
procedural rules. This inaction is done, however, with the proviso that national rules must 
reflect the principles of equivalence (non-discrimination) and effectiveness. This means in 
procedural matters that it is the national law according to which cases must be decided, 
with the proviso, however, that the applicable national law-compared to that applicable to 
purely national cases-must not be for the citizens invoking Community law 
- less favourable, and 
- less efficient. 
Where disparities are experienced, the idea is not to do comparison between national 
jurisdictions, but to do that between the national rules applicable either to cross-border or 
purely domestic cases. Harmonisation can thus take place in an indirect way. It is not the 
national procedural rules that are to be approximated, but the national procedural rules are 
to be assessed in the context of cross-border and purely domestic cases. To the extent that 
cross-border cases will not be mistreated, national procedural law systems will not be 
approximated to each other. 
The above idea is plainly expressed in Peterbroeck. In this case, the period during 
which new pleas could be raised by the appellant under Belgian law had expired by the 
time the national court held its hearing so that the latter was deprived of the possibility of 
considering the question of compatibility of the national law issue with Community law 
whether the higher company tax rate applicable to foreigners resulted in restriction on the 
freedom of establishment. As explained by the ECJ, it is for the domestic legal system of 
each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for 
safeguarding rights, which individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law. 
22
 Joined cases 133 to 136/1985 Walter Ran Lebensmittelwerke, ECR 1987, 2289, para. 29. 
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However, such rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic 
actions, nor render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights 
conferred by Community law.23 
The requirements that the public authorities should have recourse to the Community 
law framework of coordination and that national law restrictions must not go beyond what 
is necessary to achieve the legislative goal are set in the ECJ practice not only in respect of 
foreign, but also of domestic resident taxpayers. As held in Baxter, the national tax 
authorities are not prevented from benefiting from the harmonised company law directives 
on annual accounts.24 Similarly, it is explained in Vestergaard that the EC Assistance 
Directive can be invoked by tax administrations.25 Furthermore, it is precluded to prevent 
the taxpayer from submitting evidence for the expenditure relating to research carried out in 
another Member State.26 It is also prohibited to prevent the taxpayer from submitting 
evidence for the deduction of the costs of training courses, taking place in another Member 
State.27 National legislation, which absolutely prevents the taxpayer from submitting 
evidence that expenditure relating to research carried out in other Member States has 
actually been incurred and satisfies the prescribed requirements cannot be justified in the 
name of effectiveness of fiscal supervision. As confirmed in Laboratoires Fournier, the 
possibility cannot be excluded "a priori" that the taxpayer is able to provide relevant 
documentary evidence enabling the tax authorities of the Member State of taxation to 
ascertain, clearly and precisely, the nature and genuineness of the research expenditure 
incurred in other Member States.28 
(ii) Equally effective treatment, equivalence of the treatment accorded 
in various Member States 
As it comes from Metallgesellschaft and Hoechst, it is precluded to apply national law 
restrictions by the national public authorities on a claim on the grounds that the taxpayer 
did not get involved in burdensome administrative proceedings to seek remedy first.29 In 
other words, there should be enough room available for parties to conduct legal disputes on 
fair terms. Similarly, the taxpayer should be granted enough room to have direct access to 
tax relief. Raise the tax authorities doubts on how much the taxpayer's claim is established, 
they have the opportunity to challenge claims that seem to lack sufficient legal basis in a 
procedure of tax audit and the subsequent legal dispute. 
The ECJ holds in lnizan that Arts. 49 EC and 50 EC must be interpreted as not 
precluding legislation of a Member State which, first, makes reimbursement of the cost of 
23
 C-312/93 Peterbroeck, ECR, 1995, 1-4599, para. 12. See reference to the double requirement 
of equivalence and effectiveness already in Sun Giorgio, para. 12. They fist appear in 33/76 Rewe, 
ECR 1976, 1989, para. 5, and 45/76 Comet, ECR 1976, 2043, para. 13. These standards have been 
plainly explained in Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame. Accordingly, national law criteria must not 
be less favourable than those applying to similar claims or actions based on domestic law, and must not 
be such as in practice to make it impossible or excessively difficult to obtain rights. See: Joined Cases 
C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, ECR 1996, 1-1029, para. 90. 
24
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25
 C-55/98 Vestergaard, ECR 1999, 1-7641, para. 26. 
26
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hospital care provided in a Member State other than that in which the insured person's 
sickness fund is established conditional upon prior authorisation by that fund and, secondly, 
makes the grant of that authorisation subject to the condition that it be established that the 
insured person could not receive within the territory of the Member State, where the fund is 
established the treatment appropriate to his condition. However, authorisation may be 
refused on that ground only if treatment which is the same or equally effective for the 
patient can be obtained without undue delay in the territory of the Member State in which 
he or she resides.30 It is not precluded to introduce in a Member State a prior administrative 
authorisation scheme. It must be based, however, on a procedural system, which is easily 
accessible and capable of ensuring that a request for authorisation will be dealt with 
objectively and impartially within a reasonable time, and refusals to grant authorisation 
must also be capable of being challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings 
(Para. 57). 
The Community law requirement of achieving a treatment that is equally effective in 
comparable cases is a particular expression of the effectiveness principle, in this case spelled 
out in the context of the freedom to provide services. Interestingly, the problem of Ms 
Inizan, a patient, is dealt with as a matter of the freedom to provide medical services. 
Similarly, the problem of a taxpayer crossing the border may raise the issue of financial 
intermediaries that are to exercise the freedom to provide services. In contrast to the case of 
Inizan, the question is either about the domestic financial service-providers, who accompany 
their clients abroad or about foreign financial intermediaries, who accompany their clients 
in the source country. In the light of the judgment in Inizan, it is any way doubtful whether 
"a priori" exclusion of gaining access to relief at source or prevention of foreign financial 
intermediaries from serving their clients in the host Member State is consistent with 
Community law. 
A Member State is not obliged to co-operate with its fellow Member State unless the 
denial of coordination with the other Member State would prevent citizens from exercising 
their fundamental rights across the Community. The EC Court made use of this standard in 
C-446/03 Marks and Spencer as well: for lack of a fiscal nexus established in the UK, the 
United Kingdom is not obliged to grant the opportunity of carrying over the losses of a 
Luxembourg subsidiary to a UK parent company unless the UK taxpayer proves that in 
Luxembourg there is no way of recognising any loss carryover for tax purposes. It is a 
novelty in the Advocate General's opinion delivered on that case that he would extend the 
equivalence principle, germane to the concept of the internal market as introduced as of 
1993, to the matters of direct taxation, that is, to a territory where Member States traditionally 
enjoy freedom: a key to the solution of the problem is "the comparison and equivalence of 
the treatment accorded in various Member States".31 
It is interesting to see in Marks and Spencer the way in which the proportionality 
principle has been utilised. This principle was used before in the simple sense that restrictive 
national measures could be challenged or approved, depending on whether they meet the 
proportionality test. The ECJ decision is new, however, at the point of Marks and Spencer 
that the UK national legislation is subject to the proportionality test in the instance where 
there is no explicit restriction by national law on any Community freedom that would be 
30
 C-56/01 Inizan, ECR 2003, 1-12403, para. 59. 
31
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plainly inconsistent with Community law. The proportionality principle would then be left 
in a vacuum. This is not yet the case in point because the gap arising from the lack of 
explicit restrictive national law measures is filled by the special meaning of Community 
law, suggested by the profession and represented by the ECJ. The expression of this meaning 
is a result of the recursively closed organisation of interpreting and applying Community 
law. The law that has been developed in Marks and Spencer is a product of self-generation, 
that is, it has been developed, not having a peculiar legislator, who would have been 
authorised to adopt the applicable law. 
A key to understanding the decision in C-446/03 Marks and Spencer lies in the EC 
Court's assessment whether the opportunity of loss carryover for the company group has 
been fully exhausted in the particular case. It is not the UK law, strictly speaking, which is 
being evaluated. Not a single legal measure of the UK tax law has been condemned in the 
abstract. It is the UK legal practice that has been condemned, not proven friendly enough in 
a particular case. No statutory provision of the UK tax law has been challenged. The UK 
law has been criticised, however, because its impact has been detrimental, constituting a 
restriction on the taxpayer's right for cross-border loss carryover.32 
(iii) Obligation of the tax authorities to have recourse to the facilities of harmonised 
Community law on tax procedures 
In Persche,33 the ECJ is uncertain, whether the EC Mutual Assistance Directive requires the 
tax authorities of the residence Member State to have recourse to the assistance of the 
competent authorities of the recipient body's Member State of establishment to obtain the 
necessary information or whether, on the other hand, the said tax authorities may require 
the taxpayer himself or herself to provide all the necessary evidence. The question is here in 
other words of how to divide the burden of proof between the parties. Upon the finalisation 
of securities transactions, it is also a question how much foreign financial intermediaries 
and domestic resident paying agents are obliged to provide relevant information, and how 
much the local tax authorities may be requested by national law to have recourse to the 
facilities of the EC Mutual Assistance Directive, and approach their foreign counterparts. 
Where domestic or foreign intemiediaries suffer from the unusually high-level requirement 
of strict liability, no balance of interests can be achieved. The national procedural law would 
be consistent with the proportionality principle if foreign intermediaries and domestic ones 
with foreign clients were obliged to a due care standard like their normal domestic 
counterparts. 
The Commission contends that, even if the EC Mutual Assistance Directive itself docs 
not require a Member State to have recourse to the assistance of another Member State in 
order to inform itself of a fact, the evidence of which is in that other Member State, the 
fonner State would however be required, within the scope of application of Art. 56 EC, to 
have recourse to the possibilities offered by that directive in order to exclude any less 
favourable treatment of cross-border situations as compared to purely internal situations 
32
 As a consequence of the judgment, the UK legislation was eager to fill the assumed gaps left 
after the judgment in Marks and Spencer, trying to put the issue of last resort into a context of revised 
statutory law. It is the paradoxical aspect of the case, however, that such a problem cannot simply be 
solved by statutory means. For more explanation see Deák, D.: Legal autopoiesis theory in operation-a 
study of the ECJ case of C-446/03 Marks and Spencer v. David Halsey. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 
49(2008)2 , 163. 
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(Para. 36). Hence, the directive itself does not require the national authorities to have 
recourse to the facilities the directive provides. Such an obligation directly comes, however, 
from the principle of effectiveness as a positive standard (see its discussion above in 
connection with Arcaro). The requirements are thus relevant that the national authorities are 
obliged to follow a procedure in which it is possible to achieve the result envisaged by 
Community law, and that national law must be interpreted consistently with Community 
law. The positive standard of effectiveness makes a requirement for national procedural law 
by means of invoking substantive Community law to be extracted from Community 
freedoms. 
Since the EC Mutual Assistance Directive provides for the possibility of national tax 
authorities requesting information which they cannot obtain for themselves, the EC Court 
has ruled that the use, in Art. 2 (1) of the EC Mutual Assistance Directive, of the word 
"may" indicates that, whilst those authorities have the possibility of requesting information 
from the competent authorities of another Member State, such a request does not in any 
way constitute an obligation. It is for each Member State to assess the specific cases in 
which information concerning transactions by taxable persons in its territory is lacking and 
to decide whether those cases justify submitting a request for information to another 
Member State.34 The ECJ argues that it is left for the Member State to legislate whether, 
and in what conditions, the national authorities are obliged to have recourse to the mutual 
assistance with the tax authorities of another Member State. The Member State of legislation 
remains nevertheless to be subject to the proportionality principle. This is a position slightly 
different from that taken by the Commission. Namely, the latter refers to the positive 
standard of effectiveness and, therefore, concludes that the affected Member State is obliged 
to ensure the enforcement of Community freedoms. The ECJ is confined to a mcta-principle 
(proportionality), while the Commission substantiates its position by referring to 
substantive law. 
Furthermore, the ECJ holds that a Member State cannot exclude the grant of tax 
advantages for gifts made to a body established and recognised as charitable in another 
Member State on the sole ground that, in relation to such bodies, the tax authorities of the 
former Member State are unable to check, on-the-spot, compliance with the requirements 
which their tax legislation imposes. An on-the-spot inspection is not usually required since 
the monitoring of compliance with the conditions imposed by the national legislation is 
carried out, generally, by checking the information provided by those bodies (Paras 66-67). 
The national authorities that preclude the possibility of relief at source cannot thus justify 
this restriction by referring to the difficulties in organising on-the-spot audits if necessary 
because the organisation of such audits is always an extra burden for the authorities, no 
matter whether they have to conduct examination within the country or in another 
Member State. 
The taxpayer in Twoh, a Dutch company, supplied computer parts to another company 
residing in Italy. Twoh was required only to place the goods at the buyer's disposal at a 
warehouse situated in the Netherlands. Twoh issued invoices on intra-Community deliveries 
and, consequently, did not pay VAT. The Dutch tax authorities were of the opinion that 
Twoh did not demonstrate that the goods were transported to another Member State. The 
taxpayer requested the tax authorities to rely on the EC Mutual Assistance Directive and the 
34
 Para 65. See also, in C-184/05 Twoh International, ECR 2007, 1-7897, para. 32. 
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EC Administrative Cooperation Regulation35 and gather information from the competent 
Italian tax authorities, but the Dutch tax authorities refuted to meet this requirement. 
The ECJ considers that, as the Commission has correctly argued, the principle that the 
burden of proving entitlement to a tax derogation or exemption rests upon the person 
seeking to benefit from such a right is to be viewed as being within the limits imposed by 
Community law. Thus, it is for the supplier of the goods to furnish the proof that the 
conditions for exemption (Para. 26). What is important in this case is the fact that Twoh, 
being unable to provide the necessary evidence to establish that the goods have in fact been 
dispatched to the destination Member State, has requested the Netherlands tax authorities to 
gather information that should be capable of demonstrating the intra-Community nature of 
its supplies, obtaining information from the competent authority of that latter Member State, 
in application of the EC Mutual Assistance Directive and the EC Administrative Cooperation 
Regulation (Para. 28). 
As it comes from respect of the proportionality principle, where the taxpayer is unable 
to obtain the necessary evidence, being not able to approach the competent authorities of 
another Member State, the local tax authorities are obliged to act and provide the taxpayer 
with the relevant information. The local tax authorities may thus explicitly be obliged to 
rely on the EC Mutual Assistance Directive even upon the finalisation of securities 
transactions where the taxpayer is for objective reasons prevented from gaining access to 
evidence. For instance, local paying agents with foreign clients may have serious difficulties 
in approaching the foreign tax authorities if necessary. Similarly, the local authorities may 
not require from foreign financial intermediaries to obtain a local tax ID where it is easy for 
the tax authorities to approach the competent tax authorities of the home Member State and 
check if the tax ID showed is authentic. 
In the joined cases of C-155/08 Wand C-157/08 Passenheim-van Schoot,36 the Dutch 
tax authorities obtained information from the Belgian tax authorities among other things of 
the savings account of a Dutch resident taxpayer held with a Luxembourg subsidiary of the 
Belgian-based Kredietbank. The Dutch tax authorities were not in a position of providing 
any evidence for tax evasion. They were, however, eager to initiate a procedure of fiscal 
supervision. This was the case because the assets of the Dutch taxpayer, which were 
deposited in Luxembourg and concealed from the Dutch tax authorities, were subject to net 
wealth tax in the Netherlands. The Dutch tax authorities wanted to benefit from the Dutch 
tax law, which said that the normal five-year period of the statute of limitations for tax 
assessment could be extended to 12 years (from the date when the tax debt arose) in respect 
of the assets held outside the Netherlands. 
The taxpayer raised the issue as to whether these Dutch rules on the extended recovery 
period and the related calculation of tax penalty do not constitute an obstacle to the freedom 
to provide services and the free movement of capital that cannot be justified. The extent to 
which the Luxembourg bank secrecy should be lifted in order to facilitate the exchange of 
tax information between the Dutch and Belgian tax authorities in accordance with the EC 
Assistance Directive is a secondary issue, ancillary to the main subject. 
For the purposes of answering the question whether the Netherlands can be forgiven 
for introducing an extended recovery period in cross-border cases, the ECJ distinguished 
35
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between fiscal evasion and fiscal supervision (Para. 63). Where there is no evidence 
available for the tax authorities to combat tax evasion, it can be accepted that an extended 
period of the statute of limitations is applicable. Where, however, the tax authorities hold 
any means of evidence in order to discover tax liability in a cross-border case, the tax 
authorities have already the right to request information from the other Member State. 
The provision of information cannot be denied in particular where the requesting 
authorities have been in a position to gain knowledge of the case, but they need more 
information to complete their investigation. Where, however, for lack of sufficient 
information, the tax authorities are not able to provide any evidence of a particular case, 
a Member State is allowed to console itself by enhancing the chances of discovering unpaid 
tax even by extending the period of the statute of limitations for the recovery of the 
assessment of tax.37 Where the national legislation is proportionate with the aim of 
discovering fiscal evasion, the restrictions on any Community freedom that are developed 
because of the application of national law can be justified.38 
Where cross-border securities transactions are finalised, the tax authorities may 
obviously hold information that is enough for them to rely on the EC Mutual Assistance 
Directive in respect of both domestic and foreign resident taxpayers. "A priori" exclusion of 
relief at source or the mistreatment of domestic resident withholding agents or foreign 
financial intermediaries cannot thus be justified. With regard to the facilities available due 
to the operation of the Mutual Assistance Directive, the scope of the national legislator to 
act by introducing special measures, including restrictions on the legal management of 
cross-border cases, does not seem to be very wide. The ECJ explained that the mere fact 
that the taxable items concerned are located in another Member State does not justify the 
application of an extended recovery period. One can conclude from this statement that the 
exclusion of the facility of relief at source cannot be justified either by the mere fact that 
income is derived abroad or by foreigners. 
5. Effectiveness to be granted to domestic and foreign resident taxpayers through 
harmonisation in fiscal matters 
In the area of tax law, the question can be raised as to whether the exclusion of tax matters 
from the scope of internal market legislation can be extended not only to substantive tax 
law, but also to the procedural matters of taxation. One could argue that procedural tax law 
and cooperation in tax matters between the tax authorities of the Member States constitute 
issues that go beyond the scope of tax harmonisation. Reference to the EC Taxation Savings 
Directive,39 a reporting rather than a tax directive, can also be made in order to enhance the 
significance of cross-border cooperation in tax matters in terms of the exercise of Community 
freedoms. The matter of cooperation between the public authorities in tax matters should 
then extend beyond simply dealing with taxes. Arguably, free competition-the basic 
institution of the EU-can be distorted for lack of sincere cooperation between the public 
authorities, whether competent in tax or non-tax matters. 
This is the logic the Commission followed in the case of C-533/03 Commission v. 
Council, when it was required before the ECJ in vain-to base a range of amendments made 
to the existing EC directives and regulations on the cross-border cooperation in tax matters 
37
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on the legal basis of the internal market legislation rather than on the provisions of the old 
way of fiscal harmonisation to be achieved progressively in the common market (Art. 93 
EC, Ail. 113 TFEU).40 In C-533/03 Commission v. Council, the Commission contends that 
Council Regulation 1798/2003/EC41 and the directive, modifying the EC Mutual Assistance 
Directive,42 are not adopted on a correct legal basis. In essence, both the parties and the ECJ 
follow the arguments known already from case C-338/01. 
In the case of C-533/03, the ECJ held (in Para. 45) that "lex specialis" prevails over 
"lex generalis", and this is why Art. 93 EC Treaty on tax harmonisation should take priority 
over Art. 95 EC Treaty (Art. 114 TFEU) on overall internal market legislation in this case. 
As a consequence, the provisions on the cooperation of tax authorities must be treated as 
tax provisions. The issue of cooperation of the public authorities in tax matters cannot thus 
be separated from the contents of taxation. In other words, as Community law stands at 
present, the term of tax sovereignty should comprise not only substantive tax law provisions, 
but also the rules that are applicable to tax procedures. Unfortunately, attempts to seek to 
establish distinction between fiscal (substantive tax law) harmonisation and cooperation 
(procedural tax law harmonisation) have ended in failure, although one can argue that the 
law on Community cooperation should go beyond the mere subject of the harmonisation of 
substantive tax law provisions. It remains a task for the future to establish this claim better. 
In C-349/03 Commission v. UK, the UK tax authorities were condemned to the extent 
that they denied cross-border cooperation in tax matters in respect of Gibraltar on the 
grounds that the latter is not part of the EU customs territory, and thus the harmonised rules 
on VAT and excise duties were not applicable. The ECJ held that the exclusion of Gibraltar 
from the EU customs territory does not mean that Gibraltar fell outside the requirement of 
mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States. The substantive tax 
law issue has thus clearly been separated from the matter of mutual assistance in tax 
matters.43 
The ECJ does not seem to be consistent in deciding in these two cases. The difference 
in the positions the ECJ took can be reconciled, however, in so far as the two questions 
were raised in different ways. In the first case (C-533/03 Commission v. Council), the ECJ 
supported the standpoint of the EC Council that resisted the extension of the scope of 
harmonisation in the particular respect of administrative tax law due to lack of political 
consensus. In the second case (C-349/03 Commission v. UK), the ECJ reasoning was driven 
by the possibly strictest interpretation of the derogation granted to the UK upon the EC 
accession of the UK. This difference in context seems to give sufficient explanation for the 
difference in the conclusions that the ECJ arrived at in the two cases. 
The Commission contends in C-349/03 Commission v. UK that the EC Mutual 
Assistance Directive does not affect "the tax law as such of the Member States" (Para. 22). 
The Member States' competence to legislate tax should in this respect be confined to 
substantive tax law matters. Even if the harmonised rules of VAT do not apply to Gibraltar, 
the information of the taxpayers registered for VAT purposes in Spain and engaged in 
contacts with Gibraltar-based parties may be relevant for Spanish VAT purposes. The 
Commission plainly argues that the effectiveness principle of Community law requires the 
40
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extension to Gibraltar of the mutual information system (Para. 24). This example shows 
that the scope of procedural tax rules may exceed that of substantive tax law matters. Where 
harmonisation in substantive tax law can be a taboo, this is not necessarily true for the 
procedural aspect of tax law. 
The Spanish Government argues that distinction must be made depending on whether 
a cooperation measure relates to a tax harmonisation objective or relates simply to a 
measure, which confined itself to laying down rules for cooperation between the Member 
States (Para. 28). Tax cooperation measures may thus have two layers: they may consist of 
tax harmonisation provisions, properly speaking, and provisions on unqualified cooperation. 
The UK argument is, on the contrary, that the administration of a tax system and the 
revenue-raising power of a Member State are inextricably linked to each other (Para. 34). 
According to the UK, fiscal provisions concern not only the conditions of substantive tax 
liability, but also arrangements for the collection of taxes (Para. 36). 
The ECJ approved that there should be provisions of simple cooperation that cannot be 
regarded as acts on tax harmonisation (Para. 44). The EC Mutual Assistance Directive is 
still interpreted in the context of the UK accession treaty (Para. 46), and it may not affect 
common cases. Under Para. 47 of the judgment, procedural tax law rules are discussed in 
this case as acts on harmonisation, and not as fiscal provisions within the meaning of Art. 
95 (2) EC [on exceptions to the scope of internal market legislation, currently Art. 114 (2) 
TFEU], Where tax procedural rules are discussed under in the disguise of harmonisation 
acts, they may go beyond the scope of tax law. Harmonisation acts cannot be adopted, 
however, without the explicit approval of the Member States. Where tax procedural rules 
are related to fiscal rules, they should mean not only substantive, but also procedural tax 
law provisions. 
In C-338/01 Commission v. Council,44 the Commission contends that the purpose of 
the directives that modify the EC Recovery Directive45 is to bring about the internal market. 
They must accordingly be based on the Treaty basis on internal market legislation (Para. 
18). In view of the fact that Art. 95(2) EC [Art. 114 (2) TFEU] constitutes an exception to 
the principle set out in Art. 95(1) EC, it should be narrowly construed and its application is 
restricted to what is necessary for the attainment of its objectives, such as the protection of 
the Member States' sovereignty in matters relating to taxation (Para. 19). The Commission 
holds that the substantive tax law of the different Member States is not affected by the 
modification of the Recovery Directive (Para. 20). One could thus argue that sovereignty of 
the Member States to be exercised in fiscal matters is not extended to procedural tax law 
issues, and fiscal provisions would not relate to the rules of tax procedures in the context of 
Art. 114 (2) TFEU. 
Furthermore, the modifying directives do not simply concern the smooth operation of 
the internal market. They are aimed among other things at bringing about the fiscal neutrality 
of the internal market, the European Parliament contends (Para. 24). The term of fiscal 
neutrality should go beyond the scope of tax law. It should thus relate to the smooth 
operation of the internal market. The Parliament also argues that Council Directive 2001/44/ 
EC46 does not create a "sui generis" European procedure of the recovery of taxes. Instead, it 
44
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merely prescribes national treatment for foreign claims (Para. 25). The Directive provides a 
framework only that allows Member States to continue to be sovereign in tax matters. 
In contrast to the above arguments, the Council gives a broader meaning to the tenn of 
"fiscal provisions". They mean not only any measure regulating public revenue, or covering 
not only the definition and description of taxes, but also the manner in which taxes are 
assessed and collected (Para. 36). The term of fiscal should therefore be extended not only 
to substantive, but also to procedural tax law (and it should thus be confined to tax law) in 
the context of Art. 95 (2) TEC, the Council argues. Further on, a restrictive approach would 
be dependent on political assessments in respect of tax procedures, something, which would 
be at variance with the system of the attribution of powers within the Community and with 
the principle of legal certainty (Para. 37). 
The United Kingdom Government criticises the Commission for its unduly strict 
interpretation of the term "fiscal provisions" and for failing to take account of the opening 
sentence of Art. 95(1) EC, to the effect that this provision applies only "where nothing in 
the Treaty provides otherwise". Article 93 EC and Art. 94 EC are both special provisions 
for the adoption of measures relating to direct and indirect taxes (Para. 50). The UK 
Government adds that the term "fiscal" used in the English-language version of Art. 95 EC 
embraces not only taxation "stricto sensu", but also public spending and borrowing. 
Contrary to the Commission's contention, there is no justification for drawing a distinction 
between the rules on taxable persons, taxable events, bases of taxation, rates and exemptions, 
and the rules for the administration and enforcement of taxes (Para. 52). 
The ECJ held that, by reason of their general character, the words relating to fiscal 
matters cover not only all areas of taxation, without drawing any distinction between the 
types of duties or taxes concerned, but also all aspects of taxation, whether material rules or 
procedural ones (Para. 63). It should further be added that the decisive criterion for purposes 
of comparison with a view to the application of Art. 90 EC (Art. 110 TFEU) is the actual 
effect of each tax on domestic production, on the one hand, and on imported products, on 
the other. Even where the rate is the same, the effect of the tax may vary according to the 
detailed rules for the assessment and collection thereof applied to domestic production and 
imported products (Para. 65). 
III. Conclusions 
Where the institutions of the retention at source of taxes and the prevention of foreign 
financial intermediaries from assuming in the source country the liability to file tax 
information and arrange for the payment of tax in fair conditions comparable to their 
domestic counterparts are to be assessed in the light of the relevant Community law as 
communicated by the ECJ. it is crucial while concluding whether national legal practices of 
withholding taxation are consistent with Community law to apply the proportionality 
principle in specific cases. Where the application of the proportionality principle dictates us 
in a specific case respect of the effectiveness principle in enforcing rights both on the side 
of the tax authorities and taxpayers, an avenue may open up for progressively removing 
barriers from the clearing and settlement of securities transactions across the border. 
The cornerstones for such avenues can be reconstructed from the positions the ECJ has 
developed in particular as follows: 
" . . . the use of retention at source represented a proportionate means of ensuring the 
recovery of the tax debts of the State of taxation. The same is tme of the potential 
liability of the recipient of services who is required to make such a retention, as that 
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enables the absence of retention at source to be penalised if necessary. Since that 
liability constitutes the corollary of that method of collecting income tax, it too 
contributes in a proportionate manner to ensuring the effectiveness of collecting the 
tax." (paras 37-38 in FKP Scorpio); 
" . . . the taxpayer should not be excluded a priori from providing relevant documentary 
evidence enabling the tax authorities of the Member State imposing the tax to ascertain, 
clearly and precisely, that he is not attempting to avoid or evade the payment of taxes 
(see, to that effect, Case C-254/97 Baxter and Others [1999] ECR 1-4809, paragraphs 
19 and 20, and Case C-39/04 Laboratoires Founder [2005] ECR 1-2057, paragraph 
25)." (Para. 96 in ELISA); 
"Since Directive 77/799 provides for the possibility of national tax authorities 
requesting information which they cannot obtain for themselves, the Court has mied 
that the use, in Article 2(1) of Directive 77/799, of the word 'may' indicates that, whilst 
those authorities have the possibility of requesting information from the competent 
authority of another Member State, such a request does not in any way constitute an 
obligation. It is for each Member State to assess the specific cases in which information 
concerning transactions by taxable persons in its territory is lacking and to decide 
whether those cases justify submitting a request for information to another Member 
State (Twoh International, para. 32)." (para. 65 in Persche). 
Unfortunately, contradictions hidden in the first two items above of ECJ assertions can 
hardly be reconciled.47 It cannot then be understood why the domestic resident recipient of 
a foreign service-provider-bcing, e.g. a local fiscal agent-is "a priori" excluded from 
providing evidence, enabling the tax authorities of the source Member State to ascertain 
that he or she is not attempting to avoid or evade the payment of taxes while seeking to gain 
access to relief at source of taxation. As an alternative, the position granted to the local 
paying agent could arguably be extended to a foreign resident investor or a foreign financial 
intermediary accompanying its clients across the border. 
It is bad news for the taxpayers engaged in cross-border securities transactions that the 
applicability of the proportionality principle is subject to a case-by-case assessment; it is 
thus for each Member State to assess the specific cases in which information concerning 
transactions by taxable persons in its territory is lacking and to decide whether those cases 
justify submitting a request for information to another Member State. The domestic tax 
authorities may well conclude in a specific case that it is not necessary to initiate mutual 
assistance with the tax authorities of another Member State. It is good news, however, that 
the domestic tax authorities must certainly not arrive at a final decision unless they make an 
assessment of the case under examination before. 
It is a key to the application of the proportionality principle that rights and obligations 
must be allocated according to the facts and circumstances of the specific case. This means, 
for example, that it is not enough to require alleviation of foreign financial intermediaries 
from strict liability. Instead, their liability should be adjusted to the real case. There are a 
47
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few issues48 that can be highlighted to illustrate how the proportionality principle can be 
operated as follows: 
- "a priori" exclusion of relief at source seems to violate the proportionality principle 
in general; the introduction of a quick refund procedure (not appearing in the OECD 
Implementation Package) may be helpful, however, to find a balance between the legislative 
goals and means in respect of withholding taxation; 
- the source country's request for applying for a new tax identification number does 
not comply with the idea of holding a single European passport, otherwise available for 
financial enterprises both under the EC Consolidated Banking Directive;49 
- under the harmonised Community law on VAT refund, appointment of fiscal 
representatives must not be requested by the source Member State;50 such a rule could be 
extended to the tax treatment upon the finalisation of cross-border securities transactions as 
well with a view to respecting the proportionality principle; 
- from the perspective of the application of the proportionality principle, an ideal 
solution could be the provision of information by the financial intermediary to the source 
country's authorities and, in tum, the transfer of information by the source country to the 
residence country; this option is preferred both by the OECD and the EC Taxation Savings 
Directive; 
- while designing the allocation of rights and liabilities of all members that may be 
engaged in a custody chain, it is necessary to coordinate the status of authorised 
intermediaries with that of domestic withholding agents; and 
- respect of the proportionality principle requires to bear in mind that the intermediary 
that has the closest relationship with the investor has access to information about the 
investor what may entail strict liability while the domestic withholding agent does not have 
strict liability for under-withholding; in fact, proposed procedures are intended the reduce 
the risk of under-withholding, but not necessarily the authorised intermediary's liability. 
L J 
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Literature? In Substitution for Legal Philosophy? 
(Variations to and Uses of "Law and Literature") 
A b s t r a c t . A n g l o - A m e r i c a n and French, as well as German, Spanish and Hungar ian variations to " L a w and 
Literature" are surveyed for that as to the nature of the discipline s o m e conclusions can be formulated. Accordingly, 
" L a w and Literature" recal ls that which is infinite in fallibility a n d which is not t ransparent in its simplicity, that is, 
the situation conf ron ted that we may not avoid deciding abou t despite the fact that w e may not get to a final 
understanding. What is said thereby is that " L a w and Literature" is jus t a life-substitute. Like an artificial ersatz, it 
helps one to see out f r o m what he/she cannot surpass. What it is all about is perhaps not simply br idging the gap 
be tween the law's proposi t ion and the case of law, with unavo idab le tensions confront ing the general and the 
individual, as well as the abstract and the concrete. Instead, it is more about live meditation, professional 
methodicalness s tepped back in order to gain further perspect ives and renewed reflection f rom a distance, so that 
the underlying reason fo r the legal (and especial ly judicial) p rofess ion can be recurrently rethought. In a fictional 
fo rm, literature is the symbol and synonym of reflected life, a field where genuine human fates can be represented. 
Thereby, at the s ame t i m e it is a substitute for theology, rooted in earthly existence as a supply to fos ter feel ing 
kinds of. or substi tutes to, transcendence. 
Keywords : enigma o f law, Shakespeare, M a d á c h ' s The Tragedy of Man, Kleist 's Michael Kohlhaas, Sophoc les ' 
Antigoné, Dostoyevsky 
1. The Enigma of Law and its Study 
"Law and Literature"? It helps human quality to enrich us. It helps channel back again into 
the law's domain that which is endless and incomprehensible throughout, and which escapes 
from all final explanation. It reconstructs the milieu in which we can float at most but which 
we will never have acquired. It helps us recognise in our existence the image of God we can 
hardly perceive with eyes dedicated to earthy matters. It helps us cogitate about the mystery 
of our existence in the Universe, the existential unthinkability of our presence thrown into 
being. It helps the human quality restored in us, whereto we still always escape back when 
our artificial being in this very world makes us dry, shrivelled, empty or weightless. 
As is commonly known, our science is great albeit hyperbolic. We provided ourselves 
with scientific methodology to proceed step by step with the help of the logic of a world we 
made from ideas and conceptualised, and we erect intellectual buildings by executing 
relentless demands drawn from it. By the same token, in the meantime, however, we 
inevitably also deconstruct our world. And, thereby, we transformed that which has been so 
deep as to be impossible to break through and untransparently phenomenal, into simplicity 
reduced until it could be seen from one single aspect that we have sliced out of it. Moreover, 
we also prescribed what to see in it, and we also slowly began to see it-and nothing except 
it-indeed. 
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Hoping for a securer state, we built a fortress we believed to be firm as a rock around 
ourselves from mere consequences. We bedded ourselves methodically into mortar as far as 
we could; and on the fundament of our estate under our soles we scan the firmament to 
foresee whether or not we may once put even stars under the settling yoke of our intellect. 
When walking proudly and bravely, we think to navigate our existence on the field we have 
created without recognising that we have augmented it by a ballast in the meantime. For if 
sky and earth quake, we have to realise that we find ourselves in the old uncertainty. As 
lotus or corals live in water and others do live on them, we cuddle up together. And although 
flood floats and waves play with us with tide raising and sinking, in our misappointed 
sense-feeling ourselves at home in such a floating-we constitute, hand in hand, a standing 
mainland for ourselves. 
Thus, our scholarship is great even if hyperbolic. It forecalculates how and in what 
way we should go on, and we may know whether we have gone on actually, because we 
may come on steadily indeed. For in that it has a message at all, it tells the truth. For we 
may actually delve into it deeper with the help of methodicality-with regard to all matters 
we may be at all immersed in. Our civilisation is pushed by our scholarship increasingly 
further; thus, we dig even deeper and deeper until, slowly, our sight will be lost. Sometimes 
we already forget where we have begun to dig at all. By now we mostly see-exclusively, 
even if ever from nearer-that which we may sense on the edge of our spade. And the more 
our eye becomes accustomed to it, the less sight remains to see anything else. Whilst we 
approach, we also drift apart inevitably. 
Indeed, science is to be found wherein there is sacrifice, too. This is where it is 
important-unavoidably-to develop partialities in ourselves. This is where we make order by 
fabricating concepts for ourselves, and also by establishing necessary links as laws amongst 
them. And independent of how much uncertain it is-both from where it starts and where it 
concludes-we call such links established as knowledge by right, bccause we get more by it 
than otherwise. In this manner, we have already built an artificial world around ourselves. 
Under such conditions, it is worthwhile to know what we are actually doing, so that 
after having made a sacrifice for it, we may also rebuild the fullness of our human beings. 
For we may get used to our new world to a great extent. And we should realise after all that 
our science has never been and will never be anything complete or completed. Certainly, 
the outcome is not reality itself but alter ego humanly constructed and construed, which we 
have made primitive by virtualising as slices of what God created or what happened to us, 
1.e. as proofs and stems remaining in our sense. All this is as if we magically identified 
ourselves with something else, and for this, we build for our own use, from twigs and 
leaves, entities-animals or humans—living as a cosmos in themselves. Well, the actuality 
produced by our scholarship as a world of concepts is by no means more viable in itself 
than the noble action of our magical act. And still: if it is feasible to do that and that can be 
learnt and practiced, then we may precipitate effects through such substitutes, too. 
In sum, there is science. It also has to be as it proved to be useful for humanity, in the 
humans' earthly struggle. 
2. "Law and Literature" 
Law is scholarship on human ordering. It addresses the issue as to whom anything may be 
attributed and ascribed, and in what, and how, proper balance should be manifested, a balance 
that we would like to measure, with scales set up in our earthly existence. In the final account, 
our law is the constant refinement of the autocracy of human will through various deflectors. 
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Whilst we spade even deeper in our scholarship on human ordering, we become in fact 
already increasingly involved in ourselves by our deflectors, driven by and getting entangled 
with other deflectors. After a while, sometimes we cannot any longer know for sure what is 
actually driven by what. And if, instead of an appeal to, or interest in, our choice, namely, of 
our human fallibility, we try to read the scale from the miracle of Creation, then the innocence 
of admiration, of the mysticism of reunion with the divine essence, of the maiden and still 
devoted astonishment will also sooner or later be replaced by a scale reading as transformed 
into its own and distinct profession, which, through its artificial ways, will achieve its 
methodicality bom from that professionalisation so that, eventually, it cannot see in its self-
mirror anything else than its own self, virtualised by its own means. 
Law, then literature? Literature, then law? Even the expression makes them transcendent 
as there is neither law, nor literature inside. The profession of jurisprudence, always sinking 
into its own devices while becoming emotionless as to the grandiose donation capable of 
being astonished at the real world, looks in and through them -as the primitively taintless 
expression of anything human (compared to legal artificiality)-for the heady clarity of 
fullness and for the regenerating force of its conception, which withstands explanations to 
the very being. 
Returning back to the original indication: "Law and literature"? Well, "law" here is what 
it is not any longer and, in turn, "literature"-that is all. Like The Jolly Joker (as an extra 
trump card), "literature" in such a connection is all that is still capable in our world of giving 
an account of the fullness of being lost repeatedly, so as to realise newly its inexhaustibility, 
and to persuade us as to the original fallibility of whatever explanation and final setting, with 
the limited devices at our disposal. Therefore, it can stand for anything else and it will depend 
on custom, fashion or just any occasional mainstream idea, whether we hold onto whatever 
word, human expression or catharsis that is recurrently sensed by humans in its naming. Since 
it could as well be fable or myth, a primitive popular event shooting out from atavistically 
ancient directness, just as well as the playing of a string quartet, thunderstorm or volcano 
breakout, or again, the playing of moths or animal rut. We call it 'literature' as we do also 
mostly rely on text, with an understanding of texts and contexts in it. We refer to it as if 
understanding a text differed from understanding a world. That is, we act as if law were 
simple text-reproducing concrétisation, instead of the (unmatched but always accessible) 
wisdom of the realisation that we weigh much and many times whilst we equalise balance 
only rarely-at a time when we can hardly do anything else. For, we hardly abide by anything 
else in law than tradition, within the frameworks of which we wish exactly-and just through 
the law and its responsively responsible practice-to relax. 
Hamlet? Michael Kohlhaasl Raskolnikov! Heroes of Franz Kafka, Robert Musil, 
William Shakespeare, Heinrich von Kleist and Fyodor Dostoyevsky coming out from and 
then returning to fog? Instead of the self-reassuring conformism of the peacockery of 
hypocrisy, Friedrich Nietzsche shouted to the world the majestic royal nudity of Humanism 
still based on the Enlightenment. In lack of any resignation resulting from unprocessed 
conscience, Sörén Kierkegaard concluded, in tum, a self-loss of being thrown into existence. 
Now, where are we ourselves? And what may we do mainly? For want of anything better, 
meditate while in front of our wise books, reading The Trial of the Genius by Bama Horváth1  
in order to care, protect and defend ourselves, and even more so at a time when we have 
1
 Horváth, В.: Der Rechtsstreit des Genius: I. Sokrates and II. Johanna, a) Der Tatbestand and 
b) Das Verfahren. Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 22 (1942), 126-162, 295-342 and 395M60. 
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already begun to choke from our own playing of false self-reassurance, still rounded off to 
mere geometry or rhctoric in our retained honesty. It seems to be purposeless to have 
constructed, like the Chess Turk by Wolfgang von Kempelen,2 a lawyer moved by piston-
valves of the rationale of some selected schemes.3 This is so because all that notwithstanding, 
a human is hidden in the machinery, behind the bewigged-cloaked external appearances. 
That is, what is hidden is not rationality disciplined in The Turk's torso but benevolence, 
mixed with fallibility, because there is a spell of drama in the air when the lawyer starts 
calculating or concluding a deal with an apparently cool head. The tempting remembrance 
of the Greek theatre4 is not by chance, therefore. For all those fighting are humans, although 
mere fate will decide after all. We rectify, and intervene to struggle with self-created rules, 
which could perhaps be cruder without us; we even try to hold down the hand of the fate, 
although no human effort is ever to succeed in full. We may have fought ourselves to get 
into the arena without, however, pushing out fate's hand. In turn, we are already so many 
and flail with so wide a range of weapons that sometimes we already trample each other; 
moreover, here and now we ourselves stumble upon our deflecting devices more and more. 
What remains still? Nothing else but struggle and confidence. Can fight and trust be 
added to them? They are a strange combination at first glance, since the former was already 
practiced before the law, and the latter serves as a balm despite the law, too. And then, what 
might be the lesson to be drawn from all this? Maybe the first is the fact that no device can 
dispense of a manufacturer. Later on, it does not work instead of or without a user. Therefore, 
we have to resist the command of the self-laudating idol in front of us that, instead of the 
Good Lord, would make us adore this humanly created civilisation up to the point when, 
grovelling in front of it, we would also give up our civility and responsibility. 
"Law and Literature" recalls that which is infinite in fallibility and which is not 
transparent in its simplicity, that is, the situation confronted that we may not avoid deciding 
about despite the fact that we may not get to a final understanding. This is so because we 
may tear much from the wires, albeit we cannot solve their totality. What is said here and 
now—for want of anything better-as "Law and Literature" is, therefore, only a life-substitute. 
Like an artificial ersatz, it helps us to see out from our everyday complexities, exemplifying 
why our personal existence is difficult to grasp, a condition that we cannot surpass, even if 
we may improve it to make it more noble with love offered to everyone. All this is like a 
monastic psalm: they do and we do what we all have to do, as this is the only thing that 
may convey meaning on our daily efforts, on human labour, without being able to replace 
it. This is one of the chances which we may securely draw on. 
2
 Cf. <http://www.kempelen.hu/index_en.html>, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Turk> and 
<http://www.museumofhoaxes.com/hoax/Hoaxipedia/Great_Chess_Automaton/>. 
3
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Leibniz und die Frage der rechtlichen Systembildung. In: Mollnau, K. A. 
(hrsg.): Materialismus und Idealismus im Rechtsdenken: Geschichte und Gegenwart. Stuttgart, 1987. 
114-127. 
4
 What will survive in medieval mysterium and morality plays or school dramas unchangingly 
unifying theatric performance and justice publicly administered, with experiencing the transmission 
of community messages as a community function. Cf., e.g. Gillespie, J. C.: Theatrical Justice. 
Northern Ireland Legat Quarterly, 31 (1980), 67-72. as well as-equipped with sharpened problem-
centredness-Garfinkel. H.: Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies. American Journal of 
Sociology, 61 (1956), 420^424. For a summary, see Tindemans, K.: Recht en tragedie: De scène van 
de wet in de antieke polis. [Diss.] Leuven, 1995/1996. 
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3. Varieties of " L a w and Literature" 
" L a w and Li terature"? We may b r o o d over the helpless ly expans ive imperialism of the 
caduci ty of great na t ions , the u n d e m a n d i n g servility o f the se l f -emptying confidence of pas t 
conquerors , when their gloire has a l ready dissipated. 
Law and Li tera ture differs f r o m its antecedents . In the thorough ly based A n g l o -
Amer i can classical studies of m o r e than a century ago, the li terary analogon (e i ther in 
personal paths of l ife or in problemat ic ) still served as the medium of professional le isurely 
adventure; 5 and Shakespeare ' s o e u v r e was used (in general6 or as concentrated on his 
individual pieces, figures, topoi,1 or as connected wi th his once lawyerly profess iona l 
5
 Its early treatments-with the exception to, e.g. Andrews, W. (ed.): The Lawyer: In History, 
Literature, and Humour. London, 1896-were hardly more than collections of interesting features of 
mere biographical data-, e.g. Hawes, G. R.: Literature and the Law. The Green Bag [An Entertaining 
Magazine for Lawyers], 11 (1899), 234-237 and Westley, G. H.: From Law to Literature. The Green 
Bag, 12 (1900), 446^449-or dythirambs of the literary value of old lawyerly documents-Holdsworth, 
W. S.: Literature in Law Books. Washington University Law Quarterly, 24 (1939), 153-172-or a 
series of free associations on the ungraspability of anything law-, e.g. Cardozo, B. N.: Law and 
Literature. [Yale Review (1925) reprint] Columbia Law Review, 39 (1939), 119-137-, and it is only at 
a later time that analyses with a philological care will crop up-, e.g. from two periods of time, Cahn, 
E. N.: Goethe's View of Law, with a Gloss out of Plato. Columbia Law Review, 49 (1949), 904-920 
and Boland, D.: Images of Law in Classical Russian Literature. Irish Student Law Review, 8 (2000), 
53-65-and mostly for a propedeutic purpose. 
6
 Cf., e.g. Heard, F. F.: Shakespeare as a Lawyer. Boston, 1883; Davis, C. K.: The Law in 
Shakespeare. 2nd ed., St. Paul, 1884; White, E. J.: Commentaries on the Law in Shakespeare, with 
Explanations of the Legal Terms Used in the Plays, Poems and Sonnets, and a Consideration of the 
Criminal Types Presented, also a Full Discussion of the Bacon-Shakespeare Controversy. 2nd ed., St. 
Louis, 1913; Greenwood, G.: Shakespeare's Law. London, 1920; Barton, D. P.: Links between 
Shakespeare and the Law. London, 1929; Keeton, G. W.: Shakespeare and his Legal Problems. 
London, 1930; Keeton, G. W.: Shakespeare's Legal and Political Background. New York, 1968; 
Phillips, O. W.: Shakespeare and the Lawyers. London, 1972; MacKinnon, F. V.: The Timeless 
Shakespeare: The Natural Law in Shakespeare. Gloucester, 1985; Wells, R. H.: Shakespeare, Politics 
and the State. London and Basingstoke, 1986; Cook, N. L.: Shakespeare Comes to the Law School 
Classroom. Denver University Law Review, 68 (1988), 387-411; Komstein, D. J.: Kill all the 
Lawyers? Shakespeare's Legal Appeal. Princeton, 1994; Ward, I.: A Kingdom for a Stage, Princes to 
Act: Shakespeare and the Art of Government. Nottingham, 1997 and Ward, I.: Shakespeare and the 
Legal Imagination. London, 1999; Sokol, B. J.-Sokol, M.: Shakespeare's Legal Language. London 
and New Brunswick, 2000. 
7
 Cf., e.g. Guernsey, R. S.: Ecclesiastical Law in Hamlet: The Burial of Ophelia. New York, 
1885; Clarkson, P. S.-Warren, С. T.: The Law of Property in Shakespeare and the Elizabethan Drama. 
Baltimore, 1942; Gless, D. J.: Measure for Measure: The Law, and the Convent. Princeton, 1979; 
Clark, A. M.: Murder under Trust, or the Topical Macbeth and Other Jacobean Matters. Edinburgh, 
1981; Gohn, J. В.: Richard II: Shakespeare's Legal Brief on the Royal Prerogative and the Succession 
to the Throne. Georgetown Law Journal, 70 (1982), 943-973; Hamilton, D. В.: The State of Law in 
Richard II. Shakespeare Quarterly, 34 (1983), 5-17; Klein, H.-Dávidházi, P. (eds): Shakespeare and 
Hungary: The Law and Shakespeare. Lewiston, 1996; Hawley, W. M.: Shakespearean Tragedy and 
the Common Law: The Art of Punishment. New York, 1998; Kahn, P. W.: Law and Love: The Trials of 
King Lear. New Haven, 2000; Sokol, B. J.-Sokol, M.: Shakespeare, Law, and Marriage. Cambridge 
and New York, 2003; McDonald, M. A.: Shakespeare's King Lear with The Tempest: The Discovery 
of Nature and the Recovery of Classical Natural Right. Lanham and Oxford, 2004. 
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practice8) as a theological, cthical or political warehouse of patterns to forge an understanding 
of the nature and infinity of law as one of the deepest human challenges; jurist authors in 
that period turned with interest to other literary manifestations, too,4 just as they constructed 
examples in the fine arts'" or architecture." By contrast, as Law and Literature expressedly 
becomes a movement in the United States of America,12 it is not a product of philosophical 
8
 Cf., e.g. Hicks, F. C.: Was Shakespeare a Lawyer? A Review of the Literature in Question. 
Case and Comment [Rochester, N.Y.], 22 (1916), 1002-1011; Law, E.: Shakespeare's »Tempest« as 
Originally Produced at Court. London, 1920; Knight, W. N.: Shakespeare s Hidden Life: Shakespeare 
at the Law (1585-1595). New York, 1973; Kornstein, D. J.: Kill all the Lawyers? Shakespeare's Legal 
Appeal. Lincoln and London, 2005. 
9
 E.g. Hester, D. A.: Law and Piety in the »Antigone«: A Reply to J. Dalfen, »Gesetz ist nicht 
Gesetz...«. Wiener Studien, 14 (1980), 5-11; Hornsby, J. A.: Chaucer and the Law. London and 
Norman, 1988; Cambridge, R.: Aequitas and Iustitia in Mediaeval German Psalters. In: Mediaeval 
German Studies Presented to Frederick Norman. London, 1965. 31-38; Kirchberger, L.: Franz 
Kafka 's Use of Law in Fiction: A New Interpretation of In der Strafkolonie, Der Prozess, and Das 
Schloss. New York, 1986; Islawm, S.: Kiplings »Law«: A Study of his Philosophy of Life. London, 
1975; Hildebrand, E. G.: Jane Austen and the Law. Persuasions [Journal of the Jane Austen Society of 
North America], 4 ( 1982), 34-41 and Treitel, G. H.: Jane Austen and the Law. Law Quarterly Review, 
100 (1984), 549-586; Simon, E.: Palais de Justice and Poetic Justice in Albert Camus. The Stranger' 
Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature, 3 ( 1990), 111 125. 
10
 E.g. Wind, E.: Platonic Justice, Designed by Raphael. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes, 1 (1937-1938), 69-70; Cummings, F.: Poussin, Haydon, and The Judgement of Solomon. 
The Burlington Magazine, 104 (1962), 146-152; Puttfarken, T.: Golden Age and Justice in Sixteenth-
Century Florentine Political Thought and Imagery: Observations on Three Pictures by Jacopo Zucchi. 
Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 43 ( 1980), 130-149; Riess, J. В.: Political Ideals in 
Medieval Italian Art: The Frescoes in the Palazzo dei Priori [Perugia (1297)]. Ann Arbor, 1981; 
Tiefenbrun, S. (ed.): Law and the Arts. Westport and London, 1998. 
11
 Interestingly enough, English-American pragmatism produced a lot on this field like, e.g. 
Taylor, K. F.: In the Theater of Criminal Justice: The Palais de Justice in Second Empire Paris. 
Princeton, 1993; Graham, C.: Ordering Law: The Architectural and Social History of the English Law 
Court to 1914. Burlington, 2003; McNamara, M. J.: From Tavern to Courthouse: Architecture and 
Ritual in American Law (1658-1860). Baltimore and London, 2004. 
12
 Just to mention few inspiring representatives, cf., e.g. Fish, S.: Working on the Chain Gang: 
Interpretation in the Law and in Literary Criticism. [Critical Inquiry 9 (1982), 201 et seq. reprint] in 
his: Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and 
Legal Studies. Oxford, 1989, 87-103; Levinson, S.: Law as Literature. Texas Law Review, 60 (1982), 
373-403; White, J. В.: Reading Law and Reading Literature. Texas Law Review, 60 ( 1982), 415M45; 
Weisberg, R. H.: The Failure of the Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modern Fiction. New Haven 
and London. 1984; White, J. В.: When Words Lose their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions 
of Language, Character, and Community. Chicago and London, 1984 and Heracles' Bow: Essays on 
the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law. Madison, 1985; West, R.: Jurisprudence as Narrative: An 
Aesthetic Analysis of Modem Legal Thought. New York University Law Review, 60 (1985), 145-211; 
Posner, R.: Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation. Cambridge and London, 1988; Levinson, 
S. and Mailloux, S. (ed.): Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader. Evanston, 1988; 
Weisberg, R.: The Law-Literature Enterprise. Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, 1 (1988), 
1-67; West, R.: Communities, Texts, and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature Movement. Yale 
Journal of Law and the Humanities, 1 (1988), 129-156; White, J. В.: What Can a Lawyer Learn from 
Literature? Harvard Law Review, 102 ( 1989), 2014-2047; Weisberg, R. : Poethics and Other Strategies 
of Law and Literature. New York, 1992; White, J. В.: Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in Literature, 
Law, and Politics. Chicago and London, 1994; Ward, I.: Law and Literature: Possibilities and 
Perspectives. Cambridge, 1995. 
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self-reflection pressed any longer without interests but is a device for avoiding scientific 
methodicalness in tribal discordance resulting from brutalised inside fights, when demands 
are launched and historical entitlements are declared. I am the one who once took part in 
the parade of the American world when saloon-Trotskyists, hidden in the mantle of the 
mainstream Critical Legal Studies, with unbarbered heads and in unwashed engine uniforms, 
flung in the face of wondering European legal sociologists; "Then damn the theory ! "-although 
those latter asked only for the basis of this new-world toy, which played many times with us 
as a subversion, at an international scientific conference summoned at Onati in the Basque 
Country-and saw his friends, theorists of Harvard with international reputations who could 
whisper about the line that cannot be easily found between respectability and political 
correctness. So too I was the one who took part in the Anglo-American Critical Legal 
Studies meeting in the crumbling New College building in Oxford, convened for a 
fashionable meditation limited to criticism, when on the cocktail-grass of the break the 
distinguished guest, me, invited from Hungary, having noticed the always closed gate of the 
ancient chapel opening for a few minutes for ritual reasons, called out ardently, and the 
domestic participants, recruited from suburbs, as new staff without the antique titles of their 
Bodleian Library having ever been used, reproved immediately the intruder: "Up? To 
church? Why? We never go there!". Well, accordingly my ruminations formed from such 
experiences and my Australian and American impressions of three decades ago, the 
revolutionism of the generation of 1968 culminated first in so-called Critical Legal Studies. 
Then, following the split into different isms, it disintegrated into so-called re-segregation 
deconstructionisms called either feminist or otherwise (sometimes ethnic), demanding 
historical revision and justice to be done by a re-division of the chance-giving cards. For 
instance, in the sanctum of Yale feminist jurisprudence presented itself in interjections, the 
sentimentalism of injuries, which the champions of intellectual methodicalness, self-styled 
masters of reason, listened to with cold faces. When they asked for its theory of knowledge 
and methodology, the answer was a more impetuous cry of pain, since-I realised-all this 
was just showing the scandal of domination until now (with cathatonic anger flung always 
in face of the "male chauvinism of white domination"), namely, that today's female 
revolutionists did not even have vocabulary with which they could express themselves. 
"From what might we gathcr"-they said, mostly with contemptuous rejection-"even if the 
Bible also speaks by you and for you?". Well, after such representatives had experimented, 
with a foundation based on narrative jurisprudence, how to ontologise law through the style 
analysis of the language of legal processes, that is, how to reveal from behind its striking 
neutrality the relations of domination as a basic structure (which they felt intolerable), such 
legal theories began slowly wandering to the domain of literature (of course, not to the 
European or American versions, which they hated, but to their black, latino or hispanic 
variations)-in the United States of America, at the end of the millennium, following the 
barbarian coming into power of the generation of students who rioted in 1968—since there 
was neither law nor theoretical demand in their production but sheer emotional self-
conditioning and claims (that could otherwise be received with full respect).13 Under such 
13
 As formulated by T. Nagy: Narratív tematika a kortárs amerikai jogelméletben [Narrative 
topics in contemporary American legal theorising], Szeged, 2003, 22: "Writings by representatives of 
feminist jurisprudence and race-consciousness [...] begin look like literary texts proper.". Or, it may 
be claimed that "Kafka's The Trial is as good a jurisprudence as any other legal theory". Gräzin, I.: 
On Myth, Considered as a Method for Legal Thought. Law and Critique, 15 (2004), 159-181, 
abstract. 
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cond i t i ons , not even the literary m o m e n t was too cmpa the t i c with them in the sense o f 
E u r o p e a n refinement, as the whole w h i t e male k i t - f r o m Homeros to Eugen Ionescu-cou ld 
h a v e b e e n thrown a w a y with pleasure in exchange for a good Puerto Rican woman slave 
s tory o r for any pretext o f female humi l ia t ion . 
L a w and Peace. L a w and Modern i sa t ion . And Deve lopment , and Language, and 
E c o n o m y , and L i t e r a tu re - and all a long the prayer-mill, in order to speak, having somewhat 
t r a n s c e n d e d Marxism, à propos of law in terms of political action and of the claim of a new 
c lass heralding new conques t s , instead o f law in a genuine sense or the mora l i ty and human 
v a l u e s underlying it. Or , literature is j u s t a pretence here14—with a n o n y m o u s stories, instead 
of t he civilisational medi ta t ions and d e b a t e s of thousand years , as por t rayed by Sophocles, 
Jean Racine , William Shakespeare , J o h a n n Wolfgang Goe the , or jus t Alber t Camus and 
F r i ed r i ch Dür renma t t -because those r e b e l s ' demands, as sensed momentar i ly , can now be 
dec l a r ed . 
T h e French ve r s ion of Law and Literature1 5 is, as referred to earlier, dynamical ly 
f o r m i n g but its foot ing is lost and the road missed, as fo r the t ime be ing it is hardly more 
than s o m e panting f e e d i n g generated b y the feeling of be ing overdue." ' O f course, 1 believe 
that it m a y finish by b o r r o w i n g the A m e r i c a n naming pa t te rns without fo l lowing the latter 's 
f a s h i o n a b l e zigzags, and will s trengthen as an auxiliary b ranch of s tudying law, and standing 
for intcrdisciplinari ty i tself ,1 7 as mixed w i t h specific l i terary and artistic analysis . 
14
 When it serves mere rhetorical purposes by signalling the legal absurdity of police actions 
exemplified by, e.g. Ghetti, M. R.: Seizure through the Looking Glass: Constitutional Analysis in 
Alice's Wonderland. Southern University Law Review, 22 (1994-1995), 231-254. 
15
 E.g. Henriot, E.: Moeurs juridiques et judiciaires de l'ancienne Rome d'après les poètes 
latins. I—III. Paris, 1865 [reprint: Aalen, 1973 and Pamploma, 2007]. 
16
 Cf., e.g. Tzitzis, S.: Scolies sur les nomina d'Antigone représentés comme droit naturel. 
Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 33 (1988), 243-258; Biet, С.: La justice dans les Fables: La 
Fontaine et »le droit des gens«. Le Fablier [Revue des Amis de Jean de la Fontaine], (1992) 4, 17-24; 
Buschinger, D. (ed.): Le droit et sa perception dans la littérature et les mentalités médiévales. (Actes 
du Colloque du Centre d 'Etudes Médiévales de l'Université de Picardie, Amiens, 17-19 mars 1989.) 
Göppingen, 1993; Malaurie, P.: Droit et littérature: Une anthologie. Paris, 1997; Littératures 
classiques [Toulouse] (2000), 40; Bouquet, P.-Voilley, P. (ed.): Droit et littérature dans le contexte 
suédois. Paris, 2000; Peeh, T.: Conter le crime: Droit et littérature sous la Contre-Réforme: les 
histoires tragiques (1559-1644). Paris, 2000; Rubinlicht-Proux, A.: Le droit saisi par la littérature. 
[Thèse, 1997.] Villeneuve d'Ascq, 2001; Biet, С. (ed.): Droit et littérature, Europe 80 (2002) 876; 
Ost, F.-Van Eynde, L.-Gérard, P.-van de Kerchove, M. (eds): Lettres et lois: Le droit au miroir de la 
littérature. Bruxelles, 2001. As revealed by Ost, F.: Raconter la loi: Aux sources de l'imaginaire 
juridique. Paris, 2004. and Brogniez, L. (ed.): Droit et littérature: Dossier. Bruxelles, 2007, it is the 
late translation of Posner's provocative book [in note 12], unnoticed for a decade-Dro// et littérature. 
Paris, 1996.-that would give a new impetus to an enervate culture reactivated now in France. 
17
 For instance, the course by M.-A. Frison and A.-G. Slama-<http://66.249.93.104/search?q 
=cache:odh5vYr71QQJ: www.sciences-po.fr/formation/cyclel/annee2/ouverture_2006/mafr_slama. pdf 
+%22droit+et+litt%C3%A9rature%22+frison-rocheandhl=huandgl=huandct=clnkandcd=l>-stops at 
the wisdom-concluded from the legende of Horus, Le Roman de Renart [around 1175, attributed to 
Pierre de Saint-Cloud], Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice, Racine's Antigoné and Bérénice, 
Balzac's César Birotteau, Dostoyevskiy's The Brothers Karamazov, Anatole France's The Crime of 
Sylvester Bonnard, and finally, Kafka's The Trial-m accordance to which in contrast to English-
American literature, interested in procedural subtleties solely, the French literature focuses on cases 
when governmental measures can overweight law. 
L I T E R A T U R E ? IN S U B S T I T U T I O N FOR L E G A L PHILOSOPHY? 2 1 5 
4. T h e G e r m a n Study of Artistic Representat ions 
It is perhaps typical that the Germans-who, due to their past romant ic ism, founded on 
classical monographies (and in scholarly grounded manners) , exempl i fy analyses that might 
result f r o m the ful lness of human b e i n g s ' fallible swirl over the l a w - d o not re legate to any 
wonder-expecta t ion anyth ing like Recht und Literatur or Recht und Kunst. Ins tead, they do 
their j o b . With scholarly thoroughness founded a century ago, they use the li terary legacy to 
a spectacular depth. And through a ser ies of historical overv iews and panoramic processing1 8 
of oeuvres rising like symbols—firs t o f all by Shakespeare, Kleist and Kafka19—as well as 
m o n u m e n t s of world literature,20 they look for the literary precipi tat ion of the l aw ' s drama 
18
 Cf., e.g. Keysser, A.: Recht und Juristen im Spiegel der Satire. I—II. Bad Rothenfelde, 1919; 
Rathe, К.: Der Richter auf dem Fabeltier. In: Weixlgärtner, A.-Planiscig, L. (ed.): Festschrift für Julius 
Schlosser zum 60. Geburtstage. Zürich, Leipzig and Wien, 1927, 187-205; Fehr, FL: Das Recht in der 
Dichtung [Kunst und Recht, II]. Bem, 1931. and Die Dichtung im Recht [Kunst und Recht, III], Bem, 
1936. and Die Tragik im Recht. Zürich, 1945; [Reichsminister] Frank, H.: Recht und Kunst. Leipzig, 
1939; Nossack, H. E.: Das Verhältnis der Literatur zu Recht und Gerechtigkeit. Wiesbaden, 1968; 
Nentwig, M. A.: Richter in Karikatur und Anekdote. Köln, 1981; Würtenberger, T.: Satire und 
Karikatur in der Rechtsprechung. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, (1983), 1144-1151; von Schimding, 
A.: Recht und Richter im Spiegel der Literatur. Stuttgart, 1990; Kaufmann, A.: Recht und Gnade in 
der Literatur. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, (1984), 1062-1069 and Recht und Gnade in der 
Literatur. Stuttgart, 1991 ; Molk, U. (ed.): Literatur und Recht: Literarische Rechtsfälle von der Antike 
bis in die Gegenwart. (Kolloquium der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen im Februar 1995.) 
Göttingen, 1996; Weber, H.: Annäherungen an das Thema »Recht und Literatur«. Baden-Baden, 
2002; Weber, H. (ed.): Prozesse und Rechtsstreitigkeiten um Recht, Literatur und Kunst. Baden-
Baden, 2002; Weber, H. (ed.): Dichter als Juristen. Berlin, 2004; Weber, H.: Recht und Juristen im 
Bild der Literatur. Berlin, 2005; Kauf S.: Fiktionen der Gerechtigkeit: Literatur, Film, Philosophie, 
Recht. Baden-Baden, 2005. 
19
 Cf., e.g. with respect to William Shakespeare, Kohler, J.: Shakespeare vor dem Forum der 
Jurisprudenz. Würzburg, 1883-1884 and Berlin, 1919, lilies, G.: Das Verhältnis von Davenants »The 
Law against Lovers« zu Shakespears »Measure for Measure« und »Much Ado about Nothing«. Halle, 
1900 and Schwarze, H.-W.: Justice, Law and Revenge: The Individual and Natural Order« in 
Shakespeares Dramen. Bonn, 1971; in respect to Heinrich von Kleist see Саго, H. С.: Heinrich von 
Kleist und das Recht: Zum 100 jährige Todestage Kleists. Berlin, 1911; Kömer, J.: Recht und Pflicht: 
Eine Studie über Kleists »Michael Kohlhaas« und »Prinz Friedrich von Hombutg«. Leipzig and 
Berlin, 1926; Fink, A.: Michael Kohlhaas-ein noch anhänginger Prozeß: Geschichte und Kritik der 
bisher ergangenen Urteile. In: Becker, H.-J. and al. (eds): Rechtsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte. 
Festschrift für Adaiber Erler zum 70. Geburtstag. Aalen, 1971, 37-108, Sendler, H.: Über Michael 
Kohlhaas-damals und heute. Berlin, 1985, Apel, F. (ed.): Kleists Kohlhaas: Ein deutscher Traum 
vom Recht auf Mordbrennerei. Berlin, 1987; Ensberg, P. (ed.): Recht und Gerechtigkeit bei 
Heinrich von Kleist. Stuttgart, 2002; and eventually, with respect to Franz Kafka see Hebell, C.: 
Rechtstheoretische und geistesgeschichtliche Voraussetzungen für das Werk Franz Kafkas, Analysiert 
an seinem Roman »Der Prozess«. Frankfurt am Main, 1993; Ferk, J.: Recht ist ein »Prozess«: Uber 
Kafkas Rechtsphilosophie. Wien, 1999. 
20
 Cf., e.g. in chronological order of subjects, Funke, H.: Die sogennante tragische Schuld: 
Studie zur Rechtsidee in der griechischen Tragödie. Köln, 1963; Kaufmann-Biihler, D.: Begriff und 
Funktion der Dike in den Tragödien des Aischylos. [Diss.] Heidelberg, 1954; Gagarin, M.: Dike in the 
»Works and Days«. Classical Philosophy, 68 (1973), 81-94 and Dike in Archaic Greek Thought. 
Classical Philosophy, 69 (1974), 186-197; Kolb, H.: Himmlisches und irdisches Gericht in 
karolingischer Theologie und althochdeutscher Dichtung. Frühmittelalterliche Studien, 5 (1971), 
284-303; Klibansky, E.: Gerichtsszene und Prozeßform in erzählenden deutschen Dichtungen des 
2 1 6 C S A B A VARGA 
with the involved (and sometimes insoluble) dilemma that our fallible human history is to 
face. They reconstruct the law's world picture using other arts like fine arts21 and 
architecture,22 giving an opportunity to dissertations' monographic treatment.23 And all this 
12.-14. Jahrhunderts. Berlin, 1925; Conrad, H.: Recht und Gerechtigkeit im Weltbild Dante Alighieris. 
In: Bauer, C. et al. (eds): Speculum Historiale: Geschichte im Spiegel von Geschichtsschreibung und 
Geschichtsdeutung. (Johannes Spötl aus Anlass seines 60. Geburtstages.) Freiburg, 1965. 59-66; Fehr, 
H.: Das Recht in der Sagen der Schweiz. Frauenfeld, 1955; Stuby, G.: Recht und Solidarität im 
Denken von Albert Camus. Frankfurt am Main, 1965. 
21
 For a general overview see, e.g. Jessen, P. A.: Die Darstellung des Weltgerichts bis auf 
Michelangelo. Berlin, 1883; Voss, G.: Das Jüngste Gericht in der bildenden Kunst des frühen 
Mittelalters: Eine kunstgeschichtliche Untersuchung. Leipzig, 1884; von Moellcr, F.: Die Augenbinden 
der Justifia. Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst, 18 (1905), 107-122 and 141-152, Die Waage der 
Gerechtigkeit. Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst, 20 (1907), 269 et seq. and 291 et seq. as well as 346 et 
seq., Die Zahlensymbolik in ihren Beziehungen zur Gerechtigkeit. Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst, 21 
(1908), 137-148 and Das Auge der Gerechtigkeit. Das Recht, 21 (1908), 305-310; Fehr, H.: Das 
Recht im Bilde [Kunst und Recht, I]. Erlenbach-Zürich, München and Leipzig, 1923; Frommhold, G.: 
Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit in der bildenden Kunst: Eine ikonologische Studie. Greifswald. 1925; 
Holtze, F.: Die blinde Themis. Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung [Sonderausgabe (1925)]; Lederle, U.: 
Gerechtigkeitsdarstellungen in deutschen und niederländischen Rathäusern. [Diss.] Philippsburg, 
1937; König, E.: Die sog. »Gerechtigkeitsbilder« der altniederländischen Malerei. In: Das Recht in 
der Kunst. Berlin, 1938, 198-208; Simon, K.: Abendlänische Gerechtigkeitsbilder. Frankfurt, 1948; 
Schoenen, P.: Die Kunst in Dienste des Rechts. In: Wolffram, J.-Kelin, A. (ed.): Recht und Rechtspflege 
in den Rheinlanden (1819-1969): Festschrift für 150 jährigen Bestehen der Oberlandsgerichts. Köln, 
1969, 439^188 and 488-512; Kahsnitz, R.: Gerechtigkeitsbilder. In: Lexikon der christlichen 
Ikonographie. 2. (1970), 134-140; Dölger. F. J.: Die Sonne der Gerechtigkeit und der Schwarze: Eine 
religionsgeschichtliche Studie zum Taufgelöbnis. 2. Aufl. [repr. 1914.] Münster, 1971; Kissel, O.R.: 
Die Justitia: Reflexionen über ein Symbol und seine Darstellung in der bildenden Kunst. München, 
1984; Bering, K.: Kunst und Staatsmetaphysik des Hochmittelalters in Italien: Zentren der Bau- und 
Bildpropaganda in der Zeit Friedrichs II. Essen, 1986; Latz, H.-Pleister, W.: Recht und Gerechtigkeit 
im Spiegel der europäischen Kunst. Köln, 1988; Sellert, W.: Recht und Gerechtigkeit in der Kunst. 
Göttingen, 1993; Bähli, M.: Das Recht am eigenen Bild. Basel, Genf and München, 2002. 
22
 E.g., all by Frölich, K.: Alte Dorfplätze und andere Stätten bäuerlicher Rechtspflege. 
Tübingen, 1938; Mittelalterliche Bauwerke als Rechtsdenkmäler. Tübingen, 1939; Stätten 
mittelalterlicher Rechtspflege im niederdeutschen Bereich. Gießen, 1946; Rechtsdenkmäler des 
deutschen Dorfs. Gießen, 1947 and Denkmäler mittelalterlicher Strafrechtspflege in Ost- und 
Mitteldeutschland. Glessen, 1946. 
23
 As partial monographising see, e.g.-treating the oeuvre of Albrecht Dürer-Würtenberger, T.: 
Recht und Gerechtigkeit in der Kunst Albrecht Dürers. In: Kunst und Recht: Festgabe für Hans Fehr. 
I. Karlsruhe, 1948, 221-235; Schultheiss, W.: Albrecht Dürers Beziehungen zum Recht. In: Albrecht 
Dürers Umwelt: Festschrift zum 500. Geburtstag Albrecht Dürers am 21. Mai 1971. Nürnberg, 1971, 
220 et seq; Eichler, П.: Recht und Reich bei Dürer. Innsbruck, 1976; in respect of further giants, 
Hegel, E.: Rembrandt und das Recht. In: Das Recht in der Kunst. Berlin, 1938, 170-181 and Jerz, 
M.-Daumier, H. (eds): Der Mensch und die Justiz. Boppard, 1966; as to other manifestations, 
Troescher, G.: Weltgerichtsbilder in Rathäusern und an Gerichtsstätten. In: Wallraf-Richartz-Jahrbuch, 
11 (1939), 139 et seq; Kisch, G.: Gerechtigkeitsbilder auf Basler Renaissance-Medaillen. Zeitschrift 
für schweizerisches Recht, 72 (1953), 341-371 and Recht und Gerechtigkeit in der Medaillenkunst. 
Heidelberg, 1955; Gathen, A. D.: Rolande als Rechtssymbole: Der archäologische Bestand und seine 
rechtshistorische Stellung. Berlin, 1960; Engelhard, E.: Die Gerechtigkeit auf Ofenplatten. 
Landeskunde Vierteljahresblätter [Trier], 13 (1967), 7-10; von Hielmcrone, U.-D.: Die Darstellungen 
der Justitia im Landesteil Schleswig. [Diss.] Kiel, 1974; E. van Hoik, L.: Justitia: Bild und Sinnbild 
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is done so that both the genu ine uncharted mystery of our h u m a n world, which composes 
the very substrate (background and m e d i u m , conditions and deep reasons) of legal 
problematisat ion in an a lmost limitless variegat ion, and our constant search fo r value-
mediat ion, also weighing and balancing in cases of the apparently flat denial o f values, can 
be shown b y live examples . 
Reaf f i rming the unerasable human m o m e n t that is hidden in the law, we m a y encounter 
further-and especially Spanish 2 4 -cont r ibu t ions as well, occas ioned by literary2 5 and fine 
arts26 p ieces . 
Interest is also rising in Hungary.27 It mus t be founded on monographisa t ion , while its 
proper message can only be deciphered th rough essayism. For it m a y sound on " t h e »voice« 
of humaneness , which is recurrently muted by the impersonal procedures of l aw and the 
abstract ions of decision-makers."2 8 
W h a t it is all about is perhaps not s imply bridging the gap be tween the l aw ' s proposit ion 
and the case of l aw-wi th unavoidable tens ions confronting the general and the individual, 
im 17. Jahrhundert in den Niederlanden. In: Carlen, L. (ed.): Forschungen zur Rechtsarchäologie und 
rechtlichen Volkskunde. Zürich, 1981, 155-199 and Eine mittelalterliche Rechtslegende und ihre 
Darstellung in der Kunst des 17. Jahrhunderts. In: Forschungen zur Rechtsarchäologie und rechtlichen 
Volkskunde, 5 (1983), 135-157; Becker-Moelands, M.-A.: Die Titelbilder juristischer Bücher. In: 
Forschungen zur Rechtsarchäologie und rechtlichen Volkskunde, 8 (1986), 41-77; Windisch, E.: 
Justitia: Porträt eines Mädchens, Porträt eines Vogels. In: Festschrift für Hildebert Kirchner zum 65. 
Geburtstag. München, 1985. 393-411. 
24
 E.g. Obregón, J. R.: Examen critico de algunas ideas de derecho publico que se leen en Don 
Quijote. [Tesis.] Madrid, 1905; Martinez Val, J. M.: En torno al »Quijote«: Dos ensayos juridicos. 
Cuidad Real, 1960; Batiza, R.: Don Quijote y el Derecho. México, 1964; Pérez Fernández, J.: Ensayo 
humano y juridico de »El Quijote«. Madrid, 1965; Castaneda, J. E.: El Derecho et el Quijote. Revista 
de Derecho y Ciencias Politicas [Lima], 37 (1973), 5-67 and 199-250; Ciuro Caldani, M. A.: 
Filosofia, Literatura y Derecho: Estudios y notas. Rosario, 1986; Fina Sanglas, A.: Justicia y 
literatura. Barcelona, 1993; Echevarría, R. G.: Love and the Law in Cervantes. New Haven and 
London, 2005; Talavera, P.: Derecho y literatura: El Reflejo de lo juridico. Granada, 2006; Barchet, 
R. A. (ed.): El Derecho en la épocy del Quijote. (Seminario Internacional, organizado por el Instituto 
de Estudios Juridicos Internacionales Conde de Aranda: Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Campus de 
Vicálvaro, del 15 al 17 de marzo de 2005.) Pamplona, 2006; Prat Westerlindh, C.: La justicia en »El 
Quijote«. Madrid, 2006; González, J. С. (ed.): Implication derecho literatura: Contribuciones a una 
teória del Derecho. Granada, 2008. 
25
 E.g. Carpi, D. (ed.): Shakespeare and the Law. Ravenna, 2003 and Meyer, M. J. (ed.): 
Literature and Law. Amsterdam, 2004. 
26
 E.g. Zdekauer, L.: L'idea della Giustizia e la sua immagine nelle artifigurative. Macerata, 
1909 and lustitia: Immagine e idea. Siena, 1913; Stechow, W.: Römische Gerichtsdarstellungen von 
Rembrandt und Bol. Oud-Holland, 46 (1929), 134-139; Deonna, W.: La Justice à l'Hôtel de Ville de 
Genève et la fresque des juges aux mains coupés. Zeitschrift fiir schweizerische Archäologie und 
Kunstgeschichte, 11 (1950), 144-149; Jónsdóttir, S.: An llth Century Byzantine Last Judgement in 
Iceland. Reykjavik, 1950; Overdiep, Door Mr. G.: Justitia, waar is uw blinddoek? In: Pro excolendo 
iure patrio, 1761-1961. Groningen, 1961, 87-122; van Lohuizen-Mulder, M.: Raphael's Images of 
Justice, Humanity and Friendship: A Mirror of Princes for Scipione Borghese. Wassenaar, 1977. 
27
 As an auxiliary to legal history, it can also found an interdisciplinary field of research as 
exemplified by, e.g. Kajtár, L: Bevezetés a jogi kultúrtörténetbe (Introduction to the cultural history of 
law). Budapest and Pécs, 2002. 
28
 Nagy: Narratív tematika... op. cit. 6. 
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the abstract and the concrete (as interwar legal philosophies claimcd steadily29)-and perhaps 
it is not even about some refining correction or supplementation (which motivated the 
French movement30). Instead, it is more about live meditation, professional methodicalness 
stepped back in order to gain further perspectives31 and renewed reflection from a distance, 
so that the underlying reason for our profession can be recurrently rethought. 
5. Some Literary Reconsiderations 
Due to the artistic expression and internal inexhaustibility of literary presentation, in the 
parallel examination of law and literature even apparent truisms can feature as genuine 
enigmas, fertilising theoretical research. 
As to the necessary connection between the transcendence of final issues and the 
worldly undertaking of law, one may draw from The Tragedy of Man by Imre Madách32  
(dramatist, surpassing his teacher33 even as a professional thinker) the wisdom that may 
unite faith, hope and love. For "in the act of man steadily committing mistakes, who often 
fights in vain and without success, the verification of the existence of God is not included. 
To the contrary, it is man having languished in unsuccessful struggle and discouraged by 
the uncertain end, who needs strong trust in God in order to be able to restore the negative 
balance of his struggles having a penchant for denying life itself, towards life and further 
struggle." Such optimism is only feasible if it is oriented toward personal felicity through 
one of his or her community, which is precisely embodied by the Hungarian traditional 
public law focus on community, as testified to by the doctrine of the Holy Crown, in contrast 
to the Germanic model of private law dedication, rooted in their feudal experience.34 
For me, the Kleistean story of Michael Kohlhaas used to provide a basic cultural 
anthropological exemplification of the ancient wisdom, which, enshrined by the Jewish, 
Islamic and autochthonous cultures, subordinates conflict-resolution to community peace 
(the classic 'shalonT), to prevent, from the beginning, the unravelling of any one-sidedness 
without scale and proportion, especially of the relentless fights for justice.35 Albeit for others 
29
 As collected from the representative authors, see Somló, F.: Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie. 
(ed. Varga, Cs.) Budapest, 1999; Moór, J.: Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie, (ed. Varga, Cs.) Budapest, 
2006; Varga, Cs. (ed.): Die Schule von Szeged: Rechtsphilosophische Aufsätze von István Bihó, József 
Szabó und Tibor Vas. Budapest, 2006 and Losonczy, I.: Abriß eines realistischen rechtsphilosophischen 
Systems, (ed. Varga, Cs.) Budapest, 2002. 
30
 Ost, F.-Van Eynde, L. in <http://66.249.93.104/search?q=cache:AJD4ire0GaMJ:www.dhdi. 
free.fr/recherches/theoriedroit/articles/osteyndelit.doc+%22droit+et+litt%C3%A9rature%22+Ost&hl 
=hu&gl=hu&ct=clnk&cd=12> speaks about, e.g. scholarly diversion ("as a humanist decoration apt 
to clarify the dryness of legal evidence"), critical subversion ("revealing the king naked and the song's 
false disharmony"), and foundational conversion ("when the narrative turns to be the basis for making 
it »thought over«, »evaluated«, moreover, »prescribed« as well"). 
31
 "perspective on" in Posner, R. A.: Remarks on Law and Literature. Loyola University Chicago 
Law Journal, 23 (1991-1992), 181-195, quote at 182. 
32
 Moór, Gy.: Az Ember Tragédiája jogbölcseleti megvilágításban [The »Tragedy of Man« in 
the light of legal philosophy], Budapest, 1923. Cf. also <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imre_Madách> 
and The Tragedy of Man trans. Szirtes, G. in <http://mek.niif.hu/00900/00918/html/index.htm>. 
33
 In so far as running counter to his master, Anton Virozsil, he will be an early follower of the 
doctrine of "natural law with variable content", theorised by Rudolf Stammler. Ibid. 13-14. 
34
 Quote at ibid. 5, and comment at 15. 
35
 Cf. Varga, Cs.: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999, para. 2.3.3. 
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(and also in a self-justifying manner) this is just the allegory of paradoxes, since "the verdict 
will repeat then the offence convicted by i tself ' , as "Kohlhaas would have never achieved 
his justice [...], if he had not taken it himself ' , as a result of which, however, "the total 
compensation [...] will deprive him of his life".36 
Or, through the dramatic presentation of one of the earliest known allegories of rival 
interests and roles, as played by Sophocles' Antigone, we may tentatively consider laying 
aside all our resultant sympathy for a moment, since we may be convinced that it is the 
espousal of Antigone's rejection of any compromise that will force Kreon to act. For the 
community's very survival would be endangered by an equal acknowledgment of the mixed 
qualities of an emotionally fighting party, led by tradition, on the one hand, and of the 
conspirator, on the other, in the brother departed. That is to say exactly that the simple-
minded inflexibility of Antigone may exclude for Kreon the possibility of any wise, 
humanely refined offer, with a compromise achieving a counter position without a final 
sharpening, while looking for any choice for cooperation.37 
Or, pushing up to the final sense Dostoyevsky's permanently rooted humane thoughts, 
we may dawn on the idea that offences are neither to be matched with one another, nor are 
they to be matched with their penalties, since-as we may learn from common wisdom as 
opposed to the forcedly impersonal typification of the law-"[e]very story is individual, 
while the final sentence is however the same".38 
6. Conclusion 
In the end, we may realise that for such an interest, it is not literature that is from the outset 
endowed with some predestined role. As the embodiment of a type of thinking, literature is 
the symbol and synonym of reflected life, a field where "the mystery manifesting itself 
through different fates"39 can be represented. Otherwise expressed, literature is hardly 
anything other here than a substitute for theology, rooted in earthly existence as a supply to 
foster feeling transcendence. Law, too, came into being to serve this, although we cannot 
explain what it is originally and what law could serve it the best, and how. Nevertheless, the 
closest to the issue may be the Confessiones by Augustinus (preceding the time when 
theology as a distinct scholarship was born), since it targeted our faith in God as humanity's 
basic need, expressed by love streaming from humanity. 
36
 Miller, J. H.: Laying down the Law in Literature: The Example of Kleist. Cardozo Law 
Review, 11 (1989-1990), 1491-1514, quote at 1500, note 29 and at 1501. 
37
 Posner: Remarks on Law and Literature, op. cit. 183 and 193-194. 
38
 Murav, H.: Dostoïevski et le droit. Europe 80 (2002), 115. Cf. Varga: Lectures on the 
Paradigms... op. cit. para. 2.3.1.5. 
39
 Ost et al.: Lettres et lois... op. cit. 
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I. The promise of democracy 
A quarter-ccntury ago the Central European countries, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Poland, were Communist regimes that could be characterised by a single-party system 
(Hungary) or a dominant-party system (Czechoslovakia and Poland) without the possibility 
of competitive elections. The common feature of these states, like any other Communist 
countries, was chronic shortage:1 an economy of shortage instead of a market economy, 
a budget deficit instead of a balanced budget, and the lack of democratic institutions rather 
than a constitutional democracy. Although constitutions formally declared fundamental 
rights, these were not legally enforceable. The constitutional structures of these states were 
not based upon the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law. Moreover, the 
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 Kornai, J.: Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam-New York, 1980. 
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states did not ensure the independence of the judiciary or the press. And, of course, non-
governmental organisations were forced by the repressive regimes to work underground. 
Today, the Central European countries, the so-called Visegrád Group,2 belong to the 
class of constitutional democracies. This term refers to a set of political institutions and 
practices:3 notably, members of the legislature are selected through periodically held free 
elections. The vast majority of the nation's adult population has the right to vote regardless 
of race, gender or property ownership. The states' constitutions contain enforceable legal 
provisions rather than a collection of mere good wishes. The purpose of constitutions is 
seen as limiting the authority of state power. Each of these constitutions recognises and 
protects judicial independence, freedom of the press and the right to establish civil 
associations. There are constitutional courts-or in Poland, a Tribunal-hat safeguard the 
observance of constitutional regulations and strike down unconstitutional laws.4 Judicial 
protection of the constitution in all countries is closer to the centralized German model than 
to the diffuse U.S. judicial review. 
The historical turning point for the transformation from authoritarian regime to 
democracy was the autumn of 1989. Timothy Garton Ash described the events with the 
expression "refolution", combining the term of reform and revolution.5 Other authors label 
the developments as "coordinated transition",6 or "negotiated revolution".7 Moreover, the 
dissolution of the federal state of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of the Czech 
Republic and the Slovak Republic, which took place in 1993, is often mentioned as "Velvet 
Divorce", a reference to the term "Velvet Revolution" that was used internationally to 
describe the 1989 revolution8 (the Slovaks used the term "Gentle Revolution"). These 
classifications all express that the Central European single-party systems did not collapse 
2
 The Visegrád Group consists of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of 
Poland and the Slovak Republic. The name comes from the Northern Hungarian town of Visegrád, 
which hosted the royal summit of the Central European emperors in the 14th century. The group was 
established during a meeting of the President of Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel, the Prime Minister of 
Hungary, József Antall, and the President of Poland, Lech Walçsa, which was held in Visegrád in 
1991. The main reasons for the cooperation stem not only from the geographical closeness of these 
countries but also from their common interests in the future development of Central Europe within the 
EU and the transatlantic relations. 
3
 Kis, J.: Constitutional Democracy. Budapest-New York, 2003, ix, xiv. 
4
 From theoretical and critical point of view see Sadurski, W.: Rights before Courts: A Study of 
Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern Europe. Dordrecht, 2005. See 
also Schwartz, H.: The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe. Chicago-
London, 2000; Procházka, R.: Mission Accomplished: On Founding Constitutional Adjudication in 
Central Europe. Budapest-New York, 2002. 
5
 Ash, T. G.: Refolution, the Springtime of Two Nations. The New York Review of Books, 
36 (1989) 10; Ash, T. G.: Revolution in Hungary and Poland. The New York Review of Books, 36 
(1989) 13. 
6
 Kis, J.: Between Reform and Revolution. East European Politics and Society, 12 (1998) 2, 
300-383. 
7
 Tőkés, R. L.: Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic reform, social change and political 
succession, 1957-1990. Cambridge, 1996. 
8
 But see the birth of the Czech Constitution from a critical point of view. Giimplova, P.: 
Democracy and the Politics in Extraordinary: The Constitutional Making in Czechoslovakia. 1992. 
www.newschool.edu/uploadedFiles/NSSR/Departments_and_Faculty/Political_Science/Rccent_ 
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duc to a classical revolution, but through negotiations and compromises between the old 
regime and the democratic opposition. However, the political transition did result in 
revolutionary changes in the political and constitutional system and did so without a 
revolution as such.9 
In his new evaluation, Ash presupposes that the peaceful, negotiated regime changes in 
Central Europe together with unification of Germany and disintegration of the Soviet Union 
established a new model of non-violent revolution. The ideal type of classical revolution is 
"violent, Utopian, professedly class-based, and characterized by a progressive radicalization, 
culminating in terror". "The 1989 ideal type, by contrast, is non-violent, anti-utopian, based 
not on a single class but on broad social coalitions, and characterized by the application of 
mass social pressure-"peoplc power"-to bring the current power holders to negotiate. It 
culminates not in terror but in compromise. If the totem of 1789-type revolution is the 
guillotine that of 1989 is the round table."10 
Without doubt, the negotiation was a process led not by the common interests of the 
parties, but by a clash of values and interests, in which both parties, the Communists and 
the Democratic movements, were compelled to make compromises. We can say that the 
demand to reach compromises is one of the underlying characteristics of peaceful transitions. 
A well-known example is that in the first Polish elections 65 percent of the parliamentary 
seats were secured by the Communists, and the position of President of the Republic was 
also shaped to suit their expectations. Due to the rapidly changing political environment, 
the Hungarian opposition was forced to make much smaller compromises. In order to 
incorporate those modern constitutional principles and rules into the Constitution that were 
strongly favoured by the opposition, it was impossible to exclude the representatives of the 
old regime from political power and economic advantages. Moreover, not only pragmatic 
motives but also principled reasons underlay the absence of mass revenges. That is to say 
the legal guarantees of the new constitutional democracies were extended to everyone, 
irrespective of which side they had taken. The Hungarian Constitutional Court called this 
"a revolution under the rule of law"." 
Consequently, the new democracies faced a double, seemingly paradoxical task: they 
had to explore the legal and moral difference between the old and the new regime, and 
make clear beyond doubt that they did not place the representatives of the old regime at a 
legal disadvantage unacceptable in a state under the rule of law. It is striking that after the 
transition the Central European countries faced the same legal and political questions, 
applied similar constitutional principles and rules, and operated identical procedures. 
Although the solutions were sometimes different, the procedures dealing with the 
Communist heritage were basically determined by Parliaments and Constitutional Courts 
reacting to each other's activity, occasionally fighting with each other. The most significant 
issues include the rehabilitation and compensation of the victims of the Communist regimes' 
9
 János Kis characterises the coordinated transition as an interruption of legitimacy, but 
continuity of legality. Kis, J.: Between Reform and Revolution, op. cit. 317. See also from the critical 
point of view of democratic theory, Arato, A.: Dilemmas arising from the Power to Create Constitutions 
in Eastern Europe. In: Rosenfeld, M. (ed.): Constitutionalism. Difference. Identity, and Legitimacy. 
Durham, 1994, 165-194. 
10
 Ash, T. G.: Velvet Revolution: The Prospects. The New York Review of Books, 56 (2009) 19. 
11
 Decision 11/1992. See Sólyom, L.-Brunner, G. (eds): Constitutional Judiciary in a New 
Democracy. The Hungarian Constitutional Court. Ann Arbor, 2000, 214. 
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punitive measures, the restitution of the unjustly nationalised properties, the use of 
retroactive sanctions of criminal justice, and the disclosure of the secret services' files. 
In this respect the transition in Central Europe seems to be finished. The uneasy 
compromises with members of the ancien régime were an intrinsic, unavoidable part of the 
negotiated revolution. The non-violent but drastic change created political and legal 
institutions akin to those already existing in the established liberal democracies. In 
comparison with the speedy political transformation, the texts of the constitutions were 
changed progressively. In the aftermath of the Polish Round Table Agreement, the old 
constitution was amended in April 1989, and the first democratic parliament then reshaped 
the relations between the legislative and executive branches of the State ("Small 
Constitution"). The reformed constitution was finally replaced in 1997 by a completely new 
constitution for Poland. The constitution of Czechoslovakia was also amended several times 
between 1989 and 1992. The most important of these is the incorporation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms in 1991. After the dissolution of the federal state, 
the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic adopted a new constitution in 1992. However, 
the Fundamental Rights Charter remained a part of both constitutional systems. In the Czech 
Republic the separate document has the same legal rank as the constitution. In Slovakia the 
basic provisions of the Charter were integrated directly into the constitution. By contrast, 
Hungary is the only nation that did not adopt an entirely new constitution after the fall of 
Communism. Similarly to the other countries in the region, the 1989-1990 amendments of 
the old text created the legal frameworks of the new constitutional democracy. Since the 
transition, the Constitution has been amended several times, including the modification that 
empowered Hungary to join the European Union. 
Since the models of the reshaped Central European constitutions were international 
human rights instruments, as well as the more recent Western constitutions, they were 
written in the language of modem constitutionalism. As regards the constitutional principles, 
the institutional architecture and the language of the constitutional reasoning, each Central 
European country belongs to the community of modem liberal democracies. (This is why 
Ash calls the Central European revolutions non-utopian.) 
Nevertheless, I share the view that law in a constitutional democracy is an interpretive 
concept influencing the everyday life of the members of the political community, rather 
than a catalogue of rules.12 Law and, especially constitutional law, is a practice of the 
political community. The Constitutional Court, other legal authorities (the Parliament, the 
President of the Republic, ordinary courts, ombudspersons etc.), petitioners and others are 
participants in that common practice. The way a constitutional court examines the text of a 
constitution depends on place and time. The justices possess culturally and historically 
predetermined pieces of knowledge and premises ("pre-judices").13 In the course of deciding 
cases these preconceptions enter into dialogue with the norms. Thus, interpretation is 
embedded in the everyday life of the political community. On the one hand, it is so because 
the social environment provides the preconditions of interpretation; on the other, 
interpretation shapes communal practice. 
12
 Here 1 follow Dworkin's conception of law as integrity. Dworkin, R.: Law's Empire. Oxford, 
1998, 226, 410-413. 
13
 Here I refer to Gadamer's hermeneutic conception. Gadamer, H.-G.: Truth and Method. New 
York, 1975. 
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In the following analysis I show, via Central European examples, how the century-old 
historical circumstances, the social environment, and the commonly failed practice of the 
constitutional institutions interact. The words of the Constitution are inseparable from the 
social context to which those words refer. 
II. Universal principles and local peculiarities 
Universal values and principles arc the foundations of constitutional democracies. Individual 
rights and political equality arc worthy of being pursued worldwide. In the modern era, the 
constitutional institutions of democracy enjoy widespread acceptance. Since their peaceful 
transition, Central European countries have been ensuring liberty, equality and collective 
self-government much more than before. This means a transition from an authoritarian to a 
democratic regime, from dominance of communist ideology to a pluralistic society. 
However, universal values and principles conflict with particular interests, nationalist 
aspirations and theoretical conceptions of political realism. I focus here particularly on the 
constitutional issues of presidential ambitions, the privileges of churches and ethnic 
discrimination because these issues may represent well the common constitutional 
difficulties and prosperities of the Visegrád countries. 
/. Presidential ambitions 
It is generally believed that a constitutional democracy may take various, equally reputable 
institutional forms. It may be a monarchy, such as Japan and Spain, or a republic like 
France. It may have a presidential (United States) or a parliamentary system (United 
Kingdom). It may be a federal (Germany) or a unitary state (South Africa). Nonetheless, 
some theorists argue that presidential systems have difficulties sustaining democratic 
practices. We might say that under a range of cultural and social conditions, a parliamentary 
regime is better than a presidential one. Depending on political traditions and culture, the 
electoral system and the prerogatives of the other branches of the state, presidentialism 
might slip into authoritarianism.14 
The new Central European democracies followed Western European solutions in 
establishing adapted parliamentary systems instead of importing a U.S. presidential 
architecture.'5 In this respect, the Hungarian Constitution copies the German Chancellor-led 
system with a weak president elected by the parliamentary representatives. The Czech and 
the Slovak Constitutions determine similarly that the Prime Minister heads the executive 
and the Cabinet is the supreme body of that branch.16 The Polish Constitution embodies, to 
some extent, a different system, whereby the popularly elected President and the Government 
jointly head the executive branch. 
In spite of this, several scope-of-authority controversies reveal a characteristic 
uncertainty that occurs in Central European parliamentary systems. The President is 
frequently in political conflict with the Prime Minister. Formal power and actual power may 
differ: the President may expand his authority as "the guardian of the Constitution". 
14
 Lipset, S. M.-Lakin, J. M.: The Democratic Century. Norman, 2004, 38M8. 
15
 Lech Garlicki, L.: Democracy and International Influences. In. Nolte, G. (ed.): European and 
U.S. Constitutionalism. Cambridge, 2005, 264. 
16
 Following a constitutional change in 1999, the Slovak president was no longer elected by the 
parliament, instead by popular vote. However, the Slovak Republic did not change to presidentialism. 
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Vindicating real power'as the head of state and the depository of national sovereignty 
sometimes leads to theatrical struggles.17 
In the early years of new democracies, serious conflicts emerged between presidents 
and prime ministers over appointment-related issues. The first President of Hungary disputed 
with the Prime Minister over the competences of the President as commander in chief of the 
armed forces. The Constitutional Court interpreted the president's power restrictively, 
defining that the constitution clearly provided a pure parliamentary system and the 
Government was the sole executive branch.18 When the Hungarian President refused to sign 
the dismissal of the chairman of National Television initiated by the Prime Minister, the 
Constitutional Court tailored the President's right of refusal to appoint extremely narrowly. 
According to its reasoning, the President of the Republic "stands outside the executive 
power" and "no construction may be derived from the Constitution according to which the 
Government and the President of the Republic jointly head the executive branch, making 
consensus-based decisions in a mutually limiting and counterbalancing manner".19 During a 
similar so-called media war, Polish President Walesa dismissed the chairman of the 
Committee for the Supervision over Radio and Television. The ombudsman challenged his 
decision. The Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the President could not dismiss the 
chairman, except for a judicially established violation of law.2" The Slovak Prime Minister 
Meciar asked President Kovác to discharge the foreign minister. Kovác refused and asked 
the Constitutional Court whether he was required by the Constitution to obey the Prime 
Minister's request. The Court ruled in its highly criticised decision that the President was 
not obliged to comply with the Prime Minister's request only to consider it.21 
In recent years "chair wars" between prime ministers and presidents have been 
commonplace. The most decisive issues have been the following: who represents the 
country abroad and who represents the country's position in the European Union. In the 
past three years-following the short co-government of the Kaczynski twins22-Polish 
President Lech Kaczynski and Prime Minister Donald Tusk engaged in endless contention 
over the competences. It seems that the Czech President, Vaclav Klaus also wants to 
represent the State's authority in several subject matters. It is noteworthy that the Czech and 
Polish Presidents were the last two obstacles standing in the way of the EU Lisbon Treaty. 
Kaczynski signed the reform treaty into law only after Poland had won a United Kingdom-
style opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights by a protocol to the treaty.23 Klaus 
17
 Dorsen, N.-Rosenfeld, M.-Sajó, A.-Baer, S.: Comparative Constitutionalism. Cases and 
Materials. St. Paul (MN), 2003, 269. 
18
 Decision 48/1991. See Sólyom-Brunner (eds): Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy. 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court, op. cit. 159. 
19
 Decision 36/1992. See Dorsen-Rosenfeld-Sajó-Baer (eds): Comparative Constitutionalism, 
op. cit. 268. 
20
 Decision 7/1994. See ibid. 271. 
21
 Resolution 39/93. (Jun 2, 1992.) See Schwartz, H.: The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in 
Post-Communist Europe. Chicago, 2000, 202. 
22
 From July 2006 to November 2007 President Lech Kaczynski's identical twin brother, 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski served as Prime Minister. 
23
 The Art. 1(1) of the protocol precludes both the domestic courts in Poland and the United 
Kingdom, and the EU courts from finding that "laws, regulations or administrative provisions, 
practices or action" in the countries to which it applies are inconsistent with the Charter. Art. 1(2) says 
that the Title IV of the Charter, which contains economic and social right does not create judicially 
enforceable rights. 
2 2 6 GÁBOR ATTILA TÓTH 
also insisted such a preference and demanded an exemption to prevent Gennan families 
expelled after the Second World War from lodging property claims with the European Court 
of Justice. Eventually, EU leaders promised to amend the protocol so that it would apply to 
the Czech Republic, and subsequently the Czech Constitutional Court raised no objections, 
so Klaus also signed the treaty.24 
At the same time, it can be seen that these kinds of debate often result in correct 
conclusions. The Czech and the Polish Prime Ministers frequently refrain from any attempt 
to bypass the President, so as to avoid a constitutional crisis. In addition, these conflicts 
make it clear that in a parliamentary system it is the prime minister and the cabinet that 
define the state's position in EU and foreign-related matters. This means that the president 
could present the state's position at the international level only when authorized to do so by 
the prime minister and according to the cabinet and parliament's instructions. This solution 
comes from the text of the Czech and the Slovak Constitution, and, interestingly, Polish 
political and constitutional practice is moving toward this direction, too. (The Constitution 
of Poland does not contain this modification, because in 2009 the parties were not able to 
reach a consensus on this matter.) 
However, it seems to me that Hungary is the only one country among the members of 
the Visegrád Group, which is moving in the opposite direction. László Sólyom, the President 
of the Republic did not intend to award the former Prime Minister on the recommendation 
of the current head of the Government in 2007. Therefore the President filed a petition with 
the Constitutional Court seeking the abstract interpretation of the Constitution. In his 
opinion "the moral integrity of the Head of State may be jeopardized if he is not given true 
discretionary powers in making a decision under his powers following from the 
Constitution". The President was convinced that his decision on recommendation for an 
award was a purely moral issue and represents solely a value judgment. Thus, the President 
might assert the constitutional values in accordance with his own moral integrity. In its 
decision the Constitutional Court ruled: "the President of the Republic has actual 
discretionary powers in conferring orders and awards... In case of a recommendation for an 
award that violates the constitutional values of the Republic of Hungary, it is the right of the 
President not to sign the recommendation, refusing to confer the award. Therefore, the 
refusal to confer an award... protects in this case the constitutional values of the Republic 
of Hungary."25 
As a result of the decision the President refused to confer the award on the former 
Prime Minister because the latter had not changed his views on the 1956 revolution, in 
which he had fought against the rebels. Simultaneously, the President was about to widen 
his competencies. The head of the state began to represent an alternative government 
program: he launched his own foreign policy, engaged in conflicts with neighbouring 
countries, and strongly criticised the Government's economic policy. Last year the President 
de facto jeopardised the legislature by persistently returning Acts to Parliament for 
reconsideration and proposing preliminary norm control at the Constitutional Court. 
Currently, such authoritarian aspirations enjoy remarkable popularity in Hungary. It is 
widely believed that a wise statesman can be a better lawmaker than the disgraceful 
24
 The protocol Klaus requested has no direct connection with the claims of the expelled 
Germans. 
25
 Decision 47/2007. 
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Parliament, and this national leader should be the guardian of the Constitution instead of 
the unfamiliar Constitutional Court.26 
Of course, this brief survey of the features of parliamentary systems and presidential 
aspirations in Central Europe is by no means exhaustive. Moreover, executive-legislative 
relations are more complex than a simple choice between a presidential and a parliamentary 
system.27 Two conclusions, however, seems clear. First, when president and prime minister 
jointly head the executive branch, their decision-making in a mutually limiting and 
counterbalancing manner might jeopardise the functioning government.28 Second, when a 
popular head of the state gains concentrated power, this might endanger the values and 
principles of constitutional democracy and tend to authoritarianism. In spite of the 
achievements of the first democratically elected, charismatic presidents, such as Havel and 
Walçsa, dignified heads of the state with effective power may imperil democracy. Just like 
the lessons learnt from the region's earlier history, these recent examples also illustrate that 
under Central European societal circumstances a parliamentary regime could be better than 
a presidential one. 
2. Church privileges 
The future of the European political communities depends to a great extent on their ability 
to cope with religious challenges. Simply put, one of the two difficulties is to find the proper 
place for Christian values within secularised constitutional democracies. Some strongly 
warn about the growing influence of religious fundamentalism and suggest an exclusion of 
the non-secular considerations from the public discourse.29 The other challenge Europe is 
facing now is how to effectively ensure equal rights and social cohesion for Muslim 
communities and individuals. As a result of terror attacks in some metropolises and the 
long-standing economic crisis, a worrying anti-Muslim trend has been developing in 
Western European countries. 
Since the number of Muslims is much lower in Central Europe than in the West, the 
issue of the Christian values and a secular state plays a greater role in the constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Visegrád Countries. Examining closely only the text of the constitutions, 
we may assume that with the exception of Poland, the various religious organisations have 
equal status and people with different beliefs or conscience are treated as equals. Below, I 
demonstrate that the way judges apply the constitution does not depend on the text but 
rather on culturally and historically predetermined premises. In spite of the textual 
26
 President Sólyom also had conflicts with the subsequent government. This is why he was not 
re-elected by the new parliamentary majority. The current prime minister has the ambition to be "the 
leader of the nation". It seems likely that the Constitution will be reshaped soon in accordance with 
these presidential aspirations. 
27
 Shugart, M. S.: Of Presidents and Parliaments. East European Constitutional Review, 2 
(1993) 1,30. 
28
 This is also the case in Romania and Ukraine. 
29
 See for example the dispute between András Sajó and Lorenzo Zucca on the growing claims 
of religions and the position of the secular state. Sajó, A.: Preliminaries to a concept of constitutional 
secularism. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 6 (2008) 3-4, 605-629. Zucca, L.: The crisis 
of the secular state-A reply to Professor Sajó. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 7 (2009) 
3, 494-514. Sajó, A.: The Crisis that was not there: Notes on a Reply. International Journal of 
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differences, the Hungarian and the Polish constitutional case-law is similarly pro-Church 
and in some ways intolerant. 
According to Wojciech Sadurski, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal is "the author of 
surely the most outrageously partisan and illiberal decisions of any constitutional court in 
the region".30 The most infamous example is the 1997 decision concerning abortion. The 
Tribunal-by striking down a pro-choice statute-reintroduced a quasi-absolute ban on 
abortion issue. With this craven decision the Tribunal surrendered to the Church.31 It is 
noteworthy that the "Small Constitution" did not specifically include a right to life. The 
abortion ban and the rights of foetuses therefore were deduced from the abstract 
constitutional declaration that Poland is a democratic state under the rule of law. 
The 1997 constitution seemingly advanced the interests of the Catholic Church. The 
preamble refers to a "culture rooted in the Christian heritage of the Nation". In Art. 18, 
marriage, as the union of a man and a woman, is granted the protection of the state. According 
to the Art. 25, the relations between Poland and the Catholic Church shall be determined by 
international treaty concluded with the Holy See. Under Art. 53, religious education and 
religious upbringing are protected. However, according to the preamble, "we the people" are 
"[b]oth those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, [a]s well as 
those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other 
sources". The Preamble also declares that believers and non-believers are "equal in rights". 
Art. 53 guarantees freedom of conscience to everyone. Art. 25 provides further protection, 
that public officials "shall be impartial in matters of personal conviction, whether religious 
or philosophical, or in relation to outlooks on life". What is more, the relationship between 
the State and the churches shall be based not only "on the principle of cooperation", but also 
"on the principle of respect for their autonomy and the mutual independence of each in its 
own sphere." Thus, despite the reference to God and conventional morality, the constitution 
has not created a Catholic Poland as an alternative to a secular state. 
Considering only the text of the constitution, Hungary can be classified as an ideal 
example of the secular constitutional democracy. The Free Exercise Clause reads: "In the 
Republic of Hungary everybody has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion." According to the Separation Principle "the church shall operate in separation from 
the state". In contrast to the Polish constitution, this text does not refer to the Christian 
heritage or a treaty with the Holy See. Instead of state-church cooperation, it asserts only a 
strong separation principle.32 
Despite these different constitutional guaranties, however, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court often follows the ideas of historical churches by its conventionalist interpretation.33 
30
 See Wojciech Sadurski's Book Review on Herman Schwarz's The struggle for constitutional 
justice in post-communist Europe. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 1(2003) 1, 162. 
31
 Schwartz, H.: The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe. Chicago, 
2000, 69. 
32
 Moreover, the historical circumstances are also different. While a great many people in the 
Polish Church made enormous contributions to the victory of democracy in Poland, the Hungarian 
churches remained inactive during the transition. See, for example, Michnik, A.: Church and State in 
Eastern Europe.The Clean Conscience Trap. East European Constitutional Review, Volume 7 (1998) 
2, 67-74. 
33
 For a detailed analysis of the following case-list see Tóth, G. A.: Unequal Protection: 
Historical Churches and Roma People in the Hungarian Constitutional Jurisprudence. Acta Juridica 
Hungarica, 51 (2010) 2, 122-135. 
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Although the abortion case struck down the quite liberal decree only on formal grounds 
(basic rights shall be regulated by an Act of Parliament), the reasoning emphasized that the 
legislature might extend the right to life and dignity to the foetus. In such a case, the abortion 
would be possible only if it was required to save the mother's life. "The nature of such an 
extension (...) is comparable only to the abolition of slavery, but it surpasses even that 
event in significance."34 
In the Hungarian case law not only is homosexual marriage declared to be contrary to 
the Constitution, but the Court also hindered the introduction of the registered partnership 
of homosexual as well as heterosexual couples. Mainly historical churches objected the 
2008 Act on Registered Partnership. The judgment that accepted the churches' conventional 
approach was passed before the given statute had come into force.35 
According to the Court, "treating the churches equally does not exclude taking the 
actual social roles of the individual churches into account". The judgment on church status 
explicitly provided preferential treatment for historical churches vis-à-vis other religious 
communities.36 Based upon this consideration, the Court found a decree on army chaplain 
service providing for the free exercise of religion and spiritual care only for members of the 
four historical churches (Catholic, Calvinist, Lutheran, Jewish) to be constitutional.37 
Numerous cases ended with an exceptionally favourable financial outcome for 
historical churches. The Court declared it constitutional that churches are exempted from 
the general statutory ban on acquiring soil. Since 1997, "positive discrimination" has to be 
secured for church-run schools as compared with public education institutions run by 
foundations or associations. According to this decision, only church-run schools have the 
right to the auxiliary subsidy above the normative state allowance. In 2007 this preferential 
34
 It was not the Constitutional Court but the Parliament that reintroduced a quite pro-choice 
regulation. For the Decision 64/1991 see Sólyom-Brunner (eds): Constitutional Judiciary in a New 
Democracy. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, op. cit. 178. 
35
 Decision 154/2008. In terms of heterosexuals the judges found it unacceptable that the statute 
did not separate adequately the status of registered partnership from the institution of marriage. As for 
homosexual couples, the judgment implicitly established the category of separate and unequal. Even 
though the decision theoretically acknowledged that the registered partnership of homosexuals is not 
unconstitutional, it did not uphold the reviewed regulation. Apart from the fact that homosexual 
couples may not get married, when it comes to regulating their registered partnership "the differences 
flowing from the nature" of such relationships and marriage must be maintained. This means that in 
Hungarian constitutional practice the reasons for equal treatment must be shown, not that there is a 
compelling interest in unequal treatment. After the ruling the Parliament passed a restricted version of 
the Act on Registered Partnership. As a result registered same sex partnership has become a legal 
option in Hungary. The Court upheld it in its Decision 32/2010. 
36
 In the Czech Republic a 2002 Act created a two-tiered system of registration for religious 
organisations. To register at the first tier, a church must have at least 300 adult members residing in 
the country. In order to register at the second tier, the church must have existed for at least 10 years 
and must have a membership equal at least 0.1 per cent of the population. Second-tier registration 
entitles the church to a share of state funding as well as allowing the clergies to perform an officially 
recognized marriage ceremony and serve as an army-chaplain. Muslims have not been granted these 
privileges. See Pajas, P.: The Impact of the New Czech Law on Churches. The International Journal 
ofNon-for-ProfitLaw, 6(2003) 1. http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol6issl/special_6.htm 
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 According to Kis, this judgment would hardly survive the test either of the separation principle 
or that of the religious neutrality of the state and of the abolition of religious discrimination. Kis, J.: 
Constitutional Democracy, op. cit. 282. 
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financial treatment was extended to the social and welfare activities of the churches, in 
contrast to those humanist institutions that are not affiliated with churches. In 2008 the 
judges, by referring to the Treaty concluded between the Republic of Hungary and the Holy 
See, demanded that Catholic schools and public education institutions run by the state or 
municipalities be financed to exactly the same degree. 
The above-mentioned cases illustrate that the interpretative practice of state-church 
cooperation strengthened the old privileges of historical churches. Moreover, by using the 
concept in the wrong way, the exceptional treatment falls within the ambit of constitutionally 
justifiable preferential treatment. From the perspective of constitutional interpretation, the 
judges accepted the premise that historical churches have notable social weight, and that 
they have an outstanding role in the field of spiritual care, and also socially and culturally. 
At the same time, through their decisions they influenced communal practice in such a way 
that historical churches were granted exceptionally favourable conditions for their spiritual 
and other activities. This type of traditionalism supports maintaining tradition even if it 
violates the principle of equality. 
3. Ethnic discrimination 
One of the most difficult issues of constitutional theory and practice concerns the equal 
protection of ethnic minorities. Political and constitutional debates regarding the rights of 
old and new minorities are a familiar feature of Western democracies. Old minorities are 
long settled within a particular territory and not those people but the state borders have 
moved. Conversely, new minorities, who face a more unfavourable social and legal 
environment, are immigrants, asylum seekers and guest workers. 
The countries of Visegrád Group are not the preferred destinations of immigrants. 
However, a number of conflicts involving old minorities have emerged in the last two 
decades. Although ethnic violence did not undermine the transition to a constitutional 
democracy, nationalist tendencies and ethnic exclusions cause serious tensions among the 
population. In place of a comprehensive examination I describe just the tip of the iceberg. 
More than ten million Roma people live in the European Union. No ethnic group in 
Europe suffers more social exclusion, worse discrimination and greater poverty. Roma are 
divided into a number of distinct populations; the largest and still growing part of them live 
in Central and Eastern Europe. By 2030, sixteen percent of Slovakia's under-eighteens will 
be Roma, according to a study by the Open Society Foundation Bratislava. The European 
Commission estimates that by 2040, forty percent of the new entrants onto Hungary's labour 
market will be Roma. The political and social conditions for Roma are worsening in Central 
Europe: the past years have seen an expansion in racist attacks of families, with homes set 
on fire as well as forced evictions and the building of walls around settlements. 
However, for the most part, national authorities have felt little compulsion to help this 
most marginalised group. What is more, the new Hungarian Government-copying the 
Italian administration-proclaimed Roma to have become a national law and order problem. 
As a consequence, they are the target not only of increasing public hostility but also of 
special police measures and discriminatory criminal sanctions. In some countries, policies 
even add to discrimination and segregation: despite decades of calls for change, Roma 
children are still being segregated in schools and often placed in "special schools" with sub-
standard education. 
Direct or indirect discrimination against ethnic minorities is evidently a constitutional 
issue. The Constitutions of the Central European countries ensure the fundamental rights 
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for all persons on their territory without discrimination on the basis of race, colour, national 
or social origins. In accordance with this, national statutory laws prohibit discrimination 
in such areas as employment, housing, voting rights, education, and access to public 
facilities. Furthermore, all Constitutions explicitly protect ethnic minorities. (Besides the 
antidiscrimination principle, the Hungarian Constitution also provides for the principle of 
preferential treatment.) It is a common feature of the basic texts that the equality principle 
derives from the constitutional value of human dignity. The Hungarian Constitutional Court 
echoed the Dworkinian conception: "The prohibition of discrimination means all people 
must be treated as equal (as persons with equal dignity) by law-i.e. the fundamental right to 
human dignity may not be impaired, and the criteria for the distribution of the entitlements 
and benefits shall be determined with the same respect and prudence, and with the same 
degree of consideration of individual interests."38 
Constitutions contain principles and general rules of institutions and human rights. Of 
course, Roma as an ethnic group cannot be seen in the text. But the question arises whether 
the courts or other authorities can apply the constitutions independently from the historical 
background and the community practice. Could the courts fulfil their task by examining 
nothing but the text and an individual complaint? According to some Constitutional Courts, 
the answer is yes. In the light of the leading case of the European Court of Human Rights, 
the answer is no. 
In the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic39 eighteen Czech nationals of 
Roma origin alleged that, as a result of their ethnic origin, they were assigned to special 
primary schools for children with learning difficulties. They argued that the placement in 
special schools amounted to a general practice that had resulted in segregation and racial 
discrimination through the coexistence of two educational systems, namely special schools 
for the Roma and ordinary schools for the majority of the population. Previously the Czech 
Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants' appeal partly on the ground that "there was 
nothing in the material before it to show that the relevant statutory provisions had been 
interpreted or applied unconstitutionally" and partly on the ground that it was not the 
Constitutional Court's role "to assess the overall social context".40 
In contrast, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights examined the 
empirical basis for and the historical background of the segregated school-system. It 
observed, for example, that the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance had 
noted that the channelling of Roma children into special schools for the mentally retarded 
was reportedly often "quasi-automatic". According to data collected from several 
independent bodies more than half of all Roma children in the Czech Republic-and 
specifically in the hometown of the applicants-attended special schools.41 This evidence 
proved to be sufficiently reliable and significant to give rise to a strong presumption of 
indirect discrimination. In these circumstances the Court was not satisfied that the difference 
in treatment between Roma and non-Roma children was objectively and reasonably justified. 
38
 Decision 9/1990. See Sólyom-Brunner (eds): Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court, op. cit. 111. 
39
 D. H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, Judgment of 13 November 2007. 
40
 Decision I. US 297/99. 
41
 In 1999, 56 per cent of all pupils placed in special schools in Ostrava were Roma. Conversely, 
Roma represented only 2.26 per cent of the total number of pupils attending primary school in Ostrava. 
See D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, para 190. 
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As a consequence the Court held that the applicants as members of that community had 
necessarily suffered the same discriminatory treatment.42 
In the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic the Court graciously noted that 
the Czech Republic is not alone in having encountered difficulties in providing schooling 
for Roma children and, unlike some countries, it has sought to tackle the problem.43 The 
jurisdiction of the Czech Constitutional Court is certainly not exceptional.44 It is well known 
that in Hungary many hundred thousands of Roma face social difficulties, prejudice and 
segregation.45 However, if one wants to be informed by the constitutional case law, it is 
easy to overlook the fact that a part of the citizens is Roma.46 This is so since the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court has not openly addressed the problems affecting Roma. From the first 
decade of constitutional review, it can be reconstructed from one of the decisions regarding 
compensation that, during the Second World War, similarly to Jews, Roma were also 
deported. Apart from this, the court never referred to the Roma in an explicit manner. Here 
are some examples of the case-law: the judges upheld a local government decree declaring 
those Roma people who do not fit into the life of the community persona non grata; they 
concluded that it was not unconstitutional that Hungarian law did not demand equal 
treatment from private organizations acting in the public sphere; they did not deal with the 
unfair treatment of Roma squatters, in spite of the joint motion of the Parliamentary 
Ombudspersons for Civil Rights and for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities; they 
refrained from reflecting social reality when examining the anti-Roma local governmental 
resolutions revoking social allowances; they referred to U.S. governmental abuses rather 
than Hungarian (or Czech or Slovak) malpractice in connection with coercive sterilization.47 
42
 Previously a Chamber of the Court composed of seven judges held that there had been no 
violation of the Convention. Goodwin, M.: D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic: a major set-back for 
the development of non-discrimination norms in Europe. German Law Journal, 7 (2006) 4, 421-431. 
43
 But see Siklóvá, J.-Miklusakova, M.: Denying Citizenship to the Czech Roma. East European 
Constitutional Review, 7 (1998) 2, 58-64. 
44
 See also the case of Orsus and Others v. Croatia, Judgment of 16 March, 2010, which upheld 
the precedent of the D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic. The Constitutional Court of Croatia 
had dismissed the applicants' constitutional complaint on similar grounds than the Czech court. 
Subsequently the Government of the Slovak (!) Republic intervened as a third party in the European 
Court of Human Rights' proceedings. It referred to the margin of appreciation afforded to the States in 
the sphere of education and stressed that the States should not be prohibited from setting up separate 
classes at different types of school for children with difficulties, or from implementing special 
educational programmes to respond to special needs. 
45




 For detailed analysis of the following case-list see Tóth, G. A.: Unequal Protection: Historical 
Churches and Roma People in the Hungarian Constitutional Jurisprudence, op. cit. 
47
 Decision 43/2005. In reality, like in the Slovak and Czech cases, Hungarian Roma women are 
among the victims. For example, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Woman 
held that the State had violated a Roma woman's fundamental rights by performing the sterilization 
surgery without obtaining her informed consent. (CEDAW/C/36/D/4/2004.) A 2005 report by the 
Czech ombudsman identified dozens of cases of coercive sterilization between 1979 and 2001. See 
also. Body and Soul, Forced Sterilization and Other Assaults on Roma Reproductive Freedom in 
Slovakia (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2003). 
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In sum, the taboo in Roma cases has not been broken yet. For two decades the problems 
relating to the exclusion and discrimination of Roma have remained hidden.48 
Due to lack of space, I cannot deal with other constitutional aspects of Central European 
ethnic tensions. In general, the stronger a nation-building policy is, the more the Roma 
people suffer from discrimination. For example, the current legislative and governmental 
measures driven by nationalism in Hungary and Slovakia sometimes go hand in hand with 
anti-Roma actions. Recently the Hungarian parliamentary majority has reshaped the 
citizenship law, which represents an old-fashioned nation-state policy based upon language, 
culture and ethnicity rather than equality of all citizens, regardless of ethnicity.49 
While, on the one hand. Central European Constitutions affirm the principle of non-
discrimination and contain specific clauses for minority protection, on the other hand, the 
constitutional culture tends to provide room only for those who belong to the ethnic 
majority. 
III. Conclusions 
For two decades the Central European countries have been part of the group of constitutional 
democracies. In spite of uneasy political compromises, the coordinated transition resulted 
in revolutionary outcomes. Since international human rights instruments and Western 
constitutions influenced the texts of the constitutions, the reshaped constitutional systems 
do not hinder political communities from realising the full promise of democracy. In this 
respect the transition is unquestionably a success. 
From Poland to Hungary, every Visegrád Country established its own parliamentary 
system. They created judicial institutions, in the form of constitutional courts, in order to 
enforce the principles and rights recognised by the constitutions. Numerous examples 
demonstrate that neither the parliaments nor the courts have been able to retain the last 
word as to constitutional adjudication. The meaning of the constitution is constructed 
through an institutional dialogue between elected officials and judges. 
The achievement of these relatively new constitutional democracies depends 
significantly on extra textual factors, notably political and interpretive practices. The record 
of constitutional courts and other actors in defence of constitutional values is far from 
unambiguously positive. This paper has focused particularly on the constitutional issues 
of presidential aspirations, church privileges and ethnic discrimination. Of course, any 
selection of examples intended to illustrate a broader phenomenon is inevitably somewhat 
arbitrary. The differences among these countries certainly should not be ignored. Yet some 
concluding remarks seem in order. 
48
 Kriszta Kovács shows that the Hungarian Constitutional Court has never declared 
unconstitutionality based upon suspect classification. It found, for example, that the victims of gender-
based discrimination are mostly men. Kovács, К.: Think Positive, Preferential Treatment in Hungary. 
Fundamentum, Human Rights Quarterly, 5 (2008), 46, 48. 
49
 Hungary passed a law this year granting dual citizenship to Hungarians living abroad. 
Citizenship will be awarded to those who can prove their knowledge of the Hungarian language and 
claim Hungarian ancestry. The new bill has inflamed tensions with Slovakia, home of 500,000 ethnic 
Hungarians who comprise more than ten per cent of the country's population. The Slovak Parliament 
immediately passed a law in order to pose an obstacle the dual citizenship. Previously, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court ruled that it would not violate the non-discrimination clause of the Constitution 
or any international legal obligations if Parliament passed a law offering preferential naturalization 
that granted Hungarian citizenship-on request-to persons who claim Hungarian ethnicity but do not 
reside in Hungary. Decision 5/2004. 
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The words of a constitution are connected to an existing political community. The 
scope-of-authority conflicts between Central European presidents and prime ministers 
represent an uncertainty in constitutional interpretation not necessarily inherent in the 
written regulations. The constitutional status of a president can be changed without 
amending the constitution. As the recent controversies show, the main political actors, first 
and foremost the presidents, often misinterpret their competences. 
Constitutional design and case-law are part of a larger social and political process. The 
choices of the interpreters determine to what extent social reality appears in judgments and to 
what conclusions it contributes. The privileges of historical churches are not based on the text 
of the constitutions so much as the churches' hypothetical social role. When changing societal 
experiences conflict with the conventions, then the conventions are sometimes held to be 
stronger than reality. An empirical survey could be an effective method of mapping indirect 
discrimination and racism. However, while historical churches have become constitutional 
categories, Roma barely appear in the decisions. Besides adequate reflection on the social 
reality, the constitutional interpretation also requires moral evaluation. In the case of historical 
churches, the judges apply the concept of preferential treatment, but it is not clear what type 
of inequality can be found at the starting point. In contrast, in the case of Roma numerous 
studies forewarn of the extraordinary social consequences arising from inequality. 
According to the partnership view of democracy, people arc full partners in a collective 
political enterprise, so that a majority's decisions are democratic only when certain further 
conditions are met that protect the status and interest of each citizen.50 As a consequence, 
authoritarianism, prevailing ideology, historical privileges, and nationalism endanger 
democracy. In this respect, Hungary is currently in a depressing and dangerous period of its 
history. An empowered national leader seems to be an attractive constitutional alternative to 
the endless parliamentary debates. Paraphrasing the words of the Polish preamble, we can 
say that reference to God as the source of truth and justice in Hungary is more common 
than reference to those universal values as arising from other sources. These tendencies go 
hand in hand with a nation-state policy based upon national language, culture and ethnicity. 
It is noteworthy that all Central European countries except for Hungary adopted a new 
constitution after the regime change. All of them preserved the values and institutions that 
had been established between 1989 and 1992.51 The most recent Hungarian Government-
having the required two-thirds parliamentary majority-has already announced that it will 
provide a new constitution for the country. In contrast to the other countries, the clear and 
present aim of the prospective Hungarian Founding Fathers is to repeal the 1989 established 
constitutional principles and institutions. 
The future of Central European constitutional democracies relies not only on the 
actions of people in the countries concerned but also on the commitment of Western 
societies. In the long run, the Visegrád Countries are not able to ignore the achievements of 
the modern constitutionalism. This is why so important even from Eastern point of view 
that Western democracies are able to cope with the unpopularity of representative bodies, to 
find the proper place of religious values within secularised democracies, and to ensure equal 
protection of law to ethnic minorities. 
50
 Dworkin, R.: Justice in Robes. Cambridge (MA), 2006. 134, 139. 
51
 The current Polish preamble expresses that in 1989 the Homeland recovered and regained the 
possibility of a sovereign and democratic determination of its fate. 
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1. Introduct ion 
Crimina l l iabi l i ty for t rading in inf luence is a relat ively n e w p h e n o m e n o n in na t iona l 
cr iminal laws.1 Cr imina l i za t ion o f corrupt ion o f f c n c e s was t r ad i t iona l ly limited to p a s s i v e 
o r act ive f o r m o f bribery. At t h e th i rd mi l l enn ium on ly a l imited n u m b e r of coun t r i e s (e .g. 
Be lg ium, F r a n c e , Hungary, P o l a n d , Slovenia) p r o v i d e d for an exp l i c i t inc r imina t ion of 
t rad ing in in f luence . 2 The s c o p e o f the o f f e n c e descr ip t ions a r e no t identical, s i nce e.g. 
cer tain leg is la t ions cr iminal ise o n l y asking or a c c e p t i n g the u n d u e advan tage , 3 bu t o the r s 
penal ize a lso t h o s e perpe t ra tors w h o gives or p r o m i s e it.4 It s h o u l d b e noted, h o w e v e r , that 
cer tain c o n d u c t s qualif ied as t r a d i n g in i n f l uence in a c o u n t r y a r e penal ized in o the r 
ju r i sd ic t ions as bribery.5 
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 Explanatory Report of С О Е Convention, para. 64. 
2
 Vander Beken, T.-Siron, N.: Comparative Report. In: Vander Beken, T.-de Ruyver, B.-Siron, 
N. (eds): The organisation of the fight against corruption in the member states and candidate countries 
of the EU. Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, 2001. 16, 17. 
3
 Sections 256, 258/E of Hungarian Criminal Code (HCC). 
4
 Sect. 433-2 paras 1-2 of French Criminal Code; Bueb, J.-P.: France (National Report). In: 
Vander Beken—de Ruyver-Siron (eds): The organisation of the fight against corruption... op. cit. 
179-180. 
5
 Vander Beken-Siron: Comparative Report. In: Vander Beken-de Ruyver-Siron (eds): The 
organisation of the fight against corruption... op. cit. 17; Mac Mahon, L.: Ireland (National Report). 
In: Vander Beken-de Ruyver-Siron (eds): The organisation of the fight against op. cit. 235; 
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The disparity of national regulations is mirrored at the international level. Certain 
international conventions (instruments), when oblige member states to criminalise 
corruption, explicitly or actually cover only the offence of bribery. The following 
international instruments are founded on this restrictive approach of criminalisation: 
- the protocol to the convention on the protection of the European Communities' 
financial interests (27 September 1996);6 
- the convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international 
business transactions (adopted on 21 November 1997 in the framework of OECD);7 
- the convention drawn up on the basis of Art. K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European 
Union on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or 
officials of member states of the European Union (26 May 1997);8 
- the joint action of 22 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Art. K.3 
of the Treaty on European Union, on corruption in the private sector.9 
Only the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption adopted on 27 November 1999 in 
the framework of Council of Europe (hereinafter СОЕ Convention)10 contains explicit 
provisions on trading in influence on public officials." Trading in influence on executives 
of business organisations is not covered by this instrument, while both bribery of public 
officials and bribery committed in the private sector shall be penalized (at least as a 
principle).12 
Slingerland, W.: Trading in influence: corruption revisited. How a better understanding of the systemic 
character of trading in influence can help the Council of Europe and its Member States choosing the 
right instruments to tackle this form of corruption (EGPA Study Group on Ethics and Integrity of 
Governance, Toulouse, 8-10 September 2010). 9. http://www.uwdierenarts.n1/cust/corruptie2.0/art.s/ 
EGPA_paper_W.Slingerland_20100926.pdf. 
6
 Official Journal С 313, 23/10/1996. 1; See in details Vermeulen, G.: The Fight Against 
International Corruption in the European Union. In: Rider, В. A. K. (ed.): Corruption: The Enemy 
Within. The Hague-London-Boston, 1997. 333-342. 
7
 In: www.oecd. org. In details see Adolfi, G.-Pieth, M.: How to Make the Convention Work: 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Recommendation and Convention on 
Bribery as an Example of a New Horizon in International Law. In: Fijnaut, C.-Huberts, L. (eds): 
Corruption. Integrity and Law Enforcement. The Hague-London-Boston, 2002. 349-360. 
8
 Official Journal С 195, 25/06/1997. 1. See in details Grotz, M.: Legal Instrument of the 
European Union to Combat Corruption. In: Fijnaut-Huberts (eds): Corruption. Integrity and Law 
Enforcement, op. cit. 383-384. 
9
 Official Journal L 358, 31/12/1998. 2-4. In details see Grotz: op. cit. 385-386. 
10
 See in details de Vei, G.-Csonka, P.: The Council of Europe Activities against Corruption. In: 
Fijnaut-Huberts (eds): Corruption. Integrity and Law Enforcement, op. cit. 364, 368-380; Salazar, L.: 
The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. In: Alvazzi del Frate, A.-Pasqua, G. 
(eds): Responding to the Challenges of Corruption. Roma-Milan, 2000. 221-234. On the anti-
corruption initiatives in the Council of Europe see Csonka, P.: Corruption: The Council of Europe's 
Approach. In: Rider, В. A. K. (ed.): Corruption the Enemy Within. The Hague-London-Boston, 1997. 
passim. 
11
 Art. 12 of СОЕ Convention. 
12
 Arts 7 -8 and 37 of СОЕ Convention. 
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2. The СОЕ Convention 
2.1. Obligation to Criminalise-Reservations 
According Art. 12 of the СОЕ Convention "Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when 
committed intentionally, the promising, giving or offering, directly or indirectly, of any 
undue advantage to anyone who asserts or confirms that he or she is able to exert an improper 
influence over the decision-making of [domestic public officials, members of domestic 
public assemblies, foreign public officials, members of foreign public assemblies, officials of 
international organisations, international parliamentary assemblies, judges and officials of 
international courts] in consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for himself or 
herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the offer or the 
promise of such an advantage, in consideration of that influence, whether or not the influence 
is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result". 
Taking into account the different approaches of national legal systems, the СОЕ 
Convention provides that State Parties can reserve their right not to establish as a criminal 
offence under their domestic law trading in influence on public officials.13 The possibility of 
reservations is unlimited with regard to Art. 12, namely states may reserve the right not to 
establish as a criminal offence trading in influence as such. While certain forms of bribery 
of public officials, namely bribery of domestic public officials,14 active bribery of foreign 
public officials,15 bribery of officials of international organisations,16 bribery of judges and 
officials of international courts17 shall be criminalized unconditionally, namely reservations 
in these regards are not permissible. 
Certain states (Denmark,18 Netherlands,19 Republic of Slovenia20) simply reserve the 
right not to establish as a criminal offence the conduct referred to in Art. 12. Others (as 
Switzerland21 and Finland22) restricted the criminalization to conducts which had been 
already considered punishable under their domestic law. Others (United Kingdom,23 French 
Republic,24 Belgium25) explicitly referred to certain elements by which they wanted to 
restrict the scope of criminalization (in line with their existing criminal law). 
13
 Art. 37 of СОЕ Convention. 
14
 Arts 2-3 of СОЕ Convention. 
15
 Art. 5 of СОЕ Convention. 
16
 Art. 9 of СОЕ Convention. 
17
 Art. 11 of СОЕ Convention. 
18
 Reservation contained in a Note Verbale from the Permanent Representation of Denmark 
appended to the instrument of ratification deposited on 2 August 2000. 
19
 Reservations contained in the instrument of acceptance deposited on 11 April 2002. 
20
 Reservation contained in a Note Verbale from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia, 
dated 4 May 2000, deposited at the time of ratification of the instrument on 12 May 2000. 
21
 Reservation contained in the instrument of ratification deposited on 31 March 2006. 
22
 Reservations contained in the instrument of acceptance deposited on 3 October 2002. 
23
 Reservation contained in a Note Verbale handed over by the Permanent Representative of the 
United Kingdom to the Secretary General at the time of deposit of the instrument of ratification on 9 
December 2003. 
24
 Reservation contained in the instrument of ratification deposited on 25 April 2008. 
25
 Reservation contained in a Note Verbale handed over by the Permanent Representative of 
Belgium to the Deputy Secretary General at the time of deposit of the instrument of ratification on 23 
March 2004. 
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2.2. Protected interest 
The Explanatory Report explicitly states: "[cjriminalising trading in influence seeks to 
reach [.. .] the corrupt behaviour of those persons who are [ . . . ] contributing to the 
atmosphere of corruption."26 At it was correctly pointed out by Stessens, trading in 
influence does not presuppose the breach of the principal-agent relationship which forms 
the bedrock of the classical concept of public corruption.27 It should be emphasized that in 
certain cases even the commission of bribery of public officials do not jeopardise official 
duties, but only infringe the confidence in the impartiality of public administration.28 
Taking into account this background, the subsequent criminalisation of trading in influence 
seems to be self-evident, since asserting an improper influence could be as much 
detrimental to the trust in public administration as the (sometimes false) appearance of 
venality. 
2.3. Conducts on the active and passive side 
The conduct of the bribee (requesting, accepting the undue advantage or the promise 
thereof) is usually called "passive bribery", while the offence of the briber (promising, 
offering, giving the advantage) is denominated by the attribute "active". The distinction 
between active and passive side is relevant also with respect to the regulation of trading in 
influence. The "passive" form presupposes that a person, asserting a real or pretended 
influence on third persons, requests, receives or accepts an undue advantage with a view of 
assisting the person who supplied the undue advantage by exerting the improper influence. 
"Active" trading in influence means that a person promises, gives or offers an undue 
advantage to someone who asserts or confirms that he is able to exert an improper influence 
over third persons.29 The terms "active" and "passive" trading in influence are not used by 
the conventions, but mentioned in the explanatory reports30 and in the related legal 
literature.31 The СОЕ Convention obliges states parties to penalise both passive and active 
trading in influence. However, states parties can use the possibility of partial reservation to 
restrict the scope of incrimination to the passive side. This could have been done by 
Hungary, when it deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession. 
2.4. Influence 
2.4.1. Real, intended, exerted or successful influence 
The СОЕ Convention does not require real influence, only the assertion thereof. Factual 
connection between the influence trader and the public official is, therefore, not required by 
the definition. СОЕ Convention covers also cases when the influence-trader only asserts, 
but does not intend to exert his or her real influence on the public official. It is explicitly 
26
 Explanatory Report of the СОЕ Convention, para. 64. 
27
 Stessens, G.: The International Fight against Corruption. General Report. International 
Review of Penal Law. 72 (2001) 3-4 , 892, 907. 
28
 Wiener, I. A.: Hivatali büntettek (Offences Against Public Officials Duties). Budapest, 1972. 
79-80. 
29
 Explanatory Report of СОЕ Convention, para. 65. 
30
 Explanatory Report of СОЕ Convention, paras 65-66. 
31
 Stessens, G.: op. cit. 907. 
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provided in the СОЕ Convention that trading in influence should be criminalised "whether 
or not the influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended 
result".32 
The possibility of the partial reservation, however, enables member states to restrict 
the scope of the offence description by requiring the existence of real, intended or 
(successfully) exerted influence. Criminal law of the United Kingdom (on the basis of the 
corresponding reservation) remains to be confined to those cases of trading in influence in 
which an agency relationship exists between the person who trades his influence and the 
person he influences.33 Even partial reservations, in which (successfully) exerted influence 
is required as an element of trading in influence, are compatible with the СОЕ Convention. 
The reservation under Art. 37 may even neutralize the explicit prohibition in Art. 12, 
according to which the offence shall be criminalized "whether or not the influence is exerted 
or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result". 
According to Stessens "[i]t is a matter of some regret that the drafters of the convention 
have not ... required that the person concerned has influenced the decision making process 
[...], or, at least, he was actually able to influence it".34 In my opinion, requiring real, 
intended or (successfully) exerted influence would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
offence. By penalising the assertion of real (intended) influence or requiring (successful) 
exertion thereof, the offence of trading in influence protects only the decision-making 
process of public officials. If the confidence in the impartiality of public administration is to 
be secured, the alleged exertion of influence (in exchange of undue advantage) shall be 
criminalised as well. 
2.4.2. The improper influence 
According to the СОЕ Convention the influence must be improper, therefore, as it is stated 
by the Explanatory Report, acknowledged forms of lobbying do not fall under the offence 
description.35 
2.4.3. Influence on domestic, foreign or international public officials 
According to Art. 12 of the СОЕ Convention the asserted influence is connected to the 
decision-making of following types of public officials, namely 
- domestic public officials (including judges), 
- members of domestic public assemblies, 
- foreign public officials (including judges), 
- members of foreign public assemblies, 
- officials of international organisations (including judges and officials of international 
courts), 
- members of international parliamentary assemblies, 
For the purposes of the СОЕ Convention "public official" shall be understood by 
reference to the definition of "official", "public officer", "mayor", "minister" or "judge" in 
32
 Art. 12 of the СОЕ Convention. 
33
 Reservation contained in a Note Verbale handed over by the Permanent Representative of the 
United Kingdom to the Secretary General at the time of deposit of the instrument of ratification on 
9 December 2003. 
34
 Stessens: op. cit. 907-908. 
35
 Explanatory Report of the СОЕ Convention, para. 65. 
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the national law of the State in which the person in question performs that function and as 
applied in its criminal law. The term "judge" shall include prosecutors and holders of 
judicial offices.36 
СОЕ Convention covers trading in influence on public officials (including members of 
public assemblies and judges) irrespective of whether they are exercising public power at 
domestic, foreign or international bodies (or organisations). The possibility of partial 
reservation, however, enables national legislators to exclude cases, when the asserted influence 
relates to foreign or international public officials. The French Republic reserved the right not 
to establish as a criminal offence the conduct of trading in influence defined in Art. 12 of the 
Convention, in order to exert an influence, as defined by the said article, over the decision-
making of a foreign public official or a member of a foreign public assembly.37 
2.4.4. The passive influence trader 
According to the СОЕ Convention the scope of perpetrators is not confined to public officials. 
In the legal literature some regret was expressed that the scope of criminal liability is too 
wide in this respect.38 It should be noted, however, that the obligation of the СОЕ Convention 
can be restricted by applying partial reservation to offenders who are public officials or 
holders of public functions.39 Belgium reserved the right not to establish as a criminal offence 
under its domestic law the conduct referred to in Art. 12 of the Convention which does not 
concern the use by a person holding a public function of the influence-be it real influence or 
supposed influence-that he or she disposes of owing to his or her function.40 
It should be noted, however, that this restriction of the offence description docs not 
sufficiently protect cither the impartial decision making process or the public confidence 
therein. Decisions of public officials may be influenced not only by their colleagues, but by 
relatives or friends. By asserting such an influence not only public officials, but anyone may 
suggest that the decision making in the public sphere is not impartial. To comprehensively 
protect these interests it requires that criminal law shall cover all influence traders regardless 
of their status as public officials. 
3. Hungarian law 
The first Hungarian Criminal code in 1878 provided for bribery of public officials as a single 
offence of comiption. Separate regulation on trading in influence on domestic public officials 
was introduced into Hungarian criminal law only in 1942. Trading in influence on state organs 
and economic enterprises was criminalised in 1971 during the socialist era. The contemporary 
Hungarian Criminal Code (HCC) adopted in 1978 contracted these offences in Section 256. 
The regulation covers trading in influence on domestic public officials and trading in influence 
on economic enterprises and non-profit organisations. Trading in influence on foreign or 
36
 Art. 1 points a-b) of СОЕ Convention. 
37
 Reservation contained in the instrument of ratification deposited on 25 April 2008. 
38
 Stessens: op. cit. 907. 
39
 Art. 37 of СОЕ Convention. 
40
 Reservation contained in a Note verbale handed over by the Permanent Representative of 
Belgium to the Deputy Secretary General at the time of deposit of the instrument of ratification on 
23 March 2004. 
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international public officials was subsequently (in 1998) introduced into Section 258/E. of the 
HCC as a separate offence ("trading in influence international relations").41 
Taking into account this evolution (extension of the criminalisation) 
- trading in influence on domestic public officials, 
- trading in influence on foreign (or international) public officials, 
- trading in influence on business and non-profit organisations may be distinguished 
in the HCC. 
Trading in influence on domestic public officials is committed by somebody, who "by 
asserting that he is able to influence a public official, requests or accepts an undue advantage 
for himself/herself or on behalf of another person". Trading is influence on domestic 
officials is a felony which is punishable by imprisonment of one to five years. HCC defines 
the concept of domestic public official with reference to certain positions and/or functions. 
Particular positions, namely Members of Parliament, the President of the Republic, the 
Prime Minister; judges, prosecutors shall always be considered as public officials. In 
addition, domestic public officials are those persons whose "activity forms part of the proper 
functioning o f ' certain public authorities (state administration organs, local government 
organs, courts, prosecutor offices, the Constitutional Court etc.). The concept of public 
officials comprises persons, who entrusted with public power (public administrational 
duties) at organs (or bodies), which exceptionally (on the basis of a legal regulation) fulfil 
tasks of public power (public administration), e.g. teachers at state exams.42 
Trading in influence on foreign (international) officials is regulated as a separate 
offence in Hungarian Criminal Law. According to Section 258/E the crime is committed by 
any person, who-asserting to influence a foreign public official-requests or accepts an 
unlawful advantage for himself or on behalf of another person. Trading is influence on 
foreign (international) officials is a felony which is punishable by imprisonment up to five 
years. It is correctly pointed out in the legal literature that an independent offence description 
in Section 258/E is superfluous, since the regulation is almost identical with Section 256 (1) 
of HCC. Trading in influence on foreign (international) officials should have been regulated 
rather as an extension of Section 256.43 HCC provides for a legal definition of "foreign 
public official", which shall relate not only to foreign, but also to international officials. The 
concept of foreign public officials comprises 
- a person serving in the legislative, judicial or administrative body of a foreign state, 
- a person serving in an international organization created under international 
convention, whose activities form part of the organization's activities, 
- a person elected to serve in the general assembly or body of an international 
organization created under international convention, 
41
 Concerning the history of the regulation see Wiener, I. A.: A korrupciós bűncselekmények 
szabályozása a Csemegi Kódextől napjainkig (The regulation of corruption offences from the first 
Hungarian Criminal Code until recently). In: Györgyi Kálmán ünnepi kötet (Kálmán Györgyi 
Anniversary Volume). Budapest, 2004. 631-639. 
42
 Section 137 point 1 of HCC. 
43
 Tóth, M.: A magyar büntetőjogi kodifikáció történetének néhány tanulsága - az új törvény 
megalkotásának előestéjén (Some lesson from the history of criminal law codification in Hungary-on 
the eve of adopting the new code). In: Békés Imre ünnepi kötet (Imre Békés Anniversary Volume). 
Budapest. 2000. 267. 
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- a member of an international court that is vested with jurisdiction over the territory 
or the citizens of the Republic of Hungary, and any person serving in such international 
court, whose activities form part of the court's activities, 
Trading in influence on economic enterprises and non-profit organisations is regulated 
by Section 256 (3) a) of HCC. The offence is committed by "any person who requests or 
accepts an undue advantage for himself/herself or on behalf of another person by asserting 
that he is able to influence employees (of members) of economic enterprises or non-profit 
organisations". The concept of economic enterprise comprises budgetary organs, namely 
public schools, public hospitals performing public functions and financed from the state 
budget. If the employee (or a member) of the budgetary organ is entrusted with public 
power (public administrational duties), asserting influence thereon shall be qualified as 
trading in influence on public officials. 
3.1. Protected interest 
Criminalisation of trading in influence on public officials protects the public confidence in 
impartial decision making of domestic public officials.44 It was concluded from the fact that 
the definition of trading in influence is fulfilled even i f i t is impossible that the public official 
breaches his or her official duties. This interpretation may be extended, mutatis mutandis, to 
trading in influence on foreign or international public officials. With regard to trading in 
influence on economic enterprises and non-profit organisations, the protected interest may 
be conceptualized as public confidence in impartial decision making of these organisations. 
It was correctly pointed out in the legal literature that this rationale of criminalisation should 
be reconsidered with regard to economic enterprises after the fall of the socialist era and at 
the dawn of market economy.45 Unlike planned economy of the socialism, in a market 
economy the requirement of impartiality may not give reasons for the identical scope of 
offence descriptions for trading in influence in the public sphere and in the business (non-
profit private) sector. 
3.2. The undue advantage 
With regard to bribery it is widely acknowledged that the advantage may not be considered 
as undue, if its acceptance is permitted by explicit legal norms or staff regulations. In absence 
of such a regulation the legality of the advantage is vividly disputed in the legal literature.46 
44
 Vida, M.-Juhász , Zs.: Befolyással üzérkedés (Trading in Influence). In: Nagy, F. (ed.): 
A magyar büntetőjog különös része. Budapest, 2009. 375. 
45
 Kis, N.: Büntethetö-e a lobbyzás? (On the punishability of lobbying). Magyar Jog (2003) 5, 
280-281. 
46
 Gál, I. L.: Molnár Csaba ügye a Fővárosi Ítélőtáblán. Döntés az Országos Rendőr-főkapi-
tányság Pénzmosás Elleni Osztálya vezetőjének vesztegetési ügyében (Case of Molnár Csaba at the 
Higher Appellate Court of Budapest: Bribery Case of the Chie f Money Laundering Investigator of the 
National Police Department). Jogesetek magyarázata (JeMa) (2010) 1, 3 3 - 3 8 ; Hollán, M.: Molnár 
Csaba vesztegetési ügye: még egyszer az előny jogtalanságáról. Kritikai megjegyzések Gál István 
László elemzése kapcsán (Bribery case of Csaba Molnár: Once Again on the Undue Nature of 
Advantage-Critical Remarks of the Evaluation of László István Gál). Jogesetek Magyarázata (2010) 
3, 4 5 - 5 3 ; Gál, I. L.: Ujabb gondolatok Molnár Csaba vesztegetési ügye kapcsán. Válasz Hollán 
Miklósnak (New thoughts with regard to the Bribery Case of Csaba Molnár: A Reply to Miklós 
Hollán). Jogesetek Magyarázata (2010) 3, 54-56. 
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With regard to trading in influence criminal courts shall decide the undue nature of the 
advantage without any statutory basis. Act No. XLIX. of 2006 permitted to act as a registered 
lobbyists and excluded the undue nature of those advantages accepted in compliance with its 
provisions.47 The entire act was abrogated by Section 19 b) of Act. No. CXXXI of 2010 
(new regulation of civil participation in law-making), the question of lobbying became thus 
unregulated. It should be noted, however, that in my opinion, the legality or illegality of the 
advantage is closely connected to the improper nature of the influence. 
3.3. The conduct 
In contrast to bribery, the regulation of the HCC covers only passive side of trading in 
influence, namely requesting or accepting the undue advantage. Accepting the promise of 
the undue advantage, which is criminalized as bribery, is not punishable at the offence of 
trading in influence. 
Active side of trading in influence is not explicitly punishable, namely the offence 
description of the HCC does not cover giving or promising of the undue advantage. In the 
judicial practice active trading in influence is not punished, even if it may be qualified as 
soliciting or aiding (abetting) of passive trading in influence. It is usually maintained that 
the legislation purposely leave this conduct out of the ambit of criminal law. This 
interpretation is mainly supported with the observation that in the context of corruption 
offences the active side shall be explicitly criminalized as a separate offence (as it is 
regulated by bribery).48 
According to the judicial practice,49 giving or promising the undue advantage (active 
trading in influence) is qualified as active bribery,50 if the passive influence trader asserts or 
pretends that he/she is bribing a public official. Active bribery means giving (or promising) 
of an unlawful advantage in connection with the official capacity of a public official to him 
(or her) or in consideration of him (or her) to anybody else. According to the judicial 
practice not only relatives of public officials, but also passive influence traders may be 
targets of the undue advantage. This interpretation does not depend on whether the passive 
influence trader intends, attempts or actually commits the asserted (pretended) active 
bribery. 
In my opinion this interpretation of the Supreme Court is applicable mutatis mutandis 
to trading in influence on foreign (international) public officials, which definition is similar 
to bribery of domestic public officials. With regard to budgetary organs and private sector 
entities, however, the criminal liability of the active influence trader for bribery presupposes 
that he or she the gives or promises the undue advantage to induce the executive of the 
economic enterprise to breach his or her duties. The above described interpretation is 
derived from the definition of active bribery, and it, therefore, does not depend on the fact 
that the assertion of active bribery is not regulated as an aggravating circumstance of passive 
trading in influence. 
47
 Vida-Juhász: Befolyással üzérkedés, op. cit. 375. 
48
 Vida-Juhász: Befolyással üzérkedés, op. cit. 378. 
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 Opinion No. 13 of the Supreme Court (Criminal Division). 
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 Section 253 of HCC. 
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3.4. Perpetrator 
The scope of influence traders is not restricted, the offence may be committed by anyone. 
Even public officials may be perpetrators of trading in influence by requiring or accepting 
an undue advantage by asserting influence on another public officials.51 If, however, a public 
official requires or accepts an undue advantage for instructing inferior public officials, his 
or her conduct is qualified as bribery. If the passive influence trader actually bribes a public 
official etc., he or she shall be liable for active bribery and trading in influence.52 
3.5. The asserted improper influence 
The perpetrator shall request or accepts the undue advantage by asserting that he/she is able 
to influence a public official. The connection between the public official and the influence 
trader can be real (friendship, love) or only purported. The actual or attempted exertion of 
the influence is not, consequently, contained as an element of the offence description.53 
The improper nature of the influence is not an element of the current offence 
description. It is widely acknowledged, however, that the offence description requires that 
the asserted influence induce the public official to take into account factors irrelevant in the 
case (his/her connection with the influence trader etc.).54 
3.6. Aggravating circumstances 
The punishment for trading in influence on domestic public officials shall be imprisonment 
of two to eight years, if the perpetrator: 
- asserts or pretends that he/she is bribing a public official; 
- pretends to be a public official; 
- commits the criminal act for regular financial gain. 
At the offence trading in influence on foreign and international officials the HCC 
provides for no aggravating circumstances. 
The punishment for trading in influence in the private sector is up to three years of 
imprisonment if the employee (or the member) is authorised to act independently. If trading 
in influence in the private sector is committed for regular financial gain, the punishment is 
imprisonment up to three years or in case the employee (or the member) is authorised to act 
independently the offence is punishable with imprisonment of one to five years. The 
assertion of bribery or pretending to be a public official is not an aggravating circumstance 
of this offence. 
4. Evaluation of the implementation by the GRECO 
When the compliance of the Hungarian legislation with the СОЕ convention was evaluated 
by the GRECO, it was ascertained that "there [was] no specific provision which [ . . . ] cover 
active trading in influence in the Hungarian Criminal Code". 
51
 Decision of Bf. I. 761/1963. of the Supreme Court. In: Büntető elvi határozatok (Leading 
Decisions of Criminal Courts). Budapest, 1973. 
52
 Court Decisions No. 1989/176. 
53
 Court Decisions No. 1989/176. 
54
 Bócz, E.: Az államigazgatás, az igazságszolgáltatás és a közélet tisztasága elleni bűn-
cselekmények. (Offences against public administration, judiciary and purity of public life). In: 
Györgyi, K.-Wiener, A. I. (eds): A Büntető Törvénykönyv magyarázata. Budapest, 1996. 537-538. 
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Hungarian authorities claimed "that active trading in influence is fully covered by the 
provisions of active bribery of domestic public officials [...] and active bribery of foreign 
public officials and international officials [...] since these provisions cover all cases when 
"the advantage is offered/promised/given »to another person on account of« the official". 
This term "refers to a person, who-regarding his/her real or pretended relation to the public 
official-may be able to influence the actions of the public official".55 
The report explicitly mentions that "the representative of the Academia was clearly of 
the opinion that Hungarian law was not in full compliance with Art. 12 of the Convention 
in this respect".56 
The GET accepted "that [.. .] the provisions on active bribery may apply also to 
situations of active trading in influence", when the "bribe transmitted by the influence 
peddler to the influenced official". It was also pointed out that according to the СОЕ 
Convention, "[i]t is not a condition that the public official should be bribed by the influence 
peddler; the (asserted or confirmed) exertion of an improper influence over the decision-
making of the official can be different from the (promised) undue advantage. In the view of 
the GRECO Evaluation Team "it has not been substantiated that the Hungarian criminal law 
covers all possible situations of active trading in influence as foreseen in Art. 12 of the 
Convention". Therefore it was recommended that active trading in influence shall be 
regulated to be "in full conformity with Art. 12 of the Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption".57 
5. Evaluation of the author 
In contrast to several states, Hungary made no reservations58 to Art. 12 of the Convention. 
Therefore, it is obliged to criminalize trading in influence on public officials as it is defined 
by the СОЕ Convention. 
Passive trading in influence on domestic, foreign and international public officials is a 
separate criminal offence under Hungarian criminal law regulated by Sections 256 and 
258/E of the HCC. Requesting and accepting of undue advantages is punishable irrespective 
of whether the undue advantage is requested or received by a public official or by anyone 
else. The offence description covers real, pretended, intended or exerted influence. In this 
regard the Hungarian criminal law is in conformity with the requirements of the СОЕ 
Convention. 
Active trading in influence, namely promising, giving an undue advantage to someone, 
who asserts or confirms that he/she is able to exert an improper influence over third persons, 
is not explicitly regulated by the HCC. Exceptionally, this conduct may be qualified as 
55
 Group of States Against Corruption, Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs 
Directorate of Monitoring. Strasbourg, 11 June 2010 Public Greco Eval III Rep (2009) 8E Theme I 
Third Evaluation Round Evaluation Report on Hungary on Incriminations (ETS 173 and 191, GPC 2) 
(Theme I) Adopted by GRECO at its 47th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 7-11 June 2010) 91. 
56
 Op. cit. para 91. The author of this study was the representative of the Academy, his opinion 
will be presented subsequently (in title 5 of the study). 
57
 Op. cit. para 92. 
58
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active bribery of domestic59 or foreign (international) public officials,60 but only if the active 
influence trader intends that the passive influence trader (on the basis of their arrangement) 
will transmit the undue advantage to the public official. Other cases of active trading in 
influence are not punishable under Hungarian Law, e.g. when the entire advantage is given 
to an influence trader who asserts only his or her influence (without pretending the 
commission of active bribery). In this regard the Hungarian legislation is not in conformity 
with the requirements of the СОЕ Convention, which oblige member states to active trading 
in influence irrespective of the allegation of bribery. Hungarian criminal law shall be 
harmonized with the requirements of the СОЕ Convention by penalizing active trading in 
influence.61 
The СОЕ Convention does not oblige state parties to criminalize trading in influence 
on budgetary organs, economic enterprises and non-profit organisations. Decision on 
upholding, decriminalising or restricting the offence of trading in influence in these spheres 
shall be made by national legislator. In this regard the transition to market economy may 
justify the restriction of the criminal offence to budgetary organs (hospitals, nurseries etc.). 
Trading in influence in the private owned business sector shall be decriminalised. 
59
 Section 253 of HCC. 
60
 Section 258/B of HCC. 
61
 According to Art. 37 of СОЕ Convention reservations may be made only at the time of 
signature or when the state deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
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i. On some personal considerations 
As Dworkin warned, if we wish to take rights seriously, we have to take into consideration 
not only norms, rules as texts, but we should consider legal principles and numerous morally 
relevant momenta. Moreover I would suggest that we should deal with the totality of human 
phenomenon, while we attempt to discover the world of law. As I see, there is no sharp 
demarcation between legal principles and moral-social principles. It is also a big question 
how moral-social principles can bccome legal principles, if we suppose the existence of 
such a sharp border. Of course, if we think this process happens by juridical authority, we 
hint to a formal moment again. 
We should take into account that despite that, moral principles can often be grasped 
conceptually, they do not take their origin from the territory of conceptuality, but they are 
rooted deeply in the nature of man, which has been formed fundamentally by an evolutionary 
process. Some moral principles have just cultural origin, so their nature is discoverable 
from wholly cultural aspects. Dworkin asserted "A general theory of law must be normative 
as well as conceptual".1 It may be true. However. I suppose that although all research takes 
place by concepts, however, not only by them. On the other hand, usage of concepts does 
not mean that objects of inquires are exclusively concepts. Numerous legally relevant 
circumstances have non-conceptual, often unconscious, nature. Thus, we should be highly 
careful with conceptual approaches, and we must strive for a varied viewpoint, if we take 
legal philosophy seriously. 
Some years ago I attempted to outline the spiritual origin of the Roman law, which 
undoubtedly constitutes the basis of Western law, especially of the continental legal 
systems.2 At the beginning it was clear for mc that in the Roman law the strictly controlled 
forms not only restrict prevalence of equity and justice, but those result in the autonomy of 
law, result in law, as a separate phenomenon. The anxious-ritualistic attitude of the ancient 
* PhD legal adviser, Budapest. 
E-mail: szmodisj@t-online.hu 
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Roman law was conspicuous as opposed to the collective ideas about the "Proper" of Indo-
European tribes. 
While I examined the ontological nature of the Western law, I had to accept there are 
numerous previous non-legal questions, which can influence indirectly or directly the result 
of the legal research. Numerous particular problems emerge during the examination of the 
law, of which the answers fall under areas of other disciplines. Namely, law is often 
connected with religion, but wherein significant psychological phenomena appear. Thus, 
while we examine law, we have to answer in an appropriate way among others such 
problems, which are fundamentally in spheres of the history of religion or psychology. 
And at this point we can meet a huge dilemma. We either ignore and neglect the non-
legal problems because of our incompetence or we attempt to use properly the knowledge 
of other disciplines during our inquiry. However, if we do not take relevant non-legal 
aspects into account, we renounce in advance a duly sophisticated legal concept, but if we 
carefully and circumspectly utilize the knowledge of non-legal disciplines, we can 
theoretically reach a really scientific concept of law, and we can describe its mechanism. In 
my opinion the latter option is more fruitful. 
It was clear, previous researches ignored connection between the Etruscan religion and 
the Roman law despite religious determination of Roman law had been well known from 
Demelius3 to Max Weber,4 Wolff5 and MacCormack.6 On the other hand, that has been clear 
for a long time, that Etruscan religion had exerted influence on Roman religion. In order to 
see the chain of "Etruscan religion-Roman religion-Roman law" and to compare structural 
similarities of Roman law and Etruscan religion, we should surpass the exclusively legal 
aspects and we should examine the question in historical, psychological and religious 
contexts. 
Thus, we have to use a multidisciplinary approach, which does not take notice of the 
limitations of previous considerations, but always focuses on the emerging particular 
problems. During this process the topical question determines, selects and chooses the 
viewpoint of a certain discipline. That question, which is best connected with the concrete 
discipline. Consequently, multidisciplinary legal research, at least for me, is not only a 
theoretically acceptable possibility, but it is a practically tested and imperative method. 
II. On the problem of multidisciplinarity 
The well-known categorical attitude and analytical character of Western thinking have 
developed necessarily certain specialized disciplines. However, the scientific ideas, as 
models, have never been identical with the reality, which, although suffers from the 
simplification, but can take revenge. Namely, in the most cases the one-sided logic can take 
us along just to a special point of the cognition. However, the phenomenon starts being 
silent from there. Thus, in my interpretation the "Multidisciplinary Legal Research" is an 
approach without a too restrictive methodology to support sophisticated analysis, often by 
syntheses. 
3
 Demelius, G.: Untersuchungen aus dem römischem Civilrechte. Weimar, 1856. 
4
 Weber: Economy and Society: an outline of interpretive sociology. University of California 
Press. Berkeley, 1978, 781-799. 
5
 Wolff, H. J.: Roman Law. An Historical Introduction. Norman, 1951, 49. 
6
 MacCormack, G.: Formalism, Symbolism and Magic in Early Roman Law. Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis, 37 (1969), 339-468, especially 439, 444, 445. 
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Ortega wrote properly, only the scientist specializes, but science itself does not.7 Inter-
and multidisciplinary approach have got foreground recognizing this circumstance. And 
I distinguish interdisciplinarity from multidisciplinarity at this point. Namely, in my 
interpretation the phenomena are interdisciplinary, and the cognition of them is 
multidisciplinary from different aspects. The things as momenta of reality are accessible 
from a lot of possible different aspects. It is true even if we do not take this circumstance 
into account in every case. Thus, although we tend to accept the legal institutions as being 
separated from other phenomena and other no-legal approaches according to our positivistic 
tradition, law and legal phenomena are interdisciplinary. 
The conceptual analysis of law provides a lot of chances to discover the internal logic 
of a certain law. However, as we know, the life of the law has not been logic, it has been 
experience.8 It is also clear that the essence of law is in its function and this function can be 
realized just by the operation of law. The conceptual approaches are not able to catch this 
operation by analysis of the concepts. However, the functional approaches of law can take 
us along to a concept of law theoretically. Of course, the analytical-conceptual way can be 
highly helpful in cognition, but it is true first of all at such developed legal systems, which 
build themselves by concepts. We should not forget that our modern legal systems have not 
been built by only concepts and theoretical categories. Namely, these systems are 
continuation of a special ideological structure, which consisted of Christian morality, an 
irrational (but often expedient and efficient) system of the feudal domination and the Roman 
law. These are the deeper bases of our legal systems. Consequently, we can not renounce 
the analysis and inquiry of the past phenomena during cognition of the nature of our law. 
The historical aspect has a special importance from this point of view. 
That is also clear, that legal philosophy is an interdisciplinary area, because this domain 
is situated between territory of the law and field of the philosophy. In spite of this fact, the 
acceptance of inter- and multidisciplinarity proved to be significantly harder in jurisprudence 
(as in humanities in general) than in natural sciences. Although this phenomenon can have 
various causes, however, I tend to think that the most probable reason for this is in nature of 
humanities. Namely, natural science is organized on the basis of expediency, whereas 
ideological momenta have a bigger role in the human disciplines and cultural evolution.9 
These contain such belief-like elements (imagination and ideas) which resist more strongly 
new thoughts and approaches than pragmatic-rational reflections. 
From these aspects the traditional, analytical-conceptual attempts are especially 
interesting in approaches to the phenomena of normativity and validity. Also, that is thought-
provoking, how the categories of phenomenon and the concepts can get confused in this 
inquiry in certain measure. Moreover, certain paradox gets into these researches. We can 
expound only such elements from a concept, which have been taken into that previously. 
Namely, a concept cannot exist without its creator, although the phenomenon, which is 
covered by philosopher, can. We instinctively interrogate the modern concepts of normativity 
and validity on the basis of our democratic and rational ideology, however simultaneously 
we tend to smuggle certain contents into the examined concept, contents which are not in 
the concept necessarily. Thus, we should distinguish phenomena of normativity and validity 
from concepts of normativity and validity. I suppose, that the phenomenon of normativity 
7
 Ortega y Gasset, J.: The Revolt of the Masses. Notre Dame (IN), 1985. Ind. 101-109. 
8
 Holmes, O. W.: The Common Law. Boston, 1881, 1. 
9
 Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I.: Human Ethology. New York, 1989, 12. 
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(or validity) is rooted deeply in the complex of the human behavior (this is a special 
conglomerate of characteristics of human behavior),10 especially in obedience." 
Fundamentally, irrational momenta get importance in this phenomenon, but rational 
considerations significantly do not. Numerous efforts try to explain normativity in the 
context of conscious decisions, and these explanations do not take into account the irrational 
nature of real social processes.12 Thus, the concept of the normativity (or validity) is not 
discoverable by only a conceptual analysis, but its approach is possible by observation and 
in a descriptive way. Perhaps, the duality of phenomenon and concept is the biggest trap for 
the legal philosophers. Western thinking makes us believe, the conceptual way provides the 
best solution for cognition. 
However, carefully contemplating over these things, we have to accept the circumstance 
that we should not use previous ideological suppositions (for example natural legal thoughts 
about will of majority or legal positivistic ideas about faultless creation of the norms and 
validity), if we wish to discover normativity (or validity) as a value-neutral ontological 
category. We should previously observe the operation of such things, about which we 
subsequently create concept. Frankly speaking, if we examine the men-created law and its 
validity and normativity, it is expedient to know the real nature of humankind, and not only 
which we wish to see about mankind and its law. However, in this case we open wide the 
door of the legal philosophy and we have to look into the disciplines of the human nature. 
And we cannot be sure, that we see, it will be identical to our previous ideological 
expectations about humanity. 
III. Evolution of legal philosophy 
In the late periods of the cultures an account necessarily comes to the front and a historical 
attitude, too. This happened also in the Western culture in the 18th century. We can see this 
not only on the basis of Spenglcr's philosophy of history. Anyone can tell examples from 
his or her own life and on the basis of personal experiences, how the progress of the age is 
connected with the shaping of a historical attitude and a nostalgic view-point. At the same 
time, namely in the 18th century, history became a discipline, and gradually the historical 
attitude determined other forms of the thinking whether in the questions of the arts or in the 
problems of the law. Also, legal history became an independent branch of humanities, 
showing the changeability of the legal institutions and law itself. Legal philosophy, which 
significantly dealt with the connection of law and morality and researched the proper law 
previously, got dubious from that time. 
Although Grotius and Pufendorf reminded us of the culturally determined character of 
law, the plurality of legal forms and spirits of the legal systems became more and more 
clear by the opening of the historical (and of course geographical) perspective. The historical 
view and the interpretation of social processes on the basis of their reasons and causes 
brought a sociological view to the foreground, while sociology also shaped an independent 
discipline. Legal sociology developed a separated direction of the research on the trails of 
10
 Csányi, V.: Reconstruction of the Major Factors in the Evolution of Human Behaviour. 
Praehistoria, 4 -5 (2003-2004), 221-232; see also Csányi, V.: Az emberi viselkedés (Human behavior). 
Budapest, 2006. 
11
 Milgram, S.: Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. New York, 1974. 
12
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works of Ludwig Gumplowicz13 and Max Weber,14 further enlarging the perspective of legal 
philosophy. Also, the revolution of the psychology, researches of Pierre Janet, Sigmund 
Freud, Alfred Adler and Carl Gustav Jung did not leave legal philosophy intact and 
untouched. The existence of the law appears as a special interference of conscious and 
unconscious, instinctive mechanisms in the works of Scandinavian and American legal 
realism. Theories relating to culture and anthropology have helped comparative legal 
research, and legal anthropology come into existence too, while the scientific analysis of the 
literature formed the stream of "law and literature", and economy laid the foundation of the 
economical analysis of law. However, the traditional questions and problems of the legal 
philosophy revolved around legal positivism and natural law in spite of gradual 
multidisciplinary transformation of philosophy of law. 
Austin, Somló, Kelsen and Merkl and of course Langdell could summarize the 
problems of the law (as an autonomous phenomenon) in a so attractive way, and Stammler, 
Radbruch, Verdross, Rawls, Messner argued for the theory of the natural law so originally 
that the tension of this two characteristic standpoints influenced with a special force the 
discussion of the legal philosophy. Some decades later in the Critical Legal Studies (a highly 
exciting continuation of the American Legal Realism) the psychological stream became 
stronger again, but its (CLS) ideological disposition and its activist character has limited to 
the chances of this tendency in paradigmatic renascence and regeneration of legal 
philosophy. 
In the middle of the 20th century a new discipline came into being again, namely 
ethology. On the basis of researches of Konrad Lorenz and other scientists not only animal's 
behavior has been examined, but the scientific interest has been spreading on areas of 
human nature and behavior of mankind, and on the cognition and evolutionary description 
of humankind as a race. In this process among others Eibl-Eibesfeldt and such social-
psychologists created lasting works, who especially lively exposed human behavior, which 
is in the most cases independent of the cultural circumstances. 
The ideological, quite idealistic and fundamentally speculative natural law got a chance 
to renewal from the biological, evolutionary view-point. Margaret Gruter, attempted to 
approach the phenomena of law15 on the basis of biological determination of the human 
behavior, and such excellent legal scholars joined her efforts as Wolfgang Fikentscher.16 
Thus, a new inspiration of legal thought arose again in the German cultural area after 
Pufendorf, Kant, Hegel etc., but this tendency could reach break-through only in America. 
Gruter completed a pioneering work by her fundamental books, by the foundation of Gruter 
Institute, and by initiating international conferences. Owen D. Jones continues Gruter's way 
13
 Gumplowicz, L.: Der Rassenkampf. Sociologische Untersuchungen. Innsbruck, 1909. 
14
 Weber: op. cit. 
15
 Gruter, M.-Bohannan, P.: Law, Biology-Culture: The Evolution of Law. Santa Barbara, 1983; 
Gruter, M.: Law and the Mind: Biological Origins of Human Behavior. Newbury Park, 1991 ; Gruter, 
M.-Masters, R.: Common Sense, and Deception: Social Skills and the Evolution of Law. In: Großfeld, 
B.-Sack, R.-Möllers, T. M. J. (Hrsg.): Festschrift for Wolfgang Fikentscher. Tübingen, 1998. 
16
 Fikentscher, W.-McGuire, M.: A Four-Function Theory of Biology for Law. Rechtstheorie, 
25 (1994), 1-20; Fikentscher, W.: Modes of Thought: A Study in the Anthropology of Law and 
Religion. 2nd ed., Tübingen, 2004; Fikentscher, W.: Law and Anthropology: Outlines, Issues, 
Suggestions. München, 2009. 
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not only by excellent writings,17 but he managed to systematize evolutionary jurisprudential 
efforts by the organization of the Society Evolutionary Analysis in Law. 
However, all these ambitions and exertions exist just as alternatives of the mainstream 
of legal philosophy. It is also clear that the biological interpretation of law18 is spreading in 
the same way, as the research of law as an interdisciplinary phenomenon. The establishment 
of the Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal was a quite early moment of the 
latter process in 1978. Nowadays inter- and multidisciplinary research and interpretation 
come to the foreground more and more at universities and institutions. 
The common aspects of the law and the environment are accentuated at the Vanderbilt 
University Law School over and above evolution related researches of Jones. The Centre 
for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies at the Ohio State University Moritz College 
wishes to illuminate the connections of law, nature, society and the culture. In the 1990s 
reorganized Interdisciplinary Academic Programs of the University of Chicago Law School 
shows properly the essence of multidisciplinary legal efforts, namely "the law does not 
exist in a vacuum". However, the Planning an Interdisciplinary Curriculum of the Vermont 
Law School aims a many-sided approach of the law in the same way. The Yale Law School 
Forum on Multidisciplinary Legal Research has facilitated intellectual exchange among 
graduate students with research in legal or legal-related issues by more meetings. Especially 
remarkable are researches of David Garland at the New York University School of Law, 
which map the connections between punishment and culture.19 However, in Europe also 
there are some ambitions to break out f rom our traditional concepts and theories, eliminating 
boundaries between legal and non-legal phenomena. John Bell has warned properly "The 
study of all legal subjects needs to be informed by theory and perspectives non-legal 
disciplines".20 Related to the change of thinking Maurio Zamboni's article is very 
considerable, which marks acclimatization of evolutionary theory in the domain of legal 
theory.21 
With some superficiality we can establish that in the theoretical researches of law the 
cultural approach, biological-evolutionary interpretations,22 and in general multidisciplinary 
tendencies gain more and more ground.23 The biological tendency is fundamentally related 
to that fact that in the past half century such an amount of scientific knowledge concerning 
mankind has been accumulated, that cannot be neglected by legal philosophy. The change 
17
 Jones, O. D.: Law, Evolution and the Brain. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. 
Biological Sciences, 359 (2004), 1697-1707; Jones, O. D.: Law and Biology: Toward an Integrated 
Model of Human Behavior. Journal Contemporary Legal Issues, 8 (1997), 167-173. 
18
 Guttcntag, M.: Is There a Law Instinct? Washington University Law Review, 87 ( 2009) 269, 
270-327 . 
19
 Garland, D.: A Culturalist Theory of Punishment. Punishment and Society. The International 
Journal of Penology, 11 (2009) 2, 259-269. 
20
 Bell, J.: Legal theory in legal education- 'Anything you can do, I can do meta...". In: Eng, S. 
(ed.): Proceedings of the 21st IVR World Congress. Stuttgart, 2005, 61-68, 61. 
21
 Zamboni, M.: From "Evolutionary Theory and Law" to a "Legal Evolutionary Theory". 
German Law Journal, 9 (2008) 4, 515-546. 
22
 Guttentag: op. cit. 2009. 
23
 Clark, R. C.: The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution. The Yale Law Journal, 90 
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of our image about human nature allows us less and less to base the examination of the law 
on old and ideological thought. 
As an explanation for the multidisciplinary approach of law it appears in most cases 
that lawyers have to prepare themselves for certain special knowledge related to that 
profession, rules of which will be used by them. Although it is true, there are two more 
cardinal reasons for changing view. Firstly, a general inter- and multidisciplinary tendency 
of the science, secondly the legal positivistic idea about the autonomy of law, as among 
others the theory of Langdell drafted, is less and less tenable. These circumstances touch 
first of all practice, legislation and application of the law. However, we should know, the 
multidisciplinary legal research, and multidisciplinary analysis of law are important in the 
legal philosophy, too. 
Moreover, legal philosophy has to clarify the structural inter-relations among the 
approaches of different scientific disciplines. In an optimal case various approaches to law 
do not coexist just incidentally, haphazardly, offering only alternative aspects. Thus, in my 
interpretation the multidisciplinary legal research in the long run is not only a conglomerate 
of the coequal viewpoints, but it is a special system from generality to peculiarity, wherein 
the examination is fundamentally adapted to the respective ontological, law-determining 
levels. Namely, really existing (thus not hypothetical and imaginary) legal systems have 
been built on certain biological determinants, onto the basis of the complex of human 
behavior. Of course, this basis permits several, often conflicting, solutions, but from these 
cultural characteristics and traditions select and shape the actual institutions. 
Within the culturally determined system of course there is room for conceptual 
approaches and analyses of the law, but first of all only where the legal system exhibits a 
definite conceptual construct. Thus, I presume that the three fundamental levels of the 
approaches to law can be distinguished (biological, cultural and conceptual), which could 
be also complemented by horizontal viewpoints. We will return to these later. 
IV. Structure of multidisciplinary legal research 
The multidisciplinary approach of law could have various reasons and aims. This approach 
could promote dialogue among disciplines, could prepare practicing lawyers for application 
of such rules, which concern special professions, could help legislation in shaping efficient 
norms. From the aspect of legal philosophy, namely from the aspects of existence and nature 
of law the multidisciplinary approach has a fundamental importance, too. First of all, the 
view about human nature can influence the legal concepts. The different legal philosophical 
standpoints always set out from certain ideas concerning the humanity, even if they do not 
explicate this circumstance. These notions are determined culturally, moreover there could 
be more anthropological ideas within a culture subsequently, but simultaneously, too. In the 
Western culture a quite holy and idealistic view existed, because of a long domination of 
the Christian morality. This notion was followed and pushed to the background by a secular-
rational vision about the human. Reformation and its rational attitude played and eminent 
role in this process. 
The irrational aspects as a consequence of the result of modem psychology came to 
the front in 19th century. Then a highly sophisticated human-view appeared by the emergence 
of ethology and human ethology. Humankind is characterized in this scientific interpretation 
simultaneously among others by belief-like ideas (common beliefs),24 inclination to 
24
 Eibl-Eibesfeldt: op. cit. 
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constructions, altruism, indoctrinability and tendency to imitation.25 Human ethology 
explains human character by evolutionary factors and processes, emphasizing characteristic 
elements can gain varying importance in various cultures. The environment and the above-
mentioned inclination to imitation and indoctrinability can get a huge significance in shaping 
of concrete cultural forms.26 General human characteristics, as sociability, sensitiveness to 
mutuality, obedience, so-called rule-following behavior and distinction between own group 
and alien group are present in all human societies. 
Consequently, during the examination of social rules and law we should set out from 
such scientific vision about people, which describes and defines mankind as a race. This 
means omission of ideological views and departure from fundamentally emotionally 
determined approaches and concepts, and this means necessarily the consideration of human 
ethological model and facts, especially the so-called complex of human behavior. Thus, 
there is a fundamental biological, human ethological and evolutionary psychological level 
of the examination of law, which discovers for us, what the human nature is in general. This 
human quality can create various institutions and processes, however, in the reality we 
always meet quite definite and concrete forms of phenomena. Namely, every single culture 
shapes its solutions according to its own spirit and postulates whether in religion, in science 
and art, or relating to different social control.27 
So, in my interpretation, the second level of examination of law must be the cultural 
level, wherein cultural anthropological, legal sociological viewpoints can come to the front, 
and aspects of philosophy of religion and history of religion, or philosophy of history could 
get in focus. We should take into account this natural level in order to avoid numerous 
intellectual and ideological traps. For example the slavery is not accepted by natural law; 
however, Aristotle thought this institution coming from nature. Moreover, opposite to our 
modern human opinions, slavery has been and is present everywhere, but sometimes this 
phenomenon is marginal, illegal and it is named euphemistically. However, it emerges so 
stubbornly, that it cannot be opposite to nature. Consequently, we should examine very 
carefully the occurrence of slavery, and we should take very seriously this phenomenon in 
order to know, eliminate and remove that. As I suppose, this phenomenon is connected to 
the distinction between own group and alien group, because slavery can exist relatively 
lastingly in intercultural or intersexual relations. (See source of slavery from captivity; 
black slavery; in Rome selling of debtors as slaves "trans Tiberim", so to an other group; or 
in general sexual slavery as usual from foreign counties.)28 However, within groups 
sociability, empathy and altruism are more significant. Thus, we should know humans 
openly and without illusions to develop humane societies and legal systems. 
On the verge of this two levels of inquiry there are psychological approaches 
simultaneously explaining the culturally and biologically coded phenomena. In my opinion 
for example the "father-complex" theory of Jerome Frank29 as a paraphrase or variation of 
25
 Csányi: Reconstruction of the Major Factors... op. cit. 
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 Richerson, P. J.-Boyd, R.: The evolution of human ultra-sociality. In: Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 
I.-Salter, F. K. (eds): Indoctrinability, Ideology, and Warfare. Evolutionary Perspectives. New York, 
1998, 71-95. 
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 Köhler, J.: Das Recht als Kulturerscheinung. Würzburg, 1885. 
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 Eibl-Eibesfeldt: op. cit. 402-421. 
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 Frank, J.: Law and the Modern Mind. New Brunswick, 2009. 
TAKING LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIOUSLY 2 5 5 
ideas of Feud, the feminist legal theory (at Critical Legal Studies),30 and of course some of 
my ideas, too, on the basis of Jung, mean among others such psychological analysis of the 
law. From this aspect numerous statements of Scandinavian Legal Realism are highly 
relevant. This psychological-legal researches discover phenomena, which have got 
significant just in certain cultures, although which take their origins from nature. 
I regard the conceptual analysis of law as a third level of examination. This approach 
could have excellent importance in legal cultures, wherein the concepts and categories have 
more special significance, than in "average legal culture". Thus, we have to use secular-
rational concepts consistently, because Western law gradually became secularized and it 
detached itself from its religious roots and possibility of religious-moral interpretation. The 
reception of Roman law played a major role in conceptual effort. It seems, the analytical-
conceptual ambitions got decisive necessarily in the Western legal philosophy. 
As I have mentioned, three levels (biological, cultural, conceptual) of legal examination 
model the levels of reality from generality to peculiarity. This is the so-called vertical 
system of cognition. Biological, evolutionary phenomena characterize all humankind, 
culturally coded phenomena are valid within a certain culture or cultural region. However, 
concepts could have different meanings according to the domain of use of those concepts. 
Thus, the various scientific approaches are not accidental and only alternative, but they arc 
complementary shaping a special system, and they impregnate spheres of each-other. 
However, certain approaches are not situated on the basis of axis of the generality and 
the peculiarity, but they are arranged on the basis of domain of special interests. So moral-
philosophical, theological, nature legal, historical, literatúrai (and other) approaches to law 
could comprehend more levels of generality and peculiarity. I regard these as a horizontal 
system of the legal examination. Independently of this circumstance, certain horizontal 
approaches could be more firmly connected with some vertical aspects. For example natural 
law necessarily could be connected with the human ethological analysis of law, the historical 
and literatúrai researches with cultural level. Of course, approaches of legal philosophy are 
categorizable in other way, because our categories are just models of the colorful world. 
However, we should in any case consider that our current, temporary, concrete approach is 
just one of huge pile of possible approaches. Nevertheless, we should take into consideration 
various aspects and approaches of law, if we take legal philosophy seriously. 
30
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Abstract . One of the most apparent features of information society is the increasing number , diversity and 
complex i ty as well as the con t inuous and fast change of technical tools surrounding everything and everyone. In 
an interaction with the adopt ion o f new technologies, the receptive m e d i u m , the society does also change, while 
the environmental changes require adaptation. T h e change, as the n e w tools and the addit ional services are 
becoming a part of the c i t izens ' everyday life at an extent never seen be fo re , develops new deviances . However, 
the role of law in this change is constant: it has to regulate the social re la t ions in a way that it could ensure social 
col laborat ion and prevent, pun i sh any offence against it. Several branches o f law within this complex legal system 
have a different role, where cr iminal law means the sanction keystone and stands guard. However , to be able to 
unders tand the role of cr iminal law, we have to discover the env i ronment that needs to be regulated and to 
unders tand the incentives of dev ian t behaviours wi thin this change. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the Industrial Revolution starting in the second half of the 18th century, the judgement 
of technology1 has not been free of extremities in the European societies. From a layman's 
view, the most apparent feature of information society is the increasing number, diversity 
and complexity as well as the continuous and fast change of technical tools surrounding 
everything and everyone.2 In an interaction with the adoption of new technologies-the 
cognition, usage and consumer-nced-based development of its tools-the receptive medium, 
the society does also change, while the environmental changes require adaptation. According 
to the concept of technological momentum by Thomas Hughes, some technologies at a 
certain point of their lifecycle can have a deterministic power over social changes. As 
technologies become larger and more complex, they form the society even more until the 
society itself can form the technology.3 I am not trying to answer the question whether 
technology is determined by social processes or vice versa-technology determines society. 
In fact, society has changed and is changing, in which the new technology also has some 
role. According to Attila Kincsei, the features of the technological element within this 
* Public prosecutions secretary, The Budapest 4th and 15th District Public Prosecutor's 
Department, H-1041 Budapest, Erzsébet u. 28, Hungary. 
E-mail: szathmary.zoltan@gmail.com 
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 Technology (Greek: техуоХоуш < xexvp "art, skill, craft" + koyoç "study o f ' + suffx ta) covers 
knowledge and experiences about artifical tools (e.g. machines, materials and methods) that are 
practical, increase individual (human) skills and help humanity discover, change and preserve the 
surrounding environment more. The technological tools that help people solve problems in different 
areas of life are called tools at a lower level and technique at a higher level, http://hu.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Technol%C3%B3gia 
2
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Information Age). In: Balogh, G. (ed.): Az információs társadalom (The Information Society). 
Budapest, 2007. 47. 
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interaction can be summarized in the following points: the time elapsed between the 
developments of new technological systems generated by innovations is still getting shorter; 
the performance of infocommunication tools is growing; the convergence between 
information technology, telecommunication and media.4 
The change, as the new tools and the additional services are becoming a part of the 
citizens' everyday life at an extent never seen before, is often incomprehensible mostly for 
the elder generations and the socially underprivileged. Under such circumstances, we have 
to consider the changing of social morals. The scale of behaviours considered deviant is 
broadening because of the tension among the acceptors, adopters and abstainers, disclaimers 
of the new technologies. Youngsters born in an environment networked by info 
communication tools become active users, which mean that they determine the norms of the 
new social and technological system more and more, themselves. 
In this change outlined in brief, the role of law is constant: it has to regulate the social 
relations in a way that it could ensure social collaboration and prevent, punish any offence 
against it. Several branches of law within this complex legal system have a different role, 
where criminal law means the sanction keystone and stands guard as ultima ratio. However, 
to be able to understand the role of criminal law, we have to discover the environment that 
needs to be regulated and to understand the incentives of deviant behaviours within this 
change. 
II. The concept of information society and deviance 
/. Information society 
It is typical for the information society that the generation, distribution and utilization of 
information are fundamental economic, political and cultural activities. In economics the 
concept of knowledge economy is consistent with this approach. Knowledge economy 
means that through the economic utilization of knowledge as human resource such value is 
generated that can be expressed not only in an intellectual but also in a material meaning. 
Therefore the substantial elements of information society can be summarized as follows.5 
Information as financial value has a primary role for example in electronic trade that is 
based on virtual acts contrary to the functional mechanisms of traditional economy. 
Information is also a fundamental element of wielding political power because only those 
are able to gain and maintain power that generate and distribute information. Another 
essential element of information society is technology that allows gaining and processing 
information. The development of technology significantly increased the speed of society's 
reaction towards the new living conditions because the larger flows of information gradually 
reduced the time needed to gain up-to-date knowledge, and continuous learning has become 
a requirement. Another characteristic of information society is that an increasing part of 
employees doing productive activity work in a position that is related to gaining and 
processing information.6 
4
 Kincsei: op. cit. 59-60. 
5
 Sum, Sz.: A szellemi alkotások jogának információtechnológiai vonatkozásairól (Information-
technological Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). In: Takács. T. (ed.): Az informatikai jog nagy 
kézikönyve (The Great Handbook of Info-communication law). Budapest, 2009. 212. 
6
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Based on the above general description, we can see that in everyday life the expression 
information society is often used in connection with political and economic programs. The 
definition of its meaning and its differentiation from other societies characterized with 
features of earlier periods (post-industrial, post-modern, knowledge-based, etc.) are in the 
focus of actual discourses of several different areas of science. Experts of informatics, 
anthropology, sociology, politology and jurisprudence study the concept from different 
viewpoints. As information society is a subject of their studies for different reasons and 
they do not have a solid set of concepts, therefore they disagree in which area of life this 
change can be considered determinant enough to characterize the whole society-assuming 
that information society itself does have a new nature compared to the former ones. 
However, we should not miss to define in what manner the study uses this concept without 
taking a stand on any conception. Hence, I am not trying to either develop a new theory on 
information society or to summarize or compare former narratives, rather highlight those 
elements of existing theories that are necessary for criminal law and only refer to their 
origin. 
László Z. Karvalics helped my work by introducing three narratives to handle the 
concept of information society properly.7 The first, so called macro-level "major narrative" 
covers theories disputed in a highly abstractive civilization-theoretical, socio-philosophical, 
culture-theoretical context. The conceptions marked by the meso-level "minor narrative" 
still handle the questions of changing social subsystems at a highly abstractive level while 
outlining some prioritized problems. A major part of examinations related to the third, so-
called "mini narrative" contain discourses that focus on a small segment of reality and 
prefer practical aspects, therefore give an excellent basis to plan the direct interventions 
into the considered subareas. According to Z. Karvalics, the real dimensions of information 
society are not telecommunication or information technology, but education, science, 
innovation, economy and culture.8 
Searching the sine qua non of information society is not the purpose of this study; 
therefore I continue my research by examining the society's strong relations towards 
technology instead of examining socio-theoretical models. After outlining the above frames, 
the expression information society used in my study-based on the examinations and their 
results executed according to the third, micro-level narrative-is trying to create a basis to 
understand the delinquencies of information society while considering the purposes of its 
own area of science. What jurisprudence concerns from the several information society 
conceptions is that—on ground of the complexity of social relations to be regulated-a 
different shade of information society prevails concerning public administration, civil or 
criminal law. Taking the role of criminal law within the legal system as a basis, it cannot 
have an independent picture of information society as its function is to protect the existing 
social order and values when it is not enough to protcct the other branches of law or the 
extent of harm caused by an illegal action is so big that the strictest intervention-that highly 
restricts even the constitutional fundamental rights-is needed. With other words, the 
criminal law considers the society as mostly static-let it be post-industrial, information or 
7
 Karvalics, L. Z.: Információs társadalom-Mi az? Egy kifejezés jelentése, története és 
fogalomkörnyezete (Information Society-What is that? The Meaning, the History and the Setting of 
a Phenomenon). In: Pintér, R. (ed.): Információs társadalom (Information Society). Budapest, 2007. 
41—42. 
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knowledge-based. As an instrument, it does not develop the social relations directly, only 
indirectly, while it does not promote rather protect the social-economic development. 
However, it cannot avoid social changes because the application environment of 
dogmatically clarified legal institutions used by it has changed, new social values, relations 
and subjects of law evolved, and criminal offences can be committed or detected using new 
instruments. 
Without considering information society determined solely by new technological tools, 
the topic of digital technology can be considered as priority from the aspect of delinquency 
and criminal investigation on grounds of the following. Criminal liability is based on free 
will that is included among the conceptual elements of guilt. Therefore when judging the 
technological element, we should accept its neutrality, i.e. the opportunities provided by 
infocommunication tools do not necessarily result in their utilization for criminal offences 
but can be incentives of the development of certain deviances and necessitate the 
reinterpreting of dogmatics of certain criminal offences. As a starting point, we have to 
thoroughly examine the new environment provided by the technologies that make the 
commitment of criminal offences easier and help or encumber criminal investigation-also 
considering the possible offenders of the new world. So the questions arising are the 
following: What role does technology play in delinquency and criminal investigation, what 
opportunities it gives, what are those new revaluated situations that-in connection with 
technology-require a new type of protection, and who are those who endanger these social 
values? 
A keyword of the examined environment and information society is convergence. 
However, convergence has no exact, generally accepted definition in literature, from the 
aspect of this study it means that the different network platforms carry basically similar 
services but it also refers to the concentration of consumer tools such as telephone, television 
and personal computer. Abstracting from the physical environment of these tools, 
digitalization provided the convergence of formerly segregated branches such as information 
technology, telecommunication and media with the development of platform-free 
broadcasted contents. With other words, infocommunication convergence is a technological-
based multi-level process that the market and regulation only tries to follow. It's determining 
technological basis is digitalization, a technical solution that enables the same content to be 
transferred even through formerly segregated networks.9 Thus, convergence is a change in 
the fields of media, information technology and telecommunication. This process needs to 
be monitored because it determines the environment of committing IT crimes-not only 
infrastructurally but culturally as well. The technological element (tools and services) 
provides the society more intensive information flow and access to a mass of information, 
while from the society's side completing, supporting and mediating traditional, real-life 
activities with infocommunication technology systems result in the extension of these 
activities to their virtual dimensions.10 The relative wide accessibility of these tools enables 
every member of the society to communicate and build relations and communities spanning 
over national borders. 
9
 Tóth, A.: Az elektronikus hírközlés és média gazdasági szabályozásának alapjai és versenyjogi 
vonatkozásai. (The Regulation of the Electronic Communication and media from a competion law's 
point of view). Budapest, 2008. 57. 
10
 Kincsei: op. cit. 59-60. 
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2. Deviance 
The expression "deviance" refers to attitudes that violate the basic rules and norms of a 
community. Jack D. Douglas and Frances C. Waksler describe the conceptual levels of 
deviance as a funnel. According to the broadest explanation, it feels as if something was 
wrong, weird or strange, while according to its narrower meaning, it is a judgement that 
something is completely wrong. Somewhere between the two extremities becomes the 
deviant attitude criminal behaviour." 
In order to understand the new, formerly unknown deviances of information society, 
first I take the concept "anomie" from the concepts of theories related to social structure. 
The word anomie literally means "lack of social norms". Its extended meaning refers to a 
stage when for certain (usually new, not familiar) situations there is no former directive 
norm or when a long standing social practice is different from the social norms.12 With 
other words, anomie means the breakdown of social order-a result of loosing social norms 
and values.13 Emile Dürkheim illustrated the concept of anomie with the change in the 
number of suicides per period, and explained it with several phenomenons in his research. 
Suicide rate grew significantly during the larger and faster economic changes for the reason 
that people suddenly got into new, unfamiliar situations from the usual ones—into a situation 
to whose norms they suddenly had to adjust to.14 By analysing the industrial revolution of 
the 19th century, he drew the conclusion that the disengaged social powers did not get into 
balance, their relative value is not specified, and therefore the regulation cannot work for a 
while. People do not know anymore, what is allowed and what is not, what is fair and what 
is unfair, what can be claimed by right and what goes beyond its measures, therefore there 
is nothing they would not claim.15 Family, political and religious communities, social groups 
that are self-organized or based on common interest integrate the individual into the society 
in different ways. During the integration process the individual accepts the examples and 
lifestyle patterns of the society. The stage of anomie evolves as a result of weakening 
integrating powers. 
According to Robert Merton the reason for anomie is not the social change rather the 
social structure that sets equal goals for all its members but does not provide equal tools to 
achieve them, which causes tension between the requirements of our culture and the 
structure of our society.16 A result of this tension is deviance. The expression "American 
dream" reflects the approach of our society that has been accepted since the strengthening 
of the idea of equality of the French revolution: the purpose is to aim for success and 
prosperity equally, i.e. with equal opportunities. The adjustment to the goals and tools of 
the period can happen in five ways: conformism-both are accepted, innovation-we accept 
the goals but are trying to achieve them with our own tools, ritualism-we give up our goals 
but still use the legal tools, withdrawal—we give up both, rebellion-we refuse both the goals 
11
 Adler, F.-Mueller, G. O. W.-Laufer, W. S.: Kriminológia (Criminology). Budapest, 2002. 
34-35. 
12
 Gönczöl, К. Kcrczsi. K.-K.orinek, L.-Lévay, M. (ed.): Kriminológia—Szakkriminológia 
(Criminology-Specialistic Criminology). Budapest, 2006. 104. 
13
 Adler-Mueller-Laufer: op. cit. 157. 
14
 Dürkheim, É.: Az öngyilkosság (Suicide). Budapest, 1982.227-161. 
15
 Dürkheim, É.: Az öngyilkosság: szociológiai tanulmány (Suicide: a Sociological Study). 
Budapest, 2000. 274-275. 
16
 Adler-Mueller-Laufer: op. cit. 159. 
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and the tools and replace them with our own goals and tools creating a new social structure. 
Therefore innovation, withdrawal (drug and alcohol consumption) and rebellion can be 
considered deviances. 
III. The possible reasons 
1. Life on the network 
The infocommunication revolution also generates changes. A dislocation of power can be 
seen between the groups that integrate the individuals at different levels and with different 
intensity while a network society is developing.17 According to Gábor Balogh, the network 
ensures the identity of the citizens of the infocommunication period, and at the same time it 
is the sign of people's activity marked "homo informaticus" of the period. Network is, on 
the one hand, such a technical-technological tool that consists of junctions, linking routes 
and interconnections, and on the other hand, is a topologic formation that integrates those 
that act in it. A basic characteristic of the network is the connection, and as a topologic 
formation to ensure, maintain and transact infocommunication.18 In an environment 
determined by infocommunication tools-because of the possibility of losing our 
identifiability as a result of living on the network-the role of consciousness and identity 
changes, they can become independent due to the indirect, mediated nature of our 
interactions. Relationships established on the internet provide us the most unmitigated 
possibility ever for personal achievements, self-realisation and separation from our previous 
personality-often more than the physical world can offer. The forms of communication can 
be shaped and influenced so much that the individual can portray itself completely 
unrealistic.19 
Besides the possibility for experimentation, such basic human characteristics influence 
the users' online behaviour like desire for honest self-revelation, the need to share everyday 
stress with someone who understands us and has similar problems. On the other hand, it is 
a general truth that we often share our problems with strangers more easily than with our 
closest relatives. This phenomenon called "stranger on the train" can highly influence 
people's online behaviour.20 Self-revelation is not always an inner pressure; it can also be a 
requirement to legitimate the belonging to a group or to establish mutual trust-the confession 
of the otherwise stigmatized character is easier to accept in both cases.21 But what does its 
danger lie in? The possibilities provided by technology make the sharing and gathering of 
this personal information easier. 
Infocommunication tools are such non-monopolistic mass products that are available 
for every citizen, such needs of accelerated social interactions that are more and more 
becoming the conditions of existence for the modem people. A conflict arises when a person 
leaving the infocommunicational environment is unable to identify the actions and situations 
17
 Balogh, G.: Az információs társadalom olvasatai (Concepts of the Information Society). In: 
Balogh, G. (ed.): Az információs társadalom dimenziói (Dimensions of the Information Society). 
Budapest, 2006. 11-22. 
18
 Ibid. 15. 
19
 Jewkes, Y.-Sharp, К.: Crime, deviance and the disembodied self: transcending the dangers of 
corporeality. In: Jewkes, Y. (ed.): Dot.cons-Crime, deviance and identity on the Internet. Portland 
(OR), 2003. 2-3 . 
20
 Whitty, M. T.-Joinson, A. N.: Truth, Lies and Trust on the Internet. New York, 2009. 9. 
21
 Ibid. 10-11. 
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of the real, direct world. Although cyberspace, the new cultic space of the 21st century will 
keep its high importance, the scope of problems cannot be limited solely to this sector but 
conspicuously show such signs of anomie that we can use to describe the negative changes 
of our society. 
Therefore it seems easy to answer the question: what does the attractiveness of 
cyberspace lie in and why it is important to talk about its negative effects on personality? 
The answer seems to be simple: the interactions of cyberspace spread over the "real, direct" 
living space of the society. An increasingly significant part of users is unable to separate 
the interaction and role games of these two spaces, the once undiscovered, then secretly 
gratified deviances of their personality. According to M. Poster and S. P. Wilbur, cyberspace 
is ideal for the individuality to become an "unstable se l f ' , such a personality who becomes 
a convict of the process where he/she can create several personalities for himself/herself.22 
The experience is determining that enables people to move out of their physical and 
temporal space, to experiment with such sides of their personality that they are hiding in 
the real geographical space. By offering anonymity and free realization of imagination, 
cyberspace also allows the virtual realization of socially required goals and success. 
Concerning its influence on social relations, according to Rezső Mészáros, it is built on the 
users' common field of interest and weakens the geographical communities by abolishing 
geographical borders. Fanatic users get stuck in the cyberspace and step out of the "real 
world" society. The cultural influence of cyberspace is significant, considering the current 
world order, it is to be feared that it promotes the strengthening of Americanization and 
globalisation and offers an alternative space where the " se l f ' has no definite contour or 
body.23 
In Hungary, a technical development is given that is more intensive and dynamic than 
any change before; while the society is splitting into two parts (those possessing experiences 
and those who do not process any). According to the Hungarian Information Society Report 
1998-2008 published by the Information Society and Trend Research Institute (Információs 
Társadalom és Trendkutató Központ - ITTK), 30% of the age group over 14 used computer 
and nearly 18% used internet regularly in 2001. As per the 2007 data, 52% of the same age 
group used computer regularly or occasionally and 45% used internet.24 As stated in the 
Hungarian Information Society Report 2006 of ITTK,25 60% of the country's population 
can be considered digital illiterate as more than half of the Hungarian citizens has never 
used a computer. Contrary to them, others use broadband internet nearly every day and 
participate in the web 2.026 revolution. According to the report, this way Hungarian culture 
is splitting into two parts, i.e. while only a smaller part of the country is participating in the 
22
 Mészáros, R.: A kibertér társadalomföldrajzi megközelítése (The Socio-geographic of the 
Cyberspace). In: Balogh, G. (ed.): Az információs társadalom dimenziói (Dimensions of the 
Information Society). Budapest, 2006. 216. 
23
 Ibid. 218-219. 
24 ITTK-Hungarian Information Society Report 1998-2008. 39-40. 
25
 http://www.ittk.hu/web/docs/lTTK_M lTJ_2006.pdf 
26
 The expression web 2.0 is covers such 2nd generation internet services that primarily 
community-based, i.e. the users edit the content together or share information with each other. 
Contrary to the former 1.0 and 1.5 services where the content was provided by the service provider. 
Source: http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2 
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technological development, a larger part of the citizens stays out of these changes which 
will cause a kind of cultural "shock" for those lagging behind.27 
The question is whether it is about the conflict between the new practices and the 
norms accepted by the current majority or are the "mobile-madness", the autotelic, 
superficial chatting, and the addiction to virtual games and the internet real deviances. 
A complex philosophical-sociopsychological research is needed to be able to judge whether 
our society is originally demoralizating or the softening moral laws are a result of 
infocommunicational revolution, so I am not trying to judge it myself. However, the 
characterisation of deviances listed in the following chapter proves the existence of these 
problems. 
2. The incentives of deviances on the network 
How could such a young technology captivate such masses of users in such a short time? 
An important element is the virtual anonymity; the other is the soft community sanction as 
deviant behaviour in the virtual space can only result in the suspension of members with 
displeased behaviour contrary to the real world where violation of norms can have much 
more serious consequences.28 
Of course, those with similar deviant behaviour also have the opportunity to create 
their own community where they can define their own norms to follow. For that very reason, 
deviant behaviour is currently judged relative to the system of values within the dominant 
group. The problem would be even more difficult to resolve if the number of users currently 
considered deviant and the number of "average" users were equal. Users with similar 
thinking and field of interest and their communities generated a particular subculture that 
can manifest itself in the usage of communication tools and the testing of applicants wishing 
to join, which aims to strengthen the community and to keep out strangers. 
According to the research of M. K. Rogers, persons at the age of 16 and under commit 
the most of deviant computer-related behaviours.29 A good example can be a self-assessment 
survey on latent juvenile deviances that showed that downloading video and music files are 
considered one of the least serious deviances.30 The 50.9% of the youngsters interviewed 
have downloaded such contents before and 41.8% of the downloaders started this activity at 
the age of 12 or under. The young age of high percentage of users considered problematic is 
associated with the time when the tools that are based on new technologies became wide-
spread in everyday life and their usage became natural and common. 
27
 Information Society and Trend Research Institute (Információs Társadalom és Trendkutató 
Központ -ITTK)-Hungarian Information Society Report 2006. 62. 
http://www.ittk.hu/web/docs/ITTK_MITJ_2006.pdf 
28
 More details in Parti, K.: Devianciák a virtuális valóságban, avagy a virtuális közösségek 
személyiségformáló ereje (Deviances in the Virtual Reality, the Identity-formative power of the 
Virtual Communities). Infokommunikáció és jog, (2007) 2, 57-63. 
29
 Rogers, M. K.: A social learning theory and moral disengagement analysis of criminal 
computer behavior: An exploratory Study. UM1 Dissertation Services. 2001. 57-58. 
30
 Parti, K.: Számítástechnikai devianciák (Computer technology Deviances). In: Kerezsi, 
Klára Parti, K. (eds): Látens fiatalkori devianciák-Fiatalkori devianciák egy önbevalláson alapuló 
felmérés tükrében-,, ISRD-2 " (Latent Juvenile Deviances-a Self-assessment survey on latent juvenile 
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Besides the indulgent attitude of society, i.e. the soft sanctions of cyberspace 
communities, the mild judgment of real world society also strengthen these deviances. The 
reason for not sentencing such deviances is partly the fact that the idea of an absolute and 
exclusive possessive relation system regarding other "objects" had taken shape already 
decades before the development of cyberworld and has been held by the majority of society 
does not affect the "unreal", "non-physical" objects of cyberworld. Another reason is that 
the majority of offences against IT systems do not get publicity. These offences do not 
affect the individual users, "only" those big companies against which the majority of society 
often sympathizes with those résistants who like to call themselves Robin Hood. As people 
feel themselves protected from computer attacks, computer-based criminal offences fit into 
today's social system of values morally much better, so the perpetrators do not need too 
much effort to handle their actions morally.31 According to a formerly published survey of 
Sonda Ipsos, the public considers illegal usage of softwares a smaller fault than if someone 
does not give up his/her seat to elderly people in the bus, while illegal copying of CD-s and 
DVD-s is considered even less serious than scallywagging.32 
As a summary, we can state that for the young users of supported and doubted 
advantages of technology the lack of anonymity and sanctions, the cohesive subculture and 
the latent behaviours as environmental impacts verily and prove the correctness of 
continuing their behaviour. 
IV. New deviances 
I. Those concerned 
The profiler and behaviour research approach provides a method to typify those who are 
concerned by the deviances of information society. After examining the offenders of certain 
crimes considered computer-related deviances Saw, Ruby and Post set up a category called 
CITI (critical information technology insiders), i.e. the category of critical IT expert users 
who for different reasons all mean some danger for the computer infrastructure.33 
Introversive behaviour is typical for all users with a high risk factor, which means that they 
have difficulties with handling problems and establishing direct relationships to overcome 
certain barriers. They typically prefer to communicate their queries via e-mail to face to 
face. Researches demonstrated 6 high-risk characteristics: personal and community failure 
(frustration), computer addiction (extreme internet-usage), moral flexibility, decreased 
steadiness-faithfulness, self-consciousness, lack of solidarity. These personal attributes are 
associated with characteristics such as power lust, revengefulness, selfishness, greediness. 
Based on the motivations of the examined subjects a) explorers are motivated by the thirst 
for knowledge and curiosity, b) good Samaritans by helping others and amending things, c) 
hackers by the harmless self-expression and the desire for self-provement, d) machiavellists 
by achieving personal goals ignoring the environment or other persons, e) exceptions by 
acknowledging their unique quality, f) avengers by their prejudice, g) careerists by 
profiteering, h) moles also by profiteering but with the difference that they cause harm. 
31




 Casey, E.: Criminal Behavior on the Internet. In: Turvey, B. E. (ed): Criminal Profiling-an 
introduction to behavioral evidence analysis. London, 2008. 675—676. 
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2. Certain deviances 
After demonstrating the theoretical background, we should have a look at some typical 
deviant behaviour that is related to information society. Such behaviours are cybersex, 
addiction to internet or mobile telecommunication and computers, in which computers and 
infocommunication systems participate as commitment tools or targets of criminal 
offences. 
1. Cybersex. Regular visiting of pornographic sites or chatting in this subject can 
highly influence the users' life even outside of the network, which is evident, because the 
participants spend less and less time with their relatives and colleagues. However, scientists 
do not agree how significant this influence is.34 Another aspect that needs to be examined 
within this new scope of problems is that society has not clarified what unfaithfulness means 
in case of a partnership. For example, according to the research of Whitty, certain online 
interactions such as conversations in an erotic subject, flirting or satisfaction in the meantime 
is considered unfaithfulness as per the social judgement based on the answers of the 
examined persons.35 The internet changes the attitude of society and of individual users to 
sexuality by satisfying their sexual curiosity without consequences, while-with the 
possibility of experimentation-the normal attitude of heterosexual behaviour can also get a 
new content which means that the meaning of sexual categories changes, too.36 These are 
the several structured and categorized partner searching websites, websites ranked based on 
the users' votes advertising prostitutes and masseurs, and the increasingly popular role-
plays, where users can play with personalized avatars in different sexual situations.37 By 
forming online communities based on similar interests, users can exchange experiences, are 
more likely to share their worries with each other, reveal their formerly secret deviances 
and with the help of encryption provided by the new technology they are more likely to 
share their illegal pornographic records with each other. 
2. Internet-addiction. In case of internet addiction, the internet, the quantity and 
diversity of online accessible contents, the browsing itself and the search for information 
can become an autoletic source of pleasure. The question is whether we can talk about 
simple internet addiction or rather game-, sex- and information-addicted patients, who only 
differ in the chosen source of pleasure and internet only mean a tool for them. Other 
addictive relations were known earlier as well, but chat-addicts who visit different forums 
can gratify their desire only on the internet. The addicted internet users can usually be 
described as having an unsatisfied social need for company that can become pathological if 
in spite of the regular communication the possibility of meeting the communication partners 
personally does not even come to question. The majority of users concerned also suffer 
from a disorder in identification; this is why they appear with false names, age or even 
gender on the internet. In case of patients treated in hospital, the first diagnosis usually 
shows depression, distress or distracted personality instead of internet-addiction. This type 
of addiction is usually diagnosed only later, as a secondary disease. It might cause 
34
 Whitty-Joinson: op. cit. 86-87. 
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 Whitty, M. T.: Pushing the wrong buttons: Men's and women's attitude towards online and 
offline infidelity. CyberPsychology and Behavior, 6 (2003) 6, 569-579. 
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withdrawal symptoms, nervous reactions or stress if the person cannot sit in front of the 
screen.38 
According to a 2002 research of ITTK.,39 the characteristics of a typical internet-
addicted user are the following: male, under 20 years, internet is not necessarily needed for 
his work or study, uses internet at home as well, spends more than 6 hours on the web, 
those who completed primary school are highly represented which directs our attention to 
the adolescent age group, the starting date of internet usage is not significant considering 
the development of addiction. According to scientists, it is better to use the concept 
"addictive internet usage" as-based on the results of the research- those concerned can be 
classified into three often not well-separable categories: those belonging to the group of the 
addictology model, secunder internet users and those having impulse control disorders. The 
addictology model includes those who comply with the criterias of internet addiction, their 
proportion is 6%. Males are more dominant in this group compared to other groups (81%). 
This is the youngest group as 46% of its members are under 20. Secunder internet users 
hang on the web so much mainly because they can satisfy certain psychical needs better 
online than in the real life. They use the internet as a secondary source of pleasure due to 
their unsatisfactory relationship network. Their proportion is 11%. Impulse control disorder 
is typical for the age group of 21-30, their proportion is 12%. The proportion of users 
considered healthy is 71%. The addicted and secunder users less often need internet for 
their work or study, they typically use it at home. In case of all three problematic groups an 
internet usage over 3 hours can be seen, 46% of the addicted spend more than 6 hours in 
front of the screen. Those belonging to these problematic groups generally use the internet 
for purposes other than getting information or e-mailing; they rather pursue other activities 
on the web. Typical activities are: addicted users-chatting and games (with an exceeding 
value), those with impulse control disorder-games and multimedia chatting, secunder 
group-chatting and multimedia chatting (with an exceeding value). All three problematic 
groups regularly tum to psychologists for help.40 
4. Cyber-stalking, cyberbullying and sexting. Cyberstalking is a harassing behaviour 
committed on the internet. A speciality of communication possibilities offered by the 
38
 Romhányi, T.: A világháló foglyai (Prisoners of the Internet). Népszabadság, 18th Sept 2004. 
http://nol.hu/cikk/333242/ Beszélgetés dr. Vincze Gáborral, a gyulai Pándy Kálmán Kórház 
pszichiátriai osztályának osztályvezető főorvosával (Interview with Gábor Vincze dr., chief doctor of 
the psychology ward of the Pándy Kálmán Hospital in Gyula). 
39
 Participants of the research: Andrea Ritter, Zsolt Fábián Dr., Mária Hoyer, Péter Pillók. The 
research team used a survey developed by the American psychologist Kimberly Young with some 
modifications according to the Hungarian circumstances. The survey included two main parts: 11 
demographic and 20 other questions that measured the harmful usage of internet. During the research 
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internet is that certain ways of communication (e-mail, chat) are written and other sensors 
of cognition do not play any role. As a result of the lack of social control, social distress-
which is one of the main barriers of aggression-does not exist anymore. Therefore, on the 
one hand, certain feelings, emotions, desire-anger, jealousy, bitterness, thirst for possession 
and control-or aggression can directed straight towards the target of the harasser, on the 
other hand, with the possibility of the emergence of different fantasies, the victim can 
become the focus of the harasser's imagination.41 However, the thoughts of J. Reid Meloy 
are in many cases only theoretic, these possibilities should also be taken into account in a 
few sentences. He believes that in the first case the internet is a tool that the principal can 
use in order to gather personal information about the victim to make the subsequent 
harassment easier.42 An attribute of the trend marked as web 2.0 of the internet-usage is that 
the users build communities-such as iwiw, myvip, facebook and other services-where they 
share data-in most cases unconsidered. In the second case the internet is a medium or 
communication channel, through which the principal threatens his/her victim and 
communicates his/her desire, feelings to him/her. In the third case, Meloy attributes a big 
role to the psychical effect of astonishment since electronic messages can be send anytime 
to anyone, the message can exist timeless until the victim discovers it that depending on the 
timing can make the target person feel that his/her harasser is in his/her near anywhere, 
anytime.43 Anonymity increases the subjection of the victim for the reason that he/she is not 
aware of who his/her harasser is, therefore will suspect anyone in his/her environment. 
According to Bran Nicol one of the characteristics of our modem culture is that the 
motivators of persecutive behaviours became examples to follow. Under this Nicol means 
the following: accepted and supported is the conviction that, on the one hand, we gather 
information about anyone, even foreigners and build intimate relationship with them, on the 
other hand, the opposite of this is that we share even our most secret desire with everyone.44 
We live in a world where the border between the individual and others has dangerously 
obliterated therefore harassment itself has occurred as a symptom and unavoidable product 
of our culture.45 Permanently attracting attention and the constant desire to belong to 
celebrities both indicate that our conception about privacy has changed. The surrounding 
digital culture pushes us into a constant, accepted harassment. Therefore the internet itself 
plays such a transmitting role, through which, on the one hand, harassment becomes 
possible as a result of the action of the victims or by using the data published by themselves; 
or on the other hand, through the persecutive "services" mentioned by Nicol as examples. 
Nicol mentions examples of websites like CelebFanMail.com or Gawker Stalker46 that 
informs us about the e-mail address and actual place of residence of nearly any celebrity 
based on the information published by the "everyday" people who spot them. In addition, 
a speciality of the functioning of the internet is that the anonymity provided is only illusory. 
Numerous traces arose in course of the services employed by the users that can be gathered 
by experts; the popularity of phising nowadays is beyond doubt. 
41
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Besides harassment cyberbullying and sexting can be considered deviances but for the 
lack of Hungarian expressions can only be described with these new foreign keywords. 
Cyberbullying is such a rude joke or teasing when members typically of age groups of 
13—17 years disfigure each other on different platforms. In possession of a camera mobile 
phone any accident or unpleasant incident-irrespectively where it happened-can be watched 
by crowds on one of the popular websites already the same evening. Sexting is a phenomenon 
when young users publish pornographic, erotic or similar photos of themselves on social 
network websites. These two trends refer to the disappearance of private sphere, while 
cyberbullying is the ignorance of someone else's private sphere; sexting means the complete 
opening of the user's own private sphere. 
5. E-crimes. Criminal offences are those behaviours that oppose the social and legal 
norms and violate the social cohabitation the most. Computer is no longer only the tool of 
committing indictable offences but more and more the IT systems and the financial or 
personal data stored in these systems are becoming the targets of these offences. The 
analysis of IT crimes runs into difficulties for different reasons. Contrary to the "traditional" 
criminal offences, only a few statistical data is available; due to the special infrastructure 
there is a high latency; the place, time and tool of commitment are special; the commitment 
requires special expertise; there is only a few data available about the perpetrators;47 while 
the legal subject and the tool of commitment are also special. We should not forget that 
information has a political, economical value and a specific endanger potential, while the 
f reedom of information and the free information flow as principals are important premises 
of a free political and economic system. Another feature of the legal judgment of material 
and immaterial goods comes from the fact that information security should consider the 
economic interest not only of the owners or carriers of information but also of those who 
are concerned about the content of information. From this aspect of information come the 
requirements of privacy, in a narrower meaning, the requirements related to the protection 
of personality rights-especially in the course of electronic data procession.48 Therefore 
information is not only a carrier of economic and financial interests but can also possess 
value by embodying public and personal interests. 
Therefore the new criminal offences of information society violate or endanger several 
legal subjects. According to this, I consider criminal offences against IT systems and data as 
IT crimes, i.e. criminal offences that violate or endanger the smooth operation of IT systems 
and the reliability, authenticity and confidentiality of the stored data and all related economic 
interests, criminal offences related to copyright and data protection-because of data 
processing systems are supported more and more by computers. 
The question is that in an environment, where the described technology influences the 
individuals in the described way, what the area of social self-regulation is, the area of the 
4 7
 As IT crimes refer to different commiting behaviours, the perpetrators of this heterogenic 
group are also different. For example, hackers have unique characteristics: they are usually young, 
white boys, with a middle class background and high intelligence (1Q over 120). They are typically 
shy and only make contacts with those w h o just like them are interested in IT. Some of them believe 
that they belong to an "anti-culture", fight against censorship, releasing information and fighting 
against the oppressors. See Taylor, R. W.: "Computer Crime". In: Swanson, C. R.-Chamelin, N. C.— 
Tersito, L. (eds): Criminal investigation. New York, 1991. 
4 8
 Sieber, U.: A számítógépes bűnözés és más bűncselekmények az információtechnika területén 
(Computer-related and Other Crimes in the Field Area of Information Technology). Magyar jog, 40 
(1993) 1,46. 
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branches of law operating with the milder sanctions of the legal system, the educational 
obligation of the state promoting prevention, and where the dominance of criminal law 
starts. 
V. Summary 
The new deviances of information society are real phenomenon and their existence is 
connected to the social changes in which technology plays an important role. The deviances 
reflect the change of the social system of values and traditions. The presence of the users 
concerned, i.e. the masses of younger generations within the interaction provided by 
infocommunication tools mean that the system of values and rules represented by them is 
becoming a dominant, determining element-due to the speed and intensity of change. 
A gradiation between generations is missing that could ensure the mastering and teaching 
of norms of the new environment. Legislators have to consider these when they wish to 
outline the borders of criminal law within a developing, shaping system of relations— 
especially when defining the policy of criminal regulation. 
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Lajos Lőrincz, an internationally known legal expert, member of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences and professor emeritus of law, passed away on the 26th December 2010, at age 75. 
With the death of Lajos Lőrincz, the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences lost one of its most illustrious scholars, a renowned teacher at the 
Law Faculty of the Károli Gáspár University of The Reformed Church and the Corvinus 
University's Faculty of Public Administration (the former College of Public Administration) 
and a revered mentor of generations of academics. 
After graduating from the University of Szeged, Lajos Lőrincz became a researcher of 
the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences upon the invitation of 
the then deputy director of the institute, Professor István Kovács, who was first his professor, 
then his fatherly companion, and Lajos Lőrincz remained faithful to the institute for more 
than five decades. Professor Lőrincz's association with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
was long and fruitful; he was elected to be a corresponding member of the Academy in 
1990, and in 1998 he becomes a full member. 
Following the beginning of the 1990s, Lajos Lőrincz fulfilled several assigned 
academic positions, to name just a few, he was the President of the Council of Doctors, 
Vice-President of the Section of Economics and Law of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, whereas lately, he functioned as a member of the Presidium of the Academy. 
Lajos Lőrincz brought all his responsibilities to a creditable and correct conclusion. 
He was attached to István Kovács not only because of Debrecen, the homeland and the 
University of Szeged, where István Kovács lectured, while Lajos Lőrincz was a university 
student, but also because of the fact that they bore a considerable resemblance to each other 
as for their mentality. The former Kovács-student evolved to be a master throughout the 
years himself as well, and currently several generations of scholars in administrative law 
consider themselves to be Lőrincz-studcnts. Similarly to his master, Lajos Lőrincz was a 
genuine school-founding individual, therefore, in the recent years the students surrounded 
him at the same table in the same study, just as formerly István Kovács had been surrounded 
by Lajos Lőrincz, Attila Rácz, Lajos Ficzere and others. 
The career and life course of Lajos Lőrincz testifies eloquently to the responsibility of 
those, who sit behind teacher's desks in any educational institution. Teachers, may they 
work at a simple village primary school or at a prestigious university, need not only impart 
they knowledge to students, but they also have to endear learning and the subjects to the 
students. As we know straight from Lajos Lőrincz, as a schoolboy, he wasn't keen on 
learning or going to school, it was only later that the excellent teachers of the secondary 
school in Debrecen familiarised him with the pleasure of learning and reading as well as 
recognised the interested and talented student and his attraction towards history and 
literature. Merely few people may know that Lajos Lőrincz not only wrote, but also 
published poems in his youth. 
2 7 2 OBITUARY 
His scholarly career began in the Institute for Legal Studies. He obtained the title of 
candidate of sciences due to his dissertation on the state control of scientific research at 
the age of 33, and 11 years later, due to his essay titled "The Limitations of Public 
Administration," he became a doctor of sciences, and after a further period of 11 years, he 
was elected to be a corresponding member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
The research work of Lajos Lőrincz was related to administrative law for more than 
half a century. His life-work was always marked by European outlook thanks to his 
knowledge of languages and scholarships abroad. He was a legal scientist whose theoretical 
research always took the real circumstances, the condition and the problems of Hungarian 
public administration into consideration, therefore, it is not accidental that he dealt with 
issues of the reform of public administration in a number of his works. After the beginning 
of the 1970s together with István Kovács, he directed the research program titled 
"A Complex Scientific Enquiry into the Development of Public Administration," the 
direction of which was later taken over by Professor Géza Kilényi. During the recent years, 
he elaborated the conception of the reform of local government organizations in Hungary. 
As a scientist, Lajos Lőrincz was reputed not only in Hungary, but abroad as well, 
namely, such a prestigious university as the Aix-en-Provance in France conferred the title of 
doctor horis causa, and as an international recognition of his scientific work he was 
appointed to be the Vice-President of the International Institute of Public Administration in 
Brussels. Past the age of 70, having disposed of specific assignments related to university 
administration and others in scientific life, Lajos Lőrincz devoted the vast majority of his 
time to lecturing at university and scientific research. As a result, during the last five years 
volumes by Lőrincz were published on an annual basis, whereas, in certain years even two 
books appeared. 
It is difficult to retain one's composure, when we remember that the old and amiable 
colleague, who had shown us and taken pride in the volume of essays published on the 
occasion of his 75th birthday by the Professors of Károli Gáspár University o fThc Reformed 
Church as well as had spoken about his plans and conceptions with youthful enthusiasm, 
has departed this world. Lőrincz Lajos leaves wonderful memories and a corpus of very 
valuable scholarly works. 
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analysis of the elusive concept of security, based on which the efficacy, and thereby the 
constitutionality of certain law enforcement measures may be scrutinized. Empirical 
findings with a thorough methodology on the actual efficiency of law enforcement measures 
like offender, or potential offender profiling arc of corollary importance, because the well-
established principle of constitutional balancing, a core feature in jurisprudence, as well as 
in legislation, policy making and law enforcement refers to the process of weighing how 
intrusive certain means are in comparison to the ends-provided of course, that the ends are 
legitimate. The concept of proportionality is central here: in order to assess the relationship 
between the means employed and the aims sought to be realized, one needs to asses three 
criteria: effectiveness, necessity, and the degree of harm inflicted. Under the effectiveness 
criterion, what is meant is the ability of the concrete measure to achieve the ends for which 
it was conceived and this includes consideration of the extent to which the measure in 
question has led to identification of criminals, along with the extent to which the measure in 
question affects the ability of the police to work with minority groups to identify criminals 
and the extent to which the measure in question may divert the police away from identifying 
real criminal activities. The necessity criterion refers to the existence or otherwise of other, 
less invasive measures available in order to achieve the same aim. Finally, the harm criterion 
involves scrutiny of the extent to which the concrete measure affects the rights of the 
individual (right to respect for private and family life, right to liberty and security, right to 
be free from discrimination, etc.).2 
However, as I will argue, this sort of "security", a service which law enforcement 
agencies are designed and authorized to provide, is a highly elusive concept. Thus, the 
efficacy of policing, i.e. the process of "creating security" is especially difficult and 
controversial to establish. For example, in a deeply racist or prejudiced society where 
certain ethnic groups are widely believed to be intrinsically associated with criminality, say 
the Roma in Central East Europe, the police may feel, believe and even claim that they are 
doing what the white middle class majority taxpayers want them to do, therefore they are 
providing "security" if they pull over or stop and search all or many of the Roma they see. 
Law enforcement-related prejudices against minorities are extremely widespread. As we 
often hear, the majority of the prison population is Black (Roma, etc.),3 and almost all of 
the terrorists are Muslim fundamentalists (mostly from Arab countries). Accordingly, 
appropriate restriction of the circle of suspects seems easily justifiable. For example, in 
Hungary, according to a survey in 2006, almost two-thirds (62%) of the Hungarian adult 
population agreed fully or to some degree with the claim: "the tendency to commit crime is 
in the nature of the Roma".4 A 1997 survey by the Ministry of Interior showed that 54% of 
2
 As spelled out in ECRl ' s General Policy Recommendation No. 11 on Combating Racism and 
Racial Discrimination in Policing, beyond considerations relating to the individual rights affected, the 
harm criterion should be understood in more general terms, as including considerations on the extent 
to which the measure in question institutionalises prejudice and legitimises discriminatory behaviour 
among the general public towards members of certain groups. 
3
 In Hungary, a research was published in the mid-'90s revealing estimates on the ratio of Roma 
inmates, which showed that based on self-definition of inmates about 40% of the prison population is 
Roma (see Huszár, L.: Romák, börtönök, statisztikák (Roma, prisons, statistics). Amaro Drom, 1997 
August, 9-11), with prison directors giving much higher estimates, an average of 60%. Women 
Integration and Prison Project (M1P). Hungarian report "Data on Crime, Judicial and Prison data" 
2004. http://mip.surt.org/ Unpublished) 
4
 See http://www.tarki.hu/kozvelemeny/kitekint/20060201.html (02.10.2006) 
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the police perceived criminality as a central element of Roma identity5 and in 2002-2003, 
the Hungarian Helsinki Committee carried out a research on discrimination against Roma 
in the criminal justice system, finding deep-running traces of racial profiling by the police 
within Roma communities.6 Also, it is a general feature of post-9/11 developments in law 
that when anti-terrorist law enforcement measures are involved, a substantially empty 
rhetoric-the inherently false dichotomy of the "liberty vs. security"-binary-has been 
adopted, and with a sweeping move, it has been extended to crime-, and immigration 
control. 
The uniqueness of this New World is, thus, twofold. First, new standards have been set 
up (required and accepted) for government activism in the sphere of curtailing freedom as 
an exchange for security. People (the political class, the electorate) appear to be willing to 
reformulate the traditional balance between liberty and security: a little bit more documents 
and ID-checks, longer lines and more flexible search-warrants seem an acceptable tax 
levied in return for more stringent demands for government-provided security. For example, 
once being convinced that we actually need to be searched and subjected to surveillance for 
aviation safety, and for a faster process, we are willing to giving up some if our privacy and 
enter a full body scanner. It seems to be the case that there is broad consensus on the fact 
that traditional policing principles or, for that matter, the law of the Geneva Conventions 
(regulating the interrogation of prisoners of war, for example) have become unsuitcd for 
handling the peculiar warfare put on by suicide bombers and terrorist organizations. Just 
about everywhere in the world, the war against terrorism has had the effect of widening the 
control functions of the national security and immigration services, as well as of other law 
enforcement authorities. The expanded measures and procedures thus introduced were often 
ones that legislators and law enforcement officials otherwise only had dreamed of attaining, 
but this time around, they could take advantage of changes in the public sentiment due to 
society's shock over the tragic events and fear spreading in their wake. For example, there 
are certain regulations with respect to banking (and clients' data) that the authorities have 
been longing for, to aid them in their fight against drugs and organized crime, but beforehand 
they were unable to attain them due to constitutional misgivings. Under the auspices of 
anti-terrorist action, all of a sudden, the same regulations become acceptable. Likewise, 
recent decades saw the prospects of police patrolling based on discriminatory racial profiling 
fail miserably within the Anglo-American world. All the same, the Arab population became 
a natural target of the war against terrorism. It looks as though the horrific image of weapons 
of mass destruction and recurring terrorist attacks have overwritten the previously held 
principle that it is better to have nine criminals go free than to have a single innocent person 
punished. What we thus see is that the rhetoric of exceptionalism (that is, the acceptance 
that in these special, desperate times, special, desperate measures are needed, and for now 
we can and should put aside the traditional decision-making rules of thumb) is also 
sweeping: it is not limited to the "war against terrorism", but is utilized in immigration 
policies, and for example in the American criminal policies on sex offenders which 
completely overturn the long-held classic rules of punishment, but it also seen in the general 
5
 Csepeli, G.-Orkény, A.-Székelyi, M.: Szertelen módszerek (Insubstantial methods). In: 
Csányi, G. (ed.): Szöveggyűjtemény a kisebbségi ügyek rendőrségi kezelésének tanulmányozásához 
(A reader for the study of policing minorities). Budapest, 1997, 130-173. 
6
 See Farkas, L.-Kézdi, G.-Loss, S.-Zádori, Zs.: A rendőrség etnikai profilalkotásának mai 
gyakorlata (The current police practice of ethnic profiling). Belügyi Szemle, 52 (2004) 2-3, 30-50. 
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trends of shifting to post-crime and risk societies. A further unique feature concerns the role 
of the private sector: it becomes both a victim and a willingly cooperating perpetrator in 
this process: it is charged with carrying out a number tasks in control and surveillance (or 
even in the design of privacy-protection enhancing mechanisms against the very risk itself 
poses on privacy), but this also creates a lucrative business opportunity. As an addition 
ironic twist: people seem willing to provide crucial and vast amounts of data to private 
companies in return for commercial services, unaware that due to outsourced state control 
functions these will end up in the hands of the government-only making it obvious that, 
despite the discrepancy of the applicable legal framework, in the field of surveillance and 
control, the "public-private" distinction is completely outdated. 
This tendency may be alarming for many, but one can easily say that if this New 
Security Deal is passed within the habitual pathways of constitutional participatory 
democracy, there probably is not too much room for complaints against a unanimously 
empowered protective state. After all, the state is theoretically reconstructed as the outcome 
of a notional social contract in which individuals agree to trade a quotient of their liberty in 
exchange for the state's guardianship of security7 in the broad sense.8 The other apparent 
specialty of this new era, however, is more problematic: the concept of security, which is 
thus positioned centrally in the political, legal and social discourse does not seem to receive 
the degree of scrutiny its weight and relevance would require. In other words, not only is 
"security" a buzz-word for budgetary and policy demands that can easily overrule long-
standing constitutional and human rights limits for government power, but while willingly 
giving in to these demands, we do not even seem to investigate the actual effectiveness of 
many of these measures, for example, whether they actually provide us security (in exchange 
for the liberty value offered). 
In other words, at least two separate discussions are going on in the "security vs. 
liberty" debate: a theoretical and a practical one. The theoretical is centred around the 
reformulation of the traditional "security-liberty" balance-recipe. The other line of inquiry 
focuses on the actual practical effectiveness of certain political and legal measures the 
government and law enforcement agencies are allowed to have. 
In this article, through the case study of ethno-racial profiling, a specific law 
enforcement action and a potentially structural human rights risk involved, I will provide 
some additional arguments to the second debate. I will highlight the importance of defining 
and testing the security-content of all new government powers before and during the 
balancing of how much liberty this security is worth. The underlying thesis is that "security" 
is not an objectively determined social condition, but a socio-psychological construction 
influenced by a number of irrational features and it is subject to both intentional and 
7
 According to Ian Loader, the politics of resources or the politics of allocation is concerned 
with trying to ensure that all citizens are provided with a "fair" share of available policing goods; 
something that requires attention both to the unwarranted "over" (or overly invasive) policing of 
particular individuals or social groups, and to the inability of (disadvantaged) citizens and communities 
to acquire a proportionate level of such goods. See Loader, I.: Policing, Securitization and 
Democratization in Europe. Monday 18 April 2005, http://www.libertysecurity.org/article209. 
html?var_recherche=policing%2C%20securitization 
8
 See, for example Loader, I.: Necessary Virtues: The Legitimate Place of the State in the 
Production of Security. 19 April 2005, 
http://www.libertysecurity.org/article232.html?var_recherche=necessary%20virtues 
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circumstantial manipulation. I will argue that "efficiency" will have both an objective 
dimension, on which lawmakers and judges can and should rely, but it will also have a 
subjective, psychological element, which also needs to be factored into our discussions, 
because fear and prejudice may indeed make certain policies efficient by the social 
psychological effect it may have on people, even if it turns preconceptions and prejudices 
into a self-fulfilling law enforcement prophecy. 
I. The objective and subjective aspects of "security" 
In the foregoing, it has been demonstrated how important the definition and measurement 
of security should be in law enforcement, for it is on these that both the pragmatic and 
political success, as well as the constitutionality of law enforcement measures depend. But 
easier said then done. Due to the overrepresentation of crime and violence in media and 
the entertainment and infotainment-business, the public usually vastly overestimates both 
the crime problem in general, and the actual probability of one 's criminal and especially 
violent criminal victimization. While in their reports about crime and security in general, 
high-end newspapers are trying to be factual and analytical, tabloid media tend to be 
anything but restrained. As David Green put it: "Broadsheets tend to focus on government, 
quoting professional experts, elites and interest group representatives. The tabloids tend to 
focus on crime victims and their relatives, offering dramatic testimonials as counterpoint 
to the more professionalized discourse of the broadsheet press".4 Thus, tabloid readers tend 
to be more fearful of crime than broadsheet readers, particularly about being mugged or 
physically attacked. For example, results from a British Crime Survey (BCS) indicated 
that tabloid readers were almost twice as likely as broadsheet readers to believe crime had 
"increased a lot" over the last several years-43 versus 26%-when it had actually 
declined.10 
Take, for example, the widely held belief (depicted in so many movies and novels) that 
the job of an American police officer is dangerous. But, as Roger Roots" points out, police 
work's billing as a dangerous profession plummets in credibility when viewed from a 
broader perspective. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health,12 it is true that homicide is the second leading cause of death on the j o b for all 
American workers, however, the taxicab industry suffers homicide rates almost six times 
higher than the police and detective industry. A police officer's death on the job is almost as 
likely to be from an accident as from homicide, since approximately 40% of police deaths 
are due to accidents. When overall rates of injury and death on the job are examined, 
policing barely ranks at all. The highest rates of fatal workplace injuries occur in the mining 
9
 Green, D. A.: Public opinion versus public judgment about crime. Correcting the "Comedy of 
Errors". British Journal of Criminology, 46 (2006) 1, 139. 
10
 Green: op. cit. 138. 
11
 Roots, R.: Are Cops Constitutional? Selon Hall Constitutional Law Journal, Summer, 11 
(2001), 686-757. 
12
 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Violence in the Work Place, June 1997. 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Fatal Injuries to Workers in the United States, 
1980-1989: A Decade of Surveillance, National Profile, August, 1993 DHHS (NIOSH) Publication 
No. 93-108. 
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a n d construction industr ies , with t ransportat ion, m a n u f a c t u r i n g and agr icul ture f o l l o w i n g 
c lo se behind. A ful l 9 8 % of all fatal workp lace in jur ies occur in the c iv i l i an labour fo rce . 1 3 
T h e above e x a m p l e shows that it l ies within the n a t u r e of the c o n c e p t o f "securi ty" tha t 
d u e attention needs to b e given to the ac tua l verification o f security risks a n d the e f fec t iveness 
of t he offered secur i ty measures in e x c h a n g e for w h i c h w e are will ing t o of fe r some o f o u r 
r igh t s and liberties. Fo r instance, t a k e the case of ID cards: not on ly c a n terrorists u s e a 
w i d e range of t e chn iques to forge ident i t ies , a recent r e p o r t by Privacy International s h o w e d 
that two-thirds of all terrorists in h i s to ry have o p e r a t e d under their t r u e identity,14 t h u s , 
ident i ty cards w o u l d have little p reven ta t ive effect . Nevertheless , o n e hundred coun t r i e s 
a r o u n d the world cur ren t ly use na t iona l identification cards , 1 5 and ( d e s p i t e concerns r a i s e d 
by pr ivacy advoca tes ) a number o f governments a r e promoting it as a powerful tool t o 
p r e v e n t and fight ter ror ism. 1 6 
Following R o b Al lan ' s remark , 1 7 David Green 1 8 ca l l s it some th ing of a "comedy o f 
e r r o r s " in which po l i cy and pract ice are not based o n a proper unders tanding of p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n , which is, in turn, not based o n a proper unde r s t and ing of pol icy and practice.14 T h e 
p r o c e s s of securi t izat ion,2 0 a core c o n c e p t in con tempora ry socio-polit ical developments , is 
13
 Roots: op. cit. 711-712. Also, note that about 2 % of American soldiers serving in South 
Vietnam during the Vietnam War died during their service there, yet most Americans would view a 
one-year tour of duty in South Vietnam during that war as a grave danger. Amitai Aviram, The Placebo 
Effect of Law: Law's Role In Manipulating Perceptions George Washington Law Review, November, 
2006, footnote 80. 
14
 Privacy Int'l, Mistaken Identity; Exploring the Relationship Between National Identity Cards 
& the Prevention of Terrorism 2 (2004). The report also shows that "[a]t a theoretical level, a national 
identity card as outlined by the UK government - the proposed legislation in question - could only 
assist anti-terrorism efforts if it was used by a terrorist who was eligible and willing to register for 
one, if the person was using their true identity, and if intelligence data could be connected to that 
identity". See http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/idcard/UK/ id-terrorism.pdf 
15
 See Davies, S.: Identity Cards: Frequently Asked Questions, Privacy Int'l, Aug. 24, 1996, 
http:// www.privacy.org/pi/activities/idcard/idcard_faq.html 
16
 Jennifer Morris, Big Success or "Big Brother"? Great Britain's National Identification Scheme 
Before The European Court Of Human Rights. Georgia Journal Of International And Comparative 
Law, Winter 2008, 471. 
17
 Allen, R.: "There Must Be Some Way of Dealing with Kids": Young Offenders, Public 
Attitudes and Policy Change. Youth Justice, 2 (2002) 1, 3 - 1 3 . 
18
 Green: op. cit. 132. 
19
 It needs to be noted that it may very well fall within the interest of politicians to rely on 
unsubstantiated public opinion. For example (see Green: op. cit. 137), following a high profile murder 
case, the then Shadow Home Secretary, Tony Blair wrote a piece in The Sun asserting, "[w]e can 
debate the crime rate statistics until the cows come home. The Home Office says crime is falling. 
Others say it isn't. 1 say crime, like economic recovery, is something that politicians cannot persuade 
people about one way or another. People know because they experience it. They do not need to be 
told. And they know crime is rising". Blair 's comments imply that there is no substitute for experience, 
even secondhand, mass-mediated experience, and his piece lent unqualified credibility to tabloid 
portrayals. He as much as told the public that their fear of crime, irrational or not, is more important 
than any unbiased assessment of the problem. 
20
 According to the constructivist "Copenhagen School" of security analysis, securitization is 
constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to 
have substantial political effects. The semiotic structure of securitization differentiates between 
"referent objects", "securitizing actors" and "functional actors". A "referent object" of securitization 
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intertwined with a number of institutional, political and bureaucratic interests, and the entire 
avalanche is based on perception rather than on objective features. The irony of the case is 
that no efforts are required from governments to try to assess how certain institutions or law 
enforcement measures will affect the actual risk of criminal or terrorist involvement, or 
even risk-perception. Thus, the state is under no pressure or obligation to prove the 
correlation between the increase in (the perception of) security-which is in most cases only 
assumed, presumed and forecasted. Presumably, a lack of a proper methodology to test such 
dynamics lies behind the fact that the public seems to accept "risk prevention" as a proper 
price to be paid for extended law enforcement authorizations, and social risks are not 
weighted against the potential benefits. "Prevention of terrorist attacks" appears to be a 
blank check, where we are waiving our rights to actually control the effectiveness of the 
preventive measures. If no terrorist attack happens, the government may argue that is 
exactly due to these preventive commitments that we could have escaped the threatening 
disasters. If such incidents do take place in our approximate or remote distance, it is even 
more a reason to strengthen government efforts and establish further law enforcement 
measures. 
According to Peter Lock "Though once being upgraded to 'war', anti-terrorism 
becomes an open-ended activity because it is intrinsically impossible to define criteria 
which would unequivocally permit the declaration of victory and put an end to this war. 
The institutions charged with carrying out the 'war against terrorism' emerge as powerful 
bureaucracies with their own corporate agendas. They are often capable of evading 
parliamentary oversight. It plays to their advantage in their drive to achieve dominant 
positions in the state apparatus that many of their activities are shielded from scrutiny for 
asserted operational reasons. Their claims of effectiveness cannot be measured as the full 
dimension of their task is by definition unknown as long as the unbounded concept of 
terrorism rules political discourses. Their persistent exigency that they must be entitled to 
carry out covert operations at their own discretion is inherently difficult to monitor. 
Confronted with imagined terrorism as opposed to defined political challenges in a populist 
political climate elected bodies are not inclined sufficiently challenge the agendas of the 
institutional security network. The executive is capable of launching a dynamic of circular 
causation by imaging a hypothetical terror network, which is delineated as invisible (and 
hence unknowable). Politicians are not inclined to take risks and do not define how much 
production of alleged security is enough. As a result, measures adopted in the fight against 
terrorism acquire features of self-fulfilling prophecies. ... In such a context it is virtually 
impossible to measure progress in the fight against terrorism".21 Commentators point out 
that fear also plays a noticeable role in generating identity and feeling of belonging, and 
is something that is considered to be existentially threatened. In the vast majority of cases the security 
referent is the state, and the "securitizing actor" is the actor who actually performs the speech act of 
securitization, by declaring the referent object "existentially threatened", whereas a "functional actor" 
is a participant in carrying out the pragmatic consequences of securitization. Security is never 
objectively given and there is no implicit, objective or given relation between the subject-the security 
actor-and the object of securitization as this relation is constructed intersubjectively through social 
relations and processes. See Burgess, P.: The Ethical Subject of Security. Tuesday 10 May 2005, 
http://www.libcrtysecuri ty.org/article248.html?var_recherche=ethical%20subject 
21
 Lock, P.: Anti-terrorism and Effects on Freedom of Movement-Assessing the Concept of 
Progress in the Fight against Terrorism. Wednesday 20 July 2005, 
http://www.libertysecurity.org/article318.html?var_recherche=lock%20peter 
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collective insecurity can be understood as the purest form of community belonging. The 
"dangerization process" facilitates an increasing culture of defence. The security discourse 
serves as an effective means to stimulate community belonging, and is an effective vehicle 
of post-industrial political power.22 
The irony of the case is that inspired by the academic discipline of law and economics, 
in the past years, a considerable body of literature has focused on estimating the social costs 
of crime and crime prevention-only these findings have not seem to have made the desirable 
impact on public policy and discourse. For example, Paul Dolan and Tessa Peasgood 
developed a methodology to provide estimates of the intangible costs arising from the 
anticipation of possible victimization; that is, estimates of the costs of fear of crime.23 These 
costs are categorised according to whether they result in non-health-related losses or health-
related losses. When people feel that they may be about to become a victim of crime, they 
will experience anxiety and stress. The frequency with which people are in this state and 
the intensity of the anxiety is one measure of the health-related loss from anticipated crime. 
Non-health losses are associated with changes in behaviour (where for example people use 
their own cars or take taxis rather than walk or use public transport because of their fear of 
crime)24 and/or changes in how society is viewed. 
For example, a survey of public attitudes to quality of life in the United Kingdom in 
2001 found that crime was mentioned by 24% of respondents as an important factor 
affecting quality of life, which made crime the third largest factor after money and health.25 
They claim that the direct costs of security measures, insurance administration expenditure 
and costs incurred from crime-averting behaviour can be interpreted as revealing people's 
preferences to reduce the risks of victimization and the worry about victimization. Also, a 
further tangible cost attributable to anticipating crime is any loss in productivity caused by 
the time and energy spent on actions and emotions linked to anticipating possible 
victimization. This may include leaving work early to avoid walking home alone, or time 
spent dealing with a burglar alarm that has been accidentally set off.26 In addition to these, 
other behavioural changes also involve additional time costs. Based on survey observations 
in the United States, on average, an adult spends two minutes locking and unlocking doors 
each day and just over two minutes a day looking for keys, which is valued at $437 per 
year.27 It means that U.S. citizens are estimated to spend nearly $90 billion worth of time 
each year simply locking their doors and searching for their keys.28 
22
 See Lianos, M.: Hegemonic Security Discourse: Late Modernity's Grand Narrative. Tuesday 
6 September 2005, http://www.libertysecurity.org/article386.html7var recherche=michalis 
23
 See Dolan, R-Peasgood, T.: Estimating the Economic and Social Costs of the Fear of Crime. 
British Journal of Criminology. 41 (2007) 1, 121-132. 
24
 It needs to be added that more expensive forms of transport clearly bring other benefits, such 
as quicker and more comfortable journeys, and these benefits would need to be controlled for. 
Ibid. 123. 
25
 Ibid. 123. 
26
 Ibid. 124. 
27
 A study found an average willingness to pay to avoid locking or unlocking assets of $804 
(from a sample of 140 respondents). The extra time taken walking home to avoid potentially dangerous 
shortcuts could, in principle, be valued in a similar way. Ibid. 124. 
28
 Anderson, D. A.: The Aggregate Burden of Crime, Journal of Law and Economics, 42 ( 1999) 
2, 611, 623-24. 
ETHNIC PROFILING AND DISCRIMINATION... 2 8 1 
It needs to be added that according to estimates, citizens of the United States spend 
more on private precautions-'estimates range from $160 billion to $300 billion per year-
than on the entire public law enforcement budget. That is, citizens spend more on locks, 
neighbourhood watches, and the like than U.S. governments (state and federal) spend on 
police, judges, prosecutors, prisons, and prison guards".29 
This leads us back to the question of available information. Media theory frequently 
refers to the concept of cultivation. According to this, television is society's storyteller and 
if a viewer sees a great deal of violence on television, then she will presume that society is 
violent; once this presumption takes root, it can penetrate the viewer's attitudinal base and 
become a decision-making factor. Hence, a viewer who believes that society is violent may 
be more afraid to walk alone at night, inclined to purchase a home alarm system, or likely 
to support increasing the police force.30 It is well documented in criminology that individual 
risk predictions are largely based on interpretations far removed from rational considerations 
of likelihood based on recorded crime rates.31 Far more people believe that they will become 
future victims of a given offence than the number of those who actually become victims. 
For example, respondents in three waves of a longitudinal crime survey conducted in 
Trinidad believed that they are "likely" or "very likely" to be murdered in the following 
12 months at each of three times at which the sample was questioned. In fact, in 1999, 120 
murders were recorded in the population of 1.3 million, that is: 99.8% of those 585,000 
expecting to die erred on the question.32 
To sum up, not only is security an elusive and subjective concept, but most preventive 
measures will also defy objective verification. In light of these, let us now tum to the case 
study of ethno-racial33 profiling. 
29
 Mikos, R. A.: "Eggshell" Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal benefits of shifting 
crime. Michigan Law Review, 105 (2006) 2, 308. The author also draws attention to the fact that 
literature supports the claim that many of the resources spent in the private war on crime are being 
wasted because many private precautions only shift crime onto other, less guarded citizens, and this 
redistribution of crime has no net social benefit, as precautions that only shift crime constitute rent-
seeking behavior: individuals expend resources to transfer losses, without reducing the size of those 
losses. A typical example would be vehicle anti-theft devices which will urge thieves to target other 
cars but not deter them from stealing. A similar discussion centers on the question of gated 
communities, which are also found only to divert crime to other communities. (As of 2003, there were 
nearly seven million households located in gated communities in the US, which adds up to 7% of all 
households.) It is for this reason that some local governments have simply refused to allow real estate 
developers to control access to new or existing communities. See Mikos: op. cit. 309, 315, 319. 
30
 Podlas, K.: The "CS1 Effect" and other Forensic Fictions. Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment 
Law Review, 27 (2006-2007) 2, 98-99. The author notes that cultivation is rooted more in media 
theory than psychology and that according to other research, media content merely makes the audience 
aware of an issue (the agenda-setting effect); at other times, it reinforces pre-existing attitudes; at still 
others, it seems to have no impact on values or direction of response whatsoever. Podlas: op. cit. 
101-103. 
31
 See for example Chadee, D.-Austen, L.-Ditton, J.: The Relationship Between Likelihood and 
Fear of Criminal Victimization. British Journal of Criminology, 47 (2007) 1, 133-153. 
32
 Ibid. 133, 134. 
33
 Despite obvious differences in the terms, throughout this article the two will be used 
interchangeably. 
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II. Ethnic profiling: the concept and its practice 
In what follows, I will delineate the general practice of ethnic34 profiling and ethnicity-
bascd selection, and how these arise in the context of the fight against terrorism. In the 
profiling process terror-suspects, ethnic, racial, national or religious minorities, immigrants, 
indigenous or poor people are interchangeable. I will argue that besides the perennial 
problem with ethnic profiling-that it readily turns into a form of ethnic discrimination-it 
faces an independent problem: lack of effectiveness. 
There is not one universally accepted and utilized definition for profiling. Profiling in 
the abstract sense refers to identifying information, making predictions and, finally, 
inference.35 The word "profile" (profil in French) was originally used in the artistic field. It 
denoted the outlines and features of a face seen from one side or, more broadly, the portrayal 
of an object seen from one side only. Historically, the term "profiling" in law enforcement 
first came to prominence in connection with the training of crime profilers in the USA. In 
theory, these people are supposed to be capable of determining a criminal's personality type 
by analysing traces left at the scene of the crime. In any abstract profiling operation, three 
stages may be identified: The first stage is "observation", often referred to as data 
warehousing, where personal or anonymous data are collated. If the data refer to an 
identifiable or identified individual, they will generally be anonymised during this stage. 
The collected data may be of internal or external origin. For example, a bank might draw up 
an anonymous list of its customers who are bad payers, together with their characteristics, 
or a marketing firm might acquire a list of the major supermarket chains' "shopping baskets" 
without the shoppers being identified. This first stage is followed by a second set of 
operations, usually referred to as data mining, which is carried out by statistical methods 
and whose purpose is to establish, with a certain margin of error, correlations between 
certain observable variables. For instance, a bank might establish a statistical link between a 
long stay abroad and one or more missed loan repayments. The concrete outcome of this 
stage is a mechanism whereby individuals are categorised on the basis of some of their 
observable characteristics in order to infer, with a certain margin of error, others that are not 
observable. The third and last stage, known as "inference", consists in applying the 
mechanism described above in order to be able to infer, on the basis of data relating to an 
identified or identifiable person, new data which are in fact those of the category to which 
he or she belongs. Very often, only this last operation is referred to as "profiling", it, 
however, is essential, to see this final stage as part of a process.36 
Recent developments in information technology, however, make today's profiling 
activities increasingly easy and sophisticated, thus the possibilities offered by profiling are 
numerous and cover different areas of application. For example, in the USA, ATS 
(Automated Targeting System) has been developed in order to evaluate the probability of a 
34
 A note about terminology: besides obvious differences, I will treat racial, ethnic and 
nationality-based terminology as synonymous. 
35
 Dinant. J.-M.-Lazaro, Ch.-Poullet, Y.-Lefever, N.-Rouvroy, A.: Application of Convention 
108 to the profiling mechanism. Some ideas for the future work of the consultative committee. 
Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (T-Pd), 24th meeting, 13-14 March 2008, Strasbourg, G01 (T-PD). 
Secretariat document prepared by the Council of Europe Directorate General of Human Rights and 
Legal Affairs, Strasbourg, 11 January 2008 T-PD(2008)01, 4-11. 
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given individual being a terrorist. Also, data mining is an extremely valuable tool in the 
area of marketing and customer management. It is one means of moving from mass 
marketing to genuinely personalized marketing. Data mining can be defined as the 
application of statistical, data-analysis and artificial-intelligence techniques to the 
exploration and analysis with no preconceived ideas of (often large) computer data bases in 
order to extract fresh information that may be of use to the holder of these data. In other 
words, the value of data mining is that it is an IT tool which can "make the data talk". 
Generally speaking, the methods on which data mining is based can be divided into two 
categories: some are descriptive and others predictive, depending on whether the aim is to 
explain or predict a "target" variable. Descriptive methods are used to bring out information 
that is present but hidden within the mass of data, while predictive methods are used to 
exploit a set of observed and documented events in order to try and predict the development 
of an activity by drawing projection curves. This method can be applied to the management 
of customer relations in order to predict a customer's behaviour.37 The aim is for example to 
determine the profile of individuals with a high purchasing probability or to predict when a 
customer will become disloyal. Likewise, profiling is widely used in the field of risk 
management, when determining the characteristics of high-risk customers. Such aims may 
include the adjustment of insurance premiums; prevention of arrears; aid to payment 
decisions where current account overdrafts exceed the authorized limit in the banking 
sector; use of a risk "score" in order to offer individual customers the most appropriate loan 
or refuse a loan depending on the probability of honouring repayment deadlines and the 
terms of the contract, etc. Cable digital TV provides programme distributors with precise 
information regarding channel selection and channel hopping by viewers who receive 
television channels via their telephone cable by means of DSL technology. They can thus 
create and keep a perfectly accurate viewing profile for each user. It therefore becomes 
technically possible to tailor advertisements to the user's profile. Also, a similar methodology 
is used by Google's on-line advertising system, where user's click stream is monitored. In 
the age of strategic marketing, profiling and data mining is used in creating packages and 
special offers; designing new products and customer loyalty policy. 
The Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data defined profiling as a computerised method 
involving data mining from data warehouses, which makes it possible, or should make it 
possible, to place individuals, with a certain degree of probability, and hence with a certain 
induced error rate, in a particular category in order to take individual decisions relating to 
them. This concept of profiling differs from criminal profiling, where the aim is to get inside 
and understand the criminal's mind, but is similar to behavioural analysis since the aim is 
not to understand the motives which lead or might lead an individual to adopt a given 
behaviour, but to establish a strong mathematical correlation between certain characteristics 
that the individual shares with other "similar" individuals and a given behaviour which one 
wishes to predict or influence. As this approach docs not depend on human intelligence, but 
on statistical analysis of masses of figures relating to observations converted to digital form, 
it can be carried out by means of a computer with minimum human intervention. 
Thus, profiling (i) can be applied in a number of contexts, that can vary from the 
commercial sector to the field of law enforcement; (ii) it is a mechanism where the task is to 
narrow down the circle of potential individuals that may fall within the scope of activities 
37
 Ibid. 8 -9 . 
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of a particular agent within the given field: it may involve identifying a group of customers 
or potential perpetrators; (iii) profiling will always include certain characteristics upon 
which the process relies; and (iv) there will always be a scheme of reasoning according to 
which these characteristics and the way in which they are employed are established. 
In 2002, the EU's Working Party on Terrorism drew up recommendations for member 
states on the use of "terrorist profiling", and defined it as using "a set of physical, 
psychological, or behavioural variables, which have been identified as typical of persons 
involved in terrorist activities and which may have some predictive value in that respect".38 
According to Rcbekah Delsol,39 racial profiling refers to the use by the police of 
generalisations based on race, ethnicity, religion or national origin, rather than individual 
behaviour, specific suspect descriptions or accumulated intelligence, as the basis for 
suspicion in directing discretionary law enforcement actions such as stops, identity checks, 
questioning, or searches among other tactics. Specific definitions of racial or ethnic profiling 
vary along a continuum ranging from the use of race alone as the reason for the stop to 
those using race along with other factors as the reason for the stop.40 
Using a narrow definition, racial profiling occurs when a police officer stops, questions, 
arrests and/or searches someone solely on the basis of a person's race or ethnicity. A broader 
definition acknowledges that race may be used as one of several factors involved in an 
officer's decision to stop someone. A stop is likely to be made on the confluence of several 
factors such as race or ethnicity along with age, dress (hooded sweatshirts, baggy trousers, 
perceived gang dress, etc.), time of the day, geography (looking "out of place" in a 
neighbourhood or being in a designated "high-crime area"). This definition reflects the fact 
that racial profiling may be caused by the purposefully racist behaviour of individual 
officers, or the cumulative effect of the unconscious use of racist stereotypes, but may also 
result from institutional factors, such as the use of enforcement techniques and deployment 
patterns, which impact on ethnic groups unequally.41 
Profiling can take place in other stops or contacts with the public by any type of law 
enforcement officer or other authorities such as traffic stops in cities as well as highways, 
stopping and questioning of pedestrians in public places in urban areas, sweeps of trains 
and buses, immigration status checks by immigration officials, and airport security and 
customs checks or searches. Patterns of profiling can also be seen in discriminatory 
treatment after a stop has taken place, such as black motorists being given traffic citations 
while white motorists are let off with a warning, or Latin/o/a youth, but not white youth, 
being cited for noise violations, mass controls in public places, stop and search and identity 
checks, data mining and raids on places of worship, businesses and organisations.42 
Thus, ethnic or racial profiling, that is profiling that includes race and ethnicity as one 
of the characteristics involved in the process, is a practice that relies on the tenet that 
ethnicity in itself signals a certain type of criminal involvement, terrorist plotting or illegal 
border crossing as more likely, and this assumption serves as a sufficient and therefore 
38
 See Hayes, В.: A Failure to regulate: Data protection and Ethnic Profiling in the Police Sector 
in Europe. Justice Initiatives. Justice initiatives. June 2005, 37. 
39
 See Delsol, R.: Presentation to the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament. Brussels, 30 
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legitimate basis for law enforcement (police, secret service, etc.) suspicion. The peculiarity 
of profiling lies in the fact that it is not based on illegal behaviour, but is centred around 
idea to collect legal behavioural patterns or character-traits that may signal criminal 
behaviour-it is therefore based on an assumed correlation between criminality and the 
specified characteristics or behavioural patterns, a deduction based on retrospectively judged 
effectiveness, which is always assumed, rather than checked and confirmed. 
Thus, stops are not induced by suspicious or illegal behaviour, or by a piece of 
information that would concern the defendant specifically. Instead, a prediction provides 
grounds for police action: based on the high rate of criminality within the ethnic group or 
its dominant (exclusive) involvement in committing acts of terror, it seems like a rational 
assumption to stop someone on ethnic grounds. Measures are therefore applied not so much 
on the basis of the (suspicious) behaviour of the individual, but based on an aggregate 
reasoning. The goal is to make an efficient allocation (based on rational interconnections) 
of the limited amount of the available police and security resources. 
Law enforcement profiling, which mostly takes the form of stop and search, was first 
developed in the U.S. for detecting drug couriers, and was later implemented in traffic 
control, and more recently in anti-terror procedures. At the heart of these procedures is the 
idea that the race or ethnicity of the perpetrator serves as a useful tool for the detection of 
criminality. Originally, the procedure of profiling was aimed at creating a description profile 
for suspects, in order to help the authorities in filtering out potential perpetrators based on 
certain sets of (legal) behavior and circumstances. In the case of drug couriers, such a 
characterization might include short stop-overs between significant drug sources and the 
distribution location, cash paid for the airline ticket, and, based on criminal statistics, also 
ethnicity, sex and age. The inclusion of cthnicity in the profile was reasoned by the fact that 
gangs that play key roles in organized crime tend to be almost exclusively ethnically 
homogeneous. 
The idea to take race into consideration as a helpful tool to screen offenders was widely 
accepted among law enforcement officers.43 American studies on highway patrols for 
example have shown that blacks, comprising 12.3% of the American population, are 
significantly overrcpresented among those stopped and checked by the police.44 In New 
Jersey, between 1994 and 1999, 53% of those stopped by the police were black, 24.1% 
were Hispanic and only 21% were white.45 A study conducted on the Moscow Metro found 
that non-Slavs are on average 21.8 times more likely to be stopped by the police than Slavs 
although they make up only 4.6% of the riders in the Metro system. A 2006 study in 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Spain found that Roma and immigrants in Spain are more likely to 
be stopped on the street for the purpose of identity and immigration checks and once stopped 
are more likely to be treated disrespectfully by police officers. The report published by the 
43
 For example, in 1994, an estimated 2,714,000 juveniles were arrested in the United States. 
Of those juveniles, 25% were black and 62% were white. Black juveniles, however, comprised only 
15% of the total juvenile population, whereas white juveniles comprised 80% of the total juvenile 
population. Garrison, A. H.: Disproportionate Minority Arrest: A Note on What Has Been Said and 




 See Buerger, M.-Farrell, A.: The evidence of racial profiling: interpreting documented and 
unofficial sources. Police Quarterly, 5 (2002) 3, 290; Harris, D. A.: The Stories, the Statistics, and the 
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Justice Initiative Program of the Open Society Institute (OSI)46 found that in both Bulgaria 
and Hungary, Roma are about three times more likely than non-Roma to be stopped by 
police and are more likely to report unpleasant experiences. In Germany, racial profiling has 
been used in the context of the post 9/11 terrorism threats. Between 2001-2003, German 
police undertook a massive data-mining or Rasterfahndung operation to identify potential 
terrorist sleeper cells. As mentioned above, the police collected the personal data of 
approximately 8.3 million people and "trawled" the data using an ethnic profile that included 
the Muslim religion and nationality or country of birth from a list of 26 states with 
predominantly Muslim populations. The "hits" generated by the database as potential 
terrorists were then singled out for further investigation. 
Figures for 2003/2004 showed that in the UK the rate of stop and search for black 
people was nearly six and-a-half times that for whites, while for Asians, the ratio was nearly 
twice that for whites.47 Stephen Humphreys noted that the consistent overrepresentation of 
minorities in United States custodial and correctional facilities is not contested. According 
to official Justice Department statistics, more than 60% of federal prisoners in 2002 were 
from minority groups, although they make up only 25% of the population. This figure, the 
department noted, has been unchanged since 1996. Blacks alone have consistently made up 
44-45% of the prison population since 1995, despite comprising only 12% of the total 
population. By 2002, there were 134,000 more blacks than whites in the country's prisons, 
despite there being six times as many whites as blacks in the country as a whole. At the 
same time, the prison population has risen relentlessly. Between 1995 and 2002 the total 
number in custody increased by 30% (from 1,585,586 to 2,085,620). Altogether, blacks 
were seven times as likely as whites to be in prison, comprising 56% of all convicted drug 
offenders. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, "Overall, the increasing number of 
drug offenses [to 2001] accounted for 27% of the total growth among black inmates, 7% of 
the total growth among Hispanic inmates, and 15% of the growth among white inmates". 
Human Rights Watch describes the war on drugs as "devastating to black Americans", 
partly because it provides the background for ethnic profiling. In Spain, according to one 
study, about 25% of women in prison are Roma (while constituting only 1.4% of the Spanish 
population). In Italy, foreigners make up some 30% of prisoners.48 In the USA, the targeting 
of minorities for traffic stops became so ubiquitous that it earned its own nick-name: 
"driving while black or brown" or "DWB"- a twist on the crime of driving while intoxicated 
or DWI. 
After the attacks of September 11lh 2001, the "war on terror" extended the practice of 
racial profiling to include Muslims and those perceived to be of Arab or Middle Eastern 
descent. Racial or religious profiling has been identified as occurring through car stops, 
aggressive enforcement of immigration laws and alien registration, intrusive security 
46
 Miller, J.-Bernát, A.-Dencső, B.-Gounev, R-Pap, A. L.-Pernas, B.-Simonovits, B.-Wagman, 
D.: "And I can stop and search whoever I want": Police stops of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Spain. Justice Initiatives, New York, 2007. 
47
 Delsol, R.-Shiner, M.: Regulating Stop and Search: A Challenge for Police and Community 
Relations in England and Wales. Critical Criminology, 14 (2006) 3, 241-263. Also, disproportionality 
is greater under powers that do not require reasonable suspicion, such as those for terrorism and 
suspicion of violent crime, indicating that where levels of police discretion are highest, generalisations 
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screening in airports and removal from planes. Since then, "flying while Arab" has also 
entered the lexicon of profiling. 
Justices of the US Supreme Court have also acknowledged the negative impact of 
unregulated police discretion on communities of colour. In his dissent in the mentioned 
United States vs. Martinez-Fuerte-case,49 Justice Brennan predicted that the majority's 
decision, which permitted the use of Mexican ancestry as a primary factor in checkpoint 
stops to investigate undocumented immigration, would frustrate the Mexican American 
community, and warned "[tjhat deep resentment will be stirred by a sense of unfair 
discrimination is not difficult to foresee". Later, in Florida vs. Bostick,50 Justice Marshall's 
dissent invoked the concern that the police used race as a factor in deciding which 
individuals to target in conducting ostensibly "random" bus sweeps. Justices in Illinois vs. 
Wardlow51 and Atwater vs. City of Lago Vista52 also discussed the impact of increased 
police powers on people of colour who might have legitimate reasons to fear and flee from 
the police, or who might experience police harassment as a result of enforcement of a minor 
traffic law.53 
III. The assessment of profiling and some empirical findings 
As ethno-racial profiling proliferated, a fierce academic and political debate erupted over 
the issue.54 Criticism of such practices is manifold. Some emphasize that ethnic profiling is 
in principle unacceptable, because it results in the harassment of the innocent minority 
middle class, which is thus subjected to a kind of "racial tax" that affects all aspects of 
people's lives. For example, ECRI's General Policy Recommendation No 11 on Combating 
Racism and Racial Discrimination finds that racial profiling constitutes a specific form of 
racial discrimination. By defining racial profiling as the use by the police of certain grounds 
in control, surveillance or investigation activities, without objective and reasonable 
justification, it claims that the use of these grounds has no objective and reasonable 
justification if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized. Thus, 
even when, in abstract terms, a legitimate aim exists (for instance the prevention of disorder 
49
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50
 501 U.S. 429 (1991) 
51
 528 U.S. 119(2000) 
52
 532 U.S. 318 (2001) 
53
 Sinha, P.: Police Use of Race in Suspect Descriptions: Constitutional Considerations. New 
York University Review of Law and Social Change, 31 (2006) 1, 156. 
54
 Consider, for example the debate surrounding the European Commission's proposal for a 
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concerns related to profiling, in particular regarding race, ethnicity and religion, in the context of data 
protection, law enforcement cooperation, exchange of data and intelligence, aviation and transport 
security, immigration and border management and treatment of minorities. See for example Pap, A. 
L.: Ethnicity- and race-based profiling in counter-terrorism, law enforcement and border control. Ad-
hoc briefing paper, Directorate-General Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Citizens Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament, Brussels, November 2008, PE 408.326, or the Working 
Document on problem ofprofiling, notably on the basis of ethnicity and race, in counterterrorism, law 
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and Home Affairs. Rapporteur: Sarah Ludford, 30.9.2008, DT\745085EN.doc PE413.954v02-00. 
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or crime), the use of these grounds in control, surveillance or investigation activities can 
hardly be justified outside the case where the police act on the basis of a specific suspect 
description within the relevant time-limits, i.e. when it pursues a specific lead concerning 
the identifying characteristics of a person involved in a specific criminal activity. In order 
for the police to avoid racial profiling, control, surveillance or investigation activities should 
be strictly based on individual behaviour and/or accumulated intelligence. The notion of 
objective and reasonable justification should be interpreted as restrictively as possible with 
respect to differential treatment based on any of the enumerated grounds, thus different 
considerations should be taken into account in order to assess whether the proportionality 
test between the means employed and the aims sought to be realized is satisfied in the 
context of racial profiling. The Recommendation notes that in the same way as racial 
discrimination, racial profiling can take the form of indirect racial discrimination. In other 
words, the police may use (without objective and reasonable justification) criteria which are 
apparently neutral, but impact disproportionately on a group of persons designated by 
grounds such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin. For 
instance, a profile that tells the police to stop all women who wear a headscarf could 
constitute racial profiling inasmuch as it would impact disproportionately on Muslim women 
and would not have an objective and reasonable justification. The prohibition of racial 
profiling should also cover these indirect forms of racial profiling. Furthermore, the 
Recommendation notes that in the same way as racial discrimination, racial profiling can 
take the form of discrimination by association. This occurs when a person is discriminated 
against on the basis of his or her association or contacts with persons designated by one of 
the grounds mentioned above.55 
In its General Recommendation XXXI on the prevention of racial discrimination in the 
administration and functioning of the criminal justice system (2005), the Committee for the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination also held that ethnic profiling constitutes per se a form 
of racial discrimination. In line with this, the EU Network of Independent Experts on 
Fundamental Rights56 draw attention to the fact in its opinion 2006/4 that the use of "racial" 
or ethnic characteristics as part of a set of factors that are systematically associated with 
particular offences and used as a basis for making law enforcement decisions is clearly 
discriminatory, not only because of the absence of any proven statistically significant 
correlation between indicators linked to race or ethnicity, religion or national origin, on the 
one hand, and propensity to commit certain criminal offences on the other hand, but also 
because the principle of non-discrimination requires that only in exceptional circumstances 
should the race or ethnicity, the religion or the nationality of a person, influence the decision 
about how to treat or not to treat that person.57 
55
 Paras 27-34 and 38. 
56
 See Opinion 2006/4 on ethnic profiling. 
57
 Under the case law of the ECHR, Art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, "no 
difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person's ethnic origin is 
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ground among those for which "very weighty reasons " are required in order for differential treatment 
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The Network's opinion demonstrates that European case-law is somewhat uneven in 
the matter: For example, in the United Kingdom, by the House of Lords in R (on the 
application of European Roma Rights Centre) vs. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport58 
immigration officers operating at Prague Airport were held to have discriminated on racial 
grounds-contrary to the Race Relations Act 1976, Sec. 1 ( 1 )(a)-against Roma seeking to 
travel from that airport to the United Kingdom by treating them more sceptically than non-
Roma when determining whether to grant them leave to enter the United Kingdom. The 
decision was in stark contrast to a judgment passed by the Second Chamber of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court on 29 January 2001.59 Here the Court took the view that the arrest of a 
woman in a train station, in order to identify her and to control the legality of her 
administrative situation, could not be considered discriminatory, although she was dark-
skinned. The woman concerned was an African-American of naturalized Spanish citizenship. 
The identity check by the police took place upon her leaving a train. She had no identity 
documents with her but assured the police that she was of Spanish nationality, and that the 
documents were at her home. She was travelling with her husband, who was white and was 
not checked. In contrast to this position, a complaint for discrimination filed in similar 
circumstances did succeed before the Austrian Constitutional Court.60 An Austrian citizen 
bom in Ghana and her four-year-old daughter travelled by train from the Netherlands to 
Austria. During the train ride her luggage was controlled by law enforcement officers 
without any result. After arriving in Vienna she was controlled a second time without any 
result and had to declare her consent to an X-ray examination, which passed also without 
any result. The woman submitted a complaint to the Independent Administrative Tribunal in 
Vienna, arguing that the above-mentioned treatment has only happened by reason of their 
colour and place of birth. Their complaint was dismissed but later reversed by the 
Constitutional Court. 
A further unwanted result of ethnic profiling is the strengthening of racial/ethnic 
essentialism, reductionism to black and white (Roma and Hungarian; Arab and non-Arab, 
etc.). Another related argument mentions the risks inherent in alienating crucial minority 
communities in the context of law enforcement (policing and prevention). The model of 
community policing emphasizes that local policing is most effectively done with active 
participation from the community. Law enforcement thus should not be an antagonistic, 
unjust, oppressive power, but a protector of peaceful, law-abiding people, with the criminals 
pitted as the enemy. With respect to terrorism, we should not overlook the importance of 
community coopération. It is no coincidence that the Bush government identified truck 
drivers, cab drivers and parking meter attendants as high-priority potential informants 
(helpful in identifying bombers or suicide bombers), and, above all, the Muslim community, 
which can detect suspicious behaviour.61 Indeed, most of the American terrorists identified 
up until recently were caught based on community reports. It is worth considering that one 
of the very few terrorist arrests where the suspect was eventually charged, in Lackawana, 
58
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59
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60
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61
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New York, a report from the local Muslim community tipped off the authorities, leading to 
the arrest.62 Further, false positives raise a special problem with respect to terrorism: it 
seems untenable to assume that only Arabs are involved in terrorist attacks. We need only 
mention a couple of incidents that happened on American soil: Richard Reid (the "shoe 
bomber"), a Brit from the West Indies; Jose Padilla (the "dirty bomb" terrorist of Chicago's 
O'Hare Airport), a Hispanic man who converted to Islam while in jail; not to mention white 
Americans like John Walker Lindh (the American Taliban), Timothy McVeigh, and Charles 
Bishop.63 
Yet another, straightforwardly pragmatic criticism towards ethnic profiling, however, 
has been calling attention to the practical ineffectiveness of racial profiling: inherent in the 
prima facie plausible reasoning based on statistics is a profound (and provable) error. From 
the practical point of view, racial profiling could only be justified based on the assumption 
that the race or ethnicity of the person being profiled is knowable and that there is a 
consistent and statistically significant relationship between race or ethnicity and propensity 
to commit crime. In fact, neither of these is consistently true. Ethnic profiling assumes a 
consistent association, if not a causal relationship, between race/ethnicity and certain kinds 
of criminal activity. But policies premised on the notion that members of certain ethnic 
groups are more or less likely to sell drugs, carry firearms, or commit terrorist acts, are both 
under- and over-inclusive. They thus risk focusing undue law enforcement attention and 
resources on those who fit the profile, while overlooking others who don not.64 Racial 
profiles are, thus, both over-inclusive and undcr-inclusive-over-inclusive in the sense that 
many, indeed most, of the people who fit into the category are entirely innocent, and under-
inclusive in the sense that many other types of criminals or terrorists who do not fit the 
profile will thereby escape police attention. James Goldston argues that is it mistaken to 
believe that ethnic profiling is also problematic in the respect that it assumes that the race/ 
ethnicity of the person profiled is knowable and determinate. But this is not always so.65 
Racial profiling also faces the problems of predictability and evasion: the more predictable 
police profiles become, the easier it is for perpetrators to adapt to circumvent the profile. 
In the past decade or so, considerable research66 focused on the efficacy of ethnic profiling. 
62
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Studies conducted in New Jersey and elsewhere have targeted stops based on racial 
profiling, involving vehicle checks and body searches. The aim was to discern how effective 
these measures were in detecting drug possession and illegal possession of weapons. The 
studies have clearly demonstrated that there was no significant, tangible difference between 
the proportional hit rate within the white population and the non-white population. Not only 
did the study find that the authorities habitually stopped a disproportionate number of non-
white drivers, but they have also confirmed that the hit rate does not justify the utility of 
ethnic profiling. Evidence thus refutes the proposition that minorities are more likely to be 
involved in crime and highlights that racial profiling is an ineffective use of police resources, 
by engaging in stopping and searching practices that are likely to be unproductive. For 
example, despite the collection and trawling of the data of 8.3 million people, the mentioned 
Rasterfahndung operation in Germany "failed to identify a single terrorist". In 1998, the 
U.S. Custom Service responded to allegations of racial and gender profiling and low hit 
rates across all ethnic groups. In 1998, 43% of searches that Customs performed were on 
African-Americans and Latino/as. US Customs changed its stop and search procedures 
removing race from the factors considered when stops were made and introduced 
observational techniques focusing on behaviours such as nervousness and inconsistencies in 
passenger explanations; intelligence improved the supervision of stop and search decisions. 
By 2000, the racial disparities in Customs searches had nearly disappeared. Customs 
conducted 75% fewer searches and their hit rate improved from under 5% to over 13%, the 
hit rate for all ethnic groups had become almost even. Using intelligence-based, race-neutral 
criteria allowed Customs to improve its effectiveness while stopping fewer innocent people, 
the vast majority of whom were people of colour.67 Other attempts to address profiling have 
included improving internal supervision, training and the development of early warning 
systems to identify officers who are potentially racially profiling. We might sum up the 
results thus: the retrospectively judged effectiveness (which was always assumed, rather 
than checked and confirmed) turns out to be illusory and does not provide an appropriate 
policing, prevention and security policy. 
Racial profiling thus relies on the assumption that ethnicity and a high rate of 
criminality are connected, so the hit rate must be higher among, say, African-Americans. 
For a long time, no-one was asking for a proof of this seemingly sensible connection; after 
all, a sufficient number of criminals were found among the disproportionately high number 
of minority members stopped. But researchers argue that this does not yield a cost-effective 
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2; Davies, Sh.: Reflections on the Criminal Justice System after September 11, 2001.Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law, 1 (2003) I; Ramirez, D.-Hoopes, J.-Quinlan, T. L.: Defining Racial 
Profiling in a Post-September 11 World. American Criminal Law Review, 40 (2003) 3; Braber, L.: 
Korematsu's Ghost: A Post-September 11 th Analysis of Race and National Security. Villanova Law 
Review, 47 (2002) 2. 
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method because the number of false negatives and false positives is bound to be much too 
high.68 In other words, the measures have a disproportionate negative impact on the black 
(Roma, Arab) population that is law-abiding, while also reducing the possibility of finding 
perpetrators that belong to the majority population.69 
A recent pilot research project70 organized by the Helsinki Committee (HHC)71 
focusing on police stop and search practices and their discriminatory effects on Hungary's 
largest ethnic minority, the Roma showed results that are very much in line with findings in 
other countries. Since previous research has showed that discriminatory ID check methods 
are relevant to the differential treatment of the Roma,72 Strategies for Effective Police Stop 
and Search (STEPSS), an international project supported by the AGIS Program of the 
European Commission and the Open Society Institute and organized by the Open Society 
Justice Initiative was launched to change police stop and search policy and practice. For the 
purposes of the research, for the first time in Hungary, broad-spectrum data collection on 
the ethnic aspects and general efficiency of ID checks has been conducted. 
The project involved the close cooperation of the HHC, the National Police 
Headquarters (NPH), the Hungarian Police College (HPC) and selected representatives 
from the Roma community who performed the internal monitoring of the project. The 
research was carried out for six months in three pilot sites across Hungary: Budapest's 6th 
District, Szeged and Kaposvár. These three locations represent a broad range of different 
police districts with differing populations, crime profiles and resources. Budapest's 6lh 
District covers a busy city-centre area and includes the capital's main railway station. 
Szeged, with a population of 200,000, is a medium-sized district on the Romanian border. 
Kaposvár is a relatively rural police district with 120,000 inhabitants. 
The projects most important findings were the following: the effectiveness of ID 
checks was determined by examining what percentage of ID checks are followed by further 
police measures. The project identified three main types of follow-up procedures (i.e. 
68
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positive results proving that the check was well-grounded): (i) arrests, (ii) short-term arrests 
and (iii) petty offence procedures initiated (including on-the-spot fines). 
Overall, including traffic related checks, only 1% of ID checks led to an arrest, 2% led 
to a short-term arrest and 18% to petty offence procedures. If ID checks related to traffic 
offences are removed, the remaining checks result in 2% arrest, 3% short-term arrest, 19% 
petty offense procedure and 76% no further action taken. For comparison, in the UK 
nationally 10-13% of stop and searches lead to arrest.73 On the whole, it appears that the 
police use of ID checks is ineffective; large numbers of people are being inconvenienced 
with little result. This data refutes the argument that extensive checks are an efficient tool 
against criminality, and highlights the sheer amount of police time wasted conducting 
stops. 
It is noteworthy, that there was significant variation in the rate of efficiency depending 
upon what ground was recorded as the basis for the ID check. Most ID checks, 37%, took 
place during the course of traffic controls. A relatively high proportion of checks, 19%, 
were based upon the suspicion of a petty offence, 8% of all checks were pursuant to 
intensive controls, and only 2% of checks were related to the suspicion of a criminal act. 
ID checks recorded under the "other" category make up a third of all stops; this proportion 
rises to 50% when we removed traffic control stops from the data. The examination of the 
efficiency rate of the ID checks relative to their different grounds showed that the most 
frequently quoted grounds were the least efficient. 
Arrests and significant percentages of short-term arrests only followed those ID checks 
that were related to the suspicion of a crime, petty offence or finding a wanted person. Out 
of these latter cases, however, only those checks that were initiated due to the suspicion of a 
petty offence made up a substantial portion of all the checks. Overall, traffic control 
constituted the largest reason for the ID checks, though in 84% of these cases no further 
action was taken. 
Based on the data collected, it appears that the majority of ID checks take place on 
public premises (streets, parks and roads account for 78%), while relatively few checks are 
performed in pubs, discos or similar places (6%). The temporal distribution of the checks is 
relatively even, with 21% occurring in the morning (from 6 a.m. till noon), 29% in the 
afternoon (from noon till 6 p.m.), 30% in the evening (from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m.), and the 
remaining 20% at night. 
Police officers stop and check more men than women (75% and 25%, respectively), 
and in line with international trends, young people are more likely to be checked. Individuals 
belonging to the age group 14-29 represent 43% of all checks, whereas their ratio within 
the population is 22%.74 Based on the overall data collected, police in Hungary are most 
likely to check young men between the ages 14-29. 
The data also shows that Roma are disproportionately targeted for ID checks. Within 
the framework of the project, 22% of all persons checked by the police were of Roma 
origin (according to the assessment of the officer performing the check), as opposed to 75% 
being identified as "white". The remaining 3% were identified as "black", "Asian", "Arab" 
or other. According to reliable sociological research, the estimated proportion of Roma 
73
 See: Jones, A.-Singer, L.: Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System—2006/7. 
London, 2008. 
74
 Based on the figures of the 2001 census, see 
www.nepszamlalas.hu/hun/kotetek/18/tables/loadl_12.html. 
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people within the total Hungarian population (of 10,045,000) is approximately 6,2% (i.e. 
their actual number is around 620,000).75 Thus, Roma are more than three times more likely 
to be stopped than their percentage of the general population would indicate. 
The results show that Roma youth are especially likely to be targeted for ID checks. 
The proportion of Roma youth between age 14 and 16 who were stopped and checked 
during the project period was significantly higher than the already high general representation 
of Roma within the sample (32% as opposed to 22%). 
The data in the research shows that ID checks of Roma are no more likely to yield 
results than measures enforced in relation to non-Roma. It is often argued that a 
disproportionate targeting of ethnic minority groups is justified by differential rates of 
criminal involvement. The hit rate of police checks, however, shows no significant 
differences by ethnic group. On a national level, 78% of ID checks involving Roma were 
"unsuccessful" in the sense that no further measure was required after the check. For non-
Roma this ratio was 79%. The percentage of checks followed by a petty offense proceeding 
for Roma and non-Roma was 19% and 18%, respectively. Rates of arrests and short-term 
arrests are practically the same within the Roma and the non-Roma sample. In the country's 
capital, Budapest: 80% of the checks of Roma did not require any further police action, 
whereas the same proportion for non-Roma was 59%. If we compare this with the fact that 
33% of all the persons checked are of Roma origin (which is a serious over-representation 
relative to their proportion of 5 - 1 0 % in Budapest), we can see that the problem is more 
acute in Budapest than in the other pilot sites. 
In sum, in Hungary, the annual number of ID checks (per 1,000 people) is high when 
compared with other nations in Europe. The police practice behind this result is based on 
the conviction that randomly initiated ID checks constitute an efficient crime prevention 
and detection strategy. However, in the sample, only approximately 20% of the ID checks 
were followed up by any measure, and of these measures, 18% merely involved the initiation 
of a petty offense proceeding (i.e. proceedings launched due to transgressions of minor 
significance). Arrests followed only 1% of the checks in our sample. Another important 
conclusion of the research is that Roma are disproportionately targeted by ID checks. Even 
though their proportion of the general population is only between 6 and 8%, persons 
perceived to be of Roma origin by the acting officers constituted 22% of those who were ID 
checked. The research also refuted the ostensibly rational argument that is frequently 
presented to justify disproportionality; namely that the Roma are over-represented among 
offenders, therefore the practice of checking them more often is objectively reasonable. 
Concluding remarks 
Using Rebekah Delsol's words, to summarize the racial profiling discourse, we can say that 
there is no evidence that profiling works, considerable evidence that it does not, and some 
disturbing indications that it may actually hamper law enforcement. When police or 
immigration officials act on prejudice, they blind themselves to genuinely suspicious forms 
of behaviour. Profiles are both under- and over-inclusive; that is, they risk being too narrow 
and missing real suspects or they are too broad, in which case they are expensive to apply 
75
 Hablicsek, L.-Gyenei, M.-Kemény, I.: Kísérleti számítások a roma lakosság területi 
jellemzőinek alakulására és 2021-ig történő előrebecslésére, (Experimental methods for predicting 
the territorial characteristics of the Roma population until 2021). 63, see 
http://www.nepinfo.hu/index.php?p=605&m=1003 (hereafter: Hablicsek). 
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in terms of manpower and target large numbers of completely innocent people. More 
broadly, profiling feeds and aggravates existing mistrust and consequent hostility and lack 
of cooperation in fighting crime and terrorism among the very communities where support 
is most needed for counter-terrorism and immigration control.76 Critics have noted that 
racial/ethnic profiling exacts a high price on individuals, groups, and communities that are 
singled out for disproportionate attention. For the individual stopped and detained the 
experience, sometimes of frequent encounters with the police, can be frightening and 
humiliating. Racial/ethnic profiling stigmatizes whole groups, contributing to the over-
representation of ethnic minorities in other parts of the criminal justice system, legitimising 
racism, scapegoating and fostering mistrust between communities and the police. This in 
tum destroys the trust of those communities in the police and reduces their willingness to 
cooperate in criminal or terrorism investigations and tum to the police to control crime in 
their neighbourhoods.77 
Given the elusive nature of "security" in general and the peculiarity of the post 
9/11-world, the practice of racial profiling nonetheless remains persistent and to a 
considerable degree popular amongst not only law enforcement officers, but also the civilian 
majority middle class. It is ironic that it was right around the time of the World Trade Center 
attacks that racial profiling suffered decisive rejection within professional as well as political 
circles in the USA. In the fall of 1999, 81% of those asked opposed stops and vehicle 
control based on ethnic profiling. By contrast, in a poll conducted a few weeks after 
September 11, 2001, 58% approved of the idea that Arabs (including American citizens) be 
subject to stricter security checks before a flight.78 
This article has argued that besides the doctrinal debate between "security" and 
"liberty", there is another important and slightly overlooked question to be investigated: the 
actual efficacy value of policies and law enforcement measures that trigger the entire 
"liberty vs. security" polemics. What needs to be kept in mind is that "security" itself is a 
social construct, and affected by prejudices and preconceptions within society. We also need 
to bear in mind that neither "security" nor "efficacy" can be seen as absolute and isolated 
concepts. Even if the majority would actually feel secure when law enforcement officers 
stop members of a minority which is being perceived as potentially dangerous or prone to 
criminality, this cannot and should not make these measures constitutionally acceptable-not 
even if, given the peculiarities of the securitarian dynamics, the efficacy standards would 
have been met. A possible solution would be to abandon the shallow and hollow rhetoric of 
"liberty vs. security" and return to the well-beaten path of traditional constitutional 
jurisprudence-and reinstate balancing mechanisms which operate with flexible and complex 
schemes (including for example dignity or equality) when assessing the harm criterion. 
76
 Delsol, R.: Presentation to the L1BE Committee of the European Parliament. Brussels, 30 
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LÍDIA BALOGH* 
Racist and Related Hate Crimes in Hungary 
- Recent Empirical Findings 
I. An overview of the situation concerning hate crimes in Hungary 
Affected communities 
In Hungary the Roma constitute the largest minority (the estimated number of the Roma 
population is 700 000,' which is approximately 7% of Hungary's total population), and 
practically the Roma are the only "visible" minority (given the small proportion of migrants 
in the population).2 Given that the Roma are often used as scapegoats for social and 
economic problems, and prejudices and negative attitudes against Roma are pervasive in 
the mainstream Hungarian society, hate crimes or hate speech as an issue might come up 
first of all in the context of anti-Roma tensions in Hungary. 
Anti-Semitism is to be considered as a prevalent phenomenon in Hungary (including 
the political discourse), and there are numerous cases of attacks against the members of the 
Jewish community, which is estimated to be between 80 000 and 100 000,3 or vandalism 
against Jewish property. 
Other racist manifestations are not significant. The only known Islamophobic incident 
in 2009, when civil protesters, supported by local politicians, opposed the opening of a 
Muslim cultural centre in Budapest, might not be considered as an example for hate crime. 
Manifestations of hate crimes are reported against LGBT people in Hungary. Allegedly, 
a large proportion of homophobic hate crimes (including violent attack against persons and 
verbal abuses) is committed around the time of the annual Gay Pride March in Budapest. 
This trend started in 2007, and there was an enormous amount of violent attacks against the 
Pride March in 2008. 
* Ph.D. candidate, Eö tvös Loránd University, Budapest. 
E-mail: lidia.balogh@gmail.com 
1
 Council of Europe's data: http://www.coc.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/default_en.asp 
2
 According to the the Central Statistical Office, the proportion of foreigners is 1.7% in the 
whole population living in Hungary, among them a large proportion is of ethnic Hungarians, coming 
from the neighbouring countries. See details on the methods of measuring migrant population in 
Hungary: Hárs, Á.: A harmadik országokból Magyarországon tartózkodó külföldi állampolgárok a 
statisztikai adatok tükrében (The statistics of third-country nationals residing in Hungary). In: 
Bevándorlók Magyarországon. Az MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet 1С CR Budapest 
Alapítvány által végzett kutatás zárótanulmányai (Immigrants in Hungary. Final report of the research 
implemented by the Institute for Ethnic and National Minority Studies of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences and the ICCR Budapest Foundation). Budapest, 2009, 28. 
3
 U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: 2009 Human Rights Report: Hungary, 
2010, available at http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136035.htm 
RACIST AND RELATED HATE . 2 9 7 
Notable contexts of racist manifestations 
In 2009, during the EP election campaign, the National Election Commission held that 
the extreme-rightist Jobbik party's slogan "Hungary belongs to Hungarians" is unconsti-
tutional.4 However, no further sanctions were issued, and the slogan was continued to be 
used. Homophobic statements were also recurring themes in Jobbik rallies during the 2009 
EP-elections campaign. A week after the МЕР elections Jobbik announced at a press 
conference that they would work in close cooperation with other right-wing extremist 
political groups to stop the Gay Pride March by all means necessary. 
Also 2009, the Ethics Committee of the Association of Hungarian Journalists 
condemned a rightist weekly Magyar Fórum5 for portraying a prime minister candidate on 
its cover framed in a Star of David saying "Jewish Prime minister". The Association held 
that the cover violates the constitution and human dignity and asked the Parliamentary 
Commissioner of Civil and Political Rights to investigate the case. 
Extremist news media releases6 often refer to crimes involving alleged Roma 
perpetrators, as "a crime of the Gypsies", and the term is used even for cases when there is 
a lonely perpetrator, or when the ethnicity of the perpetrator(s) is unknown.7 
Despite some governmental efforts aimed at combating racist incitement on the 
internet, extremist websites (in Hungarian language) are still operating. In June 2009, 
human rights NGOs filed a report, with the National Police and the Capital Prosecutor's 
Office, claiming investigation and indictment for inciting ethnic hatred, against a notorious 
and widely known right-wing extremist blogger (who posted to his blog that Roma people 
should be "subjugated, expelled from public and cultural life and any utterance of ethnic 
nature has to be eliminated without mercy. Their spines have to be broken").8 
Racist/intolerant manifestation in sports-first of all verbal abuse, and banners 
displaying hate speech or holocaust denial on the grandstands-appears practically only in 
the context of football in Hungary. The Hungarian Football Federation9 regularly fines the 
violators of the regulations regarding "acceptable behaviour". 
4
 OVB: Az országos választási bizottság 2009. június 3-án megtartott ülésének jegyzőkönyve. 
Budapest, 2009 (Record on the meeting of the National Election Commission held on 3rd of June, 
2009), available at http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ep2009/content/of/20090603.pdf 
5
 MÚOSZ: Etikai Bizottság: törvénysértő a Magyar Fórum címlapja. 2009 (Ethics Committee: 
The front page of Magyar Fórum violatest the law) (27.03.2009) available at 
http://muosz.hu/cikk.php?page=bizottsagok&id=1908&fo=8&iid=5 
6
 For example the extreme rightist web page www.kuruc.info is operated from various 
international servers; it has been banned several times due to complaints, but is restarted again and 
again from a different server. 
7
 Balogh, L.: Etnikai adatok kezelése a magyarországi sajtóban (Ethnic data handling in the 
Hungarian media). In: Föld-rész, 2, (2009) 3 -4 , 89-90. 
8
 Jogi Fórum/Magyar Helsinki Bizottság: Jogvédő szervezetek feljelentést tettek a BRFK-n és a 
Fővárosi Főügyészségen közösség elleni izgatás miatt (Human rights NGO filed a complaint at the 
Budapest Police Headquarter and at the Budapest Chief Prosecutor's Office on incitement against 
community). Jogi Fórum (26.06.2009) available at: http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/21009 
9
 Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetség: www.mlsz.hu 
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Attention received by racist crime and other forms of hate crime 
In the last two years, apparently hate crimes against the Roma attracted the most significant 
media attention, compared to other forms of hate crimes. However, as a recent study 
shows,10 the media attention was significantly higher regarding those cases where allegedly 
Roma perpetrator committed violent crimes against non-Roma victims, compared to the 
attention regarding hate crimes against Roma victims. As for anti-Semitic and homophobic 
hate crimes, there are occasional reporting of such incidents in the media, however, 
according to NGO sources, a large proportion of hate crimes do not receive any media 
attention, because these incidents tend to remain unreported. 
Besides awareness raising activities and demonstrations organised by civil society 
actors responding to hate crimes affecting members of the Roma or Jewish communities," 
notable NGO actions, reacting to inappropriate police responses to hate crimes, took place. 
In 2009, three NGOs (European Roma Rights Centre, Legal Defence Bureau for National 
and Ethnic Minorities the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union) released a joint report12 about 
the misconducts of the relevant authorities regarding the investigation of the fatal attack 
against a Roma family in Tatárszentgyörgy. In 2010, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union 
submitted a petition to the Head of the National Police and the Head of the Budapest Police 
Headquarters regarding an attack against the home of a Jewish family on Seder evening, 
which was considered and investigated by the police as "vandalism", instead of "violence 
against members of a community".13 Also in 2010, an open letter was sent to the Head of 
the Budapest Police Headquarters by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union,14 regarding the 
attacks against the participants 2010 Gay Pride March in Budapest, which were considered 
and investigated by the police as "disorderly conducts" or "minor bodily injuries" instead 
of "violence against members of a community". 
10
 Karácsony, G.-Róna, D.: A Jobbik titka. A szélsőjobb magyarországi megerősödésének lehet-
séges okairól (The secret of Jobbik Party: on the possible causes of the sweep of Right Wing on 
Hungary). Politikatudományi Szemle, 19 (2010) 1, 31-66. 
11
 For example on 23 February 2010, the Méltóságot Mindenkinek Mozgalom (Dignity for All 
Movement) organised a Remembrance Day on the anniversary of the double murder in Tatárszent-
györgy, where a 27-year-old Roma man and his five-year-old son were shot and killed; in April 2010, 
the Szabad Emberek Magyarországért (Free Persons for Hungary) organised a peaceful "walk in kipa 
or headscarf ' , aimed at protesting against the inappropriate police response and showing solidarity 
towards religious Jews living in Hungary. 
12
 European Roma Rights Centre, Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities and 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union: Report on the circumstances of the double murder committed at 
Tatárszentgyörgy on 23 February 2009 and the conduct of the acting authorities (the police, 
ambulance and fire services), 2009, available at http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/media/03/DA/ 
m000003DA.pdf 
13
 TASZ: Nem rongálás, közösség tagja elleni erőszak-rendőrséghez fordul a TASZ a Széder 
estet ünneplők megtámadása ügyében (Not vandalism, but violence against members of a community-
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union turns to the police regarding the attack against participants of a Seder 
Eve celebration). (01.04.2010), available at http://tasz.hu/szolasszabadsag/nem-rongalas-kozosseg-
tagja-elleni-eroszak-rendorseghez-fordul-tasz-szeder-estet-unn 
14
 TASZ: A melegeket ért támadások miatt a BRFK-hoz fordultunk (We turned to the Budapest 
Police Headquarter because of the attack against gays). (06.07.2010), available at http://tasz.hu/hirek/ 
tasz-level-budapest-rendorfokapitanyanak 
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As for the attention of international organisations, apparently the issue of anti-Roma 
hate crimes (committed in 2008-2009) received the most of attention. 
In June and July 2009, Andrzej Mirga, the Senior Advisor on Roma and Sinti Issues, 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe, led a nine-day field assessment visit to Hungary to explore possible 
factors leading or contributing to the attacks on and killings of Roma and the responses of 
the authorities to these incidents. The delegation visited 12 localities in Hungary, and met 
with representatives of the central, regional and local government, of the police and of the 
civil society.15 
The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights visited Hungary in October 
2009 to discuss issues related to fight against intolerance affecting members of minority 
groups.16 Regarding the Hungarian situation, the Commissioner "stressed the need to 
increase public awareness on the situation of minorities which suffer from systematic 
discrimination or intolerance, such as the Roma, the Jewish community and LGBT (lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender) people".17 
II. The legal context regarding hate crimes in Hungary 
Current legal framework on and recent developments 
Regarding the relevant time period (2005-2010), the Hungarian Criminal Code18 
criminalised six types of behaviour that may fall under the racially/hate motivated category. 
These are: genocide;19 apartheid;20 violence against member(s) of a community;21 incitement 
against community;22 ban of using totalitarian symbols;23 ban of denying, doubting, or 
trivialising genocide or crimes against humanity committed by totalitarian regimes.24 
The article of the Criminal Code on violence against member(s) of a community25 was 
amended in 2008.26 As a result, this article of the Criminal Code, governing previously 
"violence against a member of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group", was extended to 
cover any group of the population. The name of the offence was also modified to "violence 
against member(s) of a community". As a result of the amendment, individuals engaged in 
the preparation of violence against a member of a community shall also be held criminally 
15
 See ODIHR: E-newsletter. July-August 2009, available at http://archive.constantcontact.com/ 
fs026/l 101200403519/archive/l 102659952399.html 
16
 The focus of the discussions was on anti-Roma hate-crimes in Hungary. 
17
 Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights Communication Unit: Hungary: Commissioner 
Hammarberg recommends further action to eradicate intolerance and discrimination, 2009. (Press 
Release-762(2009), available at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1520817&Site=DC 
18
 Act No. IV of 1978. 
19
 Ibid. Art. 155. 
20
 Ibid. Art. 157. 
21
 Ibid. Art. 174/B. 
22
 Ibid. Art. 269. 
23
 Ibid. Art. 269/B (since the amendment of the Criminal Code in 1993). 
24
 Ibid. Art. 269/C. 
25
 Ibid. Art. 174/B. 
26
 On 10 November 2008, the Hungarian National Assembly adopted Act No. LXXIX of 2008, 
on Certain Amendments Necessary to Protect Public Order and the Operation of the Judiciary, which 
modified Article 174/B of the Criminal Code, effective from 1 February 2009. 
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liable.27 Based on the amendments, the new provision is the following: (1) Any person who 
assaults another person for being part, whether in fact or under presumption, of a national, 
ethnic, racial, or religious group, or certain groups of the population, or compels her/him by 
applying coercion or duress to do, not to do, or to endure something, is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. (2) The punishment shall be imprisonment 
between two to eight years if the act or crime is committed: a) by force of arms; b) with a 
deadly weapon; c) causing a considerable injury of interest; d) with the torment of the 
injured party; e) as part of a group; or, f) as part of a criminal conspiracy. (3) Any person 
who engages in preparing violence against a member of a community is guilty of a 
misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment for up to two years. 
The article of the Criminal Code on incitement against community28 provides with 
protection against non-violent conduct motivated by racism, xenophobia or other bias 
motive (e.g. homophobia29), according to which anyone publicly inciting hatred against the 
Hungarian nation or any national, ethnic, racial or other groups of the population shall face 
punishment for a felony offence with imprisonment for up to three years. 
The article of the Criminal Code on ban of denying, doubting, or trivialising genocide 
or crimes against humanity committed by totalitarian regimes30 originally dealt only with 
holocaust denial or trivialising (it came into force in February 2010). A few months later, as 
a result of legislative initiatives of the newly elected Hungarian government, this sub-
paragraph was amended (entered into force in July 2010). The new version of this paragraph 
is extended to the crimes of both "national socialist" and "communist regimes", and the 
term "holocaust" is no longer there in the text. 
Other relevant development is the amendment to Criminal Code in February 2010, 
which punishes participating in the leadership or in some cases the mere activities of banned 
associations (e.g. in extremist associations: consider the amendment of the Act on Petty 
Offences) with up to three years of imprisonment.31 
Certain articles of the Criminal Code, such as those covering murder (homicide)32 or 
the causing of grievous bodily harm (battery)33 expressly grant judges the discretion to take 
into account "base motivations" when sentencing offenders, therefore judges in such cases 
may thus take racist or other bias motivation into account as an aggravating circumstance. 
Concerns and debates regarding legislation in the field of racist and other hate crimes 
While judges may take racist or other bias motivation into account as a "base motivation", 
however, racist or other bias motivation is not expressly listed in the relevant provisions of 
the Criminal Code. No general provision exists in Hungarian law under which racist or 
27
 Act No. LXXIX of 2008, Art. 2. 
28
 Act No. IV of 1978, Art. 269. 
29
 See the interpretation of the law regarding homophobic hate crimes on the website of the 
(former) Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour: Jogi háttér-Magyar jogszabályok (Legal background 
- Hungarian laws), available at http://szmm.gov.hu/main.php?folderID=21369&articleID=42416&cta 
g=articlelist&iid=l 
30
 Act No. IV of 1978, Art. 269/C. 
31
 Act No. XXXV of 2010 on the Amendment of the Criminal Code (Act No. IV. of 1978), 
amending Art. 212/A of the Criminal Code. 
32
 Act No. IV of 1978, Art. 166. 
33
 Ibid. Art. 170. M A G Y A R 
T U D O M Á N Y O S A K A D É M I A 
K Ö N Y V T Á R A 
RACIST AND RELATED HATE . 3 0 1 
other bias motivation constitutes an express aggravating circumstance in ordinary criminal 
offences. Concerning this situation, the ECRI recommends34 that the Hungarian authorities 
draft a "specific provision that would make racist motivations aggravating circumstances 
for ordinary offences", "as without such a systematic approach, the racial motivations of 
offenders are not assessed on a consistent basis". 
As for the new provisions of the Criminal Code on the ban of denying, doubting, or 
trivialising genocide or crimes against humanity committed by totalitarian regimes,35 the 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union expressed concerns in May 2010, stating that the (by that 
time, planned) measure curtails the rights to freedom of opinion and freedom of expression, 
and violates the principle of academic freedom as well.36 
Although the Act on Assembly prohibits demonstrations that would violate criminal 
provisions,37 the same act only allows for the police to prohibit demonstrations if it would 
obstruct the functioning of crucial state institutions or would practically impede traffic.38 
Thus, demonstrations obviously carrying the risk of foreseeable violence and the intimidation 
of a great number of people cannot be banned, only disbanded. (Consider the example of 
August 2009, when international neo-Nazi organisations were planning a demonstration in 
Budapest to commemorate the death of Hitler's deputy, Rudolf Hess.)39 
After the Gay Pride March in July 2008, former interpretation of relevant law, 
according to which throwing eggs at people appearing at public events was considered to be 
within the boundaries of the freedom of expression40 was changed, and throwing objects at 
participants at public events was considered as "infamation" by the Chief Prosecutor of 
Budapest, and later by the Supreme Prosecutor as well.41 Previously, the Pest Central 
District Court ruled that throwing eggs is protected by the right to freedom of expression. 
The judgement, was criticised by several human rights NGOs, along with a number of 
politicians and prominent members of the judiciary, concerned dozens of rightist protesters 
who threw eggs, bottles and rocks at the gay pride marchers and the police.42 
34
 ECRI: Report on Hungary, fourth monitoring cycle. 2009, (adopted on 20 June 2008, 
published on 24 February 2009), 14, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-
by-country/hungary/HUN-CbC-IV-2009-003-ENG.pdf 
35
 Act No. IV of 1978, Art. 269/C. 
36
 TASZ: A Társaság a Szabadságjogokért jogvédő szervezet véleménye A büntető törvénykönyv 
módosítására vonatkozó T/25, számú törvényjavaslatról (The opinion of the Hungarian Civil Liberties 
Union on the proposal no. T/25. on the amandement of the Penal Code). 2010, available at http://tasz. 
hu/files/tasz/imce/tasz_nemzetiszocialista_kommunista bunok btk2010.pdf 
37
 Act No. Ill of 1989, Art. 2. 
38
 Act No. Ill of 1989. 
39
 Pap, A. L.: Dogmatism, hypocrisy and the inadequacy of legal and social responses combating 
hate crimes and extremism the CEE experience. Proceedings of the Conference: "Extremism and the 
Roma and Sinti in Europe: Challenges, Risks and Responses". OSCE-ODIHR University College 
London, London, 10-11 Sept. 2009. (forthcoming). 
40
 See Resolution No. B.4488/2007/2-I, of the Prosecutor of the V. and XIII. district of 
Budapest. 
41
 MTV-információ: Becsületsértő a tojásdobálás-ügyészi válasz a liberális politikusoknak 
(Throwing eggs constitutes defamation-the Prosecutor's answer to liberal politicians). Jogi Fórum, 
2008. available at http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/18311 
42
 TASZ: Reakció a PKKB tegnapi ítéletére (Reaction to the decision of the Pest County 
Central Court from yesterday). 2008, available at http://tasz.hu/gyulekezesi-jog/reakcio-pkkb-tegnapi-
iteletere 
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III. Data and information on racist and related hate crimes 
Assessment of available data and information regarding hate crimes 
Data on racist violence is limited as the police, prosecutors and courts do not usually 
recognise racial motivation. It is close to impossible to draw valid conclusions regarding 
the extent, trends and forms of racist violence and crime on the basis of official criminal 
justice data and information, due to the small number of cases that are actually recorded. 
This should by no means imply that racial crimes and violence are non-existent in Hungary. 
In Hungary no specific legally binding instructions exist for the determination of racially 
motivated criminal activity. Another debate concerns the legal status of perceived ethnicity; 
however, some argue that collection and handling of data relating to one's perceived ethnic 
origin is not explicitly prohibited by the law.43 
It has to be mentioned that there are no monitoring system specialised for racist 
incidents in Hungary, although there are mechanisms aimed at monitoring the phenomena 
and racism and the situation of ethnic/national minorities, functioning in different 
international organisations' frameworks (i.e. UN, CoE). 
Allegedly, a large proportion of anti-Rom and anti-Semitic incidents (e.g. verbal abuses, 
harassment) remain unreported to the police. Similarly, according to unofficial NGO-sources, 
majority of homophobic hate crimes remains invisible and perpetrators remain unpunished, 
because the victims often do not report the crime to the police due to fear of public exposure 
of their sexual orientation and of potential further discrimination, or in several cases the 
police refused to start an investigation or stopped the investigation for the lack of finding 
perpetrators. Initiatives aimed to establish an LGBT police organisation (which would not 
only empower the affected police officers themselves, but allegedly improve the situation of 
the victims of homophobic hate crimes as well) has not been successful so far in Hungary. 
While there is no data or information on hate crimes against migrants or refugees, it 
should be noted that interviewees of a study about the social situation of third-country 
nationals living in Hungary opted not to answer the question about personal experiences 
about racist attacks or abuses.44 
Categories of incidents and crimes 
Due to the already reported data collection restrictions, it is not possible to obtain official 
numbers beyond the statistics of the six listed types of criminal offences (genocide; 
apartheid; violence against a member of a community, incitement against community; using 
totalitarian symbols, denying, doubting, or trivialising genocide or crimes against humanity 
committed by totalitarian regimes) that might contain a racial or other bias element. For 
example, instances of aggravated bodily harm or ill-treatment in official proceeding may 
43
 The Hungarian Data Protection Law (Act No. LXIII of 1992) differentiates the concept of 
'sensitive data' within the category of personal data. Sensitive data, among others data on race or 
membership in an ethnic community, constitute a type of personal data referring to an essential trait 
and thus a vulnerable part of the subject's personal identity (Art. 2, Clause 2). 
44
 Bognár, К.: Kapcsolatok és erőforrások, bevándorlók és befogadók (Relations, resources, 
immigrants and receivers). In: Bevándorlók Magyarországon. Az MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató 
Intézet ICCR Budapest Alapítvány által végzett kutatás zárótanulmányai. (Immigrants in Hungary. 
Final report of a research implemented by the Institute for Ethnic and National Minority Studies of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the ICCR Budapest Foundation). Budapest, 2009, 147. 
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have racial or other bias motivations, but in the absence of relevant statistics on the 
aggrieved party, the patterns of racist or other bias motivations are impossible to trace.45 
As for violent crimes against the person, out of the six offences, "violence against 
members of communities" may be drawn under this term. As it was mentioned above, 
potential racial or other bias motivations of other offences involving violence against the 
person (e.g. different degrees of bodily harm, homicide, etc.) are not recorded. 
In the Hungarian Criminal Cod, there is no offence separately sanctioning violence 
against property motivated by racism or other bias motivation. Therefore, no official 
statistics are available. In individual cases (e.g. vandalism in Jewish cemeteries) the judge 
may in theory assess potential bias motivations as an aggravating circumstance, as a form 
of "base motivation", but such considerations will not appear in the court statistics, so 
without targeted research focusing on individual court cases no data can be provided in this 
respect. 
Concerning verbal threats and abusive behaviour, out of the six offences listed, 
"incitement against community" may be drawn under this term. (The term of "harassment",46 
which typically covers verbal manifestations, is used in the context of the law on equal 
opportunities.) 
Victim and offender characteristics: Data on the demographic features of the victims 
and offenders is scarce, and due to the mainstream interpretation of data protection rules, 
never contain any reference to ethnicity/race. Out of the six relevant offences, only "violence 
against members of communities" might have actual victims, however, the authorities do 
not collect data even on the citizenship of the victims of these offences. No data is gathered 
either on which community is concerned by specific instances of "incitement against 
community". 
Cases recorded by the police 
The source of the statistical data on cases registered by the police is the Unified Investigation 
and Prosecution Statistical Database.47 Data about cases is recorded in the system of Unified 
Investigation and Prosecution Statistical Database once the case is "finished" from the 
aspects of investigation or prosecution: till the rejection of a report or till a charge is filed, 
respectively. 
The database refers to the relevant laws, therefore the data is presented here by the 
categories of offences, as defined by the Criminal Code. As mentioned above, the official 
data does not include a breakdown on the communities concerned, therefore no information 
is available on the actual proportion of anti-Semitic, Islamophobic or other hate motivated 
crimes among the cases. 
According to the available data, in 2008 and 2009 no cases were recorded regarding 
"apartheid", or "denying, doubting, or trivialising genocide or crimes against humanity 
45
 The latest ODIHR report on hate crimes indicates as well, referring to the information 
provided by Hungarian authorities, that the data is not classified according to the types of crimes. See 
OSCE-OD1HR (2009) Hate crimes in the OSCE region-incidents and responses. Annual Report for 
2008, 77, available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/item_l l_41314.html 
46
 Act No. CXXV of 2003, Art. 10(1). 
47
 Egységes Nyomozóhatósági és Ügyészségi Bűnügyi Statisztika (ENYÜBS). 
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committed by totalitarian regimes".48 Concerning "genocide", the two cases reported by the 
public in 2009 were rejected44 by the police. 
With respect to "violence against a member of an ethnic etc. group", one out of 13 
complaints was rejected in 2008, and two of 23 cases in 2009. The investigation resulted in 
the establishment of a petty offence in one case in 2009. Concerning "incitement against 
community": 12 of the 24 cases were rejected by the police in 2008; and 24 out of 48 was 
rejected in 2009. The investigation resulted in the establishment of a petty offence in 2 
cases, both in 2009. Regarding "use of totalitarian symbols", only eight complaints were 
rejected out of 255 in 2008, and 5 out of 104 in 2009. As a result of the investigation, a 
petty offence was established in 3 cases (all in 2009). 
Cases recorded by the prosecution service 
The source of the statistical data on cases recorded by the prosecution service is also the 
Unified Investigation and Prosecution Statistical Database. 
According to the available data, in 2008 and 2009, no cases were recorded regarding 
"genocide","apartheid", or "denying, doubting, or trivialising genocide or crimes against 
humanity committed by totalitarian regimes".50 
With respect to "violence against a member of an ethnic etc. group", eight cases in 
2008 and seven cases in 2009 were filed with the prosecution service, out of which resulted 
in order for trial only in one case, in 2009. Concerning "incitement against community", 
1-1 cases were filed in 2008 and 2009 (both resulted in indictments). Regarding "use of 
totalitarian symbols", 156 charges were filed in 2008, and 25 in 2009, out of which resulted 
in order for trial in 106 cases in 2008 and in only one case in 2009. 
Cases recorded by courts 
The source of the statistical data on cases recorded by courts is the Collection of Court 
Decisions,51 which refers to the relevant legislation.52 This database contains data and the 
text of anonymised53 court decisions that are to be made public according to the Act on the 
Freedom of Information.54 
According to the accessible information in the database, between 2008 and 2010, no 
decision in the database refers to the Criminal Code concerning "genocide", "apartheid", 
48
 The relevant article of the Criminal Code first came into force in February 2010 and then the 
amended version came into force in July 2010. 
49
 According to the Hungarian Criminal Procedure Code (Act No. XIX of 1998) on the Criminal 
Procedure Code, the police may reject a report if the reported behaviour is not a criminal offence or 
the suspicion of a criminal offence is absent (Art. 174). 
50
 The relevant article of the Criminal Code first came into force in February 2010, and then the 
amended version came into force in July 2010. 
51
 The Collection of Court Decisions is available online at: http://www.birosag.hu/engine. 
aspx'?page=anonim 
52
 The database is searchable by the referred articles of acts, or by the texts of the decisions. 
53
 The names of the parties are deleted. 
54
 Act No. XC of 2005 on the Freedom of Information, Sec. 4 on the Collection of Court 
Decisions. 
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"incitement against community" or "denying, doubting, or trivialising genocide or crimes 
against humanity committed by totalitarian regimes".55 
Concerning the illegal "use of totalitarian symbols", altogether six decisions in the 
database referred to the relevant part of the Criminal Code (2008: four decisions, one-one 
decisions in 2009 and 2010).56 Decisions show altogether nine defendants, out of which five 
were not found guilty. In 2008, two perpetrators were sentenced to probation, and one 
perpetrator was reprehended57 by the court. In 2010 one perpetrator was reprehended by the 
court.cConcerning "violence against a member of an ethnic etc. group", the database shows 
one-one cases in 2008 and 2009 (involving possible bias motivation against Roma victims, 
which was eventually not established by the court). 
Comments on developments by official sources with respect to hate crime in Hungary 
The reports and other documents issued by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights 
of Ethnic and National Minorities provide with comments on trends and developments of 
racist hate crimes. 
The 2005 report58 of the Commissioner does not contain a special section on hate 
speech or hate crimes, and there is only one reference, mentioning that several complaints 
were filed by parents of Roma origin about alleged physical abuse of pupils by teachers, 
motivated by anti-Roma hate. The report about 200659 contains some articles about the role 
of the media in stirring ethnic hatred,60 emphasizing that the responsibility of journalists is 
even larger "especially in such times burdened with tension".61 A hate speech case is also 
mentioned: the Parliamentary Commissioner ex officio reported a webpage with content 
(e.g. lyrics) explicitly inciting violence against the Roma.62 
55
 The relevant article of the Criminal Code first came into force in February 2010 and then the 
amended version came into force in July 2010. 
56
 Actually, according to the available texts of the decisions regarding the illegal use of 
totalitarian symbols, all of these cases in the concerned period, 2008-2010, involved communist 
symbols (five-pointed red stars, etc.), therefore these cases would not qualify for genuine racist/bias 
motivated hate crimes. 
57
 "Reprehension" might be considered as the most moderate disciplinary measure, aimed at 
expressing disapproval of the issuing authority. 
58
 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: A nemzeti 
és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgyűlési biztosának beszámolója a 2005-es évről (Report of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights on the year 2005). Budapest, 
2006, available at http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/word/04-29-2008_10_43_30/besz_2005.html 
59
 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: Beszámoló 
a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgyűlési biztosának tevékenységéről a 2006-es évben 
(Report on the activity of the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights in 
2006). Budapest, 2007 available at http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/data/files/145405078.pdf 
60
 Ibid. 63. 
61
 Ibid. 68. 2006 was the year when demonstrations broke out after leaking of an audio recording 
with a speech of the then prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány held before a closed-door meeting of the 
Socialist Party, stating the party had lied to the public regarding the country's economic status to win 
the 2006 Parliamentary elections and criticised the Socialist Party's governing. The demonstrations 
involved occasional violent actions, as well as extreme rightist and anti-Semitic voices. 
62
 Ibid. 69. 
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The report on 2007 presents developments regarding the sweep of the extreme rightist 
Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (For a Better Hungary Movement)63 party, and its 
political rhetoric which associates Roma ethnicity with inherent criminality, by using the 
term "Gypsy criminality". The report includes a chapter on hate speech issues.64 
The 2008 report65 contains a comprehensive chapter on hate speech, mentioning that 
besides anti-Roma manifestations, anti-Semitism is also prevalent,66 and includes a section 
on the increase in physical violence against Roma as well. As for physical attacks against 
Roma (or property owned by Roma), the report mentions ten cases (noting that the media 
reported on an even larger number of cases).67 
In November 2008, the Parliamentary Commissioner considered an attack against a 
Roma family in Pécs as a crime with "significant impact on public concerns over safety", 
and expressed his worries because the police almost immediately dismissed the possibility 
of racist motivations.68 The Parliamentary Commissioner released a statement as well, 
concerning other attacks against Roma, following consultation with several Roma public 
figures, calling the authorities to pay special attention to exploring the possible bias 
motivation behind the crimes.69 
The Parliamentary Commissioner's report on 2009 calls on70 authorities to collect 
individual data of the perpetrators and victims of hate crimes, as well to establish a 
monitoring system regarding racist attacks and incidents. 
In a 2010 report on an investigation71 initiated ex officio by the Parliamentary 
Commissioner, ineffective police response is criticised concerning an incident, involving a 
rural Roma community, which took place in the context of local ethnic tensions. 
63
 Hereinafter referred to as Jobbik. 
64
 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: Beszámoló 
a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgyűlési biztosának tevékenységéről, 2007 (Report on the 
activity of the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights in 2007). Budapest, 
2008, 79, available at http://3ddigitalispublikacio.hu/media/ombudsman/beszamolo_2007.pdf 
65
 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: Beszámoló 
a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgyűlési biztosának tevékenységéről, 2008 (Report on the 
activity of the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights in 2008). 
Budapest, 2009, available at http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/data/files/144644490.pdf 
66
 Ibid. 152. 
67
 Ibid. 166. 
68
 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: Ujabb 
romák elleni támadás (Another attack against Roma) (Press release, 19th of November, 2008), 
available at http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/hir-385-jabb-romak-elleni-tamadas.html 
69
 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: Véletlen, 
sorozatos egybeesés vagy aggodalomra okot adó tendencia? (Accidental series of coincidencies 
or a worrisome tendency?) (Statement, 19th of November, 2008), available at: http://www. 
kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/hir-386-allasfoglalas-az-elmult-evben-tortent.html 
70
 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: Beszámoló 
a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgyűlési biztosának tevékenységéről, 2009 (Report on the 
activities of the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights in 2098).. 
Budapest, 2010, 40, available at http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/data/files/185232828.pdf 
71
 Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights of Hungary: A nemzeti 
és etnikai kisebbségi jogok országgyűlési biztosának jelentése a 2009. november 15-16-i sajóbábonyi 
eseményekről és az azzal összefiiggő jogértelmezési problémáról (Report of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights on the incidents on 15-16 November 2009 in 
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The last yea rbook 7 2 of the Nat iona l Security Of f i ce , published in 2009,7 3 con t a in s a 
detailed chapter devo ted to ex t remis t groups, f o c u s i n g on the sweep o f the extreme-r ight is t , 
ant i -Roma poli t ical forces, the phenomenon of t h e paramilitary organisat ion H u n g a r i a n 
Guard (and its act ivi t ies , e.g. m a r c h e s aimed at in t imidat ing Roma communi t ies ) . The repor t 
indicates an increase in attacks against LGBT p e o p l e as well ( re fe r r ing to the v io len t 
incidents around the 2008 Gay Pr ide March in Budapes t ) . 
Unofficial data and information on anti-Roma hate crimes 
The reports pub l i shed by the E u r o p e a n Compara t ive Minority Resea rch Foundation a r e a 
rich source of in fo rmat ion on R o m a issues, inc luding ha te crimes.7 4 Mains t ream m e d i a a l so 
reported on hate c r imes against R o m a , especially concerning a se r i e s of nine a t t acks 7 5 
commit ted in 2 0 0 8 and 2009, a l legedly by an o rgan i sed group of c r imina ls . 
The media dea l t first of all w i t h the above-ment ioned nine a t tacks , resulted in dea ths , 
injuries and loss o f the properties o f Roma people. T h e s e crimes w e r e apparently t a rge ted 
against the h o m e s of Roma p e o p l e living in t h e outskirts o f rural set t lements (in 
ne ighbourhoods wi th a significant R o m a populat ion) . The perpetrators used se l f -made fire-
b o m b s ("Molo tov cocktails"), to set the bui ld ings on fire, and h a n d g u n s for the fatal 
at tacks. 
Sajóbábony and the related problems regarding legal interpretation) (reg. no. 18/2010), available at 
http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/hir-550-jelentes-2009-november-15-16-i.html 
72
 NBH: A Nemzetbiztonsági Hivatal Evkönyve. 2008 (Yearbook of the National Security Office, 
2008). Budapest, 2009, available at http://www.nbh.hu/oldpage/evk2008/001menu.htm. 
73
 The yearbook was last published in 2009. After the governmental changes in 2010, the 
National Security office was reorganised (and renamed to Constitution Protection Office). 
74
 Their latest report is EÖKK: Cigánynak lenni Magyarországon. Jelentés 2008 (To be a Roma 
in Hungary. Report 2008). Budapest, 2009. 
75
 The 1st attack in the series of nine took place in Galgagyörk, a village near Budapest, where 
shortly after midnight, 10-15 shots were fired at three houses owned by Roma. No one was injured. 
The 2nd attack was committed in Piricse, where Molotov cocktails were thrown at two houses owned 
by Roma people. A woman was shot on her leg when she stepped out of one of the houses. The 3rd 
attack was perpetrated in Nyiradony, where gunshots were targeted at a house inhabited by Roma. No 
one was injured. The 4th attack took place in Tarnabod, where Molotov cocktails were thrown and 
gunshots fired at three homes in a neighbourhood with a significant Roma population. No one was 
injured. On 3 November 2008, the 5th attack was committed in Nagycsécs, where a 43-year-old Roma 
man and a 40-year-old Roma woman were shot dead in their home in Nagycsécs. According to the 
official investigation, petrol bombs (Molotov cocktails) were thrown into the house before the 
perpetrators used firearms to kill the members of the family. On 15 December 2008, the 6th attack 
took place in Alsózsolca, where several shots were fired at a 19-year-old Roma man and his partner in 
front of their home in Alsózsolca. The young man suffered life-threatening injuries. On 23 February 
2009, the 7th attack was committed in Tatárszentgyörgy: a 27-year-old Roma father and his 5-year-old 
son were shot dead as they ran out of their burning home in Tatárszentgyörgy. The man's wife and the 
couple's two other children were also seriously injured in the attack and had to be treated for severe 
burns. On 22 April 2009, the 8th attack was committed in Tiszalök when an 54-year-old Roma man 
was shot in the chest outside his home. On 3 August 2009, the 9th -last-crime took place in Kisléta, 
where a 45-year-old Roma woman was shot dead, and her 13-year-old daughter seriously injured in 
an attack against their home in Kisléta. The girl, suffering life-threatening injuries, remained in 
hospital for several weeks. 
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Besides these crimes, "sporadic" incidents, with alleged/possible anti-Roma motivation 
in the background, were reported by the media in numerous cases, especially in 2008 and 
2009. 
Unofficial data and information on anti-Semitic hale crimes 
The Hungarian mainstream media provides with information on anti-Semitic incidents: 
violence against persons76 and property.77 The Alliance of the Jewish Religious Communities 
of Hungary collects information on anti-Semitic attacks and abuses. 
Unofficial data and information on other racist or other religiously motivated hate crimes 
There is no information about systematic collection of unofficial data regarding on other 
racist (e.g. against people of colour) or other religiously motivated (e.g. Islamophobic) hate 
crimes in Hungary. 
According to the available sources, no violent incidents against foreigners were 
reported during the last two years by migrants or refugees. However, according to 2009 
research report on migrants living in Hungary, the interviewed third country nationals 
"preferred not to talk about any racist incidents experienced by them, however, during the 
conversations, some of them mentioned that radicalisation-in connection with recent the 
political tendcncies-and the sweep of the right-wing is perceivable".78 
Unofficial data and information on homophobic hate crimes 
The sources of unofficial data and information on homophobic hate crimes provided in 
Hungarian context are: personal accounts of members of LGBT organisations; websites of 
LGBT organisations and human rights and NGOs providing legal support for victims;79 the 
"Háttér Archives" (maintained by Háttér Society);80 which is a rich source of media reports, 
press releases, legal and other documents; press releases, complaints and cases published by 
76
 The mainstream media dealt with two cases: in July 2009, three men abused a 27-year-old 
Jewish man in a neighbourhood of Budapest where a significant Jewish population lives (7th district. 
Dohány street), because he admitted his Jewish origin; in March 2010, the police warning came after 
a rabbi's home was attacked by anti-Semitic vandals who smashed the windows with stones during a 
seder holiday meal. 
77
 The mainstream media reported the following cases: in December 2009, the day after a 
conference held in the Parliament, where Elie Wiesel, Nobel Prize winner novelist was present as a 
keynote speaker, unknown perpetrators vandalised 12 gravestones and a statue in the Jewish cemetery 
of Székesfehérvár, and painted on the wall of the Memorial Hall the words "We don't need a Jewish 
Casino"; in July 2010 altogether 13 (150-200 years old) gravestones were vandalised by unknown 
perpetrators in the Jewish cemetery of Tolna. 
78
 Within the framework of a comprehensive research on migrants (third country nationals), 70 
interviews were proceeded with migrants and experts (among the latter group there were migrants as 
well). The interviewees came altogether from 23 foreign countries (Vietnam, China, Turkey, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Gambia, Ghana, Iran, Libya, Russian Federation, Syria, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Benin, Egypt, 
The Emirates, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya, Mongolia, Peru, Romania, and Tibet). See Bognár: op. cit. 147. 
79
 Labrisz Lesbian Association, Háttér Society for LGBT People, Szimpozion Association: 
http://www.szimpozion, PATENT Human Rights Association, Amnesty International Hungary, 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union. 
80
 Háttér Archívum, http://www.hatter.hu/hattcr-archivum 
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the above mentioned organisations; the mainstream media;81 the community media (LGBT 
news sites, Facebook and other community sites where LGBT and other human rights 
organisations are present); and blogs. Extremist websites in Hungary also regularly report 
homophobic hate crimes considered as "success stories' and 'acts of justice".82 
Information on anti-Roma hate crime from foreign sources and international organizations 
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the Council of Europe's 
independent human rights monitoring body published its latest Report on Hungary83 in 
February, 2009, where it "urges the Hungarian authorities to intensify their efforts to ensure 
a more vigorous implementation of criminal law provisions relating to the fight against 
racism",84 and "reiterates its recommendation that further human and financial resources be 
allocated to measures aimed at ensuring that the investigation and prosecution of racist 
crimes are carried out in a thorough and systematic fashion".85 
According to the 2010 report of the Minority Rights Group,86 "Jobbik blames Jews 
and Roma for the social and economic problems facing Hungary post-transition and post-
EU accession" and "It has also coined the term 'Gypsy crime' to denote certain types of 
crimes supposedly committed exclusively by Roma". 
The U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor87 provides with an 
assessment regarding the legal framework of hate crimes and hate speech, and of the 
implementation of the law as well: "Courts have failed to convict persons of inciting hatred 
when no physical assault followed. Under the civil code, a person specifically targeted by 
hate speech may file a civil suit, but, as long as the speech remains abstract and does not 
81
 For example, the following cases were reported by mainstream media. In May, 2009, at the 
Heroes'Square in Budapest, a group of skinhead-looking people (one of them wearing the hat of the 
Hungarian Guard) verbally insulted the participants of a film-shooting, preparing a video spot 
announcing the forthcoming Gay Pride, and spat at one of the participants, a young, foreigner woman. 
In 2009 (5 September), 41 extremists were arrested in relation to violent activities during the Gay 
Pride. Prosecution was started against 27 of them. Near the venue of the afterparty of the Pride 
extremists were gathering, and launching verbal attacks, and threw stones at one police car patrolling 
around the venue. Two men leaving the after-party on bicycles were attacked by extremists, the 
victims suffered serious injuries. After the Gay Pride March in 2009 (5 September), one woman 
wearing the organisers' T-shirt was attacked on the street by two or three men on her way home. 
82
 About a week after the Gay Pride, in July 2010, a group of extremists announced on their 
website, using hate speech, that they "desecrated" the gravestone of Károly Kertbcny. (Károly 
Kertbeny was a 19th century Hungarian writer who invented the words "homosexuality" and 
"heterosexuality". A gravestone was erected for him in 2002 by the LGBT community, and it is visited 
every year by participants of the LGBT Festival.) The extremists covered the memorial with a black 
sack and attached a quote from the Bible saying that men having sexual relations with men have 
to die. 
83
 ECRI: Report on Hungary, fourth monitoring cycle (adopted on 20 June 2008, published 
on 24 February 2009), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghFmonitoring/ecri/country-by-country/ 
hungary/HUN-CbC-l V-2009-003-ENG.pdf 
84
 Ibid. Para. 25. 
85
 Ibid. Para. 26. 
86
 MRG International: State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2010. Events of 
2009. London, 2010, 161, available at: www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=840 
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 U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: 2009 Human Rights Report: Hungary. 
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ment ion a n y specif ic i nd iv idua l , there is n o l ega l recourse" . T h e series of p h y s i c a l at tacks 
against R o m a (be tween J u n e 2 0 0 8 and 3 A u g u s t 2009) are a l s o reported, a n d t h e cri t icism 
raised a m o n g ant i - racis t ac t iv i s t s by the s h o r t c o m i n g s o f t h e invest igat ion, a n d that the 
pol ice o r d e r e d an in terna l discipl inary p r o c e e d i n g to e x a m i n e the al leged m i s t a k e s , and 
these r e s u l t e d in s anc t i ons aga ins t two p o l i c e off icers . T h e repor t men t ions t h a t a f ter the 
arrest o f f o u r suspects o n 21 Augus t 2009 , " N o addi t ional a t t a c k s of this n a t u r e occur red" . 
The r e p o r t p rov ides wi th de t a i l s regarding n o t a b l e racist m a n i f e s t a t i o n s in the p u b l i c life.88 
T h e A m n e s t y In t e rna t iona l 2010 r e p o r t 8 9 s tates tha t v i o l e n t a t tacks a g a i n s t R o m a 
c o n t i n u e d in 2009, 9 0 p r e s e n t s details o n t h r e e m u r d e r c a s e s , and m e n t i o n e s that: "In 
S e p t e m b e r , about 4 0 0 R o m a n i w o m e n in i t i a t ed legal p r o c e e d i n g s against O s z k á r Molnár , a 
M e m b e r o f Par l iament o f t he opposi t ion F I D E S Z party a n d M a y o r of E d e l e n y , over his 
a l leged d e f a m a t o r y r e m a r k s on Romani w o m e n " . 9 1 
T h e F r e e d o m H o u s e repor t s 9 2 " i n c r e a s i n g v io lence a g a i n s t R o m a led to f o u r dea ths in 
2009, a n d r i s ing insecur i ty f o r c e d R o m a n y m e n to patrol t he i r o w n n e i g h b o u r h o o d s " , and 
m e n t i o n s that " f o u r m e n w e r e arrested in A u g u s t 2 0 0 9 in c o n n e c t i o n with t he m u r d e r s " . 
88
 Ibid. [30 January 2009] "Albert Pásztor, the head of the Miskolc police headquarters, stated 
in a press conference, 'Hungarians appear to rob banks or gas stations, but all the other robberies are 
committed by Gypsies' [...] and that 'cute Gypsy children often become rude and cruel perpetrators'. 
Upon the instruction of the minister of justice and law enforcement, the HNP [Hungarian National 
Police] initiated an inquiry into the incident, and Pásztor was suspended from his position. However, 
two days later the investigation concluded that Pásztor did not break any law, and the H N P terminated 
his suspension; the decision to reinstate Pásztor was approved by the minister of jus t ice and law 
enforcement."; [2 April 2009] "Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights Szabó stated in an 
interview that 'Gypsy crime' existed and defined it as a type of crime performed to earn a living. [...] 
He also presented himself as the parliamentary commissioner of the 'majority' rather than the 
parliamentary commissioner for the rights of national and ethnic minorities. Although he withdrew his 
statement the next day following strong criticism by human rights groups, Szabó's professional 
acceptance greatly weakened following this incident."; [3 September 2009] "Oszkár Molnár, the 
mayor of Edeleny and a FIDESZ parliamentarian, stated during a press conference that pregnant 
Romani women hit their bellies with rubber hammers and took harmful medicines to increase the 
chance their child would be bom with disabilities in order to receive increased state financial aid. 
Responding to the statement, FIDESZ party leaders initially labelled it as a 'local issue' . However, in 
December the center-right FIDESZ party dropped Molnár f rom its slate for the April 2010 
parliamentary elections." 
84
 Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report 2010. The State of The World's 
Human Rights, 2010, 166, available at http://thereport.amnesty.org/sites/default/files/AIR2010_EN. 
pdf, "Robert Csorba and his son, aged five, were killed in Tatárszentgyörgy in February. After an 
initial examination, the local police announced that they had been found dead after a fire caused by an 
electrical fault in their house. Later that same day, however, the police acknowledged that evidence of 
gunshot wounds had been found on the bodies, but only opened a murder investigation 10 hours 
later." "Jenő Koka, a 54-year-old Romani man, was killed in Tiszalöks Roma neighbourhood in April. 
He was reportedly shot dead as he left his home to start the night shift in the local chemical factory 
where he worked." "Maria Balogh, a 45-year-old Romani woman, was shot dead and her 13-year-old 
daughter seriously injured in the village of Kisléta in August". 
90
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Information on anti-Semitic hate crime from foreign sources and international 
organizations 
T h e European Commiss ion agains t Racism and Intolerance stated in its report, conce rn ing 
the situation be fore June 2008,9 3 tha t "antisemitic a t tacks against p e r s o n s appear to be rare, 
incidents of vandal i sm against synagogues and Jewi sh cemeter ies a re not u n c o m m o n " , 9 4 
and reports that fo r "Ant isemit ism has also been open ly espoused by certain political part ies, 
N G O s report that even some ma ins t r eam parties d o little to d i s tance themselves f r o m such 
opinions. Overal l , the sense is that the expression o f antisemitic v i e w s is currently on the 
rise in Hungary" . 9 5 
The latest report of the U.S. Bureau of D e m o c r a c y report on h u m a n rights96 s ta tes that 
dur ing 2009 ant i-Semit ic incidents , including vanda l i sm, cont inued, but the Federa t ion of 
Jewish Communi t i e s in Hungary reported that ant i -Semit ism did no t increase in the year 
compared with 2008: "Accord ing to police there were 124 repor t s of vanda l i sm or 
destruct ion of Jewish and Chr is t ian properties (n ine in houses o f worship and 115 in 
cemeter ies) dur ing the first ten m o n t h s of the yea r compared w i t h 365 cases repor ted in 
2008" . Besides ment ioning that ant i-Semit ism is present in t he media, ant i -Semit ic 
incidents9 7 were a lso reported by the U.S. Bureau o f Democracy. 
93
 ECRI: Report on Hungary (fourth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 20 June 2008, published on 
24 February 2009, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/hungary/ 
HUN-CbC-IV-2009-003-ENG.pdf 
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 Ibid. Article 72. 
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 Ibid. Article 73. 
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 U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: 2009 Human Rights Report: Hungary. 
2010, available at: http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hnpt/2009/eur/136035.htm 
97
 [24 February 2009] "The World Jewish Congress joined MAZSIH1SZ in criticising anti-
Semitic comments made by a local government official, Attila Kiss from Rajka. Kiss called on other 
officials to take up 'sickles and swords' and 'exorcise' the local synagogue. MAZS1HISZ lodged an 
official complaint against Kiss, which the Prosecutor's Office subsequently rejected."; [4 April 2009] 
"Jobbik, Magyar Garda, and the Hungarian National Front co-organised an event commemorating the 
1882 'blood libel' trial in which residents of Tiszaeszlar accused the local Jewish community of killing 
a 14-year-old Christian peasant girl in order to use her blood for a religious ceremony. The police 
ordered an investigation into the event after the media reported that the approximately 80 participants 
made anti-Semitic comments. On December 3, the police concluded the investigation due to the lack 
of evidence of the crime of 'incitement against a community'."; [18 April 2009] "A day before the 
March of the Living procession organised by the Jewish communities, far-right demonstrators marched 
to the German embassy in Budapest to deny the Holocaust and to raise their voices against 'Zionist 
world-rule'. An estimated 250 persons, including 60 wearing Magyar Garda uniforms, held posters 
reading, 'Down with the Holocaust doctrine' and 'the Third Reich strikes back'. Others wore shirts 
that said 'Dare to be white'. MGA [Magyar Gárda-Hungarian Guard] Captain Istvan Dosa said in a 
speech that "nothing from the Holocaust is true", and then he read a petition addressed to the German 
embassy. The Budapest police initiated legal procedures against Dosa and another speaker for 
"incitement against a community". However, the participants also made an official complaint 
concerning police actions in connection with the march, which the prosecutor's office supported. 
Consequently, the police dropped their investigation of the march."; [30 June 2009] "Three men beat 
a 27-year-old Jewish man after asking if he was a Jew. The victim suffered minor injuries. The prime 
minister asked the minister of justice and law enforcement to supervise and accelerate the investigation 
and to present proposals on how to avoid similar incidents. On December 23 the police arrested two 
persons, one 16 years old and the other 18 years old, in connection with the attack and initiated an 
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The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe launched a report in June 201098 about the outcomes 
of a field assessment visit in Jun-July 2009, aimed at exploring the context of the violent 
attacks against Roma in Hungary in 2008-2009. According to the report: "Convictions on 
charges of inciting hatred against a community are rare, as the relevant practice of the 
Constitutional Court requires the prosecution to show a direct causal connection between 
hate speech and an incident of violence. The delegation heard concerns that current hate-
speech laws provide 'unlimited' free speech, leaving broad opportunities for the 
dissemination of racist propaganda". The report mentions that there are apparently "no 
specific instructions or guidelines on the investigation of hate motivation or its consideration 
as an aggravating circumstance in crimes." The report contains detailed recommendations" 
to the relevant Hungarian authorities, with regard to combating racist hate crimes and 
preventing further incidents. In Appendix,100 a comprehensive list is presented of 45 
incidents with an alleged racist motivation, involving Roma victims (22 cases from 2008, 
23 cases from 2009). As for 2010, the report states "in the first quarter of this year, two new 
attacks against Roma were reported by civil society".101 
Information on other racist hate crime from foreign sources 
and international organizations 
The only information on "other" racist hate crime is reported by U.S. Bureau of Democracy: 
"Five Roma were charged with a racist assault after allegedly beating an ethnic Hungarian 
on September 23. The four men and a woman were placed in pre-trial detention. According 
to a police spokesman, this was the country's first racist incident in which the victim was 
not a member of a minority".102 
investigation of violence against a member of a community"; [5 September 2009] "During a pride 
parade, approximately 20 demonstrators whom police had pushed out of Városház Square began 
shouting 'nasty Jews' in the direction of Budapest's largest synagogue. The demonstrators threw an 
empty beer bottle at the synagogue and tore down a hanging banner advertising the Jewish Summer 
Festival. They set the banner, along with a temporary reed fence near the synagogue, on fire. Police 
quickly extinguished the fire. They opened an investigation into the incident"; [26 October 2009] 
"A 22-year-old man smashed a memorial plaque dedicated to Armin Kecskeméti, chief rabbi of Mako 
for more than 40 years, who died in a concentration camp in 1944. The perpetrator also wrote 'what 
six million?" and "lying swine" on the wall. Two days later the police captured a suspect and initiated 
proceedings against him on vandalism charges." 
98
 OSCE-ODIHR: Addressing Violence, Promoting Integration. Field Assessment of Violent 
Incidents against Roma in Hungary: Key Developments, Findings and Recommendations. June-July 
2009. Warsaw, 15 June 2010, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2010/06/44569 
_en.pdf 
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 Ibid. Chapter 7, "Recommendations". 
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 Ibid. Appendix I, "Incidents and Violence against Roma in Hungary in 2008-2009". 
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 U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: 2009 Human Rights Report: Hungary. 
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Information on homophobic hate crime from foreign sources 
and international organizations 
The latest Amnesty International report103 mentions that the 2009 LGBT Pride March in 
Budapest on 5 September 2009 was protected adequately by the police with and no incidents 
reported during the march, however "a young woman was allegedly attacked by two or 
three anti-gay protesters after the march; she suffered injuries on her head and arms". 
The 2010 report of the U.S. Bureau of Democracy report on human rights104 states that 
"extremist groups continued to subject gay men and lesbians to physical abuse and attacks", 
and reports the same attack (attack against a young woman), noting that after the Hungarian 
Civil Liberties Union complained to the national police chief that the reason for the assault 
was related to the woman's membership in a societal group, police changed the legal 
grounds of the investigation to "violence against a member of a community". 
The 2009 report of the Danish Institute for Human Rights on Hungary105 concludes 
that hate speech is only "covered by the law when it amounts to incitement to hatred against 
a community". The report indicates that "No good practices have been identified in 
Hungary'"06 in the field of combating homophobia and discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation and gender identity. 
As for the Hungarian legislation regarding homophobic hate crimes, the ILGA 
Europe's107 Country Index108 emphasizes that the relevant criminal law does not refer 
explicitly to homophobia as a bias motive. 
IV. Positive initiatives aimed at preventing and hate crimes 
The regulation of operations, ethics, and procedures with respect to content providing (Code 
of Content Providing),109 issued by the Hungarian Association of Content Providers (last 
supervised in 2009) takes stance against hate speech, and provides editors with guidance 
regarding extremist manifestations and insulting expressions: "The Content Provider should 
strictly avoid expressions that are insulting to particular persons or groups of persons, as 
well as extremist manifestations of other kinds. Where it is appropriate, it may, however, 
give space to such views expressed by public persons: in such cases, it should be made 
103
 Al: Amnesty International Report 2010. The State of The World's Human Rights, 2010, 166, 
available at http://thereport.amnesty.org/sites/default/files/AlR2010_EN.pdf 
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 U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor: 2009 Human Rights Report: Hungary. 
2010, available at http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136035.htm 
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 Danish Institute for Human Rights, COW1: The social situation concerning homophobia and 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in Hungary. March 2009, available at http://fra. 
europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA-hdgso-part2-NR HU.pdf 
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 Ibid. Art. 43. 
107
 International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, Europe, http://www. 
ilga-europe.org/ 
108




 MTE: A Magyarországi Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesületének a Tartalomszolgáltatásra Vonat-
kozó Működési, Etikai és Eljárási Szabályzata (Code of Conduct, Ethics and Procedures of Content 
Providing, issued by the Hungarian Association of Content Providers). 2009, (last supervised: 21 
October 2009): http://www.mte.hu/etikaikodex.html 
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clear that the Content Provider does not agree with this view, considering it incompatible 
with its own basic principles. It is the duty of the editors to determine the most appropriate 
way of noting this in every case"."0 
As (racist or anti-Semitic) extremism among football fans is a prevalent phenomenon 
in Hungary, the Hungarian Football Federation implemented regulations, to prevent/ 
eliminate hate speech and racist incidents before/during/after matches. The contents of these 
documents are in accordance with the recommendations of the international football 
organisations (UEFA-Union of European Football Associations, FIFA Federation Inter-
nationale de Football Association), with a detailed regulation on the responsibility of sport 
organisations, on the tolerable behaviour of spectators, and on the applicable sanctions 
(including fines). According to the Security Regulations which regulated the rules and 
conditions of the participation at matches, it should be printed on the tickets that racist or 
ant-Semitic expressions are forbidden,"1 and, in cases of racist or scandalous manifestations, 
the match might be interrupted or even closed."2 The Code of Discipline contains regulations 
on the "banner permission" (only those banners might be brought into the grandstands that 
are checked by a special commission-e.g. racist/anti-Semitic slogans are forbidden"3 
Racist/intolerant behaviour or expressions (and defamation as well) are considered as 
misdemeanours to be sanctioned."4 The Disciplinary Committee of the Federation regularly 
fines sport organisations those fans violate of the regulations."5 
There are NGOs providing legal counselling and assistance to victims of hate crimes: 
e.g. the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union"6 and the Háttér Society for LGBT People"7 (the 
latter focuses on victims of homophobic attacks. 
The Háttér Society for LGBT People launched a project within the framework of the 
EU PROGRESS Programme"8 aimed at providing police officers with trainings regarding 
homophobic hate crimes. The project, started in May 2009, contains a module which 
110
 Ibid. Sec. V: "Separation of the public and private spheres", Art. 1 "Protection of personality 
rights". 
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 Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetség Biztonsági Szabályzata (Security regulations of the Hungarian 
Football Federation) (adapted on 16 April 2009) http://www.mlsz.hu/anyagok/szabalyzat/2009-2010/ 
Biztonsagi_Szabalyzat.pdf, Appendix 8, Article 4.4. 
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 Ibid. Appendix 8, Art. 5. 
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 Magyar Labdarúgó Szövetség Fegyelmi Szabályzata (Code of Discipline of the Hungarian 
Football Federation) (came into force on 1 July 2009, last modified: 25 June 2010) http://www.mlsz. 
hu/anyagok/szabalyzat/2009-2010/Fegyelmi_Szabalyzat, Appendix 9. 
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 Ibid. Disciplinary Sanctions, Sec. Ill, Art. 10. The Code sets the maximum limits of fines. In 
cases of such misdemeanours, players should be excluded at least 5 matches from participation, 
members of the audience might be banned from the stadium for 2 years. Clubs might be fined and/or 
ordered to organise closed-door matches because of the misdemeanour of their fans; or might be 
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 In 2010, the media reported several disciplinary decisions against football clubs because of 







 The project is implemented within the framework of Hungarian programme "Együtt az 
egyenlőségért 2009-2010" (Together for Equality 2009-2010), co-funded by the EU PROGRESS 
Programme. The call for proposals was launched by the Hungarian Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labour (applications were selected by public procurement procedure). 
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addresses police officers, and focuses on combating homophobic hate crimes and awareness-
raising on 1MBT issues. The training materials are prepared by expert groups, with the 
participation of researchers (Open Society Institute, Central European University, Max 
Planck Institute) and NGO activist (Háttér Society lega l Defence Bureau for National and 
Ethnic Minorities), and a member of the Advisory Committee of the Hungarian Equal 
Treatment Authority. 
V. Conclusions 
In the Hungarian context, it is almost impossible to draw valid conclusions regarding the 
extent, trends and forms of racist violence and other forms of hate crimes on the basis of 
official criminal justice data and information. Very few reports are filed on criminal offences 
that contain a racial or other bias motivation element, and even fewer lead to indictment. 
Similarly, due to the small number of cases that are actually recorded as criminal offences 
by the prosecution no valid conclusions could be drawn with regard to the specific 
characteristics of offenders. Data on the demographic features of victims are not collected 
by the Hungarian authorities. 
Given the lack of a specified monitoring mechanism on hate crimes, and appropriate 
official information, other sources like reports of NGOs and international organizations 
have to be considered as well. Regarding homophobic hate crimes, LMBT organizations 
report a decrease of the number of extremist homophobic offenders at the Pride March 
2009 and 2010, compared to 2008, due to the police strategy (isolating the route of the 
March) and to a change in legislation. As for anti-Roma hate crimes, unofficial sources 
(first of all, the media and NGOs) agree on the perception of unprecedented sweep of 
violence against the Roma community in Hungary in 2008-2009. This tendency ended, 
apparently in August 2009, with the arrest of four suspects of a series of nine attacks against 
Roma. 
However, by the time of closing the manuscript of the present article, new forms of 
hate motivated hate crimes are emerging in Hungary, targeting especially certain Roma 
communities in rural areas. These worrisome tendencies are being followed by legislative 
changes and initiatives, however, there are still apparent shortcomings with implementation 
of the current laws to combat hate crimes. 
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SILVANA MOSCATELLI* 
The Multiple Discrimination in the European 
and Italian Context 
1. Definition 
The term "multiple discrimination" indicates any combination of discrimination on the 
grounds of gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. 
The concept of multiple discrimination has been pioneered in the 80s in the US by an 
American scholar, Kimberlé Crenshaw, in order to identify new forms of discrimination. 
Crenshaw called attention to the many ways in which race and gender interacted to shape 
experiences of black women. The argument put forward was that individuals can belong to 
several disadvantaged groups and potentially suffer specific forms of discrimination at the 
same time.1 
Crenshaw and other scholars began criticizing the single ground approach for neither 
providing adequate protection nor a full picture of the phenomenon because, according their 
opinion, an analysis on a single issue of discrimination did not reflect reality. They also 
criticized how that analysis generally dealt with one ground of discrimination and not the 
combination or the addition of more grounds. For this reason, they found that the legislation 
did not properly address the type of discrimination suffered mainly by many African-
American women.2 
The notion of multiple discrimination was further developed by a Finnish scholar, 
Timo Makkonen.3 According to him, the term "multiple discrimination" describes the first 
of three situations where a person can be subjected to discrimination on more than one 
ground. This kind of discrimination occurs when a person is discriminated by different 
factors (race, gender, etc.) in various times. It can be mentioned, for example, the case of a 
disabled woman who may be discriminated because of gender for the acquisition of a job 
position and her difficulty of entering a public building not accessible to people using 
wheelchair. The victim accumulated various experiences of discrimination which 
differentiate from the time of suffering and the factor that causes it. Makkonen argues that 




 Crenshaw, K.: Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique 
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. University of Chicago Legal 
Forum, 1989, 67-139. See also Crenshaw et al. (eds): Critical Race Theory. The Key Writings that 
Formed the Movement. New York, 1995. 
2
 Martinez, F. R.: La discriminación multiple, una realidad antigua, un concepto mtevo. 4 et 
seq., http://www.oberaxe.es/files/datos/492a7ea083086/discriminacionmultiple.pdf. 
3
 Makkonen, T.: Multiple, Compound and Intersectional Discrimination: Bringing the 
Experiences of the Most Marginalized to the Fore. Institute For Human Rights, Abo Akademi 
University, April, 2002, http://web.abo.fi/instut/imr/norfa/timo.pdf 
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in these cases it is appropriate the use of adjective "multiple" because of its mathematical 
connotations: the victim is discriminated by factors acting simultaneously or jointly, but 
separately, as a sum: gender+disabilities.4 This concept of multiple discrimination does not 
coincide with that one of Crenshaw. 
According to Makkonen, there are other form of discrimination. For instance, the term 
compound discrimination describes rather a situation where a person suffers discrimination 
on the basis of two or more grounds at the same time, and where one ground adds to 
discrimination on another ground. It particularly refers to a situation in which one or more 
discrimination factors are added to others in a specific case producing a barrier or adding 
an existing difficulty.5 For example, in a labour market that segregates on the basis of gender 
(some jobs are reserved to men) and nationality (some jobs are available only to nationals), 
the chances that a immigrant woman finds a job according to her education are considerably 
reduced.6 
With reference to the different kind of discrimination, it is also to mention the 
intersectional discrimination. This refers to a situation in which various discriminatory 
factors interact simultaneously, producing a specific form of discrimination. For example, 
the discrimination of a gypsy woman is the result of the combination of gender and ethnicity, 
which differs from discrimination against non-gipsy women or gipsy men.7 
The conceptual disorganization involved, as several different concepts, such as 
"multiple discrimination", "double/triple discrimination", "multidimensional discrimination", 
"intersectional discrimination" and "intersectional vulnerability" have been used to describe 
essentially similar or comparable situations. In the academic field, the concept of 
"intersectional discrimination" is favoured while references to "multiple discrimination" are 
scarce, while in the field of human rights the opposite is true.8 
4
 Ibid. 10. 
5
 Ibid. 11. 
6
 An example of compound discrimination is case of Perera vs. Civil Service Commission, No. 
2 (1983) in the UK. In Perera case an advertisement for a legal assistant stated that candidates with a 
good command of the English language, experience in the UK and with British nationality would be 
at an advantage. That puts a higher than average proportion of some racial groups at a disadvantage. 
Nevertheless, in Perera vs. The Civil Service Commission, the Court of Appeal held that an 
advertisement for a legal assistant that stated that candidates with a good command of the English 
language, experience in the UK and with British nationality would be at an advantage did not amount 
to a requirement or condition within the meaning of the Race Relations Act 1976, section l(l)(b). To 
come within the Act the preference should be elevated to a requirement or "absolute bar" which has to 
be complied with. 
7
 The concept of intersectional discrimination is also known in the Canadian system. The 
Ontario Human Rights Commission in Canada has been active in promoting an understanding of 
multiple discrimination by incorporating an intersectional approach in their equality work. Apart from 
the need to develop the intersectional approach and other legal mechanisms to tackle multiple 
discrimination there is a need to identify substantive practice to prevent and combat multiple 
discrimination. On the basis of a study pursued by the Ontario Human Rights Commission, complaints 
filed between April 1997 and December 2000 indicate that 48% of the complaints included more than 
one ground, while 52% cited only one ground of discrimination, 56% of age complaints included 
other grounds; 19% of complaints filed on the ground of handicap included multiple grounds; 27% of 
cases filed on the ground of sex included multiple grounds; 94% of complaints citing the ground of 
receipt of public assistance, including other grounds, http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/resources/discussion_ 
consultation/DissIntersectionalityFtnts?page=DissIntersectionalityFtnts-OTHER.html. 
8
 Makkonen: op. cit. 8. 
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In some branches of socio-legal research there has been a progressive acknowledgement 
of the role that multiple discrimination. However, the law has been slow to recognise and 
respond to the concept of multiple discrimination in practice and, consequently, there are 
few cases addressing discrimination on more than one ground.9 The ability of a legal system 
to adequately address cases where claimants have suffered discrimination on multiple 
grounds is vital if the law is to be able to prevent disadvantage and to compensate sufferers 
sufficiently. While law in the United States have shown a developing recognition of the 
issue of multiple discrimination, in many EU Member States, legislation does not dealt with 
the needs of victims experiencing multiple discrimination.10 
2. The international legal foundation of multiple discrimination 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly on 10 November 1948, states the principle of equality and non-
discrimination. Even though the Declaration is a non-legally binding document it has been 
accepted as international customary law, whereas some articles, such as the non-
discrimination provision in Art. 2, have even acquired the status of jus cogens.11 
The non-discrimination provision in Art. 2 of the UDHR reads that everyone is entitled 
to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. The article does not have independent standing, but is, 
in a way, accessory to the other articles of the Declaration.12 
The principle of non-discrimination is also recognised by the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), under Art. 2 which affirms that each State Party to 
the Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the Covenant, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.13 The same provision is encompassed under 
Art. 2 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).14 
Beyond the mentioned instruments, the principle of non-discrimination is also 
contained in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) concluded in 1965 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979. 
9
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Multiple Discrimination. Data in Focus 
Report, EU-MIDIS, 2010, 6. 
10
 Britton, E.: Multiple Discrimination in the USA: A Growing Recognition of the Interlocking 
Nature of Disadvantage, http://www.suitel01.com/content/multiple-discrimination-in-the-usa-a45059 
#ixzz 1 ORA302t. 
11
 On the Universal Declaration of Human Rights see, inter alia Morskin, J.: Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: Origins. Drafting, and Intent. Philadelphia, 1999. 
12
 Makkonen, T.: The Principle of Non-discrimination in International Human Rights Law 
and EU Law. 5, http://iom.fi/eleaming/files/national_law/estonia/essential_reading/Principle_of_Non_ 
Discrimination.pdf. 
13
 On the scope of application of Art. 2 ICCPR see Committe on Human Rights, General 
Comment No. 18, adopted on 10 November 1989. 
14
 On the ICESCR see inter alia Craven, M.: The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. A Perspective on Its Development. Oxford, 1995. 
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Nevertheless, in the above-mentioned instrument there is no reference to the notion of 
multiple discrimination. One of the first reference to multiple discrimination is encompassed 
in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which were adopted by the Fourth World 
Conference on Women in September 1995 explicitly address the specific situation and 
experience of e.g. disabled women, immigrant women, indigenous women and rural women, 
in addition to which intersectional issues such as trafficking and violation of the rights 
of women during armed conflicts are discussed. The Declaration uses the terms to "multiple 
barriers" and even though it does not clearly deal with multiple or intersectional 
discrimination, it is widely regarded that this was the first instance ever in which these 
issues were addressed on such a high level.15 
At international level, the concept of multiple discrimination has been clearly 
recognised by the Durban Declaration adopted at the World Conference against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia an Related Intolerance in 2001. The Declaration and the 
Programme of Action adopted at the Conference contain numerous explicit references to 
the concept of multiple discrimination, in addition to which some provisions deal with 
concrete issues such as women in armed conflicts, trafficking and the right of an indigenous 
or minority child to enjoy his or her own culture and practice his or her own religion. 
Already the preamble to the Declaration emphasizes that states have a duty to protect 
and promote the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all victims of racism and racial 
discrimination, and that they should apply a gender perspective and recognise the multiple 
forms of discrimination which women can face. Under Art. 2, the Declaration specifically 
affirms that racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance occur on the 
grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin and that victims can suffer 
multiple or aggravated forms of discrimination based on other related grounds such as sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, social origin, property, birth or other status.16 
Although the list of related grounds is open-ended, some grounds are expressly 
included in the list of related grounds.17 The list of related grounds does not contain, most 
notably, disability, sexual orientation or age, which are all grounds that have been quite 
firmly recognised in international and EU law.18 
The Programme of Action expressly recognises multiple discrimination by way of 
recognizing, inter alia, that people of African descent experience particularly severe 
problems of religious intolerance and prejudice that can combine with other forms of 
discrimination to constitute multiple discrimination (Art. 14), that multiple discrimination 
can take place in the context of employment, health care, housing, social services and 
education (Art. 49). 
It is worth to underline that the Durban Conference and the documents adopted therein 
clearly evidence overwhelming international recognition of intersectional and multiple 
discrimination. As regards the field of human rights, the adoption of the Durban Declaration 
and Programme of Action in the UN World Conference against Racism in 2001 represented 
a major milestone in recognizing the way discrimination on the basis of origin and 
15
 Makkonen: The Principle of Non-discrimination ... op. cit. 3, 37. 
16




 Disability, sexual orientation and age have been recognised as explicitly forbidden grounds 
of discrimination, e.g. in the EU Council Directive 2000/78/EC prohibiting discrimination in 
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respectively on the basis of sex/gender can interact and produce previously unrecognised 
forms and manifestations of discrimination.19 
In the international context, it is also important to mention that the 2006 Convention of 
the United Nations on the Rights of People with Disabilities which recognises multiple 
discrimination. Already the Preamble of the Convention affirms that the State Parties are 
concerned about the difficult conditions faced by persons with disabilities who are subject 
to multiple or aggravated forms of discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic, indigenous or social origin, property, 
birth, age or other status.20 Under Art. 6, the Convention specifically affirms that women 
and girls with disabilities are subject to multiple discrimination, and in this regard State 
Parties shall take measures to ensure the full and equal enjoyment by them of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. Regarding to the Convention, it is worth to remind that it 
is a legally binding instrument and State parties have the duty to fulfil the obligations 
defined by the Convention. Thus, each State Party has to take measure in order to avoid 
multiple discrimination towards women and girls takes place.21 
3. The recognition of multiple discrimination in the European context 
At European level, the nationality and gender were the only equality issues on the legal 
agenda from the outset and for about 40 years. Prohibition of discrimination both on grounds 
of nationality and gender was originally introduced in EU law as a means to develop the 
internal market. In this discourse, multiple discrimination was practically not faced in 
official EU legal texts until the 1990s. Since 1999, the European Union has created a body 
of legislation aimed at combating discrimination on the grounds of ethnic and racial origin, 
religion and belief, sexual orientation, disability and age.22 
With the incorporation of Art. 13 into the EC Treaty, entered into force in 1999, the 
adoption of the two anti-discrimination directives in 2000, the Community action programme 
to combat discrimination,23 PROGRESS and the 2007 European Year of Equal Opportunities 
for All, the EU and its Member States have experienced a dynamic development in anti-
discrimination legislation and substantial initiatives to raise awareness of discrimination. 
Whit this regard it is also to mention Art. 2 TEU which provides that the "Union is 
founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
These values are common to the member states in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail". 
19
 Makkonen: The Principle of Non-discrimination ... op. cit. 3, 55. 
20
 Hendriks, A.: The UN Disability Convention and (Multiple) Discrimination: Should EU 
Non-Discrimination Law Be Modelled Accordingly. European Yearbook of Disability Law, 2 (2010), 
7-27. 
21
 On this aspect see Deila Fina, V.: Articolo 6, Donne con disabilità (Article 6, Women with 
disability). In Cera, R.-Delia Fina, V.-Marchisio, S. (eds): La Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui 
diritti delle persone con disabilità (The UN Convention on the rights of people with disabilities 
Commentary). Roma, 2010, 105-118. 
22
 Nielsen, R.: EU Law and Multiple Discrimination. CBS Law Studies, WP 2006-01, 1. 
23
 Council Decision 2000/750/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a Community action 
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At the level of the European Union the mentioned principles are also enshrined in Art. 
21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. According to this article, 
any discrimination based on grounds such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, 
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of 
a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. 
Furthermore, Art. 19 TFEU gives the Union the competence to combat discrimination on 
grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual 
orientation. 
With the addition of the new grounds of discrimination, such as race or ethnic origin, 
age, disability, religion or belief and sexual orientation, the concept of multiple discrimination 
has grown in importance. 
As observed above, the adoption of some directives contributed to address 
discrimination across a range of grounds and in different contexts encompassing employment 
through to goods and services. 
The Race Equality Directive (2000/43/EC), adopted in 2000, prohibits discrimination on 
the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, with a view to putting into effect in the Member States 
the principle of equal treatment. The scope of the Directive is very broad In the preamble to 
the Directive there is reference to the general human rights provisions. It applies to all persons, 
as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies, in relation to conditions 
for access to employment, to self-employment and to occupation and access to and supply of 
goods and services which are available to the public, including housing. 
It is also important to mention the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC) which 
establishes a framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation and in Art. 1 
lays down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation. 
Finally, Gender Directive (2004/113/EC) which expands protection against gender 
discrimination to access to and the provision of goods and services. 
Although the directives do not expressly provide for the consideration of multiple 
discrimination they do not prohibit, but expressly recognise that different grounds may 
intersect. Recital 14 of the Race Directive affirms that in implementing the principle of 
equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, the Community should aim to 
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between men and women, especially since 
women are often the victims of multiple discrimination. 
Following the passing of the Racial Equality Directive and the Framework Equality 
Employment Directive, the Council of the EU, launched a Community Action Programme 
to promote measures to combat direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. In recital 4 to the Council 
decision it is stated, in accordance with the gender mainstreaming provision in Art. 3(2) EC 
(Art. 8 TFEU), that in the implementation of the programme, the Community will seek, in 
accordance with the Treaty, to eliminate inequalities and promote equality between men and 
women, particularly because women are often the victims of multiple discrimination.24 
In recital 5 to the Decision establishing the Programme it is furthermore stated that the 
different forms of discrimination cannot be ranked because they are all equally intolerable. 
The programme is intended both to exchange existing good practice in the Member States 
24
 Council Decision 2000/750/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a Community action 
programme to combat discrimination (2001 to 2006). 
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and to develop new practice and policy for combating discrimination) including multiple 
discrimination, promoting gender mainstreaming provision in accordance to Art. 3(2) EC 
(Art. 8 TFEU).25 
In 2006, the European Commission required a study on multiple discrimination. It 
requested the European Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender Equality to provide 
a complementary report to cover 30 states, and to focus on legal problems related to gender 
equality and multiple discrimination. The mandate of this report was to highlight legal 
perspectives on discrimination against women based on grounds additional to their sex, and 
to make recommendations for further research or policy measures.26 
Also the European Parliament has frequently highlighted the problem of multiple 
discrimination. In its resolution on the Stockholm Programme27, it stressed that while EU 
law and policy markers have adopted an extensive body of law to combat the multiple 
discrimination suffered by woman from minority backgrounds, especially Roma women, no 
significant progress can be demonstrated: it therefore called on the EU Member States 
"to review the implementation of all policies related to the phenomenon of multiple 
discrimination"28. 
The importance of recognising multiple discrimination lies with the fact that it takes 
into account the complexity of discrimination as it is experienced by some people. 
Some problems perceived in the field of multiple discrimination may not be due to the 
problems with this specific field but rather stem from implementation and divergences 
between national legal orders.29 
4. The Italian legal framework 
In Italy, the principle of non-discrimination is defined under Art. 3, Para. 2, of the Italian 
Constitution which recognises that "all citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before 
the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and 
social conditions". For this reason, it is "the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles 
of an economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby 
impeding the full development of the human person and the effective participation of all 
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 European Parliament Resolution of 25 November 2009 on the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council-An Era of Freedom, Security and Justice 
serving the Citizen-Stockholm Programme, Para. 31. 
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 Ashiagbor, D.: Multiple Discrimination in a Multicultural Europe: Achieving Labour Market 
Equality Through New Governance. Current Legal Problems, 61 (2008) 1, 265-288. 
30
 On the anti-discrimination law in Italy see Barbera, M. (ed.): It nuovo diritto antidiscri-
minatorio. (The new anti-discriminatory law). Milano, 2007. For a comparative analysis with other 
countries see Schiek, D.—Waddington, L.— Bell, M. (eds): Non-discrimination Law. Oxford-Portland, 
2007. 
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The concept of multiple discrimination remained outside the framework of 
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity and nationality under Arts 43 and 44 of 
Consolidated Act 286/1998 on Immigration. Multiple discrimination only entered Italian 
legislation in the form of double discrimination.31 The only references to it are in legislative 
decrees Nos. 215 and 216 of 2003, transposing Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC, 
and in the corresponding Delegation Act. 
In particular, Art. 1 of Decree No. 215/2003 provides that the implementation of equal 
treatment irrespective of race and ethnic origin must take place "also in a perspective that 
takes into account the different impact that the same forms of discrimination can have on 
women and men, and the existence of forms of racism with a cultural and religious 
character". The implementation of Directive 2000/43/EC covered the legal vacuum of 
Italian legislation in the field of discrimination with reference to direct and indirect gender 
discrimination.32 
Referring to the mentioned Decree, it is worth to remind that it fulfils the guideline 
provided by Delegation Act No. 39/2002, which in Art. 29 requires that the implementation 
of Directive 43/2000 take into account the existence of discrimination on the double ground 
of gender and race and ethnic origin. 
A similar concept of multiple discrimination is provided by Art. 1 of Decree No. 
216/2003, which states that the implementation of equal treatment, irrespective of religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, as regards employment and occupation must 
be carried out in "perspective that also takes into account the different impact that the same 
forms of discrimination can have on women and men". Multiple discrimination, therefore, 
is not properly defined and it is perceived by the legislator only as an intersection between 
the grounds of gender and other discriminatory factors. In this regard, some scholars made 
it clear that in this case, multiple discrimination does not represent a mere sum of factors, 
but rather factors that interact with each other, producing negative exponential effects".33 
With regard to the case law, it is to notice that in Italy there is a group of cases in 
which gender discrimination could be recorded in combination with another ground of 
discrimination. These cases related to the pensionable age, which, in the Italian system, is 
lower for women than it is for men, although women can choose to keep working until the 
age provided for men. The criterion of reaching the age of retirement, irrespective of the 
lower pensionable age of women, is discriminatory both on the ground of gender and age. 
For this reason women can retire in younger age and earlier than man, despite the fact that 
women can choose to keep working until the retirement age provided for men.34 
Despite the explicit recognition of a double combination of two risk factors, one of 
which is always represented by gender, in Italian case law some issue related to the double 
disadvantage were addressed regarding combination alien-disable. In 1998, the Constitutional 
Court extended to aliens lawfully residing in the Italian territory the form of "special 
protection of disadvantaged groups of citizens" (Sentenza n. 454 del 30.12.1998, in CC, 
1998). In 2005, the Constitutional Court also declared unconstitutional the provision of the 
31
 Gottardi, D.: Le discriminazioni basate sulla razza e sull 'origine etnica (Disriminations based 
on race and ethnic origin). In: Barbera, M. (ed.): Il nuovo ... op. cit. 1-42, at 24. 
32
 Gottardi, D.: Datte discriminazioni di genere aile discriminazioni doppie e sovrapposte: le 
transizioni (From gender discrimination to double and overlapping discrimination: the transitions) 
Milano, 2003, 250. 
33
 Ibid. 251. 
34
 The European Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender Equality, note 24, at.77. 
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regional law of Lombardy concerning local public transport in so far it did not include 
foreign residents among the persons entitled to free travel on public transport services 
reserved to totally disabled persons (Sentenza n. 432 del 2.12.2005, in CC, 2005).35 
Nevertheless, the case law that deals with this issue, which is very limited, does not 
deal with the hypothesis of multiple discrimination. Thus, in Italian case law, there are no 
cases of multiple discrimination involving gender discrimination and one or more other 
grounds of discrimination.36 
5. Concluding remarks 
The legal protection against discrimination based on the different grounds varies from one 
EU country to another. Many states have not provided for any interpretation or definition of 
grounds, limiting themselves to including the various grounds in the national implementation 
legislation without paying attention to their meaning. The discrimination on some grounds 
(age, disability and sexual orientation) is less covered by national laws than other grounds. 
In fact, national legislation may prohibit discrimination for all the grounds but only in some 
areas of life. 
A growing body of academic and community-based research shows that across the EU 
especially homosexuals face relevant discrimination in access to social protection, health 
care and services, education, housing, goods and services. In this respect, EU anti-
discrimination law has not yet fully recognised and provided protection for multiple 
discrimination outside the employment field, except in relation to race and gender. 
At European level, plans should be made for the introduction specific provisions to 
tackle multiple discrimination. The most important issue is finding a shared definition of 
multiple discrimination.37 Thus, an EU definition of multiple discrimination and a specific 
prohibition of it to be implemented by national legislation would be crucial to introduce 
into domestic legislation the protection against this form of discrimination.38 Furthermore, 
an EU definition would play an important role in creating a common understanding of the 
concept, as has happened before in relation to concepts contained in the Directives on 
discrimination.39 
35
 See Gottardi, D.: Le discriminazioni... op. cit. note 28, at. 25. 
36
 As observed by Simonetta Renga, in The European Network of Legal Experts in the Field of 
Gender Equality, Multiple Discrimination in EU Law (see note 24), in Italy there are cases where the 
criterion of reaching retirement is regarded as discriminatory exclusively on grounds of age, the 
gender ground being ignored ( Tribunate Milano 27/4/2005) and cases where the existence of gender 
discrimination is denied and the age ground is not taken into consideration at all either (Cassazione 
No. 9866/2007; Cassazione No. 20455/2006; Tribunale Genova 30/9/1997), 78. 
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1. Introduction 
Thomas Hammarberg, Council of Europe's High Commissioner on Human Rights, in a 
report issued on 7 September 2011, expressed grave concerns about anti-gypsyism widely 
diffused in the Italian society.1 
According to Mr. Hammarberg, policies adopted by the Italian government against 
criminality, and in particular forced evictions of Roma and Sinti from illegal settlements 
carried out in several Italian municipalities since 2008, raised some concerns about their 
compatibility with international human rights' law, and in particular with the right to an 
adequate housing, to the right not to be discriminated on an ethnic basis and with the right 
to education of children. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the compatibility of the Italian anti-discrimination 
legislation with European and international standards and if and in which degree Italy has 
violated or violates fundamental rights of Roma and Sinti.2 
In this vein, it starts with a brief overview of international human rights' standards 
applicable to Roma and Sinti, with particular reference to economic, social and cultural 
rights. The survey will encompass the activity of the United Nations (UN) as well as of 
regional organizations, such as the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU). 
The second part of the article is devoted to the Italian legislation, with particular reference 
to the legal status of Roma and Sinti and to the main legal measures adopted in response to 
violence committed by them against Italian citizens in 2008 and 2009 (the declared state of 
"Nomad Emergency"). Particular attention will be also paid to anti-discrimination existing 
laws. 
2. Roma and Sinti and International Human Rights' Law 
In recent years, issues related to Roma people have regularly come up in activities within 
international forums, such as the United Nations and several European institutions (namely, 
Council of Europe, OSCE and EU). The problem of Roma and Sinti is one of the most 
* Ph.D., Researcher of International Law at the Institute for International Legal Studies, 
National Research Council (ISG1-CNR), Italy. 
E-mail: iljapavone@libero.it 
1
 Report by Thomas Hammarberg. Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe, following his visit to Italy from 26 to 27 May 2011. Strasbourg, 7 September 2011, 
CommDH(2011)26. 
2
 In line with OSCE documents, this paper uses the term Roma and Sinti in order to describe 
the population which in official Italian documents are commonly referred to "nomadi" (nomads) or 
"zingari" (gypsies). 
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delicate challenges posed to the human rights and institutional framework of the last decade 
and is strictly related to the rights of migrants. Far from showing a lack of applicable 
standards, the current international scene presents a large set of provisions relevant to the 
situation of Roman people, couched in a plurality of forms and reflecting varying degrees 
of legal significance. Although a specific treaty regarding Roma and Sinti does not exist, 
guidance on their rights can be mainly found in multilateral treaties concerning rights of 
minorities. 
In this respect, equality and non-discrimination, well-established principles of 
international human rights law are also of particular importance to Roma and Sinti and their 
members. They are prescribed in the UN Charter (Art. 1 para. 33 and Art. 55 subpara, (с) 
and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Art. 2). The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights contain general and specific clauses to the same effect. Specialised instruments too, 
contain anti-discrimination clauses, including the ICERD (1965), the UN Declaration on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and 
Belief (1981), the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), ILO Convention No. 
11 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (1958), the 
UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice (1978), and the UNESCO Convention 
Discrimination in Education (1960). Regional human rights instruments, such as the ECHR 
(Art. 14), include comparable clauses. As noted earlier, the Additional Protocol No. 12 to 
the ECHR embodies a general prohibition of discrimination, which provides a scope of 
protection broader than that of Art. 14 of the ECHR. The EU addressed specifically the 
topic of discrimination and xenophobia against Roma people in several documents. Among 
them, the Declaration on the Use of Racist, Antisemitic and Xenophobic elements in 
political discourse by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)3 
provides guidance to member States on how to improve their legislations in this field. 
Also, ECRI's General Policy Recommendation No. 11 provides extensive guidance on both 
improving the response of the police to racist offences and combating racially-motivated 
misconduct by the police. 
The principles of equality and non-discrimination are also widely acknowledged, at 
least in racial matters, as forming part of customary international law binding all States. 
Support for this view comes from authoritative instruments such as those cited, authoritative 
legal institutions such as the UN International Law Commission and the ICJ Barcelona 
Traction case (Second Phase) (ICJ Reports 1970:32) and advisory opinion in the case 
concerning Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (ICJ 
Reports 1971: 56-57). 
It is thus clear that any meaningful existence of minority rights, although "functionally" 
supported by physical existence and anti-discrimination standards, poses issues which are 
separated addressed by international law. In other words, physical existence and anti-
discrimination entitlements are not "minority rights" but rather essential starting points to 
enable their protection. The first multilateral treaty specifically recognizing minorities' 
3
 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, The Use of Racist, Antisemitic and 
Xenophobic Elements in Political Discourse. December 2005. 
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rights is the ICCPR (Art. 27).4 However, the most important treaty devoted to minorities' 
protection is the Council of Europe's Framework Convention of the Protection of National 
Minorities of 1995.5 
The discussion on Roma and Sinti's fundamental rights is also focused on economic, 
social and cultural rights, due to their condition of poverty and illiteracy. Among them, the 
most prominent is the right to an adequate housing.6 International human rights law 
recognizes everyone's right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate housing. 
This right is often recalled in the debate on Roma and Sinti's fundamental rights because 
forced evictions of illegal settlements have been carried out in several EU Countries, such 
as Italy and France. 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has underlined that the 
right to adequate housing, although foresees exemption clauses for security reasons, should 
not be interpreted narrowly. Rather, it should be seen as the right to live somewhere in 
security, peace and dignity. The characteristics of the right to adequate housing are clarified 
mainly in the Committee's general comments No. 4 (1991) on the right to adequate housing 
and No. 7 (1997) on forced evictions. 
In particular, the content of this right is quite clear: States Parties must make sure that 
evictions are justified and are carried out in conditions that respect the dignity of the persons 
concerned, and that alternative accommodation is available. The law must also establish 
eviction procedures, specifying when they may not be carried out (for example, at night or 
during winter), provide legal remedies and offer legal aid to those who need it to seek 
redress from the courts. Compensation for illegal evictions must also be provided. 
More details on the issue are included in the Recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on improving the housing conditions of Roma and 
Travellers in Europe, which contains a series of recommendations relating to general 
principles, legal frameworks, preventing and combating discrimination, protection and 
improvement of existing housing, frameworks for housing policies, financing of housing 
and housing standards.7 The Strasbourg Declaration on Roma, adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 20 October 20108 is also a significant document because contains an 
4
 Article 27 of the ICCIP states: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of the group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or use 
their own language". 
5
 See Pentassuglia, G.: Minorities in International Law. Strasbourg, 2002. 
6
 These include: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 
Art. 11 para. I); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 17); the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (Art. 27 para. 3); the international Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (Art. 5e); and the revised European Social Charter. The UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has also emphasized that "the right to housing should not be 
interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense which equates it with, for example, the shelter provided by 
merely having a roof over one's head or which views shelter exclusively as a commodity. Rather, it 
should be seen as the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity." 
7
 Recommendation Rec(2005)4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Improving 
The Housing Conditions of Roma and Travellers in Europe, adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
on 23 February 2005. 
8
 Council of Europe High Level Meeting on Roma, Strasbourg, 20 October 2010 "The 
Strasbourg Declaration on Roma", CM(2010)133 final. 
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"unequivocal condemnation of racism, stigmatization, and hate speech directed against 
Roma, particularly in public and political discourse". The Council also called for "measures 
to foster knowledge of the culture, history, and languages of Roma and understanding 
thereof ' . 
3. Roma and Sinti in the Italian Legal Framework 
The Italian legal framework encompasses special measures on public security specifically 
addressed to Roma and Sinti, as well as an anti-discrimination corpus of laws against 
xenophobia and racism which indirectly relates to the gypsies'community. Since May 2008, 
a number of government decisions have been issued concerning the Roma and Sinti 
communities, or "nomads", as they are commonly referred to in Italy. These measures were 
in part justified by concerns regarding crime, because Romanian Roma migrants have 
attracted considerable public attention and negative media coverage due to a growing 
prejudice and link between Roma and Sinti migrants, criminality and threats to public 
security. In fact, data show an increase in the crime rate coinciding with the inflow of Roma 
and Sinti population into Italy, especially after Romania joined the EU. This policy is legally 
justified by the "margin of appreciation" enjoyed in principle by national authorities in the 
choice and implementation of security policies that allow a derogation to some fundamental 
rights for security reasons. However, in the last months, the government has realized that a 
policy specifically devoted to the social problems related to the presence of Roma people, 
supporting the anti-crime measures, was necessary. To this aim, the third Biennial National 
Plan of Actions and Interventions to protect the rights of individuals and children's 
development9 contains several measures to promote inter-culturalism, including measures 
to help Roma, Sinti and Travellers children.10 
3.1. The Legal Status of Roma and Sinti 
Groups of Roma and Sinti migrated to Italy during different periods, beginning in the 14th 
century and they have been discriminated and stigmatized in the past by the fascist regime. 
In fact, since 1940 the fascist regime interned many of them in concentration camps in Italy 
and many of them were deported to concentration camps in Germany." Porrajmos is the 
Rontani term introduced by Romani scholar and activists to describe attempts by Nazi 
Germany, the Independent State of Croatia, Horthy's Hungary and their allies to exterminate 
most of the Romani people of Europe as part of the Holocaust. 
These events testify that many Roma people have been living in Italy since centuries 
and their offspring continues to live in Italy, but their descendants, in spite of having been 
9
 Adopted by Presidential Decree January 21, 2011, and published in the Official Gazette N. 
106 of May 9. 2011. 
10
 In particular the attention has drawn to the following: Action for the foreigners' family 
reunification; action for support, education and employment for accompanying minors involved in 
criminal proceedings, including Roma, Sinti, Travellers children as well as minor migrants children; 
action for the prevention of school dropout of children, including Roma, Sinti and Travellers children 
as well as immigrant minors, and implementation of social inclusion interventions; action to protect 
the right to health for Roma, Sinti and Travellers children and teenagers; action for the promotion of 
intercultural trainings for teaching staffs and headmasters. 
11
 In 2011, Pope Benedict XVI, during a meeting with Roma and Sinti's representatives, stated 
that the mass murder of Roma people by the Nazis was "still a little known drama". 
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born and lived there all their lives are de facto stateless.12 Furthermore, in the Italian legal 
framework, Roma and Sinti are not yet considered as a minority group and do not enjoy of 
the rights guaranteed to the minorities. In fact, Law No. 482/1999 promulgated on 15 
December 1999 in order to put into practice the fundamental principle on the defence of 
minorities provided for by Art. 6 of the Constitution, recognizes 12 linguistic minorities at 
Art. 2 para. 1, but Roma and Sinti are not included in this list.13 According to the Italian 
legislation, Roma and Sinti cannot be given national minority status because they are not 
linked to a specific part of the Italian territory and therefore cannot be recognized as a 
historic and linguistic minority. The Italian government explained that: "The basic criteria 
for the label of "linguistic minority" depend on the stability and duration of the settlement 
in a delimited area of the country, which is not the case for Roma populations." There have 
been efforts to recognize Italian Roma and Sinti as a minority, but they have not been 
successful. This would allows for the application of the specific juridical consequences 
established by the regulations and those that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
has tied sic et simpliciter to this status. 
However, as outlined by many scholars, nomadism commonly considered as a 
distinctive label of Roma and Sinti populations, is no more a specific feature of this 
population: social and economical transformations of the last century have determined the 
disappearance or the drastic reorganization of many activities at the basis of nomadism; 
their language, the Romanes, is only spoken by few people that identify themselves as 
Roma, a common State such as a common religion do not exist (although many of them 
have the Italian citizenship); the same cultural traditions are different depending on the 
different migratory trajectories of every familiar group.14 The non-recognition of their status 
of minority implies that many of them are technically subjected to Italian migration law and 
their legal position varies depending on several factors. 
The 150,000 Roma and Sinti resident in Italy, according to data provided by the 
Ministry of Interior, include Italian citizens, as well as citizens of both EU and non-EU 
countries,15 with three different legal status. After Romania's accession to the EU in January 
2007, the Romanian Roma became EU citizens and gained the right to free movement 
within the European Union. They enjoy therefore the rights related to their status of citizens 
of the European Union, including the right of free movement without the Italian territory 
and the right not to be expulsed. 
Among the non-European citizens, families belonging to different ethnic groups and 
religions were forced to flee to Italy because of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The khorahané of Islamic religion come from the southern and central 
12
 To this regards, Mr. Hammarberg in his report of 7 September 2011, urged Italy to ratify the 
European Convention on Nationalities without apposing reservations. 
13
 Legge 15 dicembre 1999, n. 482, "Norme in materia di tutela delle minoranze linguistiche 
storiche", published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale of 20.12.1999. 
14
 Due to this difficulty to get correct data on Roma people, some states, such as Romania and 
the United Kingdom, have proposed an ethnic census. Such a measure, according to the European 
Commission (2000/43/EC), is legal admissible only if its goal is to avoid any form of discrimination. 
In the United Kingdom the collection of ethnical information is mainly based on laws that in particular, 
the Law on Statistics, the Data Protection Act and the Race Relation (Amendment) Act of 2000. 
15
 On this issue see Loy, G.: La condizione dei Rom in Italia (The condition of Roma in Italiy). 
In: Cherchi, R.-Loy, G. (eds): Rom e Sinti in Italia (Roma and Sinti in Italy). Roma, 2009. 
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regions of Yugoslavia, the dasikané Christian-Orthodox from Serbia, the zergarja, yet 
Muslims, from Bosnia, the rundasha from Montenegro. 
Many of them have the status of asylum seekers and are resident on the Italian territory 
with a regular permit of stay, others are instead "irregular", that means without a permit 
of stay. 
Considered that Roma from Western Balkans are non-EU nationals, many of them 
have no documents providing their identity or places of origin rendering them de facto 
stateless (with particular negative consequences for children). They are therefore technically 
subject to Italian immigration legislation. 
The Italian immigration law (Act 286/1998) is based on annual quotas for people who 
want to enter Italy to work. Prior to seeking citizenship, a non-citizen must obtain a permit 
of stay and then apply to the local municipality for a legal residence. Permits of stay are 
given to foreigners based on proof of a minimum level of income; in case of Roma this 
poses a challenge, as most Roma live in illegal settlements and they cannot or don't want to 
have job opportunities.16 In practice, it is very difficult to change one's status from illegal to 
legal; so many migrants remain without papers, accepting very bad working and living 
conditions. In 2009, Italy adopted Law No. 94 on public security,17 in response to the huge 
inflow of migrants from Northern Africa and Eastern Europe, which is one of the strictest 
laws on migrants in Europe. Law No. 94/2009 presents considerable amendments in matters 
concerning immigration, among which the most important is the introduction of the new 
crime of "illegal entry and sojourn in the territory of the State" (Art. 1, subpara. 16), 
entrusted to the competence of the Justice of Peace, which punishes the behaviour of a 
foreigner who enters or remains in the State. The offence is accompanied by the expulsion 
of the alien. These expulsions are "security measures" that can be imposed by a judge in 
cases where a non-citizen is found guilty of a crime and sentenced to at least two years 
imprisonment. Previously, 10 years was the minimum sentence required to enact this kind 
of measure. Failure to comply with a removal or expulsion order is itself a crime entailing 
imprisonment for between one and four years. Another new crime regards housing: renting 
homes to foreigners residing irregularly in Italy is a criminal offence and landlords may be 
sentenced to prison for between six months and three years, and face the confiscation of the 
home in the case of a final verdict. Another feature of the law provides increased powers to 
mayors. In particular, they can adopt urgent measures "for the purpose of preventing and 
eliminating serious dangers that threaten public safety and urban security", ensuring also 
the cooperation of local police forces with the state police force. As outlined by Mr. 
Hammarberg, in his report of 2011, the security package, in combination with the 
"emergency legislation", has considerably worsened the conditions of Roma people in 
Italy. 
3.2. The Nomad Emergency Measures and the Right to Housing 
Since May 2008, following the violent murder of an Italian woman in the suburbs of Roma 
by a nomad, a number of government decisions have been issued concerning the Roma and 
Sinti communities. The Prime Minister issued a decree declaring a "state of emergency" in 
16
 In Hungary, the government has foreseen a compulsory job placement for Roma and Sinti in 
activities with a relevant social impact. 
17
 Legge 15 luglio 2009, n. 94, "Disposizioni in materia di sicurezza pubblica" "on Public 
Security". Gazzetta Ufficiale, N. 170 del 24 Luglio 2009. 
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relation to settlements of "nomad" communities in some regions (measure based on Law n. 
225/1992 which deals with emergency situations arising from severe natural disasters), that 
together with the legislation and extraordinary powers flowing from it have provided the 
bedrock for forced evictions of illegal settlements. "Ordinances" introducing special and 
exceptional measures concerning "nomad settlements" in the three regions (Lazio, 
Lombardy, Campania) have also been adopted. The ordinances appointed the prefects of 
Rome, Milan and Naples as "delegated commissioners" empowered to "realize all the 
interventions needed to overcome the state of emergency" declared in the Prime Minister's 
decree.18 Furthermore, in 2008 the Ministry of Interior signed security pacts with local 
authorities. They include references to security issues related to the presence of irregular 
migrants and nomads and issued related to illegal settlements and they give tot the prefects 
various powers, including the power to establish working groups. 
The state of emergency, which is still in force in five regions,19 brought to forced 
eviction of illegal settlements in several municipalities20 that have raised concerns on the 
impact of these practices on the right to housing and other human rights of Roma people.2' 
The critics are not related to the measure itself, because the States have the right to pursue 
forced evictions if they are deemed as necessary due to security issues and constitute an 
adequate and proportional response to the issues of criminality related to Roma people. 
They concern mainly the lack of procedural safeguards, because they were often carried out 
with no prior notice and no possibility to file an appeal, and involving the full dismantling 
of the settlement and destruction of inhabitants' personal belongings. In most cases, no 
alternative accommodation was provided.22 
It should be noted that according to the Ministry of Interior's guidelines of 17 July 
2008, forced evictions are not a punitive measure but an instrument for discouraging other 
Roma from settling illegally and providing them with better accommodations.23 
18
 See Pavone, I. R.: Italian experiences in combating hate crimes and hate speech in light of 
recent violence by and against Roma. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 51 (2010) 3, 187-197. 
19
 A Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 17 December 2010 (Official Gazette 
No. 304 of 30/12/2010) extended the "state of emergency for the continuation of initiatives relating to 
Nomad communities settlements on the territories of the regions of Campania, Latium, Lombardy, 
Piedmont and Veneto" until 31 December 2011. 
20
 For instance, in Rome, the local "Nomad Plan" of 2009 has foreseen the forced eviction of 
several illegal settlement in the city and the relocation of about 6 000 nomads. 
21
 See the Memorandum of Thomas Hammarberg, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights, following his visit to Italy, 19-20 June 2008, CommDH(2008)18; Report by Thomas 
Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, following his visit to Italy, 
13-15 January 2009, CommDH(2009)40. 
22
 See OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, High Commissioner on 
National Minorities: Assessment of the Human Rights Situation of Roma and Sinti in Italy. Report of a 
Fact-Finding Mission to Milan, Naples and Roma on 20-26 July 2008. Warsaw, The Hague, March 
2009, 9. 
23
 Linee guida del Ministero dell'Interno, 17 luglio 2011, per Tattuazione delle ordinanze del 
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri del 30 maggio 2008, n. 3676, 3677 e 3678, concementi 
insediamenti di comunità nomadi nelle regioni Campania, Lazio e Lombardia, Ministry of Interior, 
Rome, 17 July 2008. The report is available at the following website: http://www.intemo.it/minintemo/ 
exports/sites/default/it/assets/files/15/0095_censimento_campi_nomadile_linee_guida_pdf. 
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In 2010, the European Committee of Social Rights, the monitoring body foreseen by 
the European Charter on Social Rights, received a collective complaint against Italy.24 In its 
decision of June 2010, the Committee established that the practice of forced evictions of 
Roma people as well as the violent act accompanying such evictions constituted an 
aggravated violation of Art. E (right not to be discriminated)25 taken in conjunction with Art. 
31.1 (on the reduction of homelessness) (paras 53-59); that the living conditions of Roma 
and Sinti in camps, which had worsened following the "security measures", constituted a 
violation of Art. E taken in conjunction with Art. 31.2 (on access to housing of an adequate 
standard) and that the segregation of Roma and Sinti in camps, resulting from local and 
national housing policies which assume Roma to be nomads and fail to meet their needs, 
violated Art. E taken in conjunction with Art. 31.3 (on affordable housing) (paras 80-91). 
The Committee adopted therefore a recommendation addressed to Italy in which it 
suggested some political and legislative measures aimed at improving the living conditions 
of Roma people in Italy. 
It is worth mentioning that the same policy of forced evictions pursued in France in 
spring 2011 has raised some issues about its compliance with Art. 27.2 of Directive 2004/38/ 
CE,26 that establishes that: "Measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security 
shall comply with the principle of proportionality and shall be based exclusively on the 
personal conduct of the individual concerned". In fact, this policy, according to its critics, 
would affect one particular ethnic group instead of examining the behaviour of the single 
individual. 
3.3. Xenophobia and Intolerance in the Political Discourse 
The principle of non-discrimination is one of the main pillars of Italian Constitution (Art. 3) 
upon which the domestic legislative system is based and enforced, particularly by the 
domestic Courts. The Criminal Code of Italy contains provisions that expressly enable the 
racist or other bias motives of the offender to be taken into account by the courts as an 
aggravating circumstance when sentencing. In particular, Sec. 3(l)(b) of Law 654/1975, as 
amended by Sec. 3 of the Law 205/1993 introduces a general aggravating circumstance for 
all offences committed with a view to discrimination on racial, ethnic, national or religious 
ground or in order to help organizations with such purposes. It is also worth mentioning 
that Legislative Decree No. 215 of 9 July 2003 established the UNAR (National Office 
24
 The Complainant Organisation alleged that the housing situation of Roma in Italy amounted 
to a violation of Art. 31 of the Charter (right to housing). Article 31 states: "Everyone has the right to 
housing. With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to housing, the Parties undertake 
to take measures designed: to promote access to housing of an adequate standard; to prevent and 
reduce homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination; to make the price of housing accessible to 
those without adequate resources.". 
25
 Art. E enshrines the prohibition of discrimination and establishes an obligation to ensure that, 
in the absence of objective and reasonable justifications, any group with particular characteristics, 
including Roma, benefit in practice from the rights in the Charter. 
26
 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/22I/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC, OJ L 158/77 (30.04.2004). 
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against Racial Discriminations), as a monitoring body, with the competence of receiving 
and analyzing individual petitions of victims of racial discriminations. 
The UNAR carries out in an autonomous and independent way activity of promotion 
against any form of racism and intolerance. In particular it provides judicial assistance, it 
carries out inquiries and it disseminates information and knowledge on this topic. 
The Italian government considers that the fight against racism and xenophobia is a 
long-term process and that legislative and judicial measures had to be complemented by 
efforts at all levels, particularly through the education system, which is why the Ministry of 
Education, University and Research had developed specific educational programmes with a 
marked intercultural approach.27 
However, in spite of the completeness of the Italian legal framework on this topic, 
racist and xenophobic political discourse in Italy, targeting notably Roma and Sinti, is 
unfortunately, yet widely diffused. This type of discourse is a powerful vector of anti-
Gypsyism in Italian society and as a result, it also offsets the benefits of social inclusion 
work for Roma and Sinti carried out in Italy. Several international bodies called on the 
Italian authorities to act urgently this phenomenon. The Committee on Social Rights, in its 
decision on a collective complaint against Italy referred to above, underlined that the use of 
xenophobic political discourse against Roma and Sinti violated Art. E (non-discrimination) 
of the treaty.28 The Committee considered this as an aggravated violation, noting that "the 
racist misleading propaganda against migrant Roma and Sinti [was] indirectly allowed or 
directly emanating from the Italian authorities.29 Furthermore, in its October 2010 Opinion, 
the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, was "deeply concerned" at the increasingly common presence of racially 
inflammatory public discourse targeting notably the Roma and Sinti, Muslims and migrants 
in the discourse of certain prominent political figures and considered this situation to be 
incompatible with Art. 6 of the Convention. Also, Mr. Hammarberg, in his 2011 report, 
continued to be concerned at the presence of racist and xenophobic political discourse in 
Italy, targeting notably Roma and Sinti. 
As underlined by the Italian Observation on the Report by the reply drafted by the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,30 the Italian legal system already envisages a specific 
system of criminal protection to counter expressions of racism and xenophobia, which 
include expressions of thoughts aimed at disseminating ideas based on racial or ethnic 
superiority, hatred language as well as at the incitement to commit acts of discrimination or 
of violence for racial, ethnic and/or religious reasons. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
As outlined in the present paper, the Italian legal framework already encompasses principles 
and standards foreseen by multilateral treaties on human rights. With particular reference to 
xenophobia, intolerance and anti-Gypsyism in the political discourse, the Italy already 
27
 See www.miur.it. 
28
 European Committee of Social Rights, Decision on the merits, Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (СОНRE) v. Italy, Complaint No. 58/2009, 25 June 2010, para. 136-140. 
29
 Ibid. para. 139. 
30
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Inter-ministerial Committee of Human Rights. Italian Observation 
on the Report by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, T. Hammarberg. 
following his visit to Italy (May, 26—27, 2011). 
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complies with European and international standards. However, as underlined by international 
bodies, some shortcomings should be addresses. The UN Human Rights Council, as well as 
Mr. Hammarberg in his report of 7 September 2011, suggested Italy to re-establish adequate 
penalties against incitement to racial discrimination and violence, following the mitigation 
of the sanctions fro these offences introduced in Italy through Law 85/2006. This is 
undoubtedly the most urgent legislative measure to be adopted. 
Further improvements are however essentials. First of all, the lack of a national strategy 
for the social inclusion of Roma people has been highlighted as the main flaw at international 
and at national level.31 It would provide coherence and support to the efforts carried out at 
regional and at local level. In fact, in Italy there are currently 11 regional laws concerning 
Roma, Sinti and Caminanti and several local and municipal ordinances, but coordination 
among this set of measures is missing. 
Despite these critics, the Italian authorities are committed to adopting specific 
measures, to improve security for all citizens and to better address integration and/or 
immigration-related issues. Most recent measures, such as those included in the "security 
package", are meant to curb criminal behaviours of individuals. No provision is envisaged 
against any community, group or class, nor is linked to any form of discrimination and 
xenophobia. The stigmatization of minorities has always been a source of concern, and the 
recent episodes of violence against Roma communities had been condemned by all political 
forces and were subject to judicial investigation. However, with regard to forced evictions 
of people living in unauthorized camps, Italy noted that they were sometimes necessary to 
ensure appropriate and legal living conditions and that, wherever possible, the persons 
involved were consulted in advance. 
31
 Senato della Commissione Straordinaria per la tutela e la promozione dei diritti umani. See, 
also, the special report presented in 2011 at the Italian Senate (Rapporto conclusivo dell'indagine 
sulla condizione di Rom, Sinti e Caminanti in Italia, 9 febbraio 2011). 
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ANDREA CRESCENZI* 
The Role of the Equality Bodies. The Italian National Office 
against Racial Discriminations 
1. The EU Directive on Racial Equality 
EU Members States have been required to create laws for the promotion of equal treatment 
on the grounds of race or ethnic origin and in order to put into effect the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women since the Racial Equality Directive and the amended 
Gender Equal Treatment Directive came into force in 2000 and 2002, respectively. ' 
Fighting discrimination and enforcing legislation against discriminatory treatment is 
only one facet of the strategy: the EU founding treaties and directives call on Member 
States to endorse preventive and proactive anti-discrimination policies, by conferring their 
bodies specific competences in the field of equality promotion.2 
There is an ample evidence that strategies based solely on litigation and court decisions 
would fail to promote equality and bring about a significant reduction of discriminatory 
practices. Most national equality bodies (many of which predate the issuing of EU anti-
discrimination directives) have appraised this evidence and recognized the need for more 
effective strategies, integrating enforcement and development. 
Some EU Member States have therefore issued laws that require public services and 
enterprises to uphold compulsory positive duties. The national equality bodies, in turn, may 
be expected to participate in the implementation process and to help monitor the compliance 
of affected institutions. While this strategy has proved the most effective in addressing 
indirect discrimination, other countries have opted instead for a softer approach, whereby 
the adoption of positive action measures relies entirely on the good will of stakeholders. 
That is the scenario that has recently lead a few equality bodies to place additional 
resources in order to identity the most effective ways to prevent discrimination, promote 
and foster substantive equality, and possibly reduce the number of complaints. 




 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Official Journal L. 180, pp. 22-26 . See also 
Brennan, F.: The Race Directive. The Cambridge yearbook of European LegalSstudies, 2002-2003, 
311-331; Barbera M. (ed.): II nuovo diritto antidiscriminatorio (The New Antidiscrimination Law). 
Milano, 2007, 6; Howard, E.: The EU Race Directive. Developing the Protection Against Racial 
Discrimination within the EU. London, 2010. 
2
 On the principles of equality and non-discrimination in general see: Vandenhole, W.: Non-
Discrimination and Equality in the View of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies. Oxford, 2005. 
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2. Several Typologies of Equality Bodies 
Most Member States responded to the EU directives either by creating new bodies for the 
promotion of equality, or by increasing the powers of any existing ones.3 A few Member 
States (Belgium, Cyprus, Sweden, Ireland and the Netherlands) have exceeded the 
requirements of Directive 2000/43/EC by creating equality bodies in charge of all aspects 
of discrimination covered by EU anti-discrimination laws as well as more general human 
rights issues. The minimum Directive requirement is for the bodies to be able to provide 
independent support to discrimination victims, carry out independent surveys of 
discrimination issues, publish unbiased reports and bring forth relevant recommendations. 
Equality bodies in the Member States include Labour Inspectorates, Commissions and 
Ombudsmen, which may be called on to share the tasks defined by the Directive. In Greece, 
for instance, the Labour Inspectorate is in charge of equality promotion in the employment 
field, while the Ombudsman is tasked of dealing with non-employment matters, issuing 
reports and making recommendations as needed.4 
It should be now apparent that while equality bodies are entitled to provide legal 
counsel to individual discrimination victims, they can only support a limited number of 
cases before the courts. Lactor of choice include the strategic importance of the legal point 
in question, the financial and human resources of the equality body, and the availability of 
other sources of support for the victim, for instance from associations or trade unions. 
A number of equality bodies overtly aim to exclusively support strategic litigation. In 
addition, a few equality bodies will provide informed opinions-at the request of individual 
of legal persons-as to the compliance of a given practice with national anti-discrimination 
laws; in most countries such opinions are not legally binding, but provide a recognised 
standard of good practice. Individuals wishing to obtain a legally binding decision will thus 
have to pursue the matter before the courts. 
In some Member States, greater focus is placed on promoting equal opportunities and 
preventing discrimination rather than providing legal support for individual cases. This is 
the case of the Finnish Ombudsman for Minorities, which deals with a number of awareness-
raising initiatives. 
Funding is a major limiting factor for the efficacy of an equality body, and significant 
differences in financial and human resource allocation have been observed throughout the 
Member States. The presence of federal and regional government structures in some 
Member States can further affect a body's work, to the point of rendering it powerless to act 
on matters outside its own specific area of competence. 
3. The Italian Office Against Racial Discrimination 
There were approximately four millions documented non-nationals residing in Italy on the 
1st of January 2010. 
3
 The European Network of Equality Bodies (EQUfNET), established in 2007, brings together 
33 member organisations f rom 28 European countries. Equality Bodies were established across the 
Member States of the European Union to promote equality and to combat discrimination in the areas 
covered by the EU Equal Treatment Directives; http://www.equinetcurope.org 
4
 Ammer, M.-Crowley, N.-Liegl, B.-Holzleithner, E.-Wladasch, K.-Yesilkagit, К .Study on 
Equality Bodies set up under Directives 2000/43/EC. 2004/113/EC and 2006/54/EC. 2010, pp. 64 ss. 
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Nearly half of these figure come from elsewhere in Europe and nearly a quarter from 
Africa. Romanians, Albanians, Moroccans, Chinese and Ukrainians are the largest groups. 
Most of them work in the services sector (53.8%), but with substantial numbers also in 
the industry (35.3%), and in the agriculture (7.3%). More than 80% are employed in small 
businesses. The vast majority of migrant workers are employed in low-skilled and low-paid 
jobs, usually as unskilled workers, construction labourers, farm labourers, domestic help, 
waiters, cleaning staff, and care workers for the elderly. Migrant women are concentrated in 
domestic work and in care-provision.5 
Italy created the National Office against Racial Discrimination UNAR in 2003, in 
response to the EU Race Directive that obliged member states to designate a body for 
promoting equal treatment irrespective of race and ethnicity.6 
The Office is under the Department for Equal Opportunities of the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers. The Office is intended to be a reference point for people who claim to 
be victims of racial and ethnic discrimination, as well as an institutional body to monitor 
the effectiveness of instruments for the protection of equal treatment. The UNAR has a staff 
of civil servants and external consultants, including lawyers, judges, and experts in the 
social sciences. It works in co-operation with trade unions and business associations to 
promote positive action through training courses, information campaigns and the promotion 
of codes of conduct in the workplace. The UNAR is also supposed to provide information 
and advice to policy makers in order to assist them addressing racial discrimination. 
The National Office Against Racial Discriminations is starting a new program of 
actions to be implemented at the national level, thank to a joint effort of Regions and local 
authorities, in order to create an integrated system to prevent and contrast racial 
discriminations. 
The first main action concerns the transformation of the existing Call Centre Service 
into a web-based Contact Centre with access for potential victims or witnesses of 
discriminations, who will compile a form in their own language which will be immediately 
processed. 
A second field of intervention refers to the conversion of the current UNAR Office in 
UNA, National Office against Discriminations (i.e. not only discrimination on racial or 
ethnic grounds) is currently under consideration. 
With reference to regional centres provided for by Legislative Decree No. 286/1998, 
Art. 44 para. 12, UNAR started on July 2005 a national monitoring over all existing centres 
together with National Coordination Body for Social Integration Policies for Foreign 
Nationals (NCB), set up within the National Council for the Economy and Labour (CNEL). 
This action contemplates to create a national and permanent network among these centres 
in order to promote the dissemination of data and remedies concerning discriminatory 
offences. While using data from regional centres, which contribute to have a local 
understanding of the phenomena, UNAR can give a technical advice to victims of racial or 
ethnic discriminations. In recent years-according to the monitoring-the number of regional 
centres has increased, particularly in the Centre and in the South of Italy. 
5
 Caritas Migrantes: Immigrazione, Dossier statistico 2010, pp. 6 ss. 
6
 Article 7 of the Council of Ministers' Legislative Decree 215/2003 establishing the National 
Office against Racial Discrimination (UNAR). Cfr. Decreto legislativo 9 Iuglio 2003, n. 215 Attuazione 
della direttiva 2000/43/CE per la parità di trattamento tra le persone indipendentemente dalla razza e 
dalforigine etnica (Published in Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 186 of August 12, 2003) http://www.unar.it/. 
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4. The Functions of UNAR 
The intersectionality of race, gender, religion and culture is explicitly pointed out in the 
215/2003 Decree. Article 1 defines the purpose of UNAR as enforcing equal treatment 
regardless of race or ethnic origin and dealing with "both the differential impact that similar 
forms of discrimination can have on women and men and the existence of forms of racism 
with a cultural and religious character". As a governmental measure following EU Directive 
43/2000/EC, UNAR has been unanimously welcomed by civil society organizations 
involved in anti-racism campaigns.7 
The main tasks of UNAR are: 
— to promote measures aiming to prevent or assuage disadvantageous, race- or ethnic 
origin-related situations; 
— to spread information about protective measures, raise awareness and implement 
information/communication campaigns; 
— to carry out studies, research and training and to share expertise with relevant 
associations and institutions, specialised research units and NGOs with a common aim to 
develop guidelines for contrasting discrimination; 
— to provide jurisdictional and administrative support in undertaking proceedings to 
people who report being the target of discriminatory behaviours; 
— to carry out enquiries into the existence and extent of discriminatory episodes, with 
respect for the functions and prerogatives of the judicial authorities; 
— to promote the adoption by public and private bodies (particularly those enrolled in 
the register) of relevant positive measures aiming to avoid or dampen situations of 
disadvantage related to race of ethnicity; 
— to spread knowledge about the means of safeguard currently available, possibly by 
informing public opinion about the principles of equal treatment and by running information/ 
communication campaigns; 
— to draft recommendations and reviews on issues relevant to race and ethnic 
discrimination, along with proposals towards modifying the current legislation. 
The national equality body UNAR published a guideline on how to report websites 
and on-line materials that have discriminatory contents with regard to racism on the Internet. 
UNAR reports the website to the police in order to start a legal action; otherwise, it acts 
directly adopting the most appropriate measure, if the contents of such websites are 
considered to violate criminal law. 
The National Office for Racial Antidiscrimination compiles an annual report for the 
Parliament and the President of the Council of Ministers on the work carried out and 
promotes studies, research, training courses and exchanges, in collaboration with the 
associations and bodies enrolled in the register, with other non-governmental organisations 
operating in the same sphere and with the institutes specialised in gathering statistical data, 
also for drawing up guidelines in the battle against discrimination. 
The Office has created a Register of associations working against discrimination and 
cooperates with them in providing legal assistance and support to victims. 
Associations and bodies promoting social integration and fighting discrimination are 
entitled to proceed according to Art. 5 of Legislative Decree No. 215/2003; authorisation is 
7
 UNAR, Relazione al Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri sulfattività svolta nel 2010, http:// 
www.unar.it. 
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specifically granted to associations and bodies recognised by the Inter-ministerial Decree 
issued by the Minister of Labour and Social Policies and the Minister for Equal Opportunities 
on 16th December 2005 and published on the Official Bulletin of the Italian Republic on 
12th January 2006. 
At present, nearly four hundred associations and bodies are included in the Registry of 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. The minimum entry requirements for registration 
are: a) establishment of the body by public or private deed at least two years prior two 
registration; b) two-year continual track-record in promoting social integration and 
intercultural education; c) publication of a biennial balance sheet. 
A Free Call Centre is available in different languages to offer support to victims who 
have often difficulties to afford the costs of legal assistance. It also provides during the 
proceedings, oral or written information, advices and observations regarding discriminatory 
acts or behaviours, and encourages informal conciliatory activity, providing solutions for 
the eradication of discriminatory situations, also through the creation of a network of 
Territorial Anti-discrimination Points. 
The Italian authorities have indicated that most of these complaints concerned 
employment, housing, access to public services and relations with the police and that none 
of them has resulted in the opening of judicial or administrative proceedings so far. 
The last UNAR Report (2010) has shown that the largest number of discrimination 
concerns mobbing, "access to work" and "working conditions". 
The issue of access to work relates principally to the channels through which private 
work is offered. This is not always an obvious form of discrimination, especially with 
regards to offers of temporary work presented by work agencies, or in the recruitment of 
personnel and the capacity to manage, or mediating actions of unequal treatment in apparent 
respect of the law. 
An initial screening is often carried out at the telephone interview stage, based upon 
the caller's accent. In other cases, candidates are turned down following a request for a 
photograph or for personal information, as was customary for Italian citizens. 
The other aspect of discrimination in the working environment relates to working 
conditions. Often foreign workers are subjected to harassment in the work place that can 
manifest itself in the forms of verbal harassment (offence, defamation and insinuation) and 
physical harassment in the form of mobbing (maltreatment over a long period of time). 
The UNAR highlighted that discrimination suffered by immigrants in access to and 
use of health services are of three types: 1) bureaucratic difficulties (sometimes immigrants 
are requested to meet additional conditions not requested to Italians); 2) difficulties in 
access to specialists medical examinations and 3) they encounter problems when dealing 
with medical personnel and nursing staff. 
With regard to the housing, a common theme can be identified which binds relevant 
cases together: the problems of relationships between neighbours or the rental conditions 
imposed by the property owner. Different complaints pertaining to episodes involving the 
police have been reported to UNAR. This is a very tricky issue. The police are the main 
actor in managing immigration, both in regards to entry into the country and control 
activities within the territory. 
UNAR case-analyses highlight the difficult relationships between immigrants with a 
poor command of the Italian language, as well as the fact that a person's skin colour is often 
regarded by the police as a discriminating factor. 
Discrimination episodes also seem rife in private companies supplying services. 
Conflict has arisen between the management and immigrants about the access to and use of 
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bars, nightclubs and restaurants: immigrants' expectations for services, food and leisure are 
often disregarded by the management, or not met to the same quality standards as Italian 
citizens'. 
At the moment, the Office, in its few public statements, in general has considered 
Roma issues as a priority. 
A very recent problem is that one of the adoption of formally ethnic-blind rules or 
policies that in practice mostly affect members of Romani communities, and are developed 
out of political debates where prejudice against the Roma is evident. This can be observed 
in several policies at both national and local level, ranging from measures concerning free 
movement of EU citizens (in relation to migration flows of Roma from Romania) to a mass 
of urban policing initiatives developed in a number of municipalities. 
Wide space has been devoted to Roma issues in the Office's reports to the Parliament. 
The Office has also implemented a sensitization campaign on discrimination against persons 
of Romani ethnicity, and has participated (although in an informal capacity) in following a 
few critical situations. However, it is hard to identify a clearly defined approach. Given the 
high intensity of Roma-rclated conflicts, the Office's policy easily comes across as passive; 
this in tum might cast doubts over the Office's bonds of loyalty to the executive, especially 
regarding manifestations of anti-Romani hostility that have been substantially backed up by 
political forces. 
Concluding Remarks 
After its institution, the new National Office Against Racial Discriminations started a 
number of initiatives aimed at rising awareness (seminars, public relations actions), some of 
which has a relevant impact. According to the first yearly reports, the office has obtained a 
good degree of visibility, and this has also been accompanied by an increasing attention for 
antidiscrimination issues in legal scholarship. More problematic is the issue of dissemination 
with regard to the grounds of discrimination which are out of the competence of the new 
office, since the absence of a specialised body leaves implementation of dissemination to 
ordinary authorities which until now seem to have a quite passive attitude. 
The level of independence of the anti-racist body required by the EU Race Directive 
has been criticised. The Italian UNAR anti-racist body is placed under the Department of 
Rights and Equal Opportunities within the homonymous Ministry which depends on the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The Director is appointed by the Prime Minister. 
This institutional configuration makes UNAR greatly dependent on the government's 
political preferences and its work affected by changes in government. Thus, UNAR has no 
institutional autonomy and operational independence as Directive 43/2000/EC prescribes. 
It is obvious that UNAR is limited by funding and power. However it offers an efficient 
service which can bring forth unjust cases of race and discrimination. 
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Trademark Infringement by Domain Name Registrars 
Abstract, section 27(4) of the Trademark Act, as amended in 2005, provides enforcement against in termediar ies 
whose services are used by a third party (that is usually the infr inger itself) for the infr ingement . In the H Y U N D A I 
case the registrars of the domain names , trusted by the resellers of cars having formerly been m e m b e r s of the 
HYUNDAI commercia l chain in Hungary, were sued together with the resellers for the reason that they did not 
cancel the registration of the domain names after the commerc ia l chain had been ceased. The Hungarian cour ts of 
first and second instance built their j udgement s on the ECJ ' s B M W judgement (C-63/97) . Emphasis is g iven also 
on a case relat ing to infringement by an operator of an Internet home page, as the latter was condemned by the 
Hungarian Cour t of first instance for not complying with the Act on Electronic C o m m e r c e . Nevertheless, t he court 
of second instance condemned him not therefore but for the tort in respect of the provis ions of the Civil C o d e , e.g. 
for injury of reputation. Finally, the article is closed by an out look on ideas on the development of EC law relating 
to liability of intermediaries. 
Keywords: t rademarks, domain names , infr ingement, liability, intermediaries. 
Infringement of a trademark is an unlawful conduct. As a result of globalisation of commerce 
today it is more widespread than it was fifty years ago. The most common form of 
infringement is affixing another's mark to goods or packaging without the consent of the 
trademark proprietor or using it in advertising. 
A special kind of trademark infringement is the unlawful use of a mark in computers. 
The most spectacular cases of this kind are the recent GOOGLE judgements rendered by 
the ECJ' and the French Supreme Court.2 In the latter kind of infringement there appears a 
further person on the side of the traditional infringers and advertisers: the intermediary 
service provider, who is often creator of the domain name. 
I. Legal framework in Hungary 
The Hungarian Trademark Act of 1997, as amended in 2005, provides in Sec. 27(4) that the 
claimant for infringement can apply for an injunction also against an intermediary whose 
services are used by a third party for infringement. 
This provision is in conformity with Art. 8(3) of the Directive 2001/29/EC on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.3 
The Hungarian Act on Electronic Commerce and on Information Society of 2001 in Sec. 2 
1) contains precise notions of different intermediaries, namely: 
"I) 'Intermediary service provider ' shall mean any provider of information society 
services: 
la) engaged in the transmission of information supplied by the recipient of the service 
through a telecommunications network, or who provides access to a telecommunications 
network (mere conduit and network access); 
* LL.M., Professor of Law. 
1
 European Court of Justice C-236-238/08, 23 March 2010. 
2
 Cass. com. 13 July 2010. 
3
 OJ 2001 L 167. 
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lb) engaged in the transmission of information supplied by the recipient of the service 
in a telecommunications network, performed for the sole purpose of making more 
efficient the information's onward transmission to other recipients of the service upon 
their request (caching); 
Ic) engaged in the storage of the information supplied by the recipient of the service 
(hosting); 
Id) engaged in providing tools to the recipient of the service for the location of 
information (location tool services); " 
In the Hungarian Act on Electronic Commerce there arc further rules on liability of 
intermediaries, namely 
(1) The intermediary service providers referred to as "mere conduit and network 
access " shall not be held liable for the information transmitted, on condition that the 
provider: 
a) did not initiate the transmission; 
b) did not select the receiver of the transmission; and 
c) did not select or modify the information contained in the transmission. 
(2) The acts of transmission and of provision of access referred to in Subsection (I) 
include the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information transmitted 
in so far as this takes place for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission, and 
provided that the information is not stored for any period longer than is reasonably 
necessary for the transmission. (Sec. 8) 
The intermediary service providers referred to as "caching" shall not be held liable 
for damages resulting from the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the 
information transmitted on condition that: 
a) the provider did not modify the information; 
b) access to the stored information was provided in compliance with conditions on 
access to the information; 
c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of the information, specified 
in a manner widely recognized and used by industry; 
d) the intermediate storage did not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely 
recognized and used by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information; and 
e) the provider acted expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it 
has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the 
initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it 
has been disabed, or that a court or any other authority has ordered such removal or 
disablement. (Sec. 9) 
The intermediary service providers referred to as "hosting" shall not be held liable for 
the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: 
a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity in connection with 
the information and is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal 
activity or information is apparent; or 
b) the provider, upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of what is contained in Para, 
a) acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. (Sec. 10) 
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The intermediary service providers referred to as "location tool service " shall not be 
held liable for damages resulting from allowing access to the information according to 
Para. Id) of Sec. 2, on condition that: 
o) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity in connection with 
the information and is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal 
activity or information is apparent; or 
b) the provider, upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of what is contained in Para, 
o) acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. (Sec. 11) 
The rules on mere conduit, catching, hosting correspond to those used in Art. 12—14 of the 
Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce in the Internal Market.4 
II. The HONDAI case 
Introducing the case history, I observe that the activity of the registrars were closely 
connected to that of the Hungarian car retailers. As a result I start to deal their conduct 
together, as the Court did, too. 
1. The facts were not usual: earlier before the situation turned to infringement the retailers, 
the defendants had been regular commercial partners of the owner of the Hyundai marks. 
The claimant and defendant No. 1 concluded a Distributorship Agreement for Hungary on 
1st January 2001, with exclusivity, for a period of 2 years. Section 14 of the Distributorship 
Agreement provided in respect of the marks that "the distributor does neither acquire nor 
seek to acquire the trademarks, trade names for the goods relating to the Agreement; 
moreover, the distributor uses the marks only in selling these goods". Parallel with executing 
this contract, defendant No. I built up a commercial chain for Hyundai vehicles and 
the other defendants No. 2-No. 18 used the mark in publicity, commercial papers, 
correspondence, buildings, auto shops, service stations etc. Moreover, three further 
defendants let the domain names "hiundayauto.hu", "hyundai-speed.hu" and "hyundai-spur. 
hu" registered. 
However, a few years later the situation changed: On 1st November 2004, the EC 
regulation on the application of Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty on categories of vertical 
agreements and concentrated practices in the motor vehicle sector No. 1400/2002/EC 
entered into force in Hungary. As a result, the claimant and the defendant agreed on the 
termination of the Distributorship Agreement. The claimant informed defendant No. 1 
already in September 2004 that further deliveries within EC countries will be made to his 
German daughter company. However, as long as the latter has not established his service 
stations, i.e. until the end of January 2005 the claimant delivered motor vehicle parts and 
accessories to Hungary cooperating with his former partners. 
After this period ended, the claimant invited the defendants No. 1-23 to stop the use of 
claimant's marks. As the defendants did not comply with this invitation, the claimant filed 
the suit for trademark infringement. 
4
 OJ 2001 L 178. 
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2. In his judgement of 21st November 2007, the Metropolitan Court ordered the defendants 
to discontinue the use of the HYUNDAI marks. 
Hereafter stands only a summarized report on the grounds of the judgement in an extent 
which 1 believe is necessary for the understanding in respect of the three intermediaries, i.e. 
the registrars (defendants No. 19, 22, 23) whose activity was in my opinion only contributory. 
As the judgement states, it was not contested by the parties that at the beginning the 
defendants were not unfair by using the marks for selling Hyundai vehicles, making 
publicity. 
But after the termination of their commercial relationship the situation changed, and the 
claimant alleged that the defendant could make publicity only insomuch that they did not 
give the impression of being members of the claimant's commercial chain. In this respect, 
the claimant referred to the ECJ's judgement (C63/97) rendered in the BMW case, which he 
believed to be applicable in this case, too. Moreover, he stressed that the publicity on the 
Internet does not allow the use of domain names with the word HYUNDAI. 
The Court accepted this standpoint and quoted the EC 1 's BMW judgement as a test of 
the possibilities, and the borders of the rights of resellers being independent from the car 
producer. Namely, 
"The proprietor of a trademark is not entitled to prohibit a third party from using the 
mark for the purpose of informing the public that he carries out the repair and 
maintenance of goods covered by that mark and put on the market under that mark by 
the proprietor or with his consent or that he has specialised or is a specialist in the 
sale or the repair and maintenance of such goods, unless the mark is used in a way 
that may create to the impression that there is a commercial connection between the 
other undertaking and the trademark proprietor, and in particular that the reseller s 
business is affiliated to the trade mark proprietor s distribution network or that there is 
a special relationship between the two undertakings. "5 
The Metropolitan Court added to this quotation that without the use of the HYUNDAI 
sign the reseller could not inform the public that he was specialised or was a specialist in 
the sale of such vehicles. As a result, the sign in question has an informative character and 
its use is necessary as a guarantee of the rights of the reseller who does not acquire unfair 
advantage from the distinctive character or reputation of the mark. Thereafter, the 
Metropolitan Court examined whether defendant No. 1 used the marks in question in a 
form which could make the impression to the public that he belonged to the official chain of 
the claimant. The Court held in this respect that, e.g. the use of the marks as a domain name 
surpassed the reasonable degree. It cannot be accepted that this form of use was necessary. 
Moreover, use of the trade name was also an infringement. Furthermore, as the defendants 
were earlier members of the commercial chain and rendered services within this, this fact 
has to be considered as well. Under such circumstances the requirement of good faith must 
also be complied. As a result, these facts are speaking against the defendants. 
3. Against the judgement of the Metropolitan Court, the defendants-except one of 
them-filed an appeal, including the registrars, too. The Metropolitan Court of Appeal made 
its judgement on 17th March 2009 and dismissed the appeals reducing the procedural fees. 
5
 Para. 64. and operative part of the ECJ's judgement. 
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It is worthwhile to report that the Court of Appeal, appreciating the "detailed reference" 
to the ECJ's BMW judgement. It stated that in the suit, only the conclusions of the BMW 
judgement served as directives, since the use of the marks by the defendants was suitable 
for making the public suppose that there was a special tie with the owner of the mark. The 
court of first instance, appreciating the considerations of the BMW judgement disclosed and 
qualified the acts of use of the defendants correctly one by one in details, considering 
whether they correspond to the right on notice of information or exceed the frames of this 
right. An example of the detailed and convincing reasons of the judgement of the court of 
first instance is e.g. the appreciation of the use of the HYUNDAI marks by defendant No. 8. 
informing the public on sale of Hyundai cars alongside with others objected in the 
judgement. 
Relating to the registrars, i.e. defendants No. 19, 22, 23 the Court of Appeal says only 
that they repeated their statement on good faith and told that they would comply with the 
judgement. By the way their appeal was filed only against the procedural fees. In this 
respect the Court of Appeal said that a complete dispensation with the procedural fees had 
not been possible considering the rule of Sec. 80( 1 ) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Namely, 
it could not be established that they had not given any cause for the procedure, moreover 
they had not acknowledged the claim with the first trial (8. Pf.20.533/2008). 
4. The majority of the defendants requested the revision at the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court rejected the revision requests including also those filed by the registrars (Pf. 
IV.20.796/2009). 
Comments 
a) Applying the ECJ's BMW judgement as a leading case was not only suitable a but also 
convincing. It is not surprising that the parties requested this, too. From time to time the 
ECJ comes back to the same as well, this was the case, e.g. in the OPEL (C-48/05)6 
judgement, or in the GILLETTE (C-228/03)7 one. It can be reported that the Hungarian 
Courts follow ECJ's teaching, too, including reference cases in trademark law.8 
6
 It is true that BMW concerned the use of a sign identical to the trade mark for services which 
were not identical to those for which that trade mark was registered, since the BMW trade mark, at 
issue in the main proceedings, was registered for vehicles but not for vehicle repair services. However, 
the vehicles marketed under the BMW trade mark by the proprietor of that mark constituted the 
subject-matter of the services-the repairing of vehicles-supplied by the third party, so that it was 
essential to identify the origin of the BMW cars, he subject-matter of those services. It was having 
regard to that specific and dissociate link between the products bearing the trade mark and the services 
provided by the third party that the Court of Justice held that in the specific circumstances of the 
BMW case, use by the third party of the sign identical to the trade mark in respect of goods marketed 
not by the third party but by the holder of the trade mark fell within Art. 5(1) of the directive 
(Para. 27). 
7
 The use of the trade mark will not comply with honest practices in industrial or commercial 
matters where, first, it is not done in such a manner that it may give the impression that there is a 
commercial connection between the reseller ad the trademark proprietor (BMW, Paras 51-42 of this 
judgement). 
8
 Cf. Vida, S.: The impact of the judgements of the ECJ on the Hungarian trademark law. AIPP1 
Proceedings (Hungary). 2010, 53. 
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b) The defence of the registrars (in the appeal proceeding) was limited to lack of 
confusion of the domain names composed of the mark HYUNDAI. It is obvious that this 
was a weak defence. Reference to good faith was also unsuccessful as trademark 
infringement is judged in consideration of objective criteria. It is not surprising that they 
were condemned by the three jurisdictions. The Court of Appeal, in stating the infringement, 
applied the rules of the Act on Electronic Commerce with tacit analogy saying that "they 
did not acknowledge the claim with the first trial". Moreover, in the term of the Act of 
Electronic Commerce this would not have been sufficient. 
c) Neither the Metropolitan Court, nor the Metropolitan Court of Appeal applied Sec. 
27(4) of the Trademark Act in respect of the registrars. I believe the ground for this was that 
the claim was filed against a joinder of parties. If the claim had been filed separately against 
the registrars they would have been condemned probably with references to Sec. 27(4) of 
the Trademark Act. 
d) In respect of judging the infringing use of other's marks as domain names, it was 
probably a relief that relating to this subject there were some precedents at disposal.9 The 
judicial practicc in this respect corresponds to that of other Member States of the EU.10 
III. Excursion: Infringement by an operator of an internet home page 
Both regarding the facts and the enforcement, some similar questions were to be judged in a 
procedure against the operator of the Internet home page "www.fusz.hu", though in this 
case the claim was not in connection with trademark infringement. A reader's letter was 
published on the internet home page of the defendant, offending the honour and reputation 
of the claimant. It is a fact that after a registration everybody was free to put there, according 
to taste, any tests, comments or reader's letters. Though the County Court of Szabolcs-
Szatmár-Bereg stated that the defendant is a hosting service provider and in conformity 
with Sec. 2(1) c) of the Act on Electronic Commerce he is exempted from liability supposing 
that upon obtaining awareness of the illegality of the text displayed on his home page he 
acts immediately to remove it. This ought to be made on receipt of the claim at the latest. 
Omitting this, he became guilty in respect of injuring Sec. 75(1), 76 and 78(1) of the Civil 
Code. As a result, the Court obliged him to remove the contested reader's letter and to pay 
damages (2.R 20.307/2008). 
Comments 
a) The facts in respect of liability of an internet home page operator, in respect of injury of 
reputation, even if the latter relates to a private person, is a typical element which appears 
in trademark infringement cases, too. Even if we do not think only to "great" or "famous" 
trademarks but to marks that are at the beginning of getting acquainted it is obvious that 
even owners of such marks are careful about the reputation of their marks. The loss of 
9
 Supreme Court, see BH 2005.145; see also Baeher, G.: Összefoglaló a doménnév 
regisztrációról és a doménnevekkel összefüggő jogérvényesítésről tartott kerekasztal-beszélgetésről 
(Summary on the round-table on due process in connection with domain names and domain 
registration). Iparjogvédelmi és Szerzői Jogi Szemle, 112 (2007) 1, Különszám, 78. 
10
 For German Court decisions see Inger!, R.-Rolinke, Ch.: Markengesetz. 3rd ed., München, 
2010, after Para. 15 Rn. 167. For British ones see Morcom, R.-Roughton, A.-Malyncz, S.: The 
Modem Law of Trade Marks. 3rd ed., London, 2008, 17.18-17.25. 
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reputation, moreover, bad reputation has an unfavourable effect in business, furthermore, 
often in respect of legal protection. 
b) In the present case the Internet home page was not operated in the frame of business 
life. Though even if the operator was not aware of the injurious character of the reader's 
letter (I have serious doubts in this respect), as a result of the requirements of good faith 
and fairness he should have removed the contested reader's letter immediately after receipt 
of the claim (there was no warning letter in the case). As he did not do this and he acted 
only after being condemned by the court this omission was an obvious negligence, even if 
the Act on Electronic Commerce was not applicable in the case. 
c) In respect of enforcement there is a further parallelism between the judgement rendered 
in the HYUNDAI case and that relating to the Internet home page (www.fusz.hu). In neither 
of them were the final judgements rendered with reference to the Act on Electronic 
Commerce. Moreover, exemption of liability, even applying the provisions of the said Act 
by analogy, would not have been stated by the courts. 
Outlook: Intermediaries in the EC law 
As told at the beginning, the above referred Hungarian provisions follow those of the 
European Union. It is not surprising that in the judicial practice of other Member States of 
the EU more complicated questions arise in this respect. As a result the International 
Association for Competition Law (LIDC) put the study of liability of intermediaries" on the 
agenda of its Oxford Congress of 2011. The Hungarian Group of this Association prepared 
a respectable12 report to the exhaustive Questionnaire. From the final recommendations of 
the Hungarian Groups, I refer only to some, namely, 
— the rules on infringement of the intellectual property as stipulated in the Enforcement 
Directive of the EC13 (Art. 9.1.a) shall be applied in case of an unfair competition as well, 
— liability in respect of mere conduit should be applied similarly to hosting, 
— caching and search engine providers, impeding the accessibility of websites and 
docking domain names can be specific forms of injunctions, etc. 
I look forward to learn what kind of other propositions will be made in respect of this 
brand-new subject. 
11
 To what extent should on-line intermediaries (such as ISPS and operators of offline market 
place) be responsible for the control or prohibition of unfair competitive practices (in particular sales 
of products contrary to the law) carried out on their systems? 
12 91h iviay 2011, Hungarian National Rapporteur: Adam Liber. 
13
 OJ 2004 L 157. 
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imp lemen ted in the first th ree decades f rom 1978-1979 to 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 0 9 . The discipline of legal s inology is a 
relat ively new scientific field in Hungary and w e have adopted its me thods in the research leading to this study. 
The first and second parts o f the study are based on the grounds of the most m o d e m historical sources on the 
an teceden t s of the reforms. T h e third part of this work analyses the r e fo rm of the State Consti tution of the People 's 
Republ ic of China. The m o s t important result of this process was the recognition and protection of basic human 
rights u n d e r the State Cons t i tu t ion of the People ' s Republic of China. The fourth part highlights recent 
adminis t ra t ive reforms f r o m per iod to period. T h e administrat ive re form included the reform of the State Council 
( G o v e r n m e n t of the Peop le ' s Republic of China) , as a result of which the number of the staff of the State Council 
d imin i shed from 51,000 to 16,700. The final part of this study introduces the reforms of Civil Law. In 1949, the 
G u o m i n d a n g Laws ( inclus ive of the Civil Code) were suspended by Chinese Communis ts ; therefore, putting the 
new Civ i l Code into force w a s urgently necessary. T h e Draft Civil C o d e was completed in 2004. 
K e y w o r d s : legal sinology, l aw in the People's Republ ic of China, Chinese legal reforms, constitutional re forms in 
the P e o p l e ' s Republic of Ch ina , amendments o f the State Const i tut ion of the People 's Republic of China, 
adminis t ra t ive reforms, t he n u m b e r of the staff of Chinese public administrat ion, reforms of civil law, Maoism, 
Chinese communists , G u o m i n d a n g , human rights. 
1. Preliminary Notes 
One of the most intriguing phenomena in the contemporary world is the development 
implemented by the People's Republic of China (hereinafter: PRC). That entails the 
requirement of a change in the conception of the tasks within legal sinology. However, 
Hungarian legal sinology including its scattered antecedents is being shaped in statu 
nascendi.1 Without the revealing analyses conducted in legal studies, administrative 
sciences, economics, political science and sociology the processes taking place in the most 
populated country of the world with the fourth largest territory cannot be understood. The 
undergoing progress in PRC raises questions like what position and role PRC will take 
with respect to emerging economies such as Brazil and India, what effects the growth of 
PRC will entail with respect to such significant powers such as Russia or the European 
Union seeking its identity, furthermore, in what way the USA currently safely considering 
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1
 As for the term of legal sinology, see Koi, Gy.: Jogi sinológia (Legal Sinology). In: Lamm, V. 
(ed.): Jogi lexikon (Encyclopaedia of Legal Studies). Budapest, 2009, 350. Second, enlarged and 
revised edition. 
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itself to be the first s u p e r p o w e r of the w o r l d will be able to interfere with th is process . The 
ob jec t ives of this s tudy a re to focus on the continual r e f o r m s of PRC taking p lace for the 
past 30 years with spec ia l regard to the legal and publ ic administrat ive r e f o r m s and to 
a l low insight into the resul ts of e c o n o m i c reforms, as wel l . China has g r o w n f rom an 
underdeve loped agr icul tura l country into a supe rpower determining w o r l d processes, 
whereas , it has not c h a n g e d concerning its spiritual roots (Maoism) , a l though, its political 
sys tem has become m o r e compliant and it has accompl i shed outstanding e c o n o m i c and 
social achievements . T h e s e achievements b id fair prospects of high economic g rowth even 
dur ing the world recess ion bringing the w o r l d to heel.2 It canno t be prec luded that in view 
of the current p rocesses unless their t endency changes , P R C may b e c o m e the most 
s ignif icant power of the wor ld within a f e w decades. In parallel to these processes , the 
above-ment ioned resea rch in Hungarian legal s inology c o m m e n c e d and w a s perpetuated. 
Al though , this was de layed in line wi th the recogni t ion of the s igni f icance and 
unnegl igibi l i ty of P R C b y the Hungar ian political and e c o n o m i c elite a f te r the change of 
reg ime , which did h a v e consequences . 3 
In what fol lows w e will apply the m e t h o d that first w e will introduce the annals history 
of Ch inese reforms, w h i l e focusing on the ma jo r intersections, then, the p rocesses of the 
const i tut ional reform, the administrat ive ( including civil service) reform and finally, the 
r e fo rm of civil law wil l b e elucidated. 
2
 See the video recording of the speech of Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister of PRC in Chinese at the 
Davos Annual Meeting 2009 of the Davos World Economic Forum at the following link: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rs9fqfvYiXw (last visited on 20.12.2009). At that time, in 
comparison with the GDP figure in 2008, an annual growth of 8% was predicted for 2009 with regard 
to the difficulties. 
3
 This is unambiguously highlighted by the following quotation from an authentic Hungarian 
sinologist: "By the mid-1990s, the circumstance that Hungary became the Central-Eastern-European 
centre of the distribution network of Chinese goods was a free gift of history. Despite the historical 
aspiration of Hungary to become the economic-financial hub of the region, we could not take 
advantage of this stroke of luck and practically, we did not even recognise this fact. It was only after a 
decade's delay that Hungary attempted to transform into a Chinese bridge-head in the EU, when we 
had largely missed the opportunity under the changed circumstances. As for the current scope of 
action, the accommodation of the Chinese whole-traders enriched here as full members in Hungarian 
society could be accomplished, which could prevent their abandoning the country by withdrawing 
their wealth, as well." We need to mention that the sinologist author had held this opinion before the 
public recognition of the moment (15 September 2008: Lehmann Brothers, the fourth largest 
commercial bank of the USA pleaded Chapter Eleven) of the process of the global financial crisis 
proceeding from the subprime mortgage crisis and expanding into the world economic recession of 
2008-2009. It is also intriguing that all this supervened about 80 years after the Great Depression of 
1929-1933, thereby justifying economic cycle theories. Quotation from: Polonyi, P.: Gondolatok a 
magyarországi kínai kolóniáról (Thoughts about the Chinese Colony in Hungary). In: Polonyi, P.: 
Múlt a jövőben. írások Kínáról (Past in the Future. Essays on China). Budapest, 2007, 301. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Yingke-Várnai Law Firm, that is, the first legal enterprise expanding in 
Europe besides PRC opened in Hungary in mid-September 2010 can be acknowledged as a positive 
development. 
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2. T h e Antecedents a n d C o m m e n c e m e n t of the R e f o r m s 
The ou t se t of the " R e f o r m and O p e n n e s s " policy (in Ch inese : Zhongguo de gaigé kaifang) 
is d i spu ted . The death o f Mao Zedong ( 1 8 9 3 - 1 9 7 6 ) can be regarded as a m a j o r antecedent 
of evo lu t ion of the r e f o r m process, w h i c h struck the 82-year-old party leader on 9th 
S e p t e m b e r 1976 subsequen t ly to protracted illness occur r ing af ter a heart a t tack. 4 (Mao had 
been the number o n e leader of the C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t Party3 (in Ch inese : Zhongguo 
Gongchan Dang) (here inaf te r : CCP) for 41 years out o f its history of 55 yea r s at that t ime, 
be ing o n e of the h a n d f u l founding m e m b e r s number ing 12 according to mis taken tradition, 
in fac t , their number w a s 13).6 Several candida tes were p repared to assume p o w e r after the 
death o f the dictator including the no tor ious Gang of Four (in Chinese: Siren bang; in 
4
 More amply, see Gemet, J.: Le Monde chinois. Gallimard, Paris, 1972, 502-503; Popov, A. P.: 
Политические системы и политические режимы в Китае XX века ( Political Systems and Political 
Regimes in China in the 20 th Century). Moscow, 2007, 174-175. 
5
 Officially, the Party was established on I July 1921 by Chinese Marxists educated in the so-
called "Fourth of May Movement" under the influence of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. 
Initially, more significant figures of the movement included Li Dazhao and Zhen Tuhsiu. Concerning 
the public and party history between 1949 and 1976 see Saich, T.: Governance and Politics of China. 
New York, 2004, 25-56. 
6
 In fact, 12 delegates represented 53 founding members; the former ones can be partially 
identified by name in the Russian source-material: „Коммунистическая партия Китая была 
основана в 1921 году в качестве кружка единомышленников. Официально партия ведет отчет 
своей истории с I съезда состоявшегося нелегально в конце июня-начале июля 1921 года в 
Шанхае. На съезде присутсвовало 53 человека, в том числе 12 делегатов. Съезд провозгласил 
конечной целью партии построение в Китае социализма. Ключевую роль в съезде и создании 
партии сыграли Ли Дачжао, Чэнь Дусю, Чэнь Гунбо, Тань Пиншань, Чжан Готао, Хэ Мэнсюн, 
Лоу Чжанлун и Дэн Чжунся. На съезде в качестве одного из двух делегатов от провинции 
Хунань присутствовал и Мао Цзэдун. Среди других участиков съезда были Дун Биу, Ли 
Ханьцзюнь, Ли Да, Чэн Таньцю, Лю Жэньцзин, Чжоу Фобай, Хэ Шухэн, Дэн Эньмин, а также 
два представителя Коминтерна." "The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921 as a group 
of associates. Officially, the party has kept records of its history since its Congress held illegally at the 
end of June and early July 1921 in Shanghai. The Congress was attended by 53 people including 12 
delegates. The Congress proclaimed the ultimate purpose of the Party: building socialism in China. 
The key roles in the Congress and the establishment of the Party were fulfilled by Li Dachrao, Chen 
Duxiu, Chen Gunbo, Tan Pingshan, Zhang Guodao, He Mensun, Lou Zhranlun and Deng Zhongsa. 
The Congress was attended by Mao Zedong as one of two delegates from Hunan Province. Other 
regional congressmen included Tung Biwu, Li Hanqun, Li Da, Chen Danxiu, Liu Renqing, Zhou 
Fobai, He Shuhen, Deng Yenmin as well as two representatives of the Comintern." 
See История Коммунистической партии Китая (History of the Chinese Communist Party) 
entry at http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/HcTopna_KoMMyHuc™4ecKoFi_nap™H_KiiTax (last viewing: 
1 January 2011). 
According to the second source, seven communist groups included approximately 60 members 
and the number of the delegates was 13. The second source names the following delegates: Zhang 
Guodao, Liu Renqing (from Beijing); Li Hanqun. Li Da (from Shanghai); Tung Biwu, Chen Danxiu 
(from Wuhan); Mao Zedong. He Shuhen (from Changsha); Deng Yenmin, Wang Qinmei (from Xian); 
Chen Gunbo, Bao Huisheng (from Canton/Guangzhou); Zhou Fobai (from Tokyo). The key figures of 
the ССР-movement, Li Dazhao and Zhen Tuhsiu stayed away from the Congress. In the work of the 
Congress Mr. Maring (from the Comintern) and Mr. Nikolsky (from the Profintern) participated, 
however, according to the second source, Nikolsky is a pseudonym. See Glunin, V. 1. (ed.): A Kínai 
Kommunista Párt története 1921-1969 (History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-1969). 
Budapest, 1974, 18, 601. 
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Russian: Банда четырёх),1 however , Mao Z e d o n g appointed his successor in his life,8 
scilicet, Hua G u o f e n g ( 1 9 2 1 - 2 0 0 8 ) , who b e c a m e the party leader and ( formal ly ) the 
President of the Central Mili tary Commiss ion , but he was never assigned to the latter 
position.9 Dur ing his rule, Hua took the advice o f the more sober part (less support ive o f the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu t ion) of Ch inese military leadership (still al ive veteran 
generals). The " G a n g of Four" w a s so reckless that they spread in the groves of the party 
about Hua that he was an uneduca ted rural cadre , whose promot ion could be at t r ibuted to 
being a party secretary of the na t ive village of M a o Zedong,1 0 whe re he had es tabl ished a 
M a o Museum const i tut ing a p lace of pi lgr image, therefore, he had risen through the ranks. 
Consequently, the military leadership, especial ly Marshal l Je J ianying suppor t ing Deng 
Xiaoping rapidly convinced H u a that the " G a n g of Four" may induce a situation of civil 
war, therefore, they quoted the 1968 Party Decis ion of CCP, which st ipulated express ly that 
a situation of civil war needed to be prevented by all means. Therefore , the " G a n g of Four" 
was arrested o n the night f r om 6 t h to 7 th Oc tober 1976, which had been hastened by the 
news received f r o m Shanghai ( the nest of the gang ) that the local people ' s militia had been 
preparing the w a y for a takeover of power. By that time, however , the gang had itself 
understood the weakness of its position. By the t ime the trial of the " G an g of Fou r " was 
instituted (it lasted from N o v e m b e r 1980 to January 1981)," the 5 th Nat ional People ' s 
7
 Allegedly, the gang was designated by reason of their manifest power aspirations and 
intriguing disposition by Mao Zedong himself, who initially and partly supported the formation 
established as "The Sanghai Group", which opposed primarily Zhou Enlait and Deng Xiaoping. The 
members of the group were extreme left cultural revolutionaries, otherwise four members of the 
Political Committee of CCP: Jiang Qing, who died at the age of 77 in 1991 (i.e. Mao's fourth wife 
known as "Madame Mao" in the West); Zhang Chungqiao, Yao Wenyuan as full members of the 
Political Committee, finally, Wang Hongwen as a co-opted member of the Political Committee. Saich: 
op. cit. 54. sqq. 
8
 This is justified by written proof. The seriously ill dictator in his last days was practically 
unable to speak; therefore, he issued orders in writing. Presumably, the small scrap of paper (without 
an addressee) dates from May 1976, which in the unmistakably peculiar and hardly falsifiable 
handwriting of Mao reads as follows: "(On condition that) You manage matters, I'll be reassured." (in 
Chinese: Ni zou shih, wo fang xin). The photocopied version of the scrap of paper made the headlines 
of all Chinese newspapers on the day following Mao's death. 
9
 Jordán, Gy.: Kína története (The History of China). Budapest, 1999, 388. 
10
 His homeland was Shaoshan in Hunan province. For more ample data about this administrative 
unit in English, see Shaoshan as a Wikipedia entry in English: http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Shaoshan (last visited: 20 December 2009). 
11
 During the trial, the Gang of Four and formerly arrested persons (ten military leaders) 
belonging to the group of the "Lin Biao conspirators", furthermore, the personal assistant of Mao, 
Chen Boda (1904-1989) were indicted. Besides being the lawful revelation of the Cultural Revolution, 
the trial conducted by special judiciary was simultaneously a show trial broadcasted by the state 
television for two months, owing to which the principal defendants were convicted. Jiang set up the 
mere implementation of Mao's orders as a defence. Nevertheless, the trial did not conclude in the 
strong condemnation of Mao's activity, whereas, not only the accused but also the extraordinarily 
pestiferous and utterly meaningless Cultural Revolution was also condemned. As an outcome of the 
trial, the principal defendants were found guilty for the persecution of up to 730,000 people and the 
death of 35,000 people. Jiang Qing (Madame Mao) and Zhang Chungqiao were sentenced to death, 
but the execution of the sentence was suspended and in 1983 it was commuted to life imprisonment. 
The other accused were condemned to 16-18 years' imprisonment. The "show" nature of the trial is 
unequivocally exposed by the following text: "In 1981, the four deposed leaders were subjected to a 
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Congress (Chinese Parliament) during its third session between 30th August and 10th 
September 1980 relieved Hua Guofeng of his office as a Prime Minister (but he was only 
later dismissed from senior leadership during the Congress of CCP in September 1982), 
who was replaced by Zhao Ziyang (1919-2005) for the period of 1980-87. Policy-making 
became finally controlled by the genuine successor of Mao, the pragmatist Deng Xiaoping 
(1904-1997), who was appointed to be the third president of CCP (the position was not 
occupied between 1976 and 1978). 
Around December 1978, 18 Chinese peasants organised a secret night gathering with 
advance arrangements in the village of Xiaogang in Anhui province (in China, secret 
gatherings, religious associations, political societies and movements date back traditionally 
to ancient times). However, this one was a so-called formless gathering (in Latin: concio), 
where the participants agreed that they would withhold the product surplus and would not 
contribute it to the collective, whereas, they would carry on paying mandatory taxes and 
arising costs. Later, politicians approved of the matter posteriorly. There may have been 
other similar actions, at any rate, this went down in history and can be deemed to be 
the outset of the thirty years' reforms. However, it apparently was not a conscious 
commencement, those who participated did not suspect what they were initiators of and the 
reforms would not have amounted to much unless politics traced back the beginnings to this 
event and the political historical events, which we will elucidate in the following.12 
A significant antecedent consists in the "Ten Years' National Economic Development 
Program" based on the experience of the economic boom of 1977 and designed for the 
years of 1976-1985, the basis of which had been elaborated already in 1974. The Program 
was adopted by the 2nd Plenary Session of the 10th Central Committee of CCP held between 
18-23 February.13 The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of CCP (18-22 
December 1978) meant the "tensile test" on the one hand between the orthodox extreme left 
and the Maoist party workers promoting the Cultural Revolution aligned with Hua Guofeng, 
on the other hand, the centrist realist forces clustered around Deng Xiaoping considered 
right-wing (within the party). Some years later, this plenum was reasonably declared a 
milestone by writers of party-history, since this led to the evolution and consolidation of the 
"Reform and Openness" policy. At that time, the main slogan besides personal rehabilitations 
(which remarkably and massively rehabilitated a proportion of the politicians persecuted 
preceding the Maoist Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (in Chinese: Wùchânjiëji 
Wénhuà Dàgéming) was "socialist modernisation" and the "Ten Years' National Economic 
Development Program" designed for the years of 1976-1985 by Hua was not even 
mentioned, whereas, it anticipated a demand for change. At the same time, the session 
bestowed great attention on the issues of the democratic rights of the masses, the freedom 
of criticism, the reinforcement and extension of democracy and the legal order, furthermore, 
on the restoration of legality. Following the polemical article of a social scientist, the issues 
"whether the only criterion of the establishment of truth is indeed a practice",14 furthermore, 
show trial and convicted of anti-party activities". See Gang of Four (Wikipedia entry in English) at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gang_of_Four (last visited: 20 December 2009). 
12
 The policy of "Reform and Openess" is expounded in extensive Hungarian literature see 
Jordán, Gy.-Tálas, В.: Kína a modernizáció útján a XIX-XX. században (China on the way of 
modernisation in 19th and 20th century). Budapest, 2005, 255-348. 
13
 Jordán-Tálas: op. cit. 238. sqq. 
14
 This was raised in opposition to the following formula of Hua Guofeng published in Renmin 
Ribao on 7 February 1977: "Whatever President Mao's decision could be, we will support it, whatever 
THE FIRST THREE DECADES... 3 5 3 
"whether truth should be sought after s ta r t ing f rom facts" w e r e raised. The part icipants 
deemed it important that the people 's w a y o f thinking should be liberated since: "If 
everybody in a party, in a country and w i th in a nation acts verba t im, the w a y o f thinking 
will ha rden , progress will b e c o m e impossible , l i fe and the par ty will come to an end and the 
country wi l l decline". At any rate, the imper i shab le merits o f M a o Zedong w e r e recorded 
with the c o m m e n t that the demand that a revolu t ionary leader should be impeccab le is not 
Marx is t . ' 5 
It is deba ted even in technical l i terature wh ich year should be regarded as the first year 
of the r e f o r m s . A Russian source in a r e n o w n e d journal of legal studies points out that the 
initial y e a r of the re forms was 1978.16 T h e ar t icle of a Ch inese author wri t ten in English 
and pub l i shed in a pres t ig ious journal of pub l i c administrat ion considers 1979 to be the 
initial y e a r o f the reforms. 1 7 We deem it impor tan t to point out that the p reva lence of the 
reform b e c a m e practically manifest only b y 1980 and its outset was only subsequent ly 
establ ished. Therefore, it is very appropriate to mark the years o f 1978-1979 as " a continual 
beginning" , which entai led amazing c h a n g e s in the life of PRC. 1 8 These p rocesses are 
designated as Leninist Transi t ions by certain Western scholars1 9 (Although, in our view, the 
system o f the Chinese Proletarian Dictatorship was rather pecul iar ly Chinese and later much 
more a n d expressly Maois t than Leninist. Ins tead of Leninist, Marx i s t -Len in i s t wou ld have 
been the appropriate t e rmino logy according to the concepts of scientific socia l ism.) 
guidance President Mao gave us, we will unwaveringly follow it". This was the so-called formula of 
the "two whatevers" (in Chinese: Hang ge fanshi), concerning which Deng Xiaoping declared in May 
1977 that it did not comply with Marxism. Concerning the formula see Jordán-Tálas: op. cit. 236. On 
the statement of Deng see Deng, X.: "Liang ge fanshi" bu fuhe makesizhuyi (The "two whatevers" 
does not meet the Marxism). In: Deng Xiaoping Xttanji (1975-1982) (Selected Works of Deng 
Xiaoping, 1975-1982). Beijing, 1983, 35-36. Quoted in Jordán-Tálas: op. cit. 237, footnote 2. On the 
assessment of Hua's policy see Saich: op. cit. 55-56. 
15
 On the quotation, see Zhongguo Jingji Nianjian (China Economic Yearbook). 1981, 11/24. 
16
 Rumänin, E. V.: Китайское право в условиах реформ (The Chinese Law from the 
perspective of the reform). Советское государство и право, 61 (1988) 9, 91 sqq. 
17
 You, Ch.: Current Administrative Reform in China. International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, 52 (1986) 3, 123 sqq. 
18
 For example, it suffices to mention concerning city development that Shanghai with up to 17 
million permanent and 4 million temporary residents has become the financial centre of the Far East, 
or we could refer to Shenzhen under Deng, formerly a fishing village, then a megapolis has become 
part of the Special Economic Zone mainly because it borders on Hong Kong. In the recent two 
decades, 30 billion USD has flown into this city, which is currently the largest harbour of China and 
one of the most dynamically developing cities of the world. Today it has a population of approximately 
8,700,000. Within its population, the proportion of people under 30 is strikingly high, while 20%. of 
the Chinese Ph.D. holders live here. In 2011, Shenzhen accommodated the 26th Summer Sports 
Universiade. An important source concerning Shenzen: Má Ii Shenzhen. Glamourous Shenzhen. 
Shenzhen shi renmin zhenhfu xinwen hangong shi. Shenzhen, 2009, 24. (with a supplementary 
Chinese-English CD). 
19
 Winckler, E. A.: Describing Leninist Transitions. In: Winckler, E. A. (ed.): Transition from 
Communism in China. Institutional and Comparative Analyses. Boulder (COL, US)-London, 1999, 
3M8; Winckler, E. A.: Explaining Leninist Transitions: In: Winckler, E. A. (ed.): Transition from 
Communism in China. Institutional and Comparative Analyses. Boulder (COL)-London, 1999, 259-
294. 
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3. T h e Const i tut ional R e f o r m 
Both the traditional Chinese legal sys tem, 2 0 scilicet, the imperial pe r iod of China (221 
B . C . - 1 9 1 1 A.D.) recognised and the legal systems of the Chinese Republ ic (1912-1949) as 
we l l as of the current ly prevai l ing P e o p l e ' s Republic o f C h i n a (since 1949) have incorporated 
the legal institution o f a written const i tut ion. The enumera t ion of the Chinese wri t ten 
const i tu t ions is not an easy task.21 For a long per iod, France used to exist in such a 
const i tut ional uncer ta in ty just as the People ' s Republ ic o f China did be tween 1954 and 
1982, when it had f o u r writ ten const i tut ions within a shor t period of 28 yea r s (according to 
the sources: state const i tut ions) , however , we need to men t ion that the state constitution o f 
1982 (hereinafter: the Const i tut ion) has been pract ical ly in force for so m a n y years. T h e 
s ignif icance of const i tut ional law in Ch ina (in Chinese: xianfa) is increasing. With regard to 
the i r longevity, w e can claim that the Consti tut ion is in compl iance wi th the re forms . 
The re fo re , we will expound the pre-his tory of the e f f ec t ive Consti tut ion m o r e amply. 
The draft of the Const i tut ion w a s subjected to a four -months ' nat ional debate on 2 8 
Apr i l 1982. Formerly , the Nat ional People ' s Congres s had appointed a Consti tut ional 
R e v i e w Commit tee o f 100 m e m b e r s on 7 September 1980. Beng Chen, the Vice-President 
o f the Constitutional Review C o m m i t t e e specified the mos t important bas ic principles o f 
20
 See technical literature on the topic: Balazs, É.-Maspero, H.: Histoire et institutions de ta 
Chine ancienne des origines au XIIe siècle après Jésus-Christ. Paris, 1967, 303. passim. Bodde, D.— 
Morris, C.: Law in Imperial China. Exemplified by 190 Qing Dynasty Cases. With Historical. Social, 
and Judicial Commentaries (Translated by the Xingan Huilan). Cambridge (MA), 1967. XIII, 615. 
21
 The constitutions are enumerated chronologically in the following works of English-language 
technical literature written by Chinese authors: Zhian, T.: The Government and Politics of China. 
Cambridge (Mass.), 1950, 435. Concerning constitutional history in the republican age see Chen, R.: 
Zhongguo xianfa shi (History of the Chinese Constitution). Shanghai, 1933; Kuhn, P. A.: Les origines 
de l'Etat chinois moderne. Paris, 1999, 205; McHenry, R. (ed.): Britannica Hungarica 
Világenciklopédia (Britannica Hungarica World Encyclopaedia).Vol. 10, Entry China. Budapest, 1998, 
483. Column 2: refers mistakenly to the first Constitution of 1908 as a new constitution put in force 
by the Manchurian Court in 1906. Concerning the Constitution of 1946 see Peaslee, A. J. (ed.): 
Constitutions of Nations. Vol. I. From Afghanistan to Finland. The Hague, 2nd ed., 1956, 506-515. 
For the text of the constitution: ibid. 515-535. See the Constitution of 1946 in Taiwan: A Brief 
Introduction to the Republic of China. Taipei, 1998, 19. sqq. Concerning the Constitution of 1954 see 
Popov: op. cit. 197-202; Su, J.-H.-Tomson, E.: Regierung und Verwaltung der Volksrepublik China. 
Köln, 1972, 17-36, 70-113. According to our knowledge, the whole text of the Constitution of China 
of 1954 was published in Hungarian see Zhou, E.-Liu, S.-Mao, Z.: A Kínai Népköztársaság Országos 
Népi Gyűlésének I. ülésszaka 1954. szeptember 15-28. A Kínai Népköztársaság alkotmánya (The First 
Session of the National People's Congress between 15-28 September 1954. The Constitution of the 
People's Republic of China). Budapest, 1954. Concerning the constitution of 1975 see Popov: op. cit. 
202-203. Concerning the constitution of 1978 see Lesage, M.: Les institutions Chinoises. Paris, 1978, 
21; Popov: op. cit. 203-221. Concerning the (effective) Constitution of 1982 see Popov: op. cit. 221— 
224; Jakóbiec, W.-Rowinski, J.: System konstytucyjny Chinskiej Republiki Ludowej (The Constitutional 
System of the People's Republic of China). Warsaw, 2007, 98; Saich: op. cit. 123-124. and passim. 
Separate monographs expounding the subject: Lin F.: Constitutional Law in China. Hong-Kong-
Malaysia-Singapore, 2000, 378; Palmer, M.: The Chinese Constitution. A Contextual Analysis. 
Oxford, 2011 (publication in process). 
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the future basic law: insistence on the four (basic) principles,22 the principal task of the 
Chinese people is to focus its efforts on socialist modernisation, the development of socialist 
morals is indispensable for material development, the basic rights of the citizens shall be 
safeguarded in compliance with socialist democracy and the socialist legal system, the 
system of people's gatherings shall be reinforced and the scope of their power shall be 
extended, ethnic autonomy shall be developed, basic-level political power shall be reinforced 
etc. Special emphasis was placed on equality before the law, the protection of personal 
dignity, on the principle that no organisation or individual shall enjoy rights unless they are 
guaranteed under the constitution or separate law and on the requirement of the reinforcement 
of the socialist economic system. Finally, the constitution was adopted by the 5th Session of 
the National People's Congress on 4 December 1982. At that moment, the constitution 
contained 138 Articles divided into 4 Chapters: I. General Principles, II. The Basic Rights 
and Obligations of the Citizens, III. The Organisation of the State, IV. The National Flag, 
the National Coat of Arms and the Capital. The Constitution as promulgated was published 
in Hungarian translation relatively soon, but it was not easily accessible.23 It is worthwhile 
to expand on the four major (comprehensive) constitutional amendments before engaging in 
the actual analysis.24 
3.1. The First Amendment of 12 April 1988 
The new amendment of Art. 11 sets forth: "The state shall permit the existence and 
development of the private sector of the economy within the limitations prescribed by law. 
The private sector of the economy shall be complementary to socialist public economy. The 
state shall protect the lawful rights and interests of the private sector of the economy and 
shall exercise guidance, supervision and control over the private sector of the economy".25  
Jordán claims that this amendment reinforces the legal status of the private sector so that 
22
 We need to expand on the above-mentioned so-called four principles (Four Cardinal 
Principles, in French: quatre principes fondamentaux) contained under the Constitution. These are as 
follows: 
- The Principle of the Leadership of the Communist Party; in French: La reconnaissance du rôle 
dirigeant du Parti communiste chinois, 
- The Principle of the Guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts; in French: Les 
instructions du marxisme-léninisme et des idées du Mao Zedong, 
- The Principle of the People's Democratic Dictatorship; in French: L'attachement á la dictature 
démocratique populaire, 
- The Principle of Adherence to Socialism; in French: L'attachement á la voie socialiste. 
See Lin: op. cit. 25-35. (points 2.06.-2.13.); Bányai, L.: Quelques problèmes de la modernisation du 
système politique de la République Populaire de Chine. In: Lukic, R. (ed.): La modernisation du 
droit. Beograd, 1990, 6. 
23
 MTI International Documents, 26 (1983) 3, 3-25. Currently, the Hungarian translation of the 
significantly amended Constitution and its annotation are under publication. See the English-language 
version of the constitution: The Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Beijing, 1983. See 
further one of the Chinese text editions: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Falu Fagui Quanshu, 1 (1994), 
20. sqq. 
24
 Popov: op. cit. 221. sqq. passim. Jakóbiec, W.-Rowinski, J.: op. cit. 34. Only the Polish 
source mentions the exact dates of the 3rd and 4th amendments. 
25
 The earlier text was this: "No organisation or individual may appropiate, buy, sell, or lease 
land, or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful means." 
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the private sector shall function as a supplement to the state sector.26 Lin highlights the 
following amendment (Para. 4) of Art. 10: "No organisation or individual may appropriate, 
purchase, sell or otherwise engage in the transfer of the land by unlawful means. The right 
to the use of the land may be transferred according to law". In the opinion of Lin, the 
recognition of the existence of the private enterprise and the private sector and the regulation 
of the transfer of the right of the use of land are of crucial importance. The amendments 
reveal that Chinese economy tends to be market-oriented and some socialist dogmas have 
been replaced by practical thinking.27 
3.2. The Second Amendment of 19-29 March 1993м 
The 1993 Amendment amounted to changes in the constitution at nine points (Lin). 
According to the technical literature at our disposal, it is only Jordán who outlines three 
highly significant amendments of the preamble seeming inconsequential at first sight. As 
Jordán formulates: "The amendment adopted on 19 March 1993 declared in compliance 
with the turning point supervening in economic policy in 1992 that China shall abide by 
market economy instead of planned economy, nevertheless, it also included other important 
supplements". The requirement of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, which is 
basically applicable in nearly all respects, was incorporated in the section of the preamble 
stipulating the tasks of socialist modernisation. Mentioning Chinese characteristics, features 
or quality does not only refer to the consideration of the conditions and features of China 
upon seeking solutions, but this is also a manifestation of Chinese nationalism becoming 
more and more determinant. Other phrases of the amendment highlighted democracy and 
building a democratic socialist nation. This manifests itself in the following amendment: 
"The system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by the Chinese 
Communist Party shall prevail and develop in the distant future, as well". The Preamble 
was also supplemented by a short affirmative sentence: "China is at the primary stage of 
socialism". The statement, which does not seem to be too consequential, had had a relatively 
long prehistory, but the conclusions and references deriving from it are even more important. 
The incorporation of the tenet into the constitution was actually delayed, since it was the 
theoretical conclusion of the 13th Congress of CCP at the end of October 1987 that China 
was at the primary stage of socialism and this feature would mark at least the next 100 
years as of the 1950s. The tenet secured a relatively wide scope of action to government as 
26
 Jordán: „Az ég magas, a császár messze van. " Igazságszolgáltatás, jog, és politika Kínában 
("The Skies Are High, the Emperor is Far Away." Jurisdiction, Law and Politics in China). Budapest, 
2008, 208. 
27
 "They are concerned with the economic system and with the intention to legitimise the 
prevalence of private enterprise and the transfer of land-use rights. These amendments have 
demonstrated that Chinese economy is more market-oriented and that some of the socialist dogmas 
have given way to pragmatism." Lin: op. cit. 17. (Point 1.23.). The Polish publication on the 
amendment of 1988 is in accordance with the other two sources with respect to private enterprise: "W 
nowclizacji z 1988 roku uznano sektor prywatny za uzuplenienie gospodarki opartej na systemie 
wlasnosci publicznej (Art. 11)." In English: "In Amendment of 1988, the private sector was a 
complementary economy-based system of public ownership (Art. 11)". Jakóbiec-Rowinski: ibid. 
28
 19 March 1993 is mentioned: Jordán: „Az ég magas ..." op. cit. 208; 29 March 1993 is 
specified as the date of the amendment: Jakóbiec-Rowinski: ibid. The contradiction currently cannot 
be dissolved in a reassuring manner, since the other sources at our disposal ignore the specification of 
dates. 
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for its basic economic and political reform steps and their ideological acceptance. This 
could be quoted upon the widespread permission of private enterprise and the private sector, 
upon the application of other forms of distribution (profit, dividend etc.) besides distribution 
according to "socialist" work, upon taking over certain capitalist methods (instead of the 
former total contraposition of capitalism and socialism) and upon the justification of the 
admission of foreign operating capital funds and other forms of cooperation (Jordán). Our 
Polish source highlights terms in re the supplementary law of 1993 such as the "Reform 
and Openness" [policy] (in Chinese: gaigé kaifang\ in Polish: reformy i otwarcie), socialism 
with Chinese characteristics (in Chinese: you Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi; in Polish: 
socjalizm о chinskiej specyfice). 
Under Art. 7, issues concerning the state sector of the economy are regulated. Here, 
instead of "expansion" of the sector, the word "development" is used, since the reform 
entailed dwindling and massive shrinking of the economy supervised by the state (Jordán). 
Under Art. 8, the rural commune having dissolved a decade before (at the beginning of 
the 1980s) was replaced by the system of rural contractual liability. Jordán restricts himself 
to the assessment of the amendments under Arts 15 and 17, whereas, the Polish volume 
expands on the amendment of Art. 16, as well. Under Arts 15 and 17, the term of planned 
economy and those pertaining to state planning were deleted. Art. 15 regulates issues related 
to the public sector of the economy. The new version uses the expression "strengthening" 
instead of the former "growth" in connection with economic sector. The reform in this case 
means diminishing planned economy (economy supervised by the state).29 
Under Art. 16, rural communes dissolved at the beginning of the 1980s were replaced 
by the system of rural contractual liability. 
Our Polish source outlines the amendments pursuant to Art. 16.30 From Arts 15 and 17, 
the terms of "planned economy" and "state planning" were deleted. 
Paragraph 3 of Art. 42 was amended, as well. The term of "state enterprise" was 
changed to "state-owned enterprise".31 
As Art. 98 stipulated: "The term of mandates at the people's congresses at the regional 
level shall be five years". Whereas, the term of mandates at the lowest level of people's 
29
 Article 15: The state shall accomplish socialist market economy. The state shall strengthen 
economic legislation and improve macro-economic supervision. State laws shall prohibit disturbance 
of the social-economic order by any person. 
30
 Article 16: State-owned enterprises shall accomplish management by themselves within the 
limitations prescribed by law. State-owned enterprises shall implement democratic management via 
congresses of workers ' representatives and in other ways in accordance with the law. 
Article 17: Collective economic associations shall conduct economic activities independently 
and have decision-making powers in compliance with relevant laws. Collective economic associations 
shall implement democratic management and assign or recall the members of management as well as 
decide on major issues of organisation management in accordance with the law. In the territory of 
China, foreign companies and other foreign economic associations such as Chinese-foreign joint 
ventures shall observe the laws of the People's Republic of China. The lawful rights and interests of 
joint ventures shall be protected by the laws of the People's Republic of China. 
31
 Article 42: Work shall be a matter of honour for every citizen who is able to work. All the 
people working in state-owned enterprises as well as in urban or rural economic collectives shall 
relate to their work as masters of the country they are citizens of. The state shall promote socialist 
labour emulation as well as shall commend and reward exemplary and outstanding workers. The state 
shall encourage citizens to take part in voluntary labour. 
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congresses remained three years.32 In case of the people's congresses of counties and 
administrative units of the same level, the term was raised to five years, just as the term of 
the mandates at people's congresses of the provinces and at the People's National Congress, 
scilicet, Chinese Parliament lasted.33 Lin does not expand on the amendment in detail, 
although, he mentions that it was conceived in the spirit of the socialism with Chinese 
characteristics and market economy. The 1993 Amendment demonstrated that CCP was 
genuinely following the way of lawful procedure.34 
3.3. The Third Amendment of 15 March 1999 
According to Lin, six amendments were made, out of these, Jordán and our Polish source 
mentions four ones. It was the 15th Congress of CCP that made a decision on the 
amendments. They included "the theory" of "the eternal pragmatist", Deng Xiaoping among 
the basic principles under Section 7 of the Preamble besides the concepts of Mao Zedong. 
The basic principle of the rule of law (in Polish: rzady prawa or praworzadnosc)35 was 
incorporated under Para. 1 of Art. 5 as an eloquent proof that China shows due regard not 
only for continental law, but also for Anglo-Saxon law. Three amendments concerned the 
transition to the Chinese-type market economy, whereby the private sector was declared to 
be an important and equal component of market economy instead of being a supplementary 
component of socialist economy. On such grounds, the dominance of distribution according 
to labour under Art. 6 was qualified, since it shall co-exist with other methods of distribution. 
Article 11 regulates the above-mentioned reinforcement of private enterprise, accordingly, 
the original phrase "The private enterprise of municipal and rural workers, which shall 
operate within the limitations of law, shall be a supplement to the publicly-owned socialist 
enterprise" was replaced by what follows: "The individual, private and other not publicly-
owned enterprise, which shall exist within the limitations of law, shall be major components 
of socialist market economy". Furthermore, it also anticipated the protection of the state for 
both the individual and the private enterprises.36 In accordance with the amendment of the 
Chinese Criminal Code, the reference to counter-revolutionary crime was deleted from Art. 
28, instead, the phrase of crime threatening national security has been introduced.37 
3.4. The Fourth Amendment of 14 March 2004 
Zhiang Zemin's ideology of the Three Represents' (in Chinese: Sângè Dàibiào; in Polish: 
trzech reprezentacji) was adopted in the Preamble of the amended Constitution. This 
ideology legalised the possibility of party membership for most capitalists. The reason was 
as follows: "The party should represent progressive productive forces, as well" (this is 
32
 The lowest levels refer to the people's congresses of townships, ethnic townships and towns. 
33
 On the Amendment of 1993, see Lin, op. cit. 18. (Point 1.23a.); 87. (Point 4.14.). Jakóbiec-
Rowinski: op. cit. 35. 
34
 On the Amendment of 1993, see Lin: op. cit. 18. (Point 1.23a.); 87. (Point 4.14.). Jakóbiec-
Rowinski: op. cit. 35. 
35
 The rule of law and the Rechtsstaat are not the same concepts. The Rechtsstaat is a typical 
concept of continental law (specifically, of German law). It can be translated into English as the "legal 
state" or the "state of law", but it cannot be referred to as the "rule of law" in English texts. 
36
 Jordan: „Az ég magas ..." op. cit.; Jakóbiec-Rowinski: op. cit. 36-37. 
37
 Lin: op. cit. 18. (Point 1.23a.), 364-365. See English version of the Third Amendment, Art. 
16 as amended. 
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antagonistically contrary to the principle of class struggle of Maoism). The provision of Art. 
10 was supplemented as follows: "[...] the legally obtained private property of citizens 
shall not be violated". Article 11 promotes the most powerful protection of market economy. 
Article 13 protects more accentually the right of citizens to inherit private property. Article 
14 supports building the social security system. Paragraph 1 of Art. 33 contains a new 
sentence of historical value: "The state shall respect and protect human rights". Under Art. 
67, the new expression of "state of emergency" appears in line with the former one of "state 
of war". This new concept modified the roles of the President of PRC and the State Council 
(Arts 80, 89). Article 98 extends the term of mandate in all the lowest level (local) people's 
congresses to five years.38 Article 136 stipulated that the Chinese national anthem shall be 
March of the Volunteers (in Chinese: Yiyöngjim Jinxingqû; in Polish: Marsz ochotników); 
the reason for this affirmation was the lack of reference to Mao Zedong.39 In the following, 
we will analyse two important subject-matters of The State Constitution of PRC. 
3.5. (Self-) Definition of the People's Republic of China (Art. 1) 
According to this section, the People's Republic of China shall be governed by the working 
class, which amounts to a socialist state of the people's democratic dictatorship (dictatorship 
of the proletariat40), the foundation of which has been laid by the alliance of workers and 
peasants. It is highlighted that the socialist system is the foundational state establishment, 
which allows for no departure. The final sentence refers to the destruction of the socialist 
system, which is prohibited both in re-natural persons (humans) and associations (unity of 
persons and capital either incorporated or not, scilicet, legal entities and other organisations 
without legal entity). The text does not point it out, nevertheless, it can be presumed that the 
prohibition of destruction41 refers merely to the ordinary meaning of destruction, not to the 
criminal legal sense of the term as a fact of the case under criminal law in Hungary 
pertaining to treason. PRC shall be a single-party state. 
3.6. The basic rights and duties of citizens under Arts 33-56 
With respect to PRC, the issue of basic human rights is of major importance. The 
Constitution provides basic human rights and duties under the same chapter, which is 
dogmatically appropriate. However, we need to clear up a misunderstanding, scilicet, that it 
was revealed upon the translation of the UN Charter that the term of right does not have an 
equivalent in Chinese. The equivalent of the term of substantive law (in Latin: ius, norma 
agendi; in English: law) is falii. Indeed, the term of civic rights (in Latin: facultas agendi; 
in English: right) did not use to have an ingrained equivalent, which could substantiate the 
divergent construction of human rights (besides a different conception of power). 
38
 Jakôbiec-Rowinski: op. cit.; Jordán: Kína története, op. cit. 209-210. 
39
 Jakôbiec-Rowinski: op. cit. 37; Jordán: ibid. 210. 
40
 This is a typical concept of Karl Marx (in German Diktatur des Proletariats) in Fourth 
Chapter of Critique of the Gotha Program (in German Kritik des Gothaer Programms) f rom 1875. 
41
 Article 1: The People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's democratic 
dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The socialist 
system is the basic system of the People's Republic of China. Disruption of the socialist system by 
any organisation or individual is prohibited. 
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Nevertheless, these do not amount to the fact that the term of human rights does not have an 
equivalent in contemporary Chinese, since it means rénquánfr 
The Constitution specifies the following rights: 
- The right to citizenship (Art. 33), 
- Equality before the law (Art. 33), 
- The right to vote and the right to be elected (Art. 34), 
- The citizens of PRC enjoy freedom of speech, the freedoms of the press and of 
assembly, the freedoms of organisation, procession and demonstration (Art. 35), 
- The freedom of religion (Art. 36), 
- Citizenship rights (Art. 37), 
- The right to human dignity (Art. 38), 
- Inviolability of the residence of citizens (Art. 39), 
- The freedom and privacy of correspondence (Art. 40), 
- The right to criticism and making suggestions (Art. 41), 
- The right to petition (Art. 41 ), 
- Citizens who have suffered losses via the infringement of their civic rights by any 
state organ or functionary have the right to compensation in accordance with the law 
(Art. 41), 
- The right to work (Art. 42), 
- The right to rest (Art. 43), 
- The right to retirement (Art. 44), 
- The right to material assistance for elderly, ill and disabled persons (Art. 45), 
- The right to education (Art. 46), 
- Freedom to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic creation and other 
cultural pursuits (Art. 47), 
- Women's rights (Art. 48). 
The Constitution specifies the following duties: 
- Every citizen shall enjoy the rights and comply with the duties prescribed under the 
Constitution and other law (Art. 33), 
- The state shall respect and protect human rights (Art. 33), 
- The insult, libel, false accusation or false incrimination directed against citizens by 
any means shall be prohibited (Art. 38), 
- The duty of work (Art. 42), 
- The duty of education (Arts. 45^16), 
- Compliance with the "one child policy", or in official terms with family planning 
(Arts 25, 49, 107),43 
- Parents shall comply with the duty to raise and educate their minor children and 
grown-up children shall comply with the duty to support and assist their parents (Art. 49), 
- Violation of the freedom of marriage shall be prohibited, as well as maltreatment of 
old people, women and children shall be prohibited (Art. 49), 
42
 See Lu, Y. S. (ed.): The English-Chinese Dictionary (Unabridged) in 2 vols. Vol. 1. Shanghai, 
1991, 1571, 2. column, entry 8. 
43
 In Chinese: jihua shengyu literally means "planned birth". 
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- PRC shall protect the lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens residing abroad 
and of the family members of Chinese citizens residing abroad as well as the lawful rights 
and interests of overseas Chinese returning home (Art. 50), 
- Upon the exercise of their freedoms and rights, the citizens of PRC may not infringe 
the interests of the state, society, the collective or the lawful freedoms and rights of other 
citizens (Art. 51 ), 
- Safeguarding the unity of the country and of all its ethnic groups (Art. 52), 
- The citizens of the PRC shall abide by the Constitution and separate law, they shall 
keep state secrets, protect public property, they shall observe labour discipline and public 
order as well as respect social morals (Art. 53), 
- Defence of the motherland and doing military service (Art. 55), 
- Paying taxes (Art. 56). 
Numerically, 19 rights are juxtaposed with 14 obligations, so that work and education 
simultaneously constitute rights and obligations. We could meticulously expand on the 
specific rights and obligations; instead, we will call the readers' attention to technical 
literature on Chinese human rights.44 We cannot fail to mention that the constitutional 
amendment of 2004 momentously transformed the Chinese catalogue of human rights. 
Nevertheless, hardly half a decade has passed; therefore, the evolution of considerable 
judicial practice cannot be expected. Among the criticisms concerning human rights in 
China, we refer merely to the "problem map" of European Parliament of 2006: it reproaches 
China with the high number of death sentences (with the comment that all cases in which a 
death sentence has been imposed in the lower instance are automatically submitted for 
review to the People's High Court of Justice). The report focuses on politically motivated 
imprisonment and forced labour. Besides the issue of the freedoms of speech and religion, 
the Tibetan issue and trade in organs as well as the camp system of Laodong Gaizao 
(literally "reform through labour") arc objected to.45 
4. The Administrative Reform 
Formerly we mentioned that in the article of You, 1979 is indicated as the beginning year of 
administrative reforms. Others argue that the administrative reform commenced in August 
1980 with a speech of Deng Xiaoping,46 whereas, administrative reforms have been 
characteristic in PRC since 1949.47 The division of Chinese administrative reforms into 
different periods is well-known, which is partly factual, partly didactic, therefore, its 
publication cannot be neglected. The following periods of public administrative reforms are 
44
 Lin: op. cit. 265-284 (Points 10.32-10.76); Biddulph, S.: Legal Reform and Administrative 
Detention Powers in China. Cambridge, 2007, 143-145. Cambridge Studies in Law and Society; 
Saich: op. cit. 266-267. 
45
 See the following source concerning the human rights report of the European Parliament of 
2006: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=lMPRESS&reference=20070426IPR059 
64&language=HU (last visited: 20 December 2009). 
46
 Bums, J. P.: The Civil Service System of China: The Impact of the Environment. In: Bums, J. 
P.-Bowomwathana, B. (eds): Civil Service Systems in Asia. Cheltenham (UK)-Northampton (USA), 
2001, 103. 
47
 See the following German technical literature concerning public administration before 1978-
1979 in Su-Tomson: op. cit. 37-69, 114-155, 156-197. 
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differentiated: the reform of 1982 (1982-1988); the reform of 1988 (1988-93); the reform 
of 1993 (1993-1998) and the reforms ever since 1998. 
4.1. The Reform of 198248 
This is considered to be the first reform of greater scale entailed by the "Reform and 
Openness" policy. At that time, the relations between the central administration and local 
governance,49 the aging of civil servants and life-long assignments (mainly due to the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution) and the over-dimensioned government were all deemed 
problematic. Within the framework of the reform, the following steps were taken: the 
economic administration was decentralised and as for the personnel of civil service, both 
the number of the staff and the respective earmarked budget were decreased. Simultaneously, 
the "Four Goals" (in Chinese: Si Hua) were introduced, which summarised the desirable 
qualities of cadres (in Chinese: ganbu) such as revolutionary, young, educated and 
competent. The State Council, scilicet, Chinese Government, which had been outnumbered 
only by the Soviet Union as to its personnel, could record a considerable decrease in the 
number of background institutions and its personnel. Out of the 100 background institutions 
and agencies, 61 persisted in the 1980s and the personnel decreased by one-third.50 After 
1984, the majority of reforms focused on the local level in rural China. In 1987, Deng 
announced the introduction of the merit-based-system of civil service.51 
4.2. The Reform of 1988 
The reform of the State Council continued after 1988. The number of departments decreased 
from 45 to 41 and as for background institutions, they decreased from 22 to 19, whereas, 
the personnel of the State Council diminished by a further 19.2%. The reforms could not be 
implemented in local governments at the local level at such a scale as it had been planned. 
The demolition of the traditional planned economy also commenced separately in the scope 
of municipal reforms and rural reforms, however, the implementation of municipal reforms 
proved to be more complex.52 By 1988, the number of the personnel of the State Council 
decreased to 29,600.53 
48
 The processes are elucidated chronologically: Tang, T.: China's Administrative Systems 
Reforms and Trends in their Development. In: Gordon, M. T.-Meininger, M.-C.-Chen, W. (eds): 
Windows on China. Amsterdam-Berlin-Oxford-Tokyo-Washington DC. 2004. X-XII . 
49
 On Chinese local governments see Xiong, Y.: Redefining the Role of Local Governments. In: 
Gordon, M. T.-Meininger, M.-C.-Chen, W. (eds): Windows on China. Amsterdam-Berlin-Oxford-
Tokyo-Washington DC, 2004, 127-133. 
50
 Concerning the reform of the State Council see Xiong: op. cit. X; You: op. cit. 138; Koi, Gy: 
A kínai közigazgatási reform egyes kérdései (Specific Issues of the Administrative Reforms in China). 
Állam- és Jogtudomány, 47 (2006) 3, 504, The number of the personnel of the State Council decreased 
from 51,000 to 39,000. At the end of 1984, the number of deputy ministers decreased from 13 to 4 per 
department. The number of departments decreased from 52 to 43. (According to other sources, the 
exact number is 45. See the facts about the reform of 1988 in the body text.) 
51
 Koi: A kínai közigazgatási reform... op. cit. 505. 
52
 Xiong: op. cit. X-XI. 
53
 Koi: A kínai közigazgatási reform... op. cit. 504. 
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4.3. The Reform of 1993 
At that stage, the development of socialist market economy was more accentuated, therefore, 
an important slogan was "the separation of government and enterprises". Macro-economic 
control and the supervision of associations were increased, whereas, the entitlements of 
government to direct corporate management were reduced. The number of the general 
offices of the State Council was decreased from 42 to 1(1). Out of 19 background institutions, 
13 were maintained, while the number of government agencies decreased from 9 to 5.54 By 
1993, the regime of cadres was replaced by the system of civil service, cadres converted 
into public servants (in Chinese: gongwuyuan), thenceforth, public administration was not 
based on sheer direct party loyalty.55 
4.4. Reforms since 1998 
By the time of the Ninth Five-Year Plan, the reforms had reached a new stage, therefore, 
new problems started to emerge. The reform of the economic system required the further 
reform of government functions and the further decrease of the number of background 
institutions. Since 1998, the essential content of the reforms can be summarised as follows: 
the importance of macro-economic control, direction of the society and the provision of 
public services is sustained. Simplification, unification and the principle of effectiveness are 
fundamental in Chinese public administration and the insistence on the efforts of the 
numerical decrease of government is characteristic. The distinct allocation of the functions 
among organisations is encouraged. The legal foundation of the system of public 
administration should be reinforced.56 Due to the reforms of 1998, the personnel of the 
State Council were downsized to 16,700 (we should bear in mind that upon its establishment, 
the personnel numbered 51,000 people, thus, two thirds of that has been cut down.)57 
4.5. The Personnel of Chinese Public Administration in figures 
The apparatus of 8 million around 1958 swelled to 18 million by the 1980s. According to 
certain sources, this stratum numbers 35 million people today, which amounts to 2.5% of 
the total population as opposed to the world average of about 1 %. According to the data of 
1996, within that stratum 6,285,000 are leaders (from team leaders to ministers), which 
amounts to 18% of the total personnel and the number of women is merely 1 million. (In 
Chinese public administration, the proportion of men is 70% as opposed to the proportion 
of women of 30%.) 
We can conclude that the issue of the number of the personnel will impose numerous 
tasks on PRC in the future, as well.58 Undoubtedly, the instruments of public administrative 
law (in Chinese: xingzhengfa) need to be applied to solve the persistent problems. 
54
 Xiong: op. cit. XI. 
55
 Koi: A kínai közigazgatási reform... op. cit. 505. Concerning the Chinese equivalent see Koi: 
Akínai közigazgatási reform... op. cit. 503. On the Reform of 1993 see Gônggông guânli уй zhöngguó 
xingzhèng gàigé. Public Administration and Administrative Reforms in China (Bilingual Monography). 
[s.l.] [s.a.] 49-93. 
56
 Xiong: op. cit. XI-XII. 
57
 Koi: A kínai közigazgatási reform... op. cit. 495-509, 505. Concerning the Chinese equivalent, 
see Koi: A kínai közigazgatási reform... op. cit. 504. 
58
 Concerning Chinese civil service more amply, see Koi: A kínai közigazgatási reform... op. 
cit. 500-507. 
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5. T h e Reform of Civ i l L a w 
The ma jo r i t y of t radi t ional Chinese law consti tutes c r imina l law, whereas, the minor part is 
pub l ic administrative law. Within this f r a m e w o r k , civil l a w hardly has a ro le . 5 9 In this part , 
we wi l l examine the c rea t ion of the C h i n e s e Civil C o d e thus, family law, commercial or 
l abour law will be not sub jec t to a de ta i l ed examinat ion. 6 0 
Draf t ing the first C h i n e s e Civil C o d e commenced in 1906, when wi th the involvement 
of J a p a n e s e legal exper t s , the Qing-dynas ty of Manchur ian origin launched the compilat ion 
of a n e w criminal code , the first Civil C o d e and c o m m e r c i a l code. The d r a f t was prepared 
by 1911. The Chinese Civi l Code w a s t ak ing effect g radua l ly between 1929 and 1931.61  
B e f o r e its entry into e f f e c t , three parts o f the draft had b e e n compiled by 1911, two parts by 
1916 a n d they are k n o w n as the Private L a w Draft of t he Qing-dynasty.6 2 Subsequent ly to 
the en t r i e s into effect in 1929 and 1931, t he law can be r ega rded as being in ful l effect on ly 
as o f 1936.6 3 Its text w a s published in Eng l i sh 6 4 and in Lat in , as well.65 T h i s Chinese Civil 
C o d e h a s persisted o n l y in Taiwan.66 C o n c e r n i n g that Civ i l Code, Jordán c o m m e n t s that it 
was b a s e d on the Swis s Civil Code,67 w h e r e a s , JJamza p o i n t s out the impac t o f the Japanese 
Civi l C o d e , the G e r m a n B G B , the Swiss Civil Code ( Z G B ) , the Swiss con t r ac t code (OR) , 
the S i a m e s e Civil C o d e , the Sovie t -Russ ian Civil C o d e and of the T u r k i s h Civil Code . 
Eventua l ly , the law f o l l o w s the Swiss m o d e l of the code unique. 6 8 This C iv i l Code of 1936 
59
 Concerning Chinese traditional law and Chinese private law effective 3—4- decades ago, see 
the following main works on comparative law in Hungarian or translated into Hungarian on advice: 
David, R.: A kínai jog. In: David, R.: A jelenkor nagy jogrendszerei. Összehasonlító jog (Law in 
China. Contemporary Great Legal Systems. Comparative Law). From Les grands systèmes de droit 
contemporains transleted by Nagy Lajosné Dusa Margit. Budapest, 422^433; Hamza, G.: Kína 
(A Kínai Népköztársaság és Tajvan) (China. The People's Republic of China and Taiwan). In: Hamza, 
G.: Az európai magánjog fejlődése. A modern magánjogi rendszerek kialakulása a római jogi 
hagyományok alapján (Trends in the Development of Private Law in Europe. The Role of the Civilian 
Tradition in the shaping of Modern Systems of Private Law). Budapest, 2002, 301-303. With reference 
to Chinese civil law and the Civil Code, see Jordán: „Az ég magas... " op. cit. 6, 27, 31, 32, 53-54, 
107, 224-225, 234. A study on the method of comparative law see Péteri, Z.: Goals and Methods of 
Legal Comparison. In: Péteri, Z. (ed.): The Comparison of Law. La comparaison de droit. Selected 
Essays for the 9th International Congress on Comparative Law. Essais choisis pour le 9e Congrès 
International de droit comparé. Budapest, 1974, 45-58. 
60
 On Chinese family law (and the law of marriage therein separately) in detail see Jordán: „Az 
ég magas... " op. cit. 213—240. 
61
 Hamza: op. cit. 302. 
62
 Koi, Gy.: Francia monográfia a modem kínai magánjogról (A French Monograph on Modem 
Chinese Private Law) [Piquet, Hélène: La Chine au carrefour des traditions juridiques. Bruxelles, 
2005, 332.]. Acta Facidtatis Politico-Iuridicae Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando 
Eötvös Nominatae, 44 (2007), 233-242, in detail see 237. 
63
 Piquet, H.: La Chine au carrefour des traditions juridiques. Bruxelles, 2005,118. 
64
 See the English-language version: The Civil Code of the Republic of China I-V. Shanghai, 
1931. Quoted in: Hamza: op. cit. 301, footnote 369. 
65
 See the Latin version: Jarre, C. R.: Codex Juris Civilis Reipublicae Sinicae (translatus in 
linguam latinam). Zhinanfu, 1934. Quoted in: Hamza: op. cit. 301, footnote 369. 
66
 Hamza: op. cit. 303; Jordán: „Az ég magas ... " op. cit. 31-32; Koi: Francia monográfia a 
modem kínai magánjogról . . . op. cit. 238. 
67
 Jordán: „Az ég magas ..." op. cit. 32. 
68
 Hamza: op. cit. 302. 
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was also called Six Codes (Sexapartitum), since it consisted of six parts.69 In 1949, after the 
formation of PRC, a legal problem emerged. It was the Six Codes (it literally means "Six 
Code Completed Books" (in Chinese: liufa; in Japanese: Roppo)70 that contained the most 
important six legal codes of the Republic of China (Taiwan).7' This is not the same as the 
Six (Civil) Codes.72 Since the Government of PRC in its General Program (Art. 17)73 put 
into force a Directive Overruling the Guomindang Six Code Completed Book,74 according 
to which all the repressive laws, decrees and courts of Guomindang shall be withdrawn.75 
Since PRC consequently persisted without a Civil Code, the need for drafting a new one 
emerged urgently. The respective work commenced as early as in 1954.76 Following the 
death of Mao Zedong (1976), four drafts were promulgated between 1979 and 1982, the 
third one was published in 1981, whereas, the fourth one in 1982.77 In 1986, the document 
framed between 1980 and 1986 designated as "General Principles of the Civil Law of the 
People's Republic of China" consisting of 9 Chapters and 156 Articles,78 was adopted in 
1986 and promulgated as a decree in 1987.79 In December 2002, an important step forward 
was made, scilicet, the draft of the Civil Code was adopted by legislation, the People's 
National Assembly. This draft is 216 pages long and consists of 1209 sections. It includes 
the following 9 volumes: 
- General Principles, 
- Property Law, 
- Contracts, 
- Human Dignity and Civil Rights, 
- Marriage, 
- Adoption, 
- Law Pertaining to Inheritance, 
- The Order of Civil Law Liability, 
- International Private Law.80 
69
 Piquet: op. cit. 122. 
70
 The six Japanese Codes are as follows: The Civil Code (in Japanese: Minpo), The Commercial 
Code (in Japanese: Shoho), The Penal Code (in Japanese: Keiho), The Constitution of Japan (in 
Japanese: Nippon-koku-kenpo), the Code of the Criminal Procedure (in Japanese: Keiji-sosho-ho), 
The Code of the Civil Procedure (in Japanese: Minji sosho-ho). 
71
 The Six Codes of the Republic of China (Taiwan) are: The Constitution of Republic of China 
(in Chinese: Xianfa), The Civil Code (in Chinese: Minfa), The Code of the Civil Procedure (in 
Chinese: Minshi susongfa), The Penal Code (in Chinese: Xing/a), The Code of the Criminal Procedure 
(in Chinese: Xingshi susongfa), Administrative Laws (in Chinese: Xingzhengfa). 
72
 Jordán: Kína története, op. cit. 53-54. 
73
 "All laws, regulations and courts of the Guomindang which oppressed the people shall be 
overruled." 
74
 Jordán: Kína története, op. cit. 53. 
75
 Jordán: „Az ég magas . . . " op. cit. 53. 
76
 Koi: Francia monográfia a modem kínai magánjogról... op. cit. 239, footnote 21. 
77
 Hamza: op. cit. 303, footnote 371. 
78
 Hamza: op. cit. 303; Földi, A.-Hamza, G.: A római jog története és institúciói (History and 
the Institutions of Roman Law). Budapest, 12th ed., 2007, 131; Koi: Francia monográfia a modem 
kínai magánjogról ... op. cit. 238. 
79
 Koi: Francia monográfia a modem kínai magánjogról... ibid. 
80
 Piquet: op. cit. 201. 
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Wc need to draw the attention to the fact that contracts and the tenets of liability are 
dealt with separately in the text on general principles. This is practically due to the impact 
of common law. We can only wish that PRC drafts its Civil Code as soon as possible. 
6. Closing Remarks 
As an outset of this study, we stated that the evolution of Hungarian legal sinology is under 
a heavy handicap with regard to technical literature both written in Hungarian and translated 
into Hungarian in comparison for example with historical sinology. Therefore, a compendium 
with a legal viewpoint conccming the ongoing Chinese reforms for the recent 30 years with 
special respect to the People's Republic of China prevailing for 60 years would be urgently 
necessary. Historians and economists (especially those interested in world economy) have 
specialised in China both at the level of education and research rather than legal scientists 
flouting processes. This discipline demonstrated some interest in China substantiated by 
technical literature merely in the 1950s, however, this hardly overreached the scopc of 
descriptive booklets translated from Russian. By this day, however, the People's Republic 
of China is an unevadable world power, a macro-economic factor and if you please, a factor 
determining international law. After yielding to the conception of class struggle following 
Mao's death, the reforms beginning 30 years ago linked up the Maoist state with the 
elements of social market economy, promoting thereby the fulfilment of the inherent nature 
of the Chinese peasant population, the majority of whom were bom for trading. Our work 
has clucidatcd that the outset of the reforms as it was spontaneous cannot be attached either 
to 1978 or to 1979, therefore, it was not sparked off either by the secret product surplus 
appropriating movement or the CCP legitimating such organisations posteriorly, which 
considered the commencement of the reforms subsequently as a fact. The years of 1978-79 
can be deemed as continuous commencement of the reform, in which the crucial role was 
played by the victory of Deng Xiaoping's pragmatist policy in 1978. This can be construed 
exclusively in the light of the death of Mao in 1976, who appointed his succcssor to be the 
orthodox Marxist Hua Guofeng supporting the Cultural Revolution. Considering the legal 
policy of the reforms, we examined three areas after an analysis of the historical roots, 
scilicet, the constitutional reform, the reform of public administration and of civil law. As a 
result of the reform of constitutional law, the 4th Constitution of PRC (9th Constitution of 
the state of China) took effect in 1982 during the reforms. It was amended 4 times in 1988, 
1993, 1999 and 2004. In the scope of major policies, we need to highlight that socialist 
market economy has replaced the system of planned economy, as a result, the protection of 
private property, the effectuation of compensation for expropriation constitute the most 
essential changes of principle. It was a genuine Copernican turning point in constitutional 
law that Para. (1) of Art. 33 of the Constitution of PRC in 2004 provided that the state shall 
protect and respect human rights. Wc dealt with the reform of public administration in its 
temporality. Accordingly, 1982, 1988, 1993 and 1998 can be considered the dividing years 
of the reform, when the number of the staff of Chinese Government, i.e. the State Council 
implementing services and official functions as well as the number of politicians was 
massively reduced. The apparatus of the State Council formerly numbering 51,000 members 
decreased to 16,700 in 16 years (by 66%). The reforms considerably affected local 
governance, although the respective figures arc less known. Notwithstanding, public 
administration can still be considered overstaffed. 
The reforms of civil law arc also significant, the objective of which was drafting new 
codices after the voidance of the bourgeois laws of the Guomindang. The work commenced 
in 1954, but the first four drafts were promulgated as late as between 1979 and 1982, 
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scilicet, during the period of the reforms. The document designated as the General Principles 
of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China was framed between 1980 and 1986, it 
took effect in 1987 and has been functioning practically as a decree. The draft of the Chinese 
Civil Code was publicised in 2004. The reforms are bound to continue in the future, as well. 
However, the current Maoist political trend is unlikely to come to an end. Notwithstanding, 
the signs of démocratisation are manifest in the territory of PRC, as well. 
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It is the first time that Marcus Tullius Cicero's complete pleadings have been published in 
Hungarian. These orationes are not just masterpieces of elocution but documents that 
provide insight behind the scenes of historical events of the 1st century B.C. At the same 
time, one cannot underestimate that the legal history source value of Cicero's life-work as a 
corpus that constitutes an integral part of Roman legal science (iurisprudentia) is a uniquely 
rich treasury of our knowledge of the public law, the state and legal theory thinking of the 
last century of the age of the Republic. The prime virtue of this volume lies just in this 
complexity: the analysis of the facts of the case providing the basis of lawsuits with 
philological precision through a lawyer's eyes in the course of translating and commenting 
upon the texts characterises both the introduction and explanations written with scientific 
demand and the translation polished with great care. 
Although this work presents pleadings, the volume contains pleadings translated into 
Hungarian with an introductory study and notes, it is absolutely expedient to say a few 
words about the thoughts of the great son of Arpinum-especially about the timeliness of 
these thoughts. Cicero's life-work is extremely timely: anno Domini 2011 it is still worth 
concentrating on one scope of issues, specifically on the point that in Cicero's life-work, 
where pleadings constitute an organic part, the state and law, what is more, we should add, 
morals are conceived in a sense in a form as categories that presume a certain organised 
system, so to say institution system. Thus, the state, law organically linked to the state, and 
mos, mores, that is, morals inseparable from law cannot be examined without the institutions. 
This, however, does not mean that it is institutions only that make the state a state; instead, 
it is law inseparable from morals. In harmony with that one can quote Horatius's thought: 
"leges sine moribus vanae proficiunt" (carm. 3, 24, 35), that is, in free translation, laws 
without morals are categories without any value. 
This thought of Horatius undoubtedly goes back to Cicero's "morals-state-law" idea. 
Actually, the concept of constitution, constitutional state can be traced back to Cicero too. 
Essential thoughts such as consensus, thus, accord, social accord-which will be further 
developed in the 18th century by French political thinkers and lawyers, among others 
MontesquiQVL—consensus omnium (bonorum) are expounded primarily in Cicero's De re 
publica, although these ideas play a role in the pleadings already (for example, in Pro Sestio 
and Pro Milone). Cicero did not restrict the concept of consensus omnium bonorum to 
certain privileged layers of society: he meant this category to includc craftsmen, artisans as 
well as slaves loyal to the social order; in other words, actually even in terms of social 
thinking he can be considered a forerunner of modern thoughts. In addition to consensus 
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omnium bonorum, the other highly significant thought in Cicero's works is utilitas publica, 
that is, the idea of utility, public good that every citizen, each civ is Romanus is lawfully 
entitled to. Consensus and utilitas publica are the principles that legitimise the State and 
law-and not primarily institutions. 
A few words about Cicero's reception in Hungary. Cicero's thoughts assumed special 
role in Hungarian legal and legal philosophy literature, in Werbőczy's Tripartitum, in János 
Ujfalusy Ncpomuk's works, in the oeuvre of the famous legal philosophers Tivadar Pauler, 
Rudolf Werner, the noted criminal law expert Ferenc Finkey as well as Gyula Moór and one 
of the most outstanding figures of Hungarian legal philosophy, Barna Horváth. On the 
international scene, the effects of Cicero's highly rich and far-reaching thoughts can be 
demonstrated in Dante, Christian Wolff, Kant in specific forms. 
Back to the Antiquity: in the age of Iustinianus's codification, in the 6th century A.D., 
in the Institutiones, which had vigor legis, legal force, the words lex and mos are mentioned 
twice, at emphatic points, both in book 1 and book 4, although there is no reference to 
Cicero's name. The thought of "omnespopuli, qui legibus et moribus reguntur" (1, 1), that 
is, "every people that is governed by laws and morals " goes back to Cicero. And what has 
similar significance with regard to the pleadings: in caput 17 of book 4 the following can be 
read concerning judges' obligations (De officio iudicis): "...in primis illud observare debet 
iudex, ne aliter iudicet, quam legibus atque constitutionibus aut moribus proditum est ", that 
is, "in passing judgment judges must primarily take into account what is contained, 
manifested in laws, imperial decrees as well as customs and morals". Consequently, in the 
fourth book of lustinianus's Institutiones the instruction on judges ' duties (officia), office 
clearly reflects the effect of Cicero's thoughts—approximately six hundred years after 
Cicero's death. 
Finally, I should like to refer to the last great Humanist, the Swiss Jacob Burckhardt, 
whose thoughts on Richteramt undoubtedly reflect Cicero's ideas. And in this respect the 
pleadings are again to be taken into account, that is, not the dialogues or Cicero's other 
works but specifically the pleadings published for the first time in Hungarian in Tamás 
Nótári's translation: from them we can build a bridge between law, unwritten law, statutes, 
the State, morals and Cicero. In Cicero's pleadings all this can be demonstrated in specific 
forms at several points: all the thoughts that are set out by him regarding the State, morals 
and law in his philosophical and political works are used by him in specific forms in his 
pleadings-among others especially with regard to judges' office. In this sense this is the 
particular connection, this is the bridge between judges' activity, one of the branches of 
power, and Cicero's thoughts; at the same time, it is another topical issue regarding Cicero's 
thoughts. It is, among others, for this reason that the rich material that is available in 
Cicero's pleadings-now also in Hungarian translation-is significant for the present time. 
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Editorial Statement 
We would like to inform our readers that the revoked study of Attila Gábor Tóth with the 
title From Uneasy Compromises to Democratic Partnership: The Prospects of Central 
European Constitutionalism has been published because of technical error in Volume 52 
Number 3 (pp. 220-235) of Acta Juridica Hungarica. The final version of the study can be 
found in Volume 13 Number 1 (pp. 80-96) of European Journal of Law Reform. 
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